

THE *Hudson*
Natural Immortality
 OF THE
S O U L

*Asserted, and Proved from the Scriptures,
 and First Fathers:*

In Answer to Mr DODWELL'S *Epistolary Discourse*,
 in which he endeavours to Prove the Soul to be
 a Principle *Naturally Mortal*.

By *THOMAS MILLES*, B. D.

In animi autem cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in
 Physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil
 concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex.
 Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerpi, nec
 distrahi potest: nec interire igitur. Est enim interitus quasi dis-
 cessus, & secretio, ac direptus earum partium, quæ ante interitum
 junctione aliqua tenebantur. &c. *Cicero. Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1.*
 §. 71. *Ed. Gron.*

*Whether Matter be not wholly destitute of Active Power, as it's
 Author God is truly above all Passive Power, and whether the
 Intermediate State of Created Spirits be not that alone, which is
 capable of both Active and Passive Power, may be worth Consi-
 deration. Mr Locke's Essay, Book II. Chap. 21. §. 2.*

O X F O R D,
 Printed at the THEATER for *Ant. Peisley*, MDCCVII.

19 1/2, 119

C 1182.4.95*

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY

1868. Aug. 21.

✓

Bequest of

Charles Frederick Hudson,

Imprimatur,

A. R. CHARLETT.

PRO-VICE-CAN. OXON.

January 3. 1706.

4

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER in GOD
WILLIAM
LORD BISHOP OF
LINCOLN.

My Lord,

THE onely Reason that moved me
humbly to desire your Lordship's
Patronage to the following Pa-
pers was, that I knew no body more able
to afford them that Protection, which tho'
upon account of any intrinsic Worth of
their own, they cannot indeed merit, yet
upon the Score of that Fundamental Prin-
ciple of all Moral and Religious Duty,
that is endeavour'd to be maintained in

DEDICATION.

them, they may be thought not altogether unworthy of. For as your Lordship is allowed to have the most perfect Knowledge of whatever is contained in Antiquity, that can yield any Light or Strength to this great, and most concerning Doctrine about the *Immortality of the Soul*, so it is most visible, that no one has given more convincing Testimonies of an unfeigned Belief, and firm Perswasion of it, by a constant and steddy Practice, thro' the whole Course of your Life, of all those Graces and Virtues, which have deservedly made you the greatest Ornament of the Present Age, and will render you the brightest Pattern to all Posterity. When such as teach and Recommend the Doctrines and Precepts of Religion, shew as much by their Actions, as their Arguments, that they themselves sincerely believe, and heartily embrace them, and are carefull to let the reality of this their Perswasion concerning the Truth and Certainty of the former appear most plainly, by the Influence the latter has upon their Lives and Manners, they must needs spread,

DEDICATION.

spread, and propagate the Truths of Religion with a force and conviction that is irresistible; and whenever they please to favour an Attempt to vindicate any Doctrine from Misinterpretation, it cannot fail of all that Success, which it can any way deserve. It is indeed the peculiar felicity of our Church at this time, that it has a great many true Fathers, and faithfull Pastors of it, who both by their Lives and Writings defend, and adorn it's Divine Truths, and Apostolical Constitution; but yet it is acknowledged by all, that amongst these, your Lordship has shone forth with a more than ordinary Lustre, in all the parts of the Ministerial Function, ever since your first appearance upon the public Stage of Life. It cannot be forgotten with what an Universal approbation, and applause your Lordship's Labours from the Pulpit were received upon your first coming to *London*, and it will always be remember'd, as long as there shall be any mention of reformed Religion, or Civil Liberty in this Nation, with what a truely primitive Zeal, and

DEDICATION.

Courage, and with what Strength and Clearness of Reason and Argument your Lordship opposed, and overthrew those Attempts that were made in a late Reign, to introduce and reestablish that worst, and most detestable Corruption of Christianity, *Poper*y. And with what a general Commendation and Esteem from all sorts of People, your Lordship's whole Conduct and Ministry were received in that most Honourable Congregation over which you last presided, is so well known and universally acknowledged, as to make the very mention of it superfluous. These and other Perfections and Excellencies both of your Public and Private Life, as they have always drawn on your Lordship the Eyes and Admiration of all good Men, so they have given you the surest title to the Esteem and Favour of the *Best of Princes*, who as she has declared herself to have nothing more at Heart, than the Preservation and Prosperity of the *Church of England*, so in nothing does she give clearer Evidences of her most sincere Affection to it, than in advancing such to
the

DEDICATION.

the Direction and Government of it, who are most able and most willing not onely to protect and enlarge it for the Present, but also to transmit it down, safe and flourishing, to succeeding Ages.

To so great a Judge of all Ecclesiastical Learning, as your Lordship is allowed to be, it is impossible to offer any thing in the following Treatise, but what you are perfectly well acquainted with already. I can therefore onely assure your Lordship, what I know will most recommend it to you, that with the utmost *fairness*, and *impartiality*, without knowingly giving a wrong turn, or false colour to any *one* thing, I have faithfully represented, what I take to be the true Sense of those Fathers, and other Writers, I have made use of, in debating this great point concerning the *Natural Immortality of the Soul*: and I have likewise endeavoured, as much as I was able, to apply my Answers to those Parts of the Arguments, that *Learned Gentleman* I have here opposed has alledged, in which he has placed his greatest Strength.

May

DEDICATION.

May the Good God long continue your Lordship an Honour and a Blessing to this Church! That by your Lordship's Learning the Doctrines of it may be still defended; by your Wisdom and Piety the Defects of it's Constitution may be supplied; by your Mildness, Goodness, and Candour, those unhappy Misunderstandings, which have for some time prevailed among it's Clergy, may be wholly removed. This, I am sure, is what all that have any concern for our *Jerusalem* earnestly desire, and is the hearty Wish, and fervent Prayer of, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most Obedient,

Humble Servant,

THOMAS MILLES.

TO THE
READER.

THE Immortality of the Soul is a Subject of so great Moment and Importance, and the Truth and Certainty of it, I am perswaded, is so agreeable to the Hopes and Desires of a good part of Mankind, that I cannot think it necessary for me to make any Apology for thus appearing in the Public Defense of it. And altho' there be not wanting those, who with a peculiar Air of Pride and self Conceit are always telling us, that the World is already too full of a great many insignificant Books upon this, as well as most other Subjects, and some may be ready enough to say, that the following Treatise onely adds to the Number of them, yet since the Mistakes of that learned and pious Person, which gave the Occasion of Writing it, have made so great a Noise amongst us, and it is to be feared have already had but an ill influence upon the Principles, and may have a much worse upon the Practices of some Men, I am inclined to believe, that I shall, at least, be pardon'd, for endeavouring to Undeceive them in a matter, which so nearly concerns their greatest interest both in this, and a better Life. The Usual Pretences for troubling the World with things of this kind, such as the Importunity of Friends, the Authority of Superiors, the Copy getting abroad without the Author's Knowledge &c. with many more that are commonly alledged, are so often nothing but the weak colours, and fig-leave covering of Pride and Vanity, Ambition and Design, that
how

how true soever any of them may be with Reference to my self, I shall not so much as mention them, as the Motives, which induced me to make public, what I had writ upon this Subject. Let it be sufficient to say, That when any Man publishes his Opinions, he makes an Appeal to the Judgments of Mankind, by virtue of which he gives every Man a Right to examin his Arguments, and, if he finds them not agreeable to Reason and Religion, publickly to declare and enter his Dissent to them, together with his Reasons for it; which if clear and conclusive, and delivered with Modesty, and a due Deference to the Person and Character of him he differs from, can never, I think, stand in need of an Excuse, and if they want these Qualification will not, I am sure, admit of any. I should therefore without longer detaining the Reader proceed to tell him, what he is to expect in the following Papers, and so dismiss him without further Preamble to the Perusal of them, if I did not think it necessary to premise an Argument or two taken from Reason, by which the Immateriality, and consequently Immortality of the Soul may be plainly and certainly proved.

The Arguments taken from Reason, that have hitherto been made use of to prove the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul, are acknowledged by the most nice and impartial Judgments fairly to prove thus much, That Thought cannot possibly result from, nor be accounted for by, any of the known Powers and Properties of Matter: but then it is said, that this cannot be looked upon to amount to a Demonstration, that the Soul is Immaterial; because it is possible, that God may have super-added the Power of thinking to Matter, besides and beyond the ordinary, known, and natural Properties of it. Now not to mention the great Difficulties, which attend this Supposition, and that it in great measure takes away
the

the certainty of those Conclusions, we make concerning the Properties of things, if it can be made to appear, that the Power of thinking is inconsistent and incompatible with any of the known Properties of Matter, it will, I think, from hence Demonstrably follow, that God himself cannot superadd the Power of thinking to it. For the Properties of a thing necessarily belonging to, and flowing from, the Nature and Essence of the thing it self, or, as some will say, being the very Nature and Essence of it, at least as far as it is knowable by us, it must be impossible for Omnipotence it self, to give a Power to any thing, which is inconsistent with it's Nature, or any one of it's Essential Properties: since this would imply a Perfect Contradiction, in as much as it supposes contradictory Properties, which must be inconsistent with, and destroy each other, to be in the same Subject. If therefore it can be proved, that the Power of thought is inconsistent with the perfectly Passive Nature and Extension of Matter, it will, I believe, from hence follow, with the force even of a Demonstration, that the thinking Principle within us cannot be Material.

First then the Power of thinking is inconsistent with the perfectly Passive Nature of Matter. By this Property of Matter I understand nothing more than what it is commonly known to imply, and is expressed by that, which the most excellent of the Modern Philosophers, Sir Is. Newton, establishes, as the first and Fundamental Law of Nature, Motion, and Matter, which is, ^a That every Body will continue and persevere in that Condition, whether of Rest or Motion, in which it is once put, until by some extrinsecal Impulse it be obliged to

^a Corpus omne Perseverare in statu suo quiescendi, vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus à viibus impressis cogitur statum illum mutare. *Philosoph. Natur. Princip. Math. p, 12.*

change this it's state. Now this implies plainly these two things: First, that Matter or Body can have no Power to begin Motion, and likewise that it can have no Power to stop Motion, when it is begun. And this is comprehended in that Property of Matter, by which it is a substance purely Passive. This Property also does evidently belong as inseparably to Matter, as it's Extension or Solidity; and therefore there can be no species or kind of it, in which it is not to be found. But now we are sure, that the thinking Principle within us has a Power of Beginning and Stopping its own Motions and Actions. We plainly find in our selves a Capacity of fixing our Thoughts upon any Object we please, of continuing them upon it as long as we please, and of calling them off, and fixing them upon any other. These therefore are Powers, which cannot possibly belong to Matter, which as it cannot act of it self, but onely as it is acted upon, so neither can it of it self stop, and put an end to any Action, or Operation, that is impressed upon it. So that to suppose God can superadd the Power of thinking to Matter, is to suppose that he can make it both Active, and Passive. For let us imagine some Particle or Atom of Matter to be the Soul. This Atom, because it is a Body, must be Extended, Solid, and purely Passive. But now, if we suppose God to superadd the Power of thinking to it, we must suppose him able to reconcile Contradictions, and to make the most Opposite Properties exist together in the same Subject, which it has always been thought Impossible even for Omnipotence it self to Perform. For as God cannot make Unextended or Unsolid, so neither can he make Unpassive or Active Body, without altering its Nature by thus taking away, and destroying its Essential Properties. If it be said that Passiveness is not an absolute Property of Body, as Solidity and Extension

THE PREFACE.

v

ension are, but onely a Relative one, belonging to it, as it has a respect to something else, I answer, that I can find no difference between the Extension, Solidity, and the Passiveness of Bodies, but one belongs as intimately, and inseparably to Body as the other. Nor is this Property any more Relative than the other. For I would fain know what that is, with respect to which Matter is purely Passive. Surely in no other Respect, nor upon any other Account, than because God, when he created it, made it Passive, as well as Extended and Solid. To suppose therefore that God has superadded the Power of thinking to Matter, is to suppose him to rescind, and contradict the Act of his Creation, by which he made Matter purely Passive, by enduing it with a Principle or Property of Activity and Self-Motion. This Argument, which upon the fairest and most impartial Consideration, and weighing of it, I must profess, appears to me to be perfectly cogent and conclusive, is indeed no other than what most of the Antients have made use of upon this Subject. And it is so far from being in the least weaken'd by any of the modern Notions and Reasonings about Nature and Body, that it is indeed much strengthen'd by them: since that medium and principle, upon which it is founded, and which is no other, than that I have just mention'd, is universally acknowledg'd to be the fundamental Law of Nature with Reference to all Bodies whatsoever, however diversified by the bulk, situation, figure, and motion of their parts.

Secondly, Another Property of Matter, with which the Power of thinking is Inconsistent and Incompatible, is its Extension. This is allowed to be one of the primary and principal Attributes of Body, and which cannot so much as in thought be separated from it: it being, I think, impossible to conceive unextended Body. If there-

fore it can be made to appear, that Thought is inconsistent with the Extension of Body, it will evidently follow, that the thinking Principle within us cannot be Body. Now if that which perceives, judges, and reasons within us be extended, it must consist of parts: but it is impossible that what has parts should be the Subject of Thought. For since Thought is always attended with one simple, undivided Consciousness, that which thinks, cannot be Extended and Divisible. For if it were Divisible, as it must be if it be extended, and consisted of a great, perhaps an infinite Number of parts, some of which must be actually separated from each other, by the interposition of others, when the Idea of any thing is impressed upon one of these parts, that part must have a distinct Consciousness of this Idea, and so there must be as many Consciousnesses, that is, as many Ideas of any one thing we perceive, as there are parts in this Extended Substance, which is supposed to be the Soul. But this would make it impossible for us to have any Uniform Conception of any thing, and in effect destroy the onely Use of Reason in the Perception of its proper Objects. If it be said, that Consciousness does not reside in any of those parts by it self, but in the Mass or System made up of them all, I answer, that Consciousness must be where the Power of Perception is, but the Power of Perception must be equally in all those parts of which this thinking System is composed, it being impossible to conceive, that a System of thinking Matter should be made up of parts, all which have not a Power of perceiving and thinking in them. This Argument, as to the main substance and chief intent of it, has been already excellently well managed and urged by the very Reverend and Learned Mr Clark, in his Letter to Mr Dodwell, p. 33, 34. Since which there have been some Remarks bestowed upon it, in order to invalidate it's force, by a
late

late Author of a Letter to the Learned Mr Dodwell, And tho' Mr Clark be much better able to speak for himself, and to defend his own Positions than I can pretend to be, yet I hope I shall be excused, if in defence of this Argument, which by urging after somewhat a different way than he has done, I have in some measure made my own, I examin and discuss those Observations which this Remarker has made upon it.

The first Observation which he makes is, That since it is onely required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of thinking, or at least that it may be possible for God to superadd to it a Power of thinking; it is evident by Mr Clark's own Account of Matter, which he makes to consist of Actually separate and distinct parts, that those separate and distinct parts are capable of having a Power of thinking, or an Individual Consciousness super-added to each of them: because the want of Individuality and Distinctness is the sole Reason urged, why a System of Matter cannot have a Power of thinking, or an Individual Consciousness: and consequently, according to Mr Clark's own Reasoning, Matter may have a Power of thinking, or an Individual Consciousness. By an Individual Being, in Mr Clark's Reasoning, we are, I suppose, to Understand an Indivisible or Unextended Being, as I have put it in the Argument above: and if it be understood in this sense, it is impossible that the Power of Perception and Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness should belong to Matter. For tho' we should grant it to be very true, that a System of Matter may not be an Individual Being, when notwithstanding the actually separate and distinct parts of which it consists may be so, and therefore have
that

that Individuation, which according to the sense the Remarker puts upon that Word, is requisite to a Power of thinking, yet it is impossible that the actually Separate and Distinct Parts of this supposed System should have that Unextendedness and Indivisibility, which our Argument supposes Necessary to a Power of Perception and Individual Consciousness. And therefore taking Individuality in this sense for Unextendedness, our Reasoning is far from supposing, that Matter may have a Power of Thinking, and which is the consequence of it an Individual Consciousness: since it is impossible, but these actually separate and distinct parts, of which this System consists, must be extended, and consequently divisible, because these, we know, are Essential Properties of Body, and so cannot be separated from the smallest Atom, which can be supposed. The Remarker's next Observation is in a great measure answer'd already upon the Principle here laid down, yet least he should complain of my not having given a distinct Reply to whatsoever he has alledged, I shall here set it down at full length, in his own words, and after make some further Reflections upon it.

Since, says the Remarker, an Individual Being, according to Mr Clark, can onely be the Subject of a Power of thinking, why may not several particles of Matter, when united in one System, become an Individual Being, and be by the Power of God render'd incapable of any Division or Separation by Natural Causes, and consequently be a Subject capable of Thinking? If several Particles of Matter can be so united, as to touch one another, or closely to adhere; wherein does the Distinctness, or Individuality of the several particles consist? The Distinctness or Individuality is as much lost to me by this supposed Union, as the Distinctness of the parts
(if

(if I may so speak) of an Immaterial Being, upon supposition that Extension is not excluded out of the *Idea* of Immateriality, as it is not by Mr *Clark*, if I rightly apprehend him. For if the Union of Material Principles be compleat and entire, I can as well conceive an *Immaterial Being* capable of Division, as conceive those particles so united capable of Division from one another. All the Difference perceivable by us, between such a Material Substance, and an Immaterial Substance, besides Solidity in one, and want of Solidity in the other, lies in this, that one perhaps continues as it was created, and the other becomes by the Power of God, what the other was by creation. And what difference that will make, as to ones being capable of the Power of thinking, and the others not being capable of that Power, does not appear to me, and never will, till Thinking and Solidity are proved to be incompatible in the same Subject. If by an *Individual Being* we are to understand, as I suppose Mr *Clark* intends, and I have expressed it, an *Unextended*, or *Indivisible Being*, it is plainly impossible for several parts of Matter united in one System, or for the least particle of it to become an *Individual*, as that signifies an *Unextended Being*. For the least Atom of Body must have extension, and what has extension must have parts, and what has parts must be capable of being divided into those parts. For since every, even the smallest, piece of Matter has a great Number of smaller parts, of which it consists, it is impossible but some of these must be actually divided and separated from each other by the Interposition of others: and therefore it is impossible for God himself to make those parts incapable of Division and Separation, which are thus actually divided and separated from

each other, by that Natural Situation they have, as making up this supposed thinking System, or small part of Matter. And tho' it be possible indeed for several particles of Matter to be so closely united as to make one Individual System, in the common sense of that word; yet it is impossible for them, if they be a great Number, as without doubt they must be, so closely to adhere, as that they shall all Immediately touch one another, much more so as to make an unextended or indivisible Being. And therefore tho' I must confess individuality or distinctness may be lost by such a supposed Union of several particles in one System, yet extendedness and divisibility, it's plain, cannot be thereby lost. And as for what the Remarker is pleased to say, that Extension is not excluded by Mr Clark out of the Idea of Immateriality, it is plain, he did not rightly apprehend, or accurately consider his Argument. For, not to mention that his Argument is intirely founded upon the supposal of the Unextendedness of an Immaterial Substance, does he not expressly say, That Matter being a Divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct parts, cannot be an Individual Conscious Being: which certainly supposes that what is capable of being an Individual Conscious Being, cannot be extended. So that, I think, the Remarker has done Mr Clark a great deal of Wrong, in saying he does not exclude extension out of the Idea of Immateriality, taking Immateriality here for the same as Spirituality: since it's plain our Argument would have no force, but upon supposition, that the Immaterial Thinking Substance within us is proved not to be Extended. Besides it is most certain, that Immateriality in the most common and obvious Notion of the Word excludes Extension. For since Matter is an Extended Substance, that Substance which

is opposed to this Extended Substance, and which is called Immaterial, must be an Unextended Substance. And this the Remarker himself has very fairly acknowledged, where he affirms, that one perceivable Difference between a material, and immaterial Substance is Solidity in one, and want of Solidity in the other. For does not Solidity necessarily suppose Extension? And I would desire the Remarker to shew me, what that Substance is, which is solid and not extended. So that if our Argument proves the Power of Thinking to be inconsistent and incompatible with Extension, it proves à fortiori, that it is incompatible with Solidity, which cannot be supposed, or conceived without Extension, and consequently, upon the Remarker's own Concession, that the thinking Principle within us cannot be material. But he proceeds to his third Observation.

But let us, says he, suppose with Mr Clark, that a Material Substance in any manner disposed, is not an Individual Being, yet I cannot see but that an Individual Power may reside in a Material System, which consists of actually separate and distinct parts; and consequently, that an Individual Being is not indispensably Necessary to be the Subject of an Individual Power. Now if an Individual Power can be lodged by God in, or superadded to that, which is not an Individual Being, or follows from the Composition or Modification of a Material System, consisting of actually separate and distinct particles, the very soul and strength of Mr Clark's Demonstration is gone. And Matter of fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart, and consider'd singly. Let us in-

stance for Example in a *Rose*. That consists of several Particles, which separately and singly want a Power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience in them, when united. And therefore either each of the Particles in that Union contributes to the Individual Power, which is the external Cause of our Sensation; or else God Almighty superadds the *Power* of producing that Sensation in us upon the Union of the Particles. And this, for ought I can see, may be the Case of Matter's thinking. Those Particles, which compose the Brain, may under that Modification, either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them, or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, tho' singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking. The fallacy of Mr *Clark's* Argument, by which, as I take it, he deceives himself, lies in this, That by an Individual Power he understands a Power that can onely proceed from, or reside in, an Individual Being; which is a plain begging of the Question, or supposing the thing in dispute, that Thinking is such an Individual Power: to prove which, he has not, tho' all he says depends on it, offer'd so much as one word, and I conceive cannot, till he is perfectly acquainted with the Nature of Thinking. I readily acknowledge, that we can distinguish the various Modes of Thinking from one another; but whether Thinking is such a kind of Operation, as proceeds from an Individual Being, or whether it proceeds from a Being, which consists of actually separate and distinct parts, I must be content to be ignorant, till some better Proof is produced to place it in an Individual Being,

Being, than by calling it an Individual Power. *If by an Individual Power the Remarker means an Undivided Power, that is a Power not inherent in several Bodies, which are actually divided and separated from each other, it is plain that such a Power cannot possibly reside in a Material System, nor indeed in the smallest particle of Matter. For how can a Power, which is in it self undivided, be communicated to five, or perhaps five hundred Particles, some of which are so far from being closely united, that they do not so much as touch one another. For let us suppose the Particles A, B, and C, &c. of which this thinking System consists, to have all of them a Power of Perception, the Consciousness of the Particle A must be distinct from that of the Particle B, and that of the Particle B distinct from that of the Particle C, and so there must be not onely as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there be parts in this Material System, but also as many as there be Particles of those parts, which will utterly destroy the very Power of Perception, by introducing nothing but Confusion into the Understanding. So that it is impossible for an Undivided Power, such as that of Perception and Consciousness is, to belong to any thing, but an Undivided Being, and consequently the life and soul, as this Remarker is pleased to express it, of Mr Clark's Demonstration remains still in its full force and vigour. As to what he says, that the matter of Fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein are individual Powers; as for instance, a Rose, which consists of several Particles, that separately and singly want a Power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience in them when united, I must beg the Remarker's Pardon, if I deny, that the Power of producing that agreeable Sensation we experience from*

a Rose is an Individual or an Undivided Power: since this Power resides in all those Steams, or small Particles, which coming off from the Rose, and being drawn into the Nostrils by the Breath, or otherwise coming into them, strike upon and affect those Expansions of the Olfactory Nerves, which are extended upon the Os cribrosum, with this agreeable sensation. But now this Instance can by no means be thought to come up to the point under Debate. Because the Power of Perception is evidently of a quite different nature from any of those Powers, by which Bodies affect our Senses, as for many other reasons, so chiefly for this, that these Powers are divided and extended as the Bodies in which they reside are; but this is here asserted and proved by Mr Clark to be an Undivided or Unextended Power. For does not his Argument plainly suppose, that the Power of Perception is an Undivided Power? For as much as if it were a divided Power, each Particle, or Point of that Extension, into which it is divided, must have it, and so each Particle would have a separate and distinct Consciousness, which is the sure attendant and necessary consequence of Perception. Here therefore again the Remarker abuses Mr Clark in saying he has offered no Proof, That Thinking is an Individual Power. For does he not plainly suppose, that the Power of Perception being always attended with an Undivided Consciousness, which experience sufficiently confirms to us, if the Power of Perception resided in several Particles of Matter actually separated from each other, there must be as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there be Particles, in which this Power resides. Since it is plainly impossible to conceive a Power of Perception without Consciousness. His next Observation is this:

Supposing Mr Clark had proved, that Consciousness

ness could onely reside in an Individual Being, and that that Individual Being must be an Immaterial Being, the Soul would not then be proved to be naturally Immortal; and consequently all the Pains taken to prove the Soul Immaterial, signify nothing, Nothing is prov'd naturally Immortal by the Supposition of the Soul's Immateriality, but the Substance of the Soul. Now the Soul is supposed to be a Thinking Immaterial Being: and unless a Thinking Immaterial Being can be proved naturally Immortal, the Soul cannot be proved naturally Immortal. But how this can be done I know not, but by shewing the inseparable Connection between Immaterial Being, and Thinking; and till then we have as much reason to believe, that Thinking is an Action, which may commence after the Existence of it's Subject, and may perish, and cease to exist, it's Subject still remaining. And thus there is no more Progress made in the Proof of the Natural Immortality of the Soul, by proving its Immateriality, than there would be in proving the Natural Immortality of Mens Bodies, which are laid in the Grave, by showing that Matter can onely perish by Annihilation. For as in the last Case no Proof is made of the Necessary Continuance together of the several Particles that compose our Bodies; so in the other Case we have no Proof, that thinking is an inseparable Property of an Immaterial Being. Of what Use then is this Argument to the Ends and Purposes of Religion? For if we have no security, that we must hereafter exist in a State of Perception, as by onely proving the Natural Immortality of the Substance of the Soul, we have not; it can be of no use to influence our
Lives

Lives and Actions. *The Substance of this Observation of the Remarker may briefly be reduced to thus much: That granting this Argument to prove the Immateriality, and consequently the Immortality of the Soul, yet does it not prove, that thinking always belongs to it, nor indeed, as he says, can it be proved, till it be shewn, that there is an Inseparable Connexion between Immaterial Being, and Thinking. The word Thinking in his Argument stands either for the Power and Faculty of Thinking, or else for the Act, and Operation of that Power. If it stands for the former (as it must do, if the Remarker writes pertinently: since it is in no other sense, that any body affirms the Soul to be a Thinking Being) there must be a natural and necessary Connexion between Immaterial or Spiritual Being, and Thinking. For since Thinking, in this sense, is allowed to be, what we commonly call an Essential Property of Immaterial or Spiritual Being, it must exist in it, as long as the Substance or Subject, which sustains it, exists, and can no more be separated from Immaterial or Spiritual Substance, than Extension and Solidity can from Material Substance. So that the Remarker's Argument in this place is just such, as if any one should say: It is true indeed, you have proved the Substance of Body to be Eternal; but you cannot prove that Extension is Eternal, till you have shewn the inseparable Connexion between material Being and Extension. If the Remarker had understood any thing, I wont say of Logick, which I suppose he despises, but of the known Principles of Reason and Philosophy, which, I fear some new admired System has quite jstled out of his Head, and made him a perfect stranger to, he would have known, that there be some Properties of things, which can never be separated from the Substance of those things, but must always be where their Substances or Subjects are. Now the Power*

of Thinking has always been looked upon, and is now by every one acknowledged (tho' the Act of Thinking be not) to be of this kind, as being an Essential and Necessary Property of Spirituality, and so having an Inseparable Connexion with it. And therefore I may fairly conclude, even without the Remarker's leave, that the Substance of the Soul being proved Immortal, the Power of Thinking, which necessarily and inseparably belongs to it, must be proved Immortal too. The last Objection the Remarker makes against the foregoing Argument, taken from the several Orders of sensible Creatures, being upon the supposition that this Argument concludes, put into the same Condition with Men, and made capable of Eternal Happiness, as well as he, has been already urged to so much better advantage, than it is here by the Remarker, and all the Difficulties of it so much more fully and clearly answer'd, than I have Room for in this place, that I think I may very well wave any further mention of it. I have been the shorter in my Animadversions upon these Observations of this Remarker, because the very Reverend and Learned Gentleman, who is more immediately concerned in them, is so much better able than I am to give a more just and particular Answer to them, if he shall think it to be worth his while. I hope however that I may be excused for intermeddling in this matter, not onely because I have used the same Argument, but also as concurring with the Reverend Mr Clark in the same Design of shewing the Weakness and Inconclusiveness of any Reasons, which can be alledged to prove the Natural Mortality of the Soul.

As to the Conclusiveness of the two Arguments I have above alledged to prove the Natural Immortality of the Soul, I must profess, that they both appear to me to have the force of a Certain Proof. And tho' I am well aware, that

that there be some, who will never be brought to think so, and will be ready to receive this Attempt with that Scorn and Contempt, which these Arguments, as they are weakly urged and managed by me, may perhaps deserve (but which however these Men without fear or wit often bestow upon much better things.) yet I must take leave to think them in themselves perfectly cogent, untill I have better Arguments than I have yet met with, to make me alter my Judgment.

The chief Design of the following Treatise is not onely to answer and satisfy those Citations and Arguments, which the Learned and Pious Author of the Epistolary Discourse has produced to prove the Soul to be Naturally Mortal, but also to set the Opinions of the Fathers here alledged concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul, in a just and proper Light. And this I have endeavoured to do, not by citing here and there a Passage out of their Writings, as a weak Memory, or imperfect Index might direct and enable me, but by considering and weighing the whole Scheme of their Doctrine as to these points, and by representing their sense so, as to make them consistent with themselves, with each other, with the Analogy of Faith, and Catholic Tradition. I am sufficiently sensible, that it is no difficult matter to make a shew of proving any thing out of the Fathers, and indeed out of any other Writers, by citing Passages out of them, without any Regard to the Scope, and Sense of the Father, or the Tenor of those Opinions, which were received and embraced in the times when the Author writ; but he that would make this Argument taken from Tradition act and exert it self in it's full force, and with it's utmost vigour, must endeavour to make his Testimonies agree together, and jointly conspire to give in

a Uniform Report to the Doctrines he would advance. The Testimonies of Antiquity thus managed, and drawn up, and formed into a well Compacted and Regular Body, have a Force in them, which hardly any thing can resist, they appear delightfully terrible, as an Army with Banners, and easily defeat, and put to flight all those novel Opinions, and fantastick Notions, which later Ages have been so fond of, how much soever they may seem to be supported and patronised by a specious, but false, pretence to clear Reason, and sound Philosophy.

When I first set my self to consider Mr Dodwell's Citations out of the Fathers, I presently found it necessary to give a particuilar Answer to each of them, as well as to examine and discuss all the Arguments he has raised from them. And this is what, I think, has not yet been performed by any of those Replies, that have been yet made to the Epistolary Discourse. The Reverend Mr Clark, tho' he has indeed urged the strongest and most cogent Arguments, taken from Reason, against the Hypothesis advanced in this Dissertation, remarked some absurdities and contradictions of its Author, and shew'd his Interpretations of Scripture to be forced, and unreasonable, yet as to the Fathers, and Catholic Antiquity, he neither gave himself time nor room enough to examin and represent their Sense and Opinions so fully and clearly, as if he had taken a longer day, and a larger compass, we might justly have expected from a Man of his singular Abilities and extraordinary Learning. He has contented himself with mentioning onely such Observations as were most easy and obvious, and with shewing, that in some particulars Mr Dodwell had grievously mistaken the meaning of the Fathers, and the sense of Antiquity. The Reverend Mr Chishull has gone somewhat further, and been more minute and particular

in giving us the Opinions of the Fathers he has used. But then he did not think it necessary to reply to all the Passages Mr Dodwell has cited. And so several of them, which carry a very plausible appearance, and seem, upon a superficial view, to make much for his Hypothesis, are but slightly, or not at all, touched upon by him. The Reverend Mr Smalbroke has excellently well shewn the inconsistency of his Notion with the Universality of a future Judgment, which he has asserted and clearly proved against our Learned Adversary, by the best Arguments drawn from Scripture and Reason. In the following Treatise the Reader will find the sense of Antiquity more fully explained, and clearly laid open, upon this Subject concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul, than has yet been done by any of those, that have writ upon it: there being hardly any thing relating to the Soul in the Writings of those Fathers I have made use of, that had but the least tendency to give any light to the Debate in hand, which in the following Papers is not largely insisted upon, and very particularly explained.

*In the prosecution of this Debate I have endeavoured as much as possible to avoid all Personal Reflections upon that learned and pious Gentleman I have here opposed: and if there be any thing of this kind, which, thro' Inadvertency, or having my thoughts wholly taken up with the point in hand, has unfortunately slipped from my Pen, I do here before hand retract it, and beg his and the World's Pardon for it. I think nothing so unbecoming a Theological Controversy, as bitter Invective, and foul Language; and how much soever some Men may shew their Wit and Satyr by this way of treating an Adversary, I am sure they hereby demonstrate themselves to have but very little of the Spirit and Disposition of a
Christian,*

Christian. Men may differ in Opinion without Breach of Charity, and whilst they are contending earnestly for what each judges to be true, maintain a sincere and hearty Respect and Veneration for the Person of their Adversary. This, as it is, I am sure, the Duty of all in general, so I must profess, that I apprehended my self more especially obliged to express my self with more than ordinary caution concerning the Person of the very learned Mr Dodwell, with whom I have for some time had a very Advantageous Correspondence, and of whom, notwithstanding that I think him greatly mistaken in the subject of this Debate, as well as in some other things, yet I cannot but give this Character, that I have always found him one of the greatest Innocence of Life, the most undissembled Probity and Sincerity of Manners, and to have the heartiest Zeal for what he judges to be Religion.

As to the Style of the following Treatise, my chief Care and Endeavour has been onely to express my Sense clearly, and with the least ambiguity I was able, avoiding as much as was possible, all such forms of Speech, and turns of Expression, how quaint or witty soever they may be esteemed, which might render the Sense either Obscure or Dubious. And therefore if I have sometimes drawn out my Proofs to a greater length than was just necessary, and now and then repeated the same Argument, it was onely that I might the more intirely possess the Readers Understanding with the full Sense, and true intent of the Argument in that place. What some Men, who endeavour to gain a Reputation onely by finding fault with, and disparaging others, and yet are known to be not more nicely Impertinent Censurers of their Performances, than they are remarkably Careless, and scandalously Defective

in their own, may say to this Conduct, or to any thing else they shall please to spend their Judgments upon, I am not in the least concerned to know. And since it is impossible, by any thing one can do, to please all, I shall be contented, if, in these matters of smaller moment, I can please, and have the Approbation of a few.

I have taken the Liberty to imitate the great Mr Chillingworth, throughout the following Treatise, in applying my self more immediately to my Adversary, the Learned Author of the Epistolary Discourse, not onely because it was principally for his Conviction and Satisfaction, that I first began to draw it up, but also because by this means, the whole takes up less room, than it would have done, if I had used any other form of expressing my self with regard to him.

If any one should think me too late in this my Answer, I can onely say, that I have performed it as soon as I could. I have this indeed further to plead in excuse of my Delay, that, besides the ordinary Interruptions of Life, and of the Station I am in, I have had some part of that time, which I should have bestowed upon this Work, taken up by a Business, which was not to be neglected, the attending upon, and assisting the Studies of a Person of Quality of the greatest Hopes.

There is one thing more I must take notice of before I put an End to this Preface. A certain very Reverend and most Judicious Person, to whom I communicated one or two of the first Sheets of the following Treatise, as they came from the Press, thought I had mistaken Mr Dodwell's Sense in representing him in page the fifth and sixth, as contradicting himself with relation to the soul, the Breath of Life, which in some places he expressly affirms to be in it's own Nature Immortal, but in others again

again, out of a strange Inconsistency and Fluctuation of thought, he denies to be so. I then thought, and do still think, that I have done Mr Dodwell no injury in thus charging him with Contradicting himself. For in §. 4. of his Premonition, to which I have there referred the Reader, he says expressly: That by virtue of the Soul's being a *πνεῦμα*, a Breath, it is thereby made not so to depend on any other created Being, but that it may still continue it's Duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from it, if God be pleased still to continue that Ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary, for it's continuance, which can no more continue than give it's own Being: which is all that ever any Body affirmed, concerning the Eternal Duration of the Soul, and is the very Essence and Definition of Natural Immortality. But if this be not thought sufficient, unless express words formally asserting this be produced, this worthy Person may be pleased to turn to page 301. of the Dissertation, and there he will find him positively asserting, that the *πνεῦμα* it self was Immortal also, and that it gives Immortality to the lower Soul. But in the Premonition, page 26. he says, that this Flatus was not in it self Immortal. And now I leave it to the Judgment first of this Reverend Person, and then of my other Readers, whether I have mistaken or misrepresented Mr Dodwell, in saying he contradicted himself, or he has mistaken me, in thinking I had done Mr Dodwell Wrong, as to this matter.

As to the Success which this Performance, that has cost me a great deal of labour and thought, may meet with in the World, I leave it intirely to the Disposal of God's Good Providence: and whether it be received with approbation and kindness, or with that coldness and indifference,

rence, which upon my Account some will be ready enough to say it deserves, I shall be perfectly well satisfied; since I have this comfortable reflection and sense, that to the utmost of my Power I have endeavoured as much to avoid Mistakes in the Arguments, and Misrepresentations of the Citations I have here alledged, as to discover them in those of my Learned Adversary.

THE

THE CONTENTS.

CHAP. I. ad §. 2

THE State of the Question. The true sense of Gen. II. 7. The distinctions St Paul makes 1 Cor. XV. not to this Author's Purpose. By the Natural Body is onely meant the present Body, by the Spiritual onely the Resurrection Body. The word *ψυχὴν* being added to Body no proof of the Soul's Mortality. Our title to the Resurrection by the *πνεῦμα* Spirit, does not infer all our title to Immortality to be by the same Spirit. The Resurrection ascribed in Scripture to all the Persons of the Trinity. His other Texts out of 1 Cor. XV. not to his Purpose. His owning an Immortality to punishment for Unbelievers overturns his Hypothesis.

CHAP. II. ad §. 3. & 6.

The Ill consequences of disowning the Universality of the Resurrection, and future Judgment. The Universality of the Resurrection always acknowledged in the Church: proved from Reason, Scripture, (this Author's explication of John V. 28, 29. refused) and primitive Antiquity. His notion of a future Judgment consider'd shewed contrary to Scripture, Reason, and the belief of the Church, in all Ages, and of Mankind before the coming of our Saviour. Our Author's Argument to restrain the last Judgment from Matt. XXV. 40. of no force. His argument against the Universality of a future Judgment from Hell being prepared onely for the Devil and such as join with him consider'd. The Universality of the Resurrection and future Judgment fundamentally destroys his Hypothesis of Immortality onely by the *αναιμα*.

CHAP. III. ad §. 7.

The Improbability that Plato should give any reason to think the Soul naturally Mortal. He proves the Soul to be in

THE CONTENTS.

it's own nature Immortal in his Phædo. The distinction he makes between ψυχή, νῦς and λόγος in his writings, and especially in his Timæus consider'd. He asserts the Soul to have been created by the Supreme God, and therefore in it self Immortal. Our Author's notion of deriving the Πνεῦμα from the divine Breathing Gen. II. 7. inconsistent with his Hypothesis. In what sense Philo Judæus uses the words ψυχή and Πνεῦμα. The passages cited out of Philo by our Author consider'd. In what sense Philo distinguishes the two Men. The true meaning of the Text 2 Pet. 1. 4. and Dan. II. 11. The citations out of Homer and Virgil not to this Author's purpose.

CHAP. IV. ad §. 8.

Our Author's weak reasoning from the Heathen Originals (as he calls 'em) of Scripture. The true Notion of the Heathens concerning Hades and Tartarus. All wicked Souls were supposed by the Poets, and are represented in the Scriptures to be punished in Tartarus. A future Judgment and punishment for the wicked known, tho' not so certainly before the coming of our Saviour. The Devil known to be and proclaimed a Traitor before the Preaching of the Gospel. Our Author's weak Reasoning from Matt. XXII. 12. Man said to be equal to the Angels upon account of his Soul, and not upon the Score of any adscititious Spirit. The true sense of 1 Pet. III. 19. No argument to be thence drawn to our Author's Purpose.

CHAP. V. ad §. 9, & 10.

Rules to be observed in using the Writings of the Fathers in Controversies of Religion. In what sense the Fathers take Mortality and Immortality. Justin Martyr being a Platonist, not likely to think the Soul Naturally Mortal. His true Opinion concerning the Nature and Immortality of the Soul. The passages our Author has cited out of him consider'd. Tatian whilst the Disciple of Justin most likely to be then of his Opinion. His Opinions after Justin's Death Heretical. He asserts however the Natural Immortality of the Soul. The passages cited out of him shewn not to this Author's Purpose.

THE CONTENTS.

CHAP. VI. ad §. 11.

*Irenæus's Notion concerning the Parts of the Human Compositum. He believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul. What he meant by the Spirit. Mr D's Opinion very like to some Doctrines of the Gnostic and Valentinian Heresy. Irenæus and St Augustin improperly joined together. Mr D's citations out of Lib. II. Cap. 64. to prove the Soul to depend upon the Pleasure of God, not to his Purpose. In what sense the Soul depends upon the Will of God. This not onely consistent with, but supposes it's Natural Immortality. The learned Pearson speaks less accurately concerning this matter. Life in one part of this Chap. of Irenæus to be understood of happiness onely. The passage Mr D. has cited out of this Chap. makes entirely against his Hypothesis. His citation out of Lib. V. Cap. 4. expressly asserts the Natural Immortality of the Soul. What Irenæus means by the Spirit, and a Perfect Man Lib. V. Cap. 6. The distinction he makes Lib. V. Cap. 12. between the Breath of Life and the quickning Spirit, not to this Author's Purpose. St Augustin believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul. In what sense his Reasoning, that whatever is *vivens* must be *passibilis*, is to be understood.*

CHAP. VII. ad §. 12, 13.

*Athenagoras's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul. He both supposes and expressly asserts it's Natural Immortality. Mr D's first Citation out of this Father consider'd. The true meaning of *Nûs* and *Abv* in this place. This sense confirm'd by the Tenor of the Father's Argument in this place. The Parts of Man are onely meant of the Soul and Body. The Resurrection cannot be ascribed to the *Πνεῦμα* (Spirit) any otherwise than as the third Person in the Trinity is signified by it. The Passage cited out of the Legation consider'd. The Sin of the fallen Angels was not carnal conversation with Women, but Pride. The Opinion of the Fathers concerning the Place, to which they were condemn'd. Nothing can be deduced from what Athenagoras here says to Mr D's Purpose. Theophilus An-*

THE CONTENTS,

tiochenus's Opinion concerning the Spiritual Nature and Immortality of the Soul. What Theophilus understood by the *πνεῦμα* (Spirit.) The true sense of the first Passage cited out of this Father, and shewed to be an express Testimony for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. In what sense Adam is said to have been naturally, neither Mortal nor Immortal. Our Author's Reasoning from this notion consider'd. Whom Theophilus understood by the many who he said believ'd the Soul Immortal from Genes. II. 7, The other Passages cited out of this Father examin'd.

CHAP. VIII. ad §. 14, 15, 16, 17.

*The Opinion of Tertullian concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul. He expressly affirms the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal, and that Immortality belongs as much to it's Essence, as Thought, Knowledge, and Freedom of choice. That Tertullian no further affirms the Soul to be actually Immortal, than as that is implied in it's Natural Immortality. That Tertullian never mentions the communications of the Blessed Spirit for any other purpose, than the Effects of it's ordinary or extraordinary Gifts and Graces. Tertullian's ascribing the Resurrection and Eternal Happiness to the Spirit no Argument that the Immortality of the Soul is to be ascribed to the same Spirit. Mr D's notion of actual Immortality has no ground in Antiquity. In what respect the Soul may be said to depend upon the Body. The Soul's being derived ex traduce no proof of it's Natural Mortality. In what sense Tertullian believ'd the Soul to be derived from the Parents. The Corporeity of the Soul no argument that Tertullian thought it was naturally Mortal. Tertullian's deriving the human Soul from the Breath of Life, Gen. II. 7. no Argument that he thought it in it's own nature Mortal: nor his distinguishing this Breath of Life, from the *πνεῦμα* (spirit.) In what sense Immortality is an attribute peculiar to the Divine Nature, and distinguished from the Immortality of any Creature. This no Argument against the Soul's natural Immortality. Mr D's Argument from the right the Body has to a Resurrection being attributed to the spiritual*

THE CONTENTS.

tual Body not to his purpose. No argument to be drawn from the Church not declaring it self against deriving the Soul ex traduce for it's natural Mortality. The Opinion of Origen upon this subject.

CHAP. IX. ad §. 18, 19, 20.

St. Cyprian believed the Soul to be in it's own Nature Immortal. He never ascribes it's Immortality to the Holy Spirit. The first Passage Mr. D. has cited from him consider'd. By the Spirit nothing is meant but the gracious assistances of the Holy Spirit. St. Cyprian's Notion of the first and second Birth not to MrD's purpose. Arnobius's Opinion concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul. What Dependence Arnobius thought the Human Soul had. He never takes the Spirit for a Principle of Immortality, with reference to the Duration of the Soul. Lactantius's Opinion concerning the Origin, and Nature of Soul. He held it to be in it's own Nature Immortal. The first passage Mr D. has cited shewn not to be to his Purpose. The second passage which Mr D. has cited to prove the Soul naturally Mortal, proves it to be in it's own nature Immortal. By Immortality when made the effect of the influences of God's Holy Spirit, and the Reward of Virtue is meant a State of Happiness, and not the Eternal Duration of the Soul. The Passage cited out of this Father to prove that he held the distinction between Soul and Spirit does not prove that he believed any such distinction.

CHAP. X. ad §. 21.

St. Athanasius's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul. He believed the Soul in it's own nature Immortal. He never ascribes it's Immortality to the Spirit; which shews he did not believe it actually immortal, any otherwise than as that is implied in a natural Immortality. What St Athanasius means by saying that Man by his Creation was not capable of existing for ever. The Opinions of the Fathers, and of St Athanasius, concerning the Image of God in Man. Adam's being barely placed in Paradise did not give him a Title to Heaven. Immortality understood by

THE CONTENTS.

by St Athanasius, as the consequence of our choice, in a Compounded sense, for Eternal Happiness, and not in a Divided, for the Existence or Duration of the Soul. By the Death which was threatened for the transgression of God's Command to Adam, we are not to understand the Death of the whole Man, as to both the parts of his Composition, but onely the Separation of Soul and Body and Consequent Corruption and Dissolution of the Body. This is all St Athanasius means, where he gives an Account how Death came into the World. This proved from his comparing the Death of Mankind to that of our Lord, and from his assigning the Resurrection, as a means by which we are redeemed from it. Our Redemption from Death by the Saviour, to be Understood onely of the Death of the Body. The Close.

THE

THE
Natural Immortality
OF THE
SOUL

*Asserted and Proved from Scripture, and
Primitive Antiquity:*

In Answer to a Book Written by
Mr. DODWELL,

ENTITULED,

The Distinction between Soul and Spirit.

I Cannot but be well pleased to find you in the beginning of this Dissertation professing your self sensible; that your Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, is contrary to the received Notions of the World: which tho' I am willing to hope is in great Measure true, and that Mankind, miserably corrupted as it is, both in Principles and Practice, is notwithstanding hardly yet arrived to so high a pitch of Infidelity, nor sunk so deep into Immorality and Irreligion as generally to disbelieve this Fundamental Principle of Moral, as well as Religious Duty; yet I am sorry to find that this Charitable Opinion of yours is in part a mistaken one, and that the Disbelief of the Immor-

A

tality

lity of the Soul has spread it self wider, than Men of your Candour and Goodness are willing to suspect. For if this great Principle were firmly believed and heartily embraced, and People were generally possess'd with a sense, that their Souls would survive their Bodies to Eternity, it would be hardly possible that Vice should have so large an extent, and obtain such an universal sway and empire in the Lives of Men. For tho' the Number of such as profess themselves to disbelieve this Opinion be very small, yet I fear the multitude of such as disbelieve it, without letting this their Disbelief appear any otherwise than by their Actions, is so large, as to comprehend some, and I would to God that they were but a few, of all ranks and orders of Men. It was therefore a very unseasonable time at the least for the publishing an Opinion to the World, which has so visible a tendency to encrease the general looseness of Manners, and to set Men free from those small remains of Modesty and Conscience, which are still preserved amongst us. And indeed this Notion concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul was the onely Fortrefs of Religion, which has been hitherto formally unattack'd: and therefore it cannot certainly be for the Interest of our common Christianity to endeavour to discover any weak Places in it, and to shew the Enemy where it is to be assaulted with most hopes of success. This indeed was in some degree lately done by a very ingenious Writer, who has had the good luck to be much admired by the Learned World, who in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, seems to have endeavoured to call in Question, and to make People doubt of the Immortality of the Soul,

Soul, by insinuating so often as he does, that it's immateriality is a thing altogether unknown to us, that Religion is not concern'd in the belief of it, that God may possibly have endued some Systems of matter with a Power of thinking; all which has a direct tendency to make People imagin that their Souls are onely the more refined and purer parts of their Bodies, and consequently that they must die and perish with them. I do not think, nor would be thought so much as to insinuate, that this worthy Person designed any of these ill Uses, which others have made of this, and his other Notions, but that his Opinions have besides his intention unhappily had a very bad influence, is, I fear, too evident to be denied.

The great deference you profess your self ready to pay to the Judgement of your Ecclesiastical Superiours is highly to be commended in you, and is indeed nothing but what is strictly due to *their* Character, and most agreeable to *your own*: since you have so constantly endeavour'd to advance the Dignity and Authority of the Priesthood out of no other Principle, than that there is no surer way to bring Religion again into Repute, and make it once more flourish in the World.

Your professing your self willing and ready to retract any Opinion, which you shall be convinced is contrary to Scripture, and Catholick Antiquity, makes me willing to join Issue with you in this Debate upon these two points, and in order to your Conviction I shall endeavour to shew, *First*, That there is no ground for your Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul in Scripture, nor, *Secondly*, in Catholick Antiquity.

And in doing this I shall generally follow you in the method you have taken; which tho' not always so clear and exact as I could have wished, yet least your Arguments should lose any thing of their weight and force, by being taken out of the Rank, in which you have placed them, I shall examine them in the same order as they lie before me, and most commonly represent them in the strength and force of your own Expressions.

CHAP. I. *ad* §. 2.

*The State of the Question. The true sense of Gen. II. 7. The distinctions St. Paul makes 1 Cor. XV. not to this Author's Purpose. By the Natural Body is onely meant the present Body, by the Spiritual onely the Resurrection Body. The word *σῶμα* being added to Body no proof of the Soul's Mortality. Our title to the Resurrection by the *πνεῦμα* Spirit, does not infer all our title to Immortality to be by the same Spirit. The Resurrection ascribed in Scripture to all the Persons of the Trinity. His other Texts out of 1 Cor. XV. not to his Purpose. His owning an Immortality to punishment for Unbelievers overturns his Hypothesis.*

YOur design, You say, in this place is to shew, that the Scripture owns all our title to Immortality to proceed from the Spirit, or *πνεῦμα*. Before I proceed to examin the Texts you have produced to this purpose, I think it necessary to premise something in order to clear and ascertain your meaning throughout this whole Dissertation. And that because in your *Premonition* §. 3, and 4. you plainly acknowledge another ground or principle, Contradistinct to the *πνεῦμα*, upon which the actual

Immor-

Immortality of the Souls of Men, at least of the wicked, does depend. This you call the *πνοή* or *Flatus*, by which God Breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul. Gen. II. 7. and this you seem to make the same with the *Divine Pleasure*, how truly 'tis not my present Business to determin, upon which, you say, the Eternal duration of even Angels depends, tho in their own natures Immortal. This Principle, which it's plain Man received at his Creation, and which you acknowledge to be common to all Men, you say is that which not onely extended that finite duration which was natural to Man to Eternity, but also constitutes the difference betwixt the Souls of Men, and of Brutes; those of Brutes going downwards, or perishing, whilst the Spirit of Man going upwards, returns to God who gave it; that is, does not perish, as the force of the Antithesis obliges us to interpret it. This, you say, as it implies a more immediate dependence on God, is that which makes the Soul so independent on any created Being, as still to continue its duration, what created influences soever be withdrawn from it, provided God still continue that *ordinary* Providence, which is essentially necessary to the duration both of it, and of all created Beings, which can no more continue their own existence than give it. Here I think you make a very full and ample Confession, not onely that there is some other Principle, which will support the Souls of Men to Eternity, besides the *πνῦμα*, the contrary of which you notwithstanding profess to prove in this Section, but also that the Soul is a Principle naturally and in its self Immortal. For this is all that is meant by

the natural Immortality of the Soul, that it has not in it self any Principles or seeds of Corruption, and in its own nature is so independent on all Created Being, that it cannot by any influences from them be destroyed, but depends absolutely upon the Will and Pleasure of God for the continuance of its duration.

Afterwards indeed, out of an unhappy inconsistency and fluctuation of thought, you seem to retract what you had before allowed, and would have this *Flatus*, as you call it, at least as to *Adam*, not to be it self Immortal any otherwise than as it might have enabled him to lay hold on that Diviner Spirit which would have Immortalized him. But if this be so, how is it that you ascribe Immortality in order to punishment in express terms to the $\pi\nu\omicron\iota$, and not to the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$? whether this $\pi\nu\omicron\iota$ $\zeta\omega\eta$ s be the Soul it self, or should we grant it onely something belonging to and necessarily inherent in the Soul, of which presently, if by occasion of it the Soul exists to Eternity, as you expressly assert *Premon.* p. 24. it must be in it self immortal.

Now it is too evident to need a laborious Proof, that by the *Breath of Life* Gen. II. 7. nothing else can be meant but the Soul it self. The Design of the sacred Historian in this verse is to give a full Account of the Creation of Man: and therefore after having related the formation of his Body out of the *Dust of the Ground*, he adds, and God *Breathed into him the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul.* The obvious sense of which words can be nothing but this, that God infused and united the Soul to the Body so form'd. And accordingly all Commentators I think antient and modern

den understand it in this sense. So St. Chrysostom upon this place : ^a *This Breathing*, says he, gave a vital energy to what was form'd out of the Earth, and also constituted the Substance of the Soul. And Theodoret more fully to the same purpose : ^b *By this*, says he, we have an Intimation given us, what the Nature of the Soul is, to wit, that it is a created, invisible, intellectual Spirit, altogether free from corporeal dimensions. And a little after : ^c *since therefore*, says he, God is incorporeal this Breathing must be understood to be agreeable to the Nature of God. But if by this way of Expression of Breathing into Man, you would have understood, as you seem to insinuate, that the Soul is as arbitrarily dependent upon the Will and Pleasure of the Almighty, as the Breath of a Man is upon his Will, this may very well be granted you, and yet the Soul be nevertheless in its own Nature Immortal. For are not Angels, by your own Confession, of an Eternal duration? who yet depend altogether upon the Will of their great Creator for their Being and Existence, and whose sustaining and supporting Power, if it should once be withdrawn from them would undoubtedly presently reduce them to their original Nothing. And as for those Expressions in Job XXXIV. 14, 15. where 'tis said that if God gather unto himself his Spirit and his Breath, all Flesh shall perish together, and Man shall turn again to his Dust; and Psalm. CIV. 29. Thou takest away their Breath, they die and are turn'd

^a Ζωτικὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ ἐμφύσημα ἐχαρίσατο τῷ ἐκ γῆς πλασθέντι, καὶ τὸτο ἐγένετο εὐγενεῖς τὸ εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς Chrysost. in Gen. ^b --- Πρὸς δὲ τὸτο ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φύσιν αἰνιττῆσαι ὅτι Πνεῦμα ἐστὶ κενὸν αἰετῶν τι καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ σωματικῶν ἀπὸλλανμένων παρῴντων. ^c Εἰ δὲ τὸ Θεοῦ ἀνάστημα Θεοπραπὸς ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐμφύσημα νοητικόν. Theodoret in loc.

to their Dust, nothing more can be understood by them, than that our Lives are in the hands of God, and that when he pleases to call our Souls out of our earthly House of this Tabernacle, it will immediately dissolve and return back to its primitive Dust. So that if this *πνεύμα*, this *Breath of Life*, be truly and properly nothing else but the Soul, & if, as you confess, this exists to Eternity, you have very fairly acknowledged what yet in your whole Dissertation you profess to deny, namely, that the Soul is in its self Immortal.

But because in the Paragraph before me you avowedly advance the natural mortality of the Soul, and pretend to support your Assertion by Scripture, I shall take the pains to follow you, and see whether those Texts you have alledged do indeed prove what you have produced them for. And here out of that sincere respect and veneration I have and shall always retain for your Person I cannot but profess my hearty sorrow, that after having seriously weighed and considered their utmost force I am obliged, tho' with great reluctancy upon your Account, to profess that I have found your Arguments taken from Scripture to be so weak, misapplied and obscure, that they hardly afford ground enough to fix an Answer upon, and, if there were not such Numbers of Libertines among us, who are willing to embrace the Conclusion upon the slightest, or indeed no grounds at all, they might, without my endeavours to confute them, have been left to fall by their own apparent weakness.

In the first place you would insinuate, as if the distinction St. Paul. makes 1 Cor. XV. between the

the *Earthly* and the *Heavenly* Man, and between the *Images* of the *Earthly* and the *Heavenly* Man, supposing the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to be the Image of the Former, and the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ of the Latter, as also the distinction between the Natural and the Spiritual Body were a good ground to found the natural mortality of the Soul upon. The Apostle, you say, in this Chapter supposes the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or *Soul* to be a mortal, and the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ or *Spirit* to be an Immortal Principle; the former of these we receive from nature, by our Descent from *Adam*, the latter from Christ by our being made Christians. But is there any consequence from St. *Pauls* distinguishing these two Men, the *Earthly* and the *Heavenly*, and the *Images* of them, that the Soul is therefore in its own nature mortal? If indeed the Apostle had said that the *Earthly* Man was naturally Corruptible and Perishing, as to his Soul, there had been some colour for such an inference, if he had affirm'd the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or Soul to be a mortal Principle, and that the *Earthly* Man, both Soul and Body, was capable of dissolution at Death, there had been some probability in your Arguments. But the Apostle's whole design in this Chapter being to speak, onely concerning the certainty and manner of the Resurrection of the Body, he had no reason, nor does he any where in it speak concerning the Soul. The Immortality of this the *Corinthians* had never raised any dispute about, as they had about the Resurrection; and therefore he determines nothing expressly in this Chapter concerning it. When in the 47. and 48. verses he distinguishes betwixt the *Earthly* and the *Heavenly* Man, his design is onely to shew the difference between what our Bodys are
now,

now, and what they will be when altered at the Resurrection. For is not the Apostle answering that subtle captious Question, which some among the *Corinthians* had started, concerning the Qualities of the Resurrection Body? *But some will say how are the Dead raised up, and with what Body do they come?* verse 35. In reply to which Demand he largely shews that our Bodies at the Resurrection will be very much alter'd and different from what they are now. That whereas now they are Corruptible, Dishonourable, Infirm, Animal, they will then become Incorruptible, Glorious, and Spiritual; that whereas we derive these Bodies from the first Man, which therefore, like his, must be of a Dissolveable Perishable nature, so shall we derive the other from the second Man, which *is the Lord from Heaven*, inasmuch as by his Power and Spirit they will be Raised from the Dead, and like his own, be made Spiritual and Eternal. As the first *Adam's* Body was made out of the Earth, and upon the fall did return to the Earth, whence it was taken, so the second *Adam's* Body, by virtue of his Resurrection, was not subject to Corruption, but was carried into Heaven, where it was made Glorious and Spiritual. And hence it is that the Apostle infers, that as in respect of the corruptibility of our Bodies we bear the Image of the Earthly Man, so after the Resurrection, in respect of the Spirituality and Immortality of these same Bodies, we shall also bear the Image of the Heavenly.

If therefore the Apostle adds *ψυχικὸν* (*natural*) to *σῶμα* (*Body*) it was certainly for no other reason than to distinguish it from the *πνευματικὸν σῶμα*, the *Spiritual Resurrection Body*, and cannot be supposed, without

without putting the greatest force upon his words, to have had any respect to the Soul, or to imply in the least that this was also mortal. The mortality and corruptibility of the Body was the only thing he was concerned in this place to insist upon; and accordingly the Fathers are unanimously of Opinion that ψυχικὸν (*natural*) refers entirely to the Body. So Theophylact interprets ψυχικὸν (*natural*) of the ^a *Body we carry about with us in the present Life*, and πνευματικὸν (*spiritual*) of that *we are to have in the next, which will, he says, be the same with this, only be made Spiritual, that is, Incorruptible*. So also Photius in Oecumenius, and Oecumenius himself. By ψυχικὸν, (*natural*) says the former, ^b *is meant the earthly heavy Body*, and a little after, *the mortal Body of Man*, and Oecumenius tells us, that *the mortal Body of Man is very properly called a natural Body*. But if you should urge, that the Apostle therefore supposes the ψυχή (*Soul*) to be a decaying mortal Principle, because ψυχικὸν (*natural*) is so often put as an epithet to the corruptible Body, this Consequence I fear will by no means be allowed you, as being not with the least probability deduceable from the Antecedent. For the *Body* is mortal, not upon account of the mortality of the Soul, but because it consists of matter that is corruptible, and will actually be dissolved when the Soul is separated from it. If it be asked why the Apostle calls this mortal Body, ψυχικὸν (*a natural Body*),

^a Ὁ ὢν ἰσχυρὸς ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ζωῇ. ὁ μίλλοντος ἔστιν ἐν τῇ μέλλοντι, τὸ αὐτὸ μέλλον, πνευματικὸν δὲ, τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως. Theophylact. in 1 Cor. XV. ^b ψυχικὸς λέγει τὸ γῆινος ὁ βαρὺ — πὶ θνητῷ ἀνθρώπῳ σῶμα — ὅτι τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ θνητῷ σῶμα αἰσθητὸς ἐστὶ ψυχικὸν καλεῖται. Oecumenius in 1 Cor. XV.

Oecumenius will tell us it is, not because the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (*Soul*) is a Principle naturally mortal, but because, whilst in conjunction with it, *it ministers to and is the instrument of the Soul*. And from hence we may see the reason why the Apostle affirms us to die in *Adam*, supposing us to be in him by bearing his Image, namely because we have derived from him Bodies, which, like his, are obnoxious to Death and Corruption, as we may be properly said to be made alive in or by Christ, by bearing his Image; in that our frail mortal Bodies, by his Spirit and power, and according to the example of his Body, will be made Glorious and Immortal at the Resurrection.

In order further to prove that all our Title to Immortality is in Scripture ascribed to the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*Spirit*) you urge, that all our Title to the Resurrection, is by the Apostle represented as depending upon Christ; and therefore cannot belong to such as are not Christians. These, not being Baptized, cannot receive the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*Spirit*) to the Power and Energy of which in this Chapter the Apostle ascribes the Resurrection, as he does, you say, in other places to Christ himself. Before I proceed to consider what Truth and Force your Arguments have, I think it necessary to observe, that both here, and in some other places of your Dissertation you confound two things which should have been carefully distinguished, the Immortality of the *Soul*, and the Immortality of the *Man*. From observing which real

α Τὸτο οὖν τὸ διητὸν σῶμα ψυχῆς ἐστὶ ἐν τοῖς ψυχικαῖς ὑπερβάσις πύγματι.
Oecumen. *ibid.*

which

difference you would have found, that altho' the Scripture does ascribe all our Title to a Resurrection, (which consisting in an indissoluble union of Soul and Body, and more especially in a Restitution of our dissolved scattered Dust into a more Beautifull and Glorious Frame, does indeed imply the Immortality of the Man) to the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) yet it does by no means from thence follow that the Immortality of the Soul is ascribed in Scripture to this same Power and Spirit. This was a thing, which those Men to whom the Apostle wrote, whether Jewish or Gentile Christians, never thought of. The onely thing, that they doubted of was, how the Body after it had been Corrupted, Dissolved and Moulder'd into Dust, could be again restored, united to the Soul, and continue with it to Eternity, never moving any Question, as far as appears by what the Apostle here says, concerning the Natural Mortality or Immortality of the Soul. And therefore to infer that because the Resurrection is ascribed to the Spirit, that the Immortality of the Soul is likewise owing to the same Principle, is that very Sophistical way of arguing, which the Logicians call *à bene conjunctis ad male divisa*, and which is altogether unworthy of the Learning and Sagacity of so truly great a Man.

How far the Resurrection will extend, and whether it is to belong to such as are not Christians, I shall have Occasion hereafter to consider. I shall onely observe at present as to what you say, that the Scriptures ascribe the Resurrection to the Power and Energy of the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*), that this great work is in several places of Holy Writ ascribed to each of the three Persons of the ever Blessed

Blessed Trinity, upon the score of their common Omnipotency, and other divine Attributes they have as God; and therefore not onely, as you assert, to Christ and the Spirit we receive from him. Thus *Acts* II. 24. the Resurrection of Christ is ascribed to God the Father, *Whom God raised from the Dead*, and again verse 32. *This Jesus has God raised up*. And *Rom.* VI. 4. the Apostle tells us, *Christ was raised up from the Dead by the Glory of the Father*, and *Ephes.* I. 19, 20. he uses expressions inimitably lofty and magnificent, which strongly imply his Power to raise us, by having raised his Son: *That we may know what is the exceeding greatness of his Power, to us-ward who believe, according to the working of the might of his Power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him up from the Dead*. See likewise *Galat.* I. 1. and many other places to the same purpose, which need not be cited in so plain a point. That Christ's Resurrection, and consequently ours, is likewise attributed to Christ himself, is confess'd by you, and evidently to be proved from a multitude of places to this purpose. And I think in every one of those Texts where the Resurrection is ascribed to the *Spirit*, by it we shall be obliged to understand nothing else but the third Person in the Trinity. Most certain it is, that St. Paul in his Epistle to the *Rom.* VIII. 11. attributes both Christ's and our Resurrection jointly to the Father and Holy Ghost: If, says he, *the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the Dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the Dead, shall also quicken your mortal Bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you*. So little ground had you from Scripture to ascribe such momentous important things, as are our hopes of Immortality,

and

and our title to the Resurrection of the Body to the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*;) as distinct from the ever Blessed Spirit, the third Person in the undivided Trinity.

As for those Texts you cite 1 Cor. XV, 13. *If there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then is Christ not risen*; and again verse 16. *If the Dead rise not then is not Christ raised*, the Apostle's onely design in them is to prove the certainty of our Resurrection, from that of our Lord's: inasmuch as God by raising up Christ not onely gave a Specimen and instance of the possibility of the thing, but also an earnest and assurance of the certainty of it. And this appears, too evidently to be denyed, as from the general Tenor and Design of the Apostle throughout this whole Chapter, so more particularly from his introducing this Argumentation immediately after he had proposed an objection against the Possibility of the Resurrection; which was made by some among the *Corinthians*, who said, *that there was no Resurrection of the Dead* verse 12. In what Follows concerning such bad Men, as have been Baptized, being properly called Christians, and truly said to be in Christ, and members of his Church I have not the least dispute with you: but am however much at a losse to find how this can be at all to the purpose and design of the Proposition you undertook to prove in this Section. I likewise agree with you that God's design of punishing those most severely; who had been admitted to the greatest Favours is frequently own'd in Scripture and most strictly righteous: but am equally ignorant how to make this square, or be in the least pertinent to the matter in hand.

You proceed in the remaining part of this Section

to

prove, that the Scriptures own an Immortality to punishment of Unbelievers, such Men, who have rejected the Gospel after they heard it preached, and enjoyed all the means and opportunities to understand, believe, and embrace it. The same Argument you resume §. 4th and 5th. Now tho' this be most certainly and evidently true, yet is it a flat Contradiction to, and has a direct tendency to overturn, the very Foundation of your Opinion concerning the Soul's being made Immortal onely by the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*), which it receives at Baptism. For if the Souls of such as never receive this *Spirit*, do exist to an Eternity of Punishment, then must they be preserved to this infinite duration some other way than by it. Indeed in your *Premonition* §. 3. you ascribe their Immortality to the Will and Pleasure of God. If by the *Pleasure of God* you mean nothing more than the ordinary concurrence of his Providence in sustaining and supporting all created things in the same beings which he at first gave them, this is very easily consistent with the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and is no more than what is necessary to the Eternal duration of even the Angels themselves, which you allow to be in their own nature Immortal. But if by the *Pleasure of God*, you mean a positive and particular act of his Power, by which he continues the duration of these Men's Souls to an Eternity they would never arrive at in virtue of their own Natures, assisted with the general support of his Providence, this I must take leave to say, is a precarious groundless supposition, which neither Scripture, Reason, nor Catholick Antiquity gives you the least pretence to make. For
where

where I pray does the Scripture tell you, or from what place of it can you fairly infer, that the Soul's of Unbelievers are preserved from the effects of their natural Mortality, by an extraordinary and miraculous Act of God's Power? The Scripture indeed every where, as you acknowledge, inculcates that Unbelievers shall be punished with an Eternity of Torments, but it no where intimates, that in order to preserve them to this Eternity of Punishment, God exerts any extraordinary Act of his Power: from which we may justly infer that the Scripture supposes them in their own natures Immortal. And this, one would think, should have been sufficient to have discover'd to you the Weakness and Falseness of your Hypothesis concerning the Immortality of the Soul onely by virtue of the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*;) since the Scripture by your own confession plainly owns and asserts the Immortality of such Souls, as never could receive this Principle of Immortality. And as for your flying to the *Pleasure of God*, so far as it implys any thing more than the ordinary support of his General Providence, tis indeed nothing but a meer evasion, such a wretched broken Reed, which instead of propping up your sinking Cause, stabs it to the very heart. For can we have any reason, nay have we not all the reason in the world not, to suppose any extraordinary Interposition of God's Power, where he does not clearly plainly, and expressly manifest it to us? As to the opinion of *Justin Martyr* concerning this matter which you alledge *Premon. §. 1.* it will be time enough to consider it, when I come to answer those passages you have cited from him. In the mean time I cannot

dismiss this Consideration without professing my wonder, that a fond affection for a novel, singular Paradox, which you have thus unhappily espoused, should so totally extinguish the light of your mind, as not to let you see that in these Sections you plainly act the *Felo de se*, by Fundamentally overturning, and utterly destroying your own Hypothesis.

CHAP. II. ad §. 3. & 6.

*The Ill consequences of disowning the Universality of the Resurrection and future Judgment. The Universality of the Resurrection always acknowledged in the Church: proved from Reason, Scripture (this Author's explication of John V. 28, 29, refuted) and primitive Antiquity. His notions of a future Judgment consider'd, shew'd contrary to Scripture, Reason, and the belief of the Church, in all Ages, and of Mankind before the coming of our Saviour. Our Author's argument to restrain the last Judgment from Matt. XXV. 40. of no force. His argument against the Universality of a future Judgment from Hell being prepared onely for the Devil and such as join with him consider'd. The Universality of the Resurrection and future Judgment fundamentally destroys his Hypothesis of Immortality onely by the *πνδσνα*.*

IN these two Paragraphs you endeavour to prove, that neither the Resurrection of the Dead, nor the last Judgement will be absolutely Universal, so as to reach to and comprehend all Mankind. As to the last Judgement you expressly affirm, that the form of it, mention'd by our Saviour *Math. XXV.* implies that no one can be concerned in it, but who has either profess'd and embraced or at least heard of the Gospel. And afterwards, that if such Persons as have never embraced nor heard of

Christia-

Christianity be to be judged, *it must be by another Form, which cannot be known, and therefore ought not to be believed; and so they will not be Judged at all.* And for the Resurrection your whole design in §. 6. is to shew that the place of *St. John V. 28, 29.* which is indeed very full and expresse for a General Resurrection, need not be understood in that unlimited universal latitude, which the words literally taken do plainly import. And then add, *No-thing therefore can be concluded from the Universality of the Expression in this present place. And it was perfectly satisfactory to our Saviour's design, if all those who heard him Preach those words should rise out of their Graves and should be adjudged to one of those States of a Resurrection to Life or a Resurrection to Damnation.* And a little after you affirm it most agreeable to our Saviour's design in that place, *That he should not mean these words in a larger sense, than this, of those who had heard of the Gospel.* This I must confess is making clean work with two of the most important and fundamental Articles of Religion. If this Doctrine should take and be received in the World, that none but such as had heard and profess'd the Gospel, and been Baptized need to fear a future account, as it would most effectually keep Men from ever attending to, and embracing Christianity, so would it at once set em free from all those obligations, which we must esteem to be the main stay and support of Society and Government it self, as well as the onely security of those common Duties of Humanity, which by the Laws of Nature we are obliged to pay to each other, and upon which the Welfare of Mankind does principally depend. Men would, presently disband. and Government be dissolved, if

this opinion should once prevail, and instead of being mutually helpful and serviceable to each other, they would immediately separate, inhabit woods and caves, and like the *Cadmean* Brethren fall upon and destroy each other. Far be it from me so much as to insinuate that you design'd all or any part of this Mischief by publishing to the World this *unhappy Book*: nay I am very confident you did not. But this I mention to shew you the Natural consequences of your Opinion, and what would be the sad effects of your Doctrine, should it happen, which 'tis to be hoped however is not very likely, to gain many Profelytes in the World.

I shall begin with the Resurrection, as in order preceding the last Judgment. And before I examin what you have said to take off the force of that remarkeable Text in *St. John* I think it necessary to observe, that a *General* Resurrection of the whole Mass of Mankind, is a Doctrine, which our own, and all the Churches in the world have ever look'd upon, as a prime and fundamental Article of the Christian Faith. None I think even among those great Numbers of antient Hereticks in the primitive Church, (unless any one should except the *Photinians*) that did but own a Resurrection in general, how much soever they might be mistaken about the manner and circumstances of it, ever denyed its Universality, and I believe this opinion of its extending onely to a part of Mankind, if it had not been now maintained, might till now have been unknown in the World, if some of the *Docinians* had not a good while since asserted it as well as you; with this difference however betwixt them and you, that

that you assert onely they shall arise who have received the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) and they that onely the Good and Pious shall rise again, whilst the Impious and Profane perish for ever.

But now that there will be a general Resurrection, which will extend to all Mankind, both to such as have heard of the Gospel, and been Baptized into the Faith of it, and to such as never heard of, nor have been Baptized into it, is a Truth, which Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity do most strongly confirm to us. If we consult our Reason, and consider the most perfect and unnerring Justice of God, and reflect withall, that there is such an unequal Distribution of Good and Evil, of Rewards and Punishments in this Life, we shall from hence be convinced, that there must be a future state, wherein all these inequalities of Providence will be corrected and made amends for, and the wisdom and justice of all God's Dealings with Men, fully and clearly vindicated. And this argument does not more necessarily infer the certainty and universality of a future state, than it undoubtedly proves the certainty of a General Resurrection, when all Mankind, Soul and Body, shall be rewarded or punished according to the just merit or demerit of their Actions here. For as neither the Body without the Soul, nor the Soul without the Body can properly be said to be the Man, so neither can this just distribution of Rewards and Punishments in another Life, which is absolutely necessary to acquit the Justice of God's Proceedings in this, be otherwise made to the whole World, than by a general Resurrection of their Bodies, as well as an everlasting duration of their Souls. And after this manner

we find the Antients to have argued, and thereby have irrefragably proved the certainty of a general Resurrection. Thus *Irenæus* reasons: ^a Since says he, 'tis manifest that acts of Righteousness are perform'd in and by the Body, our Bodies also, which partake with our Souls, as our Souls do with our Bodies, in the goodness of our Actions, will with them be rewarded with happiness. Since God is able to bring those Bodies to a place of Bliss, which have served him, we hence infer the Truth and Certainty of the Resurrection. And *Tertullian* frequently makes use of the same Argument, in his *Apologetic*, and largely in his Book *de Resurrectione Carnis* he pursues the same way of reasoning, as in many other places, so more especially where he affirms, ^b That the Body, being to be look'd upon as

a Quia enim in corporibus perficiuntur ea quæ sunt Justitiæ manifestum est ---- Et Corpora quæ participaverunt Justitiæ, cum animabus quæ similiter participaverant, obtinebunt refrigerii locum. Siquidem potens est Justitia illuc transducere ea quæ participaverunt ei, & verus & firmus emerget de Resurrectione Corporum sermo. *Irenæus* lib. II. cap. 51. b Caro dum ministra & famula animæ deputatur, consors & cohares invenitur; si temporalium cur non & æternorum? *Tertul.* de Res. Carn. cap. 7. Certe quia ratio Restitutionis destinatio Judicii est, necessario idem ipse qui fuerat exhibebitur, ut boni seu contrarii meriti judicium à Deo referat. Ideoque representabuntur & corpora. Quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola, sine materia stabili, id est, carne; & quod omnino de Judicio Dei pati debent animæ, non sine carne meruerunt, intra quam omnia egerunt, *Apologetic.* Cap. 4. Now tho' *Tertullian* be here in an Error concerning the impossibility of the Souls suffering, when it is separated from the Body, yet he plainly argues upon this Foundation, that the Bodies of Men must rise to reward or punishment, because in this Life they were the partners with the Soul in those actions which are to be rewarded or punished. And *Athenagoras* is full of this Doctrine; and therefore I shall think it sufficient to cite onely one Place. Ἐπειδὴ μὲν δὲ θείων ὁ παλαιότερος οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πᾶσι καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐφ' οἷς ἡ κρίσις, ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ψυχῶν καὶ σώτων. *Athenagoras* de Resurrect. Mortuorum. The substance of these Arguments comes to this; that since 'tis the Person compos'd of Soul and Body that was the Author or doer of the good or evil Actions which are perform'd in this Life, therefore the same Person compos'd of Soul and Body ought to be rewarded or punished in the next.

the

the Servant and Instrument of the Soul, is always found to be its companion and copartner in temporal Rewards and Punishments, and why not therefore in Eternal? Now altho' it must be confess'd that the Fathers in these and other places intend onely to prove the certainty of the Resurrection of the Body, yet their arguments very plainly conclude as strongly for the Universality of it. For since the wisdom and justice of God require that all Mankind should be rewarded or punished in another state, it will from hence unavoidably follow, according to this method of reasoning, that the Bodies of all Mankind must be raised in order to partake of those Rewards, or to undergo those Punishments, which, as having been in a personal conjunction and union with the Soul, they thereby deserve to enjoy or suffer with it.

Another argument for the Universality of the Resurrection may be taken from the Universality of the Punishment of Death inflicted for the sin of our first Parent. We find by sufficient experience, that the dreadfull effects of that dismall sentence: *Dust thou art, and to Dust thou shalt return,* extend without exception to all Mankind. And therefore we may fairly infer, that our Redemption from Death thro' Christ by the Resurrection of our Bodies must be as Universal. And accordingly we find the Apostle argues after this manner 1 Cor. XV. *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all, without exception of such as have or have not believed the Gospel, be made alive.* And indeed nothing can be more congruous to the Mercy and Kindness of God to Man, thro' Christ than that the Benefits and Advantages of his Death, and Passion should be as widely extended, as the curse and punishment derived

upon Man by our first Parent's fall. The whole Systeme of the Christian Religion seems to be founded upon this. And nothing I think can detract more from the Worth and Merit, the Dignity, and Excellency of what our Lord did and Suffer'd for us, than to suppose that far the greatest part of Mankind, will notwithstanding lie under the Deadly Consequences, of that severe but just Threat: *In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely Die*, by for ever sleeping within the dismal receptacles of the Grave. The Redemption of the Bodies of Mankind from the Power of Death, is the onely way, by which the Merits of his Sacrifice can become actually Universal: and therefore to deny the Universality of the Resurrection is in effect to deny the Universality of our Saviour's Redemption. And certainly 'twill be very hard indeed to give a tolerable sense and interpretation of those many Texts throughout, the whole new Testament, which declare that our Lord Died for the whole World, if the Resurrection be restrained onely to a certain Number of Men.

A third reason why the Resurrection must be general is because our Saviour's Resurrection is in Scripture represented as the first fruits of ours. Now we know that the first fruits being offer'd to God did derive certain properties, and denominations upon the whole Masse from which they were taken. And agreeably to this the Apostle tho' in a different Case *Rom. XI. 16.* very rightly infers; *If the first fruits be holy, the lump is also holy.* Now our Saviour's rising from the Dead, and being the first fruits of them that slept, implies that the whole lump or masse of the Humane nature must rise likewise. And so indeed

indeed the Apostle argues 1 Cor. XV. 20. &c. very reasonably deducing the Resurrection of all Mankind, from our Lord's rising as the first fruits. *But now is Christ risen from the Dead, and become the first fruits of them that Slept. For since by Man came Death, by Man came also the Resurrection from the Dead. &c.*

But if these reasons and many more which might be alledg'd did not prove the Universality of the Resurrection, yet those very exprefs and clear Texts of Scripture, which are usually produced to this purpose, are so very strong and convincing an argument, as to leave no room for any uncertainty. The first which is commonly alledged is that, you have endeavour'd §. 6. to evade the force of, with what success I shall now consider. The words were utter'd by our Saviour himself, and stand recorded *John. V. 28, 29. Marvel not at this: For the hour is coming in the which all that are in the Graves, shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil unto the Resurrection of Damnation.* Here, you say, in the first place, that there is no reason to understand these words in the utmost Universality they seem literally to import; because it is customary among the Eastern writers, to make use of these large Expressions when they mean no more by them than was requisite for and suitable to the Occasion on which they were spoken. It must be confessed that it was the Custome of the Eastern People, and among these of the Divine Penmen, sometimes to use lofty and magnificent Expressions, which were wont to rise far above the obvious meaning, which the things signified by them could require. But then this usually was when a thing of less importance,

was

was to be a Type of a thing of greater moment; and in this case in order to intimate that something further and greater was couched under those Low Resemblances, they were very properly to be expressed by such terms, as might make men think something more was implied than appear'd in the obvious sense, and by this means lead them to the Nobler and chiefly intending meaning of the words. Thus the Captivity and Destruction of the Jewish People, City, and Polity, is in the Old and New Testament express'd by such sublime words and images as imply plainly enough the destruction and final consummation of all things, of which the overthrow of the Jewish state was no doubt a Type. But I no where can find, that it is usual in Scripture to make an absolutely universal assertion, where onely a particular is to be understood. As to the first of those Instances you have given to prove the contrary I think it cannot in the least be thought Parallel to the Text in Question. For is not here a plain distinction made between *Saul and his House*, and *Israel*? The words are 2 Sam. XXI. 4. *We will have no Silver nor Gold of Saul nor of his House*; that is, we will not accept of any pecuniary recompense for the Injuries that have been done us: *Neither for us shalt thou kill any Man in Israel*; that is, we desire not the Lives of any among the People. And then they demand seven of *Saul's* sons to be deliver'd to them. So that you see here is never an *Israelite* to be put to Death for them, which they had indeed disclaimed, but onely the sons of that *Man who had devised against and consumed them*, whom they before in their manner of Expression plainly distinguish from *Israel*. Your other instance indeed of what *Obadiah* said

to

to *Elijah* concerning his Master *Ahab's* diligence in searching for him is more full to your purpose: but then it cannot be denied that here are plain circumstances in the story, that limit and restrain the Universality of the assertion, which, as I shall presently shew, are wanting in the Text before us. As to the following instances you give, of *St. Paul* affirming to the *Corinthians*, that he Baptized only such and such, and afterwards owning that he Baptized others, and of God granting to *St. Paul* the Lives of all that were in the Ship with him, and of the agreement of the *Spies* with *Rahab*, I cannot after the most nice and exact consideration of them see how they can be in the least to your purpose: because to all these are added very express and particular limitations and restrictions, none of which are to be found either expressed or implied in the Text of which I am speaking. Nothing therefore can oblige us to restrain the general import and signification of these words but the Occasion or Design on which they were spoken, which, you say, was onely to oblige those who were Auditors to our Lord, to embrace his Doctrine and to secure obedience to his Laws by the Sanction of an Eternal Reward of the most blissfull Happiness, and an everlasting Punishment, of the most extreme misery. This no doubt was one End, and that a principal one too, of our Lords speaking these words; but then I cannot by any means be perswaded it was the onely design he had. No doubt one reason of our Lord's uttering them with so great and awful a solemnity, was to declare, and as it were to reveal to them, and by them to all the World a Truth of the highest Moment and

and Concern, which notwithstanding they and the rest of Mankind then and before, as well as since, did not so thoroughly understand, or had not so well consider'd, nor so frequently meditated upon as they ought. So that I take our Saviour in this place to sustain not onely the Person of a *King and Legislator* denouncing rewards of the most enticing, and punishments of the most affrighting nature to his Vassals and Subjects, but also that of a *Prophet*, declaring to Mankind in general a most important truth, concerning the Resurrection of the Body and a future Judgement. Now if our Lord be here consider'd under this last Character, these words cannot be understood so, as to be restrained to those onely who should hear the Gospel, but must be considered as relating even to the whole world, which however it may not always have attended to the truth contained in them, yet has always had light and understanding enough to discern and know that there would certainly after this Life be a future state of Rewards and Punishments; which our Lord, after a Prophetick manner of speaking, tells them was nigh at hand.

And that these words are indeed to be understood in such a wide unlimited sense, will further appear, when we consider, that those other Texts of Scripture, which declare this same Doctrine run in the same Universality of Expression. Thus *Acts XXIV. 15.* *St. Paul* professes his *hope towards God*, which he tells *Felix* the Jews *themselves also* allowed, *that there would be a Resurrection both of the Just and Unjust*. This seems to be a form of speech, which as it will admit of no limitation or restriction, either from the Occasion or Construction of the words, so it seems

seems to be peculiarly well adapted to express the utmost Universality of the Resurrection, so as to make it reach as far and wide as the bounds of the Universe, and extend to the whole race of Mankind. The contradiction admits of no *medium*, and in regard it is said to be of the *just* and *unjust*, it is therefore to be understood to extend to all Heathens as well as Jews and Christians: so that it comprehends all Men of all times and places. In vain therefore do some endeavour to abridge the latitude of the Affirmation in this Text by endeavouring to prove that by the *Unjust* here are onely meant such as have been so but have repented: since the Apostle's design in this place is evidently to profess his Faith and Hope in the general Resurrection, and likewise to move his impious Judge to Repentance. And certainly if when *he reason'd of Righteousness, Temperance, and a Judgment to come, Felix* could have thought this last did not belong to him, as it would have been very improper for the Apostle to have reason'd with him about it, so would not his reasoning have had that effect upon him to put into a fit of Trembling, who if this sense were to be admitted, could not but be conscious that he was *unjust* enough to have escaped that Judgment, which he could not avoid shewing he was afraid of.

The last Text I shall mention, for it would be endless to mention all, is *Revelat. XX. 12, 13, 14, 15. And I saw the Dead small and great stand before God, and the Books were open'd &c. and the Dead were judg'd according to their works. And the Sea gave up the Dead which were in it, and Death and Hell deliver'd up the Dead which were in them &c.* These words are indeed very comprehensive, as that, if I may be permitted

with reverence so to speak, the Holy Ghost seems here to have taken a great deal of care and pains to express his mind so fully and clearly, with a design to prevent all Cavil and Evasion. For certainly by *the Dead small and great, and the Sea, Death and Hell, delivering up the Dead which were in them*, nothing less can be meant than a general Resurrection and Judgment of the whole world.

After these so very plain and evident Texts of Scripture, which cannot with all the violence that has been used towards them, be forced to retract or in the least diminish, the full confession they make of the Universality of the Resurrection it may be thought needless to take in the additional strength and Force they receive from the concurrent Testimony and Tradition of the Primitive Church, as 'tis handed down to us in the Writings of the Fathers. And indeed those undoubted Monuments of Antiquity which have been conveyed down to our times are so full of Evidence in this matter, that it would be too tedious a Task to lay together even a small part, of what might be thence drawn to this Purpose. I shall not however I hope be thought to deviate from my subject, or to affect the shewing an ostentatious Pomp of reading by making large citations, if now I am upon this head I just mention two or three Passages, which are the shortest and fullest of any that I remember upon this Subject. The first is to be found in *Justin Martyr's* second Apology, reckoning in that order it is commonly, tho falsely reputed, where he says, *that when*

α Τλω διδ. υπ'ιραν, οταν μιται δεξης εξ ερανων μιται τ' αχελικης αυτη γραπτης παρα-
 χειροσται κεκηρυκται, οτι κ' τα σωματα αναζηρει παντων τ' χροσθων ανθρωπων, κ'
 τ' ρον αζιων, ενδουσει αφθαρσιαν, τ' δε αδικων, εν αιδησει αιωνια μτ' τ' φαυλων δαι-
 μωνι εν τω αιωνι πωρ τιμψει. *Justin. p. 87 Edit Par.*

Christ

Christ shall descend the second time. from Heaven with Glory, accompanied with his Angelical Host, he shall raise from the Dead the Bodies of all Men that ever were born, and shall cloath those of the Just with Immortality, but the Bodies of the Unjust he shall send into everlasting Fire to be punished with the evil Spirits by a perpetual sense of Pain. Athenagoras likewise in his Book concerning the Resurrection has many passages very expressly attesting this Doctrine of the Church for a general Resurrection. As where he says, ^a *This is manifestly false, because all men that die must rise, and a little after, all must rise, even those who die in their Infant years and know neither good nor evil.* I chuse rather to cite these than any other places, because the Father here takes the General Resurrection for granted, and reasons from it, as from a Principle which could not be denied or doubted of. The last Testimony I shall trouble you with shall be taken out of a short treatise concerning the Resurrection of Christ which has sometimes been falsely ascribed to St. Cyprian. ^b *The Resurrection, says this Author, is general, and both the Just and Unjust must appear and stand before the Tribunal of Christ. The divine Justice necessarily requiring, that Piety and Impiety should each have its due reward and punishment in the workers of them: that such as refused to put an end to their sins,*

α τῶν δὲ περισσῶς δεικνύται ψυδῶ, καὶ τὸ πᾶν μὴ ἀνίστασθαι τὸς ἀποθνήσκοντες ἀνθρώπους — ἔξον δὲ πᾶν ἀνίστασθαι τὸς τι ἀδύς, & τὸς κατὰ σῶμα ἡλικίας τελευτήσαντες. Athenagoras de Resur. Mort. Edit. Par. ^b Resurrectio quidem communis est, & ante Tribunal Christi necesse est in Corpore justos stare, & impios, Dei hoc dictante Justitia, ut Pietas & Impietas in operatoribus debitis stipendiis donarentur: ut qui finem habere contempserunt in malis, infinita clauderentur ultione in pœnis, & qui gloriati sunt in cruce, cum crucifixo regnantes, beatæ fierent perennitatis participes. Inter opera Cypriano adscripta p. 342. Edit. Par. 1666.

may suffer the Vengeance of Endless punishment, and that such as gloried in sufferings and the Cross, reigning with the Crucified Jesus, may be made partakers with him of a Blessed Eternity. From all which it may I think, in some measure appear, to have been always a Tradition in the Church founded upon the most exprefs Texts of Scripture, that the Resurrection was to be so general, as to extend to all that ever wore a Body about with them in this world.

The next thing to be consider'd, is your notion of the last Judgment; which you abridge, and restrain in such a manner §. 3. as to make it concern onely such as have had the Gospel preached to them, and if you enlarge it a little 'tis onely so far as to extend it to the Jews of the old *Peculium*, absolutely excluding the Gentiles before the Preaching of the Gospel, and such Heathens since, as have never heard of the Gospel from any share or concern in it. Nay you go so far as to affirm, that there could be no punishment in another World for Wicked Men, before the Preaching of the Gospel. For in your *Premonition* §. 5. you argue, that Hell being prepared at first onely for the Devil and his Angels, and not for Men (a comfortable Doctrine indeed to some sort of Men) they could not be liable to this punishment, but by joining themselves with the Devil. But they could not join themselves with the Devil, so as to become criminal for so doing, till he was proclaimed a publick Enemy, but, you say, he was not proclaimed a publick Enemy till the Gospel; and so you bring matters at last to this very fair Issue, that no one can be adjudged to Hell and Damnation, who lived before the Preaching of the Gospel. Before I examin the grounds you
have

have taken to establish these wild assertions upon I think it necessary to premise a few Arguments whereby to prove the Universality of the future Judgment and consequently that the Punishment of the wicked in Hell will belong absolutely to all wicked Men.

The former of these is, I think, so clearly reveal'd, and so agreeable to reason, that there ought to be no doubt or uncertainty about it. I have already proved the Universality of the Resurrection, which consider'd under its just consequences, doth necessarily infer the Universality of the last Judgment. For to what End should all Men rise at the last Day, but in order to undergo the Judgment of the last Day? But the Scripture is so full and plain in this point, that I believe the Texts, which are commonly produced upon it are incapable of being interpreted to another sense. All the possible ways by which the Universality of the last Judgment could be express'd are made use of by the divine Penmen to this purpose. Does a Universal Proposition use to be express'd by particles of Universality? This way of speaking is frequently, and in it's utmost variety made use of concerning the last Judgment. Thus *St. Jude* mentioning the Prophecy or Denunciation of *Enoch, the seventh from Adam*, concerning the Judgment of the great Day expresses it thus: *Behold the Lord cometh with ten Thousands of his Saints, to execute Judgment κατὰ πάντων upon, or against ALL.* And so even in the old Testament *Isaiah* introduces God himself, with the most tremendous solemnity affirming the Universality of the last Judgment, *Chap. XLV. 23. I have sworn by my self, the word is gone out of my Mouth in Righteousness, and shall not return, that unto me EVERY knee shall*

shall bow, and EVERY tongue shall swear. And again, *Chap. XLVI. 15, 16.* with an elegance and loftiness of expression peculiar to this Prophet: *For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his Chariots like a Whirlwind, to render his Anger with Fury, and his Rebukes with flames of Fire. For by Fire, and his Sword, will the Lord plead with ALL Flesh.* And the Prophet *Joel* expresses himself concerning this matter with as much Universality, tho' with less of the Prophetic Heat and Rapture, where he says *Chap. III. 12.* *Let the Heathen be wakened, and come up to the Vally of Jehosaphat: for there will I sit to Judge ALL the Heathen* (or nations) *round about.* Which words tho' in their primary and obvious sense, they may seem to refer to something else, yet in their Prophetick and Mystical sense, they are no doubt to be and by the best Expositors have always been, understood of the last Judgment. But the New Testament is most plainly decisive upon this point: thus *Mat. XXV. 32.* *Before him shall be gather'd ALL Nations.* And *St. Paul* to the *Romans*, referring to and interpreting the above cited passage of *Isaiah, XLV. 23.* affirms that *We shall ALL stand before the Judgment seat of Christ,* and the same Apostle to the *Corinthians* expresses himself more fully *2 Cor. V. 10.* *We must ALL,* says he, *appear, before the Judgment seat of Christ, that EVERY ONE may receive the things done in his Body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad.* Often times the last Judgment is expressed by such forms of Speech, as denote it's utmost extent to the furthest corners of the Earth. Thus *Gen. XVIII. 25.* God, with respect to this last Judicature, is call'd *the Judge of ALL the EARTH,* and *Sam. II. 10.* it is said that he *shall Judge the ENDS of the EARTH,* and

Psalms

Psal. IX. 8. that he shall Minister Judgement to the PEOPLE in uprightness, and Psal. XCVIII. 9. 'tis said that he cometh to Judge the EARTH, with Righteousness shall he Judge the WORLD, and the PEOPLE with equity. And agreeably to these expressions of Universality in the Psalmist, *St. Paul tells the Athenians Acts XVII. 31. that God had appointed a Day in the which he will Judge the WORLD in Righteousness.* But least all this variety of expressing the several Modes of Universality should lose it's force by Interpretation, and those Universal Particles *All, Every,* as well as those general Terms *Earth, Ends of the Earth, World, and People,* should be thought to mean onely a Universality limited and restrained within a certain compass, the Holy Spirit has in other places made use of such expressions of Latitude as will not, I think, admit of any Evasion, or endure any Restriction whatsoever. As where 'tis said, that God will Judge the *Righteous* and the *Wicked*, the *Just* and the *Unjust*, the *Believers* and the *Unbelievers*, the *Great* and the *Small*, the *Quick* and the *Dead*; which are modes of speaking so expressive of Universality, that according to the known Rules of Logick, they must be understood in the utmost extent and latitude they are capable of, so as to take in and comprehend *all* Mankind: since all the Men, that ever were, are, or can be, must be contained within the Classes of the *Righteous* and the *Wicked* &c. And particularly as to the *Wicked*, who lived before the preaching and promulgation of the Gospel, and to whom, in order to favour and strengthen your Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, you are so kind, that you would put them out of any fear of an everlasting punishment after this Life, the

Scripture is so plain throughout both Old and New Testament in asserting their Punishment, that I cannot but a little wonder that a Person so well read in, and acquainted with the Sacred Writings as you are known to be, could fall into so palpable an Error. Thus *Deut. XXXII. 5. To me belongeth Vengeance and Recompence, their foot shall slide in due time &c.* and *Psal. XI. 6. Upon the Wicked he shall rain Snares, Fire and Brimstone, and an Horrible Tempest, this shall be the Portion of their Cup.* And *St. Peter. Ep. 2. Chap. II. 9.* tells us, that *the Lord knows how to reserve the Unjust unto the Day of Judgment to be Punished*; and then he subjoins a Catalogue of such Vices as Men might be, and indeed were frequently guilty of, even before the Preaching of the Gospel; which shews that the reserving Wicked Men unto *the Day of Judgment to be punished*, did not commence upon the Preaching of the Gospel onely, but was due to them even from the Foundation of the World.

These very expers and clear Texts of Scripture were a sufficient ground for the Faith of the Church in all Ages concerning a General Judgment to rest upon. And hence no doubt it came to pass that in the Creeds of the Antient Church, to be sure in those three approved and received by the Church of *England*, the faith of a Christian in a future General Judgment is particularly expers'd. Especially the Creed commonly ascribed to *St. Athanasius*, tho' certainly not writ by him, is very full both for a General Resurrection, and a General Judgment. *At whose coming, says the Creed, ALL men shall rise again with their Bodies, and shall give account for their own Works. And they that have done good shall go into Life everlasting and they that have done evil into everlasting*

lasting Fire. After these arguments from Scripture for a General Judgment I shall not, I suppose, be thought to wander from my Subject, if I add the Judgment of one or two of the most Antient Fathers. The first is that of the Holy Martyr *St. Polycarp* Bishop of *Smirna*, ^a *We are*, says he, *always in the Presence of the Lord our God.* And then he makes use of the words of *St. Paul Rom. XIV. 10, 12,* and *2 Cor. V. 10.* with some little variation, and *ALL, says he, must appear before the Tribunal of Christ, and EVERY ONE give an Account of himself.* His argument seems to be this, That all that live under the Eye of God's Providence, must give an Account of themselves to God. The next is that of *Justin Martyr* in his Book concerning the Monarchy of God, ^b *For that God onely*, says he, *is able to judge Men*

^a Ἀπὸ τῆς γὰρ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ ἰσχυρῆς ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐπὶ πάντας διὰ παντὸς ἡμεῖς τῷ Θεῷ ὡς Χριστῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν λογιζόμεθα. *Polycarp, Epist. ad Philip. s. 6.*

^b Ὁ πᾶς ὁ δυνατὸς ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τῷ [Leg. Biv] σωματικῶν προξένῳ, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸ θεῶν ἀγνωστὰς κρίσειν ἡσυχάζει, οἰκίῳ μέρειντας παραστήσει ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ γὰρ Σοφοκλῆ, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Ἐστὶν γὰρ ἡμεῖς καὶ αἰῶνας χρόνος
Ὅταν πῦρ ἡμεῖς ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν χάσῃ
Χρυσῶντος αἵματι. ἢ διὰ βοσκῆς φλογὸς
Ἀπὸ τῆς πύργου καὶ μεταρῶν
Φλόγῃ μανθάνει. ὅταν δὲ ἐκλείπῃ τὸ πᾶν,
Φῶς ὁ μὲν ἡμεῖς κυμαίνεται ἅπας βυθός,
Γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸν ἰσχυρῶς, ἐπὶ ἅρ' ἐν
Πᾶσι τῷ φῶτι βασιλεύει παρμένη.
Καὶ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν δύο τοῖς νομίζουσιν,
Μία δὲ δικαίω, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἀδικῶν.

That the Poet here speaks of the last Judgment is plain, because he subjoins what he says concerning it to a description of the dissolution of all things. And tho' Grotius will not have these verses to belong to that Sophocles, whose Tragedies are now extant, but to a later Poet of that name, yet because he barely affirms this without argument or authority to support his assertion I think it may be as easily denied, as 'tis by him affirm'd. But Philemon whom presently after Justin cites is more full

Οἱ οὖν τῆς θανάτου, ὁ Νικοφάνης,
Τρυφῆς ἀπίσης μεταλαβόντας ἐν βίῳ,
Καὶ γὰρ, καλυψόν, ὡς δὲ τῷ πάντ' ἐς χρόνον

for their Actions in this Life, and for their Ignorance of him, may be proved by witnesses of our own. And then he cites a passage out of Sophocles, and another out of Philemon, and a third out of Euripides, concerning the End of the World, and the Judgment that is to pass upon Men afterwards. To these antient and pregnant Testimonies I shall onely add one out of Theophilus's second Book to Autolycus. That God, says he, will Judge, the World, and that punishments will suddenly overtake the Wicked and profane, even Æschylus testifies in these words: Punishment will swiftly overtake Men, and the Villanies of such as neglect Justice, will suddenly find 'em out.

And indeed as appears from these Testimonies of the Fathers citing the Antient Authors that lived before the Birth of our Lord, this Doctrine of a future Judgment has always been believed and received in the World; it being most agreeable to the Common sense and most obvious reasonings of, Mankind. For if a Man considers himself, and finds that his Creator has given him *understanding* to know his Duty, and *liberty* freely to set himself to perform it, he cannot but thence conclude that he must stand accountable for the neglect of it. If he

Προβλέπειν τὸ θεῖον, ὡς ἀληθέως;
 Ἐπὶ δικῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ, ὅς τῃ πᾶσι ὁρᾷ.
 Εἰ γὰρ δικαιοῦ καὶ ἀσπίδος ἐξουσίαν
 Ἀρπάζει, ἀπὸ τῶν κλέπτει ἀσπίδας καὶ
 Μὴδὲν πλεονεξῆς ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸν κλέπτει
 Ἡμεῖς παύσει οὐδὲν ἂν πάντων δικαστῆς
 Οὐ γὰρ νομοφύλαξ, ἀλλ' ἂν ἀποκρίσασθαι ἔχοι.

I think it needless after this so express a Testimony for a future general Judgment to charge the page with that out of Euripides which is very full and express to the same purpose.

α Καὶ ὅτι μέλλει ἡ Θεὸς κρίνει πάντα, καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ποιεῖς αἰφροδῶς καταλαμβάνει, καὶ τὴν Αἰχὺλὸν ἐπιμαχὴ λίγαν

Τὸ καὶ τὸν ποιεῖς ἐργάζεσθαι βροτῶν

Καὶ τὴν ἀμολύματα πρὸν τῷ Θεῷ.

looks abroad into the World upon the works of nature and providence, he will plainly see a Law of nature, necessarily resulting from the nature of these things, and those Relations they bear to one another, and to himself: and this cannot but teach him, that the great God who made the World, himself, and all things in it, has enjoined him to observe this Law, and that if he acts according to such Rules of Justice and Wisdom as all Government is founded upon, and which is necessary to secure obedience to any Laws whatever, he must call Men to an Account for the Observance or Neglect of them. But in regard 'tis evident this is not done in this World, there must be a state of things hereafter wherein this will be done. And hence have always arisen, as well before, as since the Preaching of the Gospel all those *Itus* and *Laniatus*, those Smirings and Wrackings, those Pangs and Terrors of Conscience, those foreboding apprehensions of a future Punishment, which ill Men have always been tormented with upon the Commission of any wickedness. ^a Tho' the fact has been most secret, and so must escape the Eye of Human Justice, or the Malefactor most Powerfull, and so above the fear of temporal Punishment, yet still the Criminal

^a Exemplo quodcumque malo committitur ipsi
 Displicet auctori. prima est hæc ultio quod se
 Judice nemo nocens absolvitur: improba quamvis
 Gratia fallacis Prætoris vicerit Urnam *Juven. Sat. XIII.*
He that commits a Sin, shall quickly find
The pressing guilt lie heavy on his mind.
Tho' bribes or favour shall assert his Cause
Pronounce him guiltless, and elude the Laws.
None quits Himself; his own impartial thoughts
Will Damn, and Conscience will record the Fault.

Crech.
 could

could never absolve himself, the Consciousness of his own guilt haunted him wheresoever he went, and the fear of Punishment from the great Creator of the World in another State always made him uneasy. And this reasoning drawn from the nature of things, and the common sense of Mankind, concludes for a Judgment to come, as well for those who lived before as since the Promulgation of the Gospel.

I shall now consider what you have said §. 3. in defence of your Opinion, by which you restrain the last Judgment onely to Christians and Jews. The main, and, I think, onely argument you make use of to this purpose is taken from the form of the Proceſſe, recorded by *St. Matthew XXV. 40.* which our Saviour tells us will be observ'd in the Judgment of the great Day. This, you say, plainly supposes the Persons concerned in it to have been Christians, such as had done good works for Christ's sake, or by neglecting to do them had affronted him. But, you say, 'tis impossible for any to do Charity on Christ's account, or to affront him by neglecting it, who never had heard that there was a Christ. Before I answer this Argument I cannot but observe, that it proves a great deal too much, and indeed overturns that foundation upon which you bring the Jews into a share in the future Judgment. For if none but such as do their good Actions for the sake of Christ can have any Title to a reward for them, then I fear the Jews themselves, who lived before our Saviour appear'd, will, according to this Scheme, fall short of future rewards. For where, I would gladly know, under the Jewish Law were the Jews commanded to do their good works for the sake of Christ? The motives

tives of their Obedience, agreeably to the Threats and Promises that were made to them, will, I believe, be found to be of another Nature. A Fruitfull Land, long Life, Surviving Posterity, Protection from, and Victory over their Enemies, seem to me to have been the onely springs of their Duty mentioned in the Law. Nor will it help your Hypothesis, that the *λόγος*, the second Person in the Blessed Trinity, was their Governour, as their Government was Theocratical, unless they knew or had been taught, that their good Actions were to be done for his sake, or upon his Account, which I no where find they were. And tho' the New Testament writers suppose, that the Appearances of the Deity, which are mention'd in the Old Testament, were of the Second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity, yet I don't any where find, that the Jews knew so much and therefore must conclude, that they could not make *that* the motive of their Actions, which they knew nothing of. And what if Christ went and Preached to the Spirits in Prison, and tho' we should suppose that these Spirits were the Souls of such Jews, as had died before the coming of Christ, yet what would it avail 'em to have Christ preached to them, when they were in a separate State, who had never heard of him while they were in this Life, and so could not entitle themselves to share the rewards of another, by doing good Actions for his sake, or incur any punishment, by affronting him in neglecting them? If the New Testament does suppose, that such as knew nothing of Christ, or, as you say, of any concern they had with him, can have no relation to the last Judgment, then I affirm the Gentleman, to whom you
write

write, very justly to have charged upon you, that which is indeed the natural consequence of your Opinion that the Jews before the coming of Christ were not liable to Eternal Punishments.

But there is indeed no consequence at all in this whole Argument. For how, I pray, does it follow, that because a particular part of the form and proceſſe of that dreadful day, which more eſpecially relates to the Diſciples and Followers of our Lord, is here mentioned and deſcribed, that therefore no other form will be uſed, or that they to whom this form does not agree will be excluded from any part in this Solemnity. You may with as much reaſon argue, that becauſe Charity to the Poor is the onely thing here mention'd, upon which the Tryal of Men in the laſt Judgment will proceed, that therefore no one ſhall be rewarded for any Grace or Virtue but Charity, or puniſhed for any Vice but the want of it. Our Lord's deſign in this place was not to make a full deſcription of all the parts and circumſtances of that awful Solemnity, but onely to mention a ſmall part, which did more immediately concern his Diſciples of that time. They were going to plant a Religion in the World, which would make all the Powers of Earth and Hell ſet themſelves to oppoſe it. They were like to ſuffer the loſs of all that was near and dear to them in this World for Preaching of the Goſpel. In order therefore to give them ſome Comfort and Support under ſuch melancholy Circumſtances, which he foreſaw were like to befall 'em, and to make them more ready to be helpſui to, and relieve one another, our Lord tells them he will at the laſt Day eſteem all acts of kindneſs and Charity

rity done to the meanest of his Disciples, as done to himself, and the neglect of them as an affront and injury to himself. And that this is all which is meant by this Description most evidently appears, because the Scripture in other places plainly tells us, that God will proceed with others after another manner. Thus we are told *Rom. II. 12, 14, 15, 16.* *That as many as have Sinned without Law, shall perish without Law, that is, as many as never embraced the Jewish Law, shall be adjudged to everlasting punishment without any reference to that Law, and as many as have Sinned in the Law, shall be Judged by the Law, that is, such as have professed and embraced the Jewish Law shall at the last day be Judged by it : and then the Apostle goes on : For when the Gentiles, which have not the [Jewish] Law do by nature the things contained in the [Moral] Law, these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves : which shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing one another in the Day when God shall Judge the Secrets of Men by Christ Jesus.* Here you plainly see is another method of Proceedure, and such as seems calculated entirely for the Heathen, whom you exclude from any share in the last Judgment. And therefore we may fairly from hence infer, that tho' the proceedings of the last Day will be made with Christians, after the form here described by our Lord, yet such as are not Christians will be proceeded with after a different method, but by no means can you hence conclude that no other form will be used, or that such as cannot be Judged by this will not be Judged at all. What you say concerning the narrow signification of the word *World* I am persuaded

swaded you will retract, when you consider those other modes of Universality, by which the Judgment of the last day is expressed in the Texts I have produced above. As to that Text *Heb. X. 27.* which the Gentleman alledged against your Notion for a General Judgment, tho', I must confess, 'tis plain that the Emphasis lies upon the Particle *ἀνὰ* [*once*] yet I think the indefinite Proposition in this place must be understood as equivalent to an Universal. And so the sense of it will amount to thus much, That as necessarily as *all* Men must once undergo Death, so must they likewise Judgment. But however this be, I shall not stand with you for one Text, and think that in this cause where so many Texts voluntarily offer themselves, none ought to be press'd into the Service.

Your Notion that there could be no punishment for the Wicked before the Preaching of the Gospel, because the Devil was not then proclaimed a public Enemy, seems inconsistent with the History of the Fall. For was not the Devil sufficiently known to be an Enemy by seducing our first Parents? Was he not sufficiently proclaimed such *Gen. III. 15.* *And I will put enmity between thee, and the Woman, and between thy Seed and her Seed, it shall bruise thy Head, and thou shalt bruise his Heel;* which tho' immediately relating to the Messias, yet may be understood to bear a reference to the whole Posterity of the Woman. Was it not known before the coming of our Saviour, that he was at open Hostility with, and a most implacable enemy to Mankind? Yes certainly, 'tis too plain to need any proof that these things were known before the coming of our Saviour, and therefore it was highly, tho'

tho' perhaps not in the same degree, criminal to join with him before, as well as after the coming of our Lord.

Now the Universality of the Resurrection and future Judgment evidently contradicts and fundamentally destroys your Notion, concerning our having no Title to Immortality, but by the *πνεῦμα* (*Spirit*.) For if *all* Men without exception must arise and be adjudged to one of those states of an Eternity of happiness or an Eternity of misery at the last Day, but *all* Men do not receive the *πνεῦμα* (*Spirit*), namely, as many as never heard of the Gospel, and have had no Title to the Spirit in Reversion, then there must be some other Ground of Immortality besides the *πνεῦμα* (*Spirit*.) And this can be nothing but the Soul's being in it's own nature Immortal. For since God cannot with reason be supposed, unless it were revealed, by any particular and extraordinary Act of his Power, besides the concurrence of his general Providence, to sustain and support the Souls of Men to Eternity, we may justly infer, that since they do certainly exist for ever, it cannot proceed from any thing else but that they are in themselves Immortal. And indeed I think my self obliged to take notice, that you seem *your self* so sensible of the force of this reasoning, as to own §. 6. if the Text *John. V. 29, 29. be indeed to be understood in the Universality it seems to imply, you should then be inclinable to believe, that all Men, who had not heard of the Gospel in this Life, might be admitted to the Favour of having it preached to them in their separate State.* What ground you have for this Notion, and how far it is true, shall be considered in it's proper place. In the mean time I cannot but profess my Sorrow,

row, that you should have advanced a Notion, which requires so very uncouth and odd an Hypothesis as this of the Gospel being Preached and Baptism administer'd to Souls in a separate State, to make it consistent with those two main Articles of our Faith, the Resurrection of the Body, and a future Judgment.

CHAP. III. ad §. 7.

The Improbability that Plato should give any reason to think the Soul naturally Mortal. He proves the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal in his Phædo. The distinction he makes between ψυχή, νῆς and λόγος in his writings and especially in his Timæus consider'd. He asserts the Soul to have been created by the Supreme God, and therefore in it self Immortal. Our Author's notion of deriving the πνεῦμα from the divine Breathing Gen. II. 7. inconsistent with his Hypothesis. In what sense Philo Judæus uses the words ψυχή and πνεῦμα. The passages cited out of Philo by our Author consider'd. In what sense Philo distinguishes the two Men. The meaning of the Text 2 Pet. I. 4. and Dan. II. 11. The citations out of Homer and Virgil not to this Author's purpose.

After having thus endeavour'd to prove that your Doctrine of our receiving Immortality onely by the πνεῦμα, the divine Spirit, is not contrary to Scripture, your next Advance is to shew, §. 7. that the deriving Immortality from the Spirit is agreeable to the Notions received by the Jews in the Apostolical Age. And this, you say, does still more confirm to you your Opinion in this matter: since you find it to be not onely agreeable to the words of Scripture, but also to those Notions that

were received when the Scriptures were written. How well you have made out the former of these, others must now Judge, but to prove the latter you take notice, that the *Rabbins* mention their *Nephefch, Ruach*, and *Neshamah*, which answer you say to the three parts in Man mentioned in the New Testament, of *Body, Soul*, and *Spirit*. How far this Observation is just I shall not at present enquire, having so many other points to debate with you, which will draw this Answer out to a greater length than I at first designed; especially since you wave the Authority of the *Rabbins*, as not sufficient to give an Attestation to any Tradition so Antient as the Apostolical Age. Leaving therefore these Jewish Doctors, you refer your self wholly to *Plato*, whom you think to be very clear to your Purpose, and whose Notions and Philosophy were received and made use of, not onely by *Philo* and others of the Jews, who lived in or near our Saviour's Age, but even by the inspired writers themselves.

Before I consider what grounds *Plato* has given you in that Treatise of his, which you mention, to think it was his opinion that the Soul was in it's own Nature Mortal; I cannot but profess to you in general, that I fear the World will Judge it to be a very odd kind of undertaking to go about to prove the Natural Mortality of the Soul out of an Author, that above all other speaks the most fully and expressly for it's Immortality. Can it, do you think, be in any degree probable, that there should any Terms or Distinctions of the *Nēs*, [*Mind*] *νοῦς*, [*Reason*] from the *ψυχή*, [*Soul*] implying the natural mortality of the Soul, be made use of in the works of this Philosopher, from whom all the Philo-

Philosophers that followed, and especially the most excellent of Philosophers, as well as Orators, *Tully*, took almost all their Notions and Arguments concerning it's Immortality. He that travel'd as far as into *Italy* to learn the *Pythagorean* System, and more especially to inform himself of their Opinion concerning the Immortality of the Soul, which we are told ^a he not only embraced, but strengthened and confirm'd by reasons of his own, cannot certainly be supposed to have given any just grounds in any writings of his to think it Mortal. And indeed to undertake to prove the Mortality of the Soul out of *Plato* seems to me to be such another extravagant kind of Enterprize, as it would be for any one to endeavour to prove the Presbyterian form of Church Government out of *Ignatius* and *St. Cyprian*, or to shew that there were never any such Places as *Troy* or *Rome* out of *Homer* and *Livy*. That divine Work, his *Phædo*, which is writ with such strength of Argument, such delicacy of Thought, such copious and beautiful elegance of Expression, that it not onely made *Tully* confess ^b that he had rather be in an error as to this matter with *Plato*, than in the right with the other Philosophers, but also inflamed ^c *Cleombrotus* with

a Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoreos cognosceret, in Italiam venisse, & didicisse Pythagorea omnia: primumque de Animorum Æternitate non solum sensit idem quod Pythagoras, sed rationem etiam attulisse. Cicero. Tuscul. Quæstionum lib. I. §. 39. Ed. Gronov. b Errare mehercule malo cum Platone, quem cum istis vera sentire. Ibid. c Callimachi quidem Epigramma in Ambraciotam Cleambrotum est; quem ait cum nihil ei accidisset adversi, è muro se in mari abjecisse. lecto Platonis libro. Cicero. Tuscul. Quæstionum lib. I. §. 84 The Epigram being short, may not improperly be here inserted.

Εἰπας, "Ἢλπι χεῖρι, Κλειόμορον· ὦ μορακίωτης

Ἢλατ' ἀφ' ὧν ἦλθ' ταῖχ'· εἰς αἶδ' ἔλθ'.

"Ἄξιον ἔδν' ἰδοὶ θανάτου ἔσθαι, ἅλλα Πλάτων·

Εἰ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς χάμμι· αἰολαξέμεν·

such

such an ardent desire of Immortality, as made him, upon the reading it presently to throw himself into the Sea, that he might the sooner lanch forth into Eternity, will for ever be a standing Monument what his Opinion as to this point was. And therefore what passages soever may be cited out of his works, or what Interpretation soever a strong and misguided fancy may put upon them, yet we can never be perswaded they can be capable of such a sense as is contrary to, or in the least different from his known Opinion concerning the Soul's Immortality. And in regard my design in these Papers is not onely, as far as I am able, to refute those Arguments you have brought to prove the Soul to be naturally Mortal, but also as occasion is given me to prove and confirm it's natural Immortality, I shall not, I believe, be thought to wander from my subject, if, before I consider what you have said in this Section in favour of your Opinion, I lay before the Reader a short Abstract of one or two of those many Arguments, which this great Man makes of use to prove the Soul Immortal.

In this Dialogue *Plato* introduces *Phædo* making a very particular Relation to *Echecrates* of the manner of *Socrates's* Death, and what was the Substance of the Conference he had with his Friends, who came to the Prison, upon the morning of his Execution, to see him Die. After he has given some Account of the reason why the Execution of *Socrates* was so long delayed, after sentence had passed upon him, he relates what upon the taking off his Fetters he said concerning Pleasure and Pain mutually succeeding one another, and likewise tells us by what strong reasons and

D

arguments

arguments he proved it unlawful to lay violent hands upon ones self, but that however Death was a thing a Wise Man ought not very solicitously to avoid. After this he represents *Socrates* making use at first, as his manner was, of some slighter Arguments to Prove the certainty of the Souls Surviving the Body: introducing him comforting himself^a upon the near Approach of Death, with the thoughts that after he should pass out of this Life, he should certainly come into the Society of the God's, and such great and good Men as had died before him, the former of which were much better Governours, and the latter much better Companions than those he left behind him. And if he had not a perfect assurance of this, he ought not to undergo his Death with so much indifference. But this Cheerfull Hope, that there was something after Death, and that, according to what had been for a long time believed, it would be much better for good than ill Men, in this future State, made him entertain the thoughts of Death, without that concern which otherwise it would have been the part of a wise Man in his Circumstances to have been affected with. For that no one ought to have any dread or terror upon him on Account of that, which would infallibly draw after it so many and great Advantages. And since it ought to be the constant Study and Practise of a Wise Man, by still weaning and

^a Εὐχόμενος γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἔμμεν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ Θεοῦ ἄλλης σοφίας τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων πεπαισθηκότας ἀμείνους, ὅτι ἐνθάδε, ἠδὲ καὶ ἐνθάδε, ἂν ἐκ ἀγαθῶν τῶν θανάτων. οὐκ δὲ εἴ τι παρ' ἀνδρῶν τι ἐλπίσω ἀφίξειν ἀγαθόν. ὅτι μὲν παρὰ Θεοῦ δεσπότας πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος τῶν τοιούτων, δι' ἡμετέρας αἰτίας ἂν καὶ τούτοις. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ ὁμοίας ἀρρογῶν, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι, εἶναι ἢ τοῖς πεπαισθησὶ, ἔ, ὡς περὶ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολλοὶ ἀμείνους τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. *Phædo. p. 63.*

abstracting himself more and more from all the enticing Pleasures, and bewitching Charms of the Body, to be always learning to die, he ought by no means to be afraid of that which if he answer'd the intent and end of Philosophy he was every day to undergo. After this *Socrates*, or rather *Plato* under the Person of *Socrates* sets himself directly to prove the Immortality of the Soul, in answer to the Opinion of those who say it perishes with the Body. His first arguments are not indeed so concluding as those which follow, one being founded upon the *Pythagorean* notion of a Transmigration, the other upon a peculiar Opinion of his own, that all knowledge is Remembrance, by both which he rather proves the preexistence than future Eternity of the Soul. After this therefore he proceeds to shew the Immortality of the Soul, by such Arguments as more directly infer it; by shewing what kind of being that is, which is capable of mortality and dissolution, and that the Soul is not such a kind of thing, which is capable of Mortality. For, says he, are not those things capable of dissolution, which be capable of Composition, and are actually compounded? therefore if any thing be purely simple and uncompounded, that cannot be capable of being dissolved. But 'tis probable that those things are most simple which are always found to be the same, without any Change or Alteration, and that those things are compounded which undergo perpetual Changes and never continue in the same state. And these are such as are visible and tangible, or do any way strike upon and affect our Corporeal senses. But such things as are permanent and lasting, which never

vary or alter their State, are such as cannot otherwise be perceived than onely by the light of the mind and understanding, being wholly invisible and imperceptible to the senses. From hence therefore says he, we may lay it down as certain, that there be two sorts of beings, which are of quite opposite Natures, namely, such as cannot and such as may be the Objects of our senses, the former are unalterable and invariable, the latter change and vary: among these last we must no doubt place the Body, as among the former we ought to reckon the Soul. And thus, says he, it happens, that when the Soul makes use of it's Companion the Body in the finding out of Truth, and by the sight, the hearing, or any other sense comes to the knowledge of corporeal objects, which are inconstant and changeable, it must be liable to Fluctuation, Uncertainty and Mistake: but when it retires as it were within it self, and contemplates it's own Ideas, it betakes it self to that which is *Pure, Immortal, invariable*, and thereby becomes less liable to mistake, as being then employed about such abstracted general Objects, as be of a fixt and stable nature. From hence he concludes that the Soul is more likely to be of an uncompounded invariable Immortal Nature, as the Body we evidently see to be of a nature quite different from and opposite to these. Again, says he, while these two parts of Man are in conjunction, we find one to exercise an Authority and Dominion over the other, and the other to obey and be subservient to that. Now it seems to be most likely that the part which commands the other should be of a Spiritual, Divine, Immortal Nature, as that which is subject is
visibly

visibly of a Mortal and Perishing constitution. From hence he infers that as the Body must in a short time dissolve and perish, so the Soul must be altogether in it's own Nature Indissolveable and Immortal.

And this I think sufficiently shews what the Opinion of this Great Man was concerning the Matter in debate between us: since by these and many other Arguments he so strongly contends and earnestly proves, for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. It is withall remarkeable that throughout this whole Treatise he makes use of no other word but $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to denote that Principle to which he affirms Immortality to belong; not once mentioning $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ or $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ as a part or principle different from the Soul, and this I think amounts even to a Demonstration, that he thought the Immortality of the Soul, could be ascribed to nothing but to it's own Nature. There is this further to be observ'd to shew that *Plato's* Opinion was directly opposite to yours, that we find him in this Treatise proposing and refuting that very Opinion, which throughout your Dissertation you endeavour to advance: namely, That the Soul may Subsist some while after it's separation from the Body, but after some time decays, drops away, and perishes thro' it's own natural mortality. And this I think makes it indisputably evident, that 'tis impossible for any thing to be found in *Plato*, which can favour your very singular Opinion, and that what terms or notions soever of the *Platonic* Philosophy either *Philo* or the Sacred Writers made use of, if they did but make use of them in *Plato's* sense, they could never design to mean by them that the Soul was in it self Mortal.

But because, you say, that in his *Timæus* he clearly makes a distinction between the Νεὺς or Λόγος, the *Mind*, or *Reason*, and the Ψυχὴ, *Soul*, affirming the former to be created by the Supreme Being, which could make nothing Mortal or Corruptible, and the latter to be left to the inferior *Demiurgical*, Deities, which could make nothing Incorruptible or Immortal; from hence I suppose intending to imply, that it was *Plato's* Opinion, at least in his *Timæus*, that the Ψυχὴ (*oul*,) is in it's own nature Mortal, I shall consider this matter a little more distinctly; and in order to discover what ground you have from *Plato* for the Assertions you here make I shall *first*, Consider in what sense *Plato* always, but more especially in the *Timæus*, uses the words Ψυχὴ (*Soul*,) Νεὺς (*Understanding*,) Λόγος (*Reason*,) *secondly*, shew that *Plato* plainly asserts the Ψυχὴ (*Soul*,) to have been created by the supreme Deity.

As to the former of these, the word Ψυχὴ is known ordinarily to signify that part in the Human Composition, which we commonly call the *Soul* or *Spirit*: and therefore, *Hesychius* renders it by the word πνεῦμα, as *Suidas* does by πνεῦμα νοερόν, because it is that thinking intellectual Principle, from which all the Actions and Operations of the Man originally proceed. Nor does *Plato*, that I find, any where use it to signify any thing else. Most certain it is that in his *Phædo* he constantly makes use of this word to signify what we call the *Soul*, as together with the Body intirely constituting the Humane Nature, nor does he any where in this whole Treatise take it in any other sense. It would be endless to cite but even a small part of the passages in *Plato's* works where this word can be understood to stand for nothing

thing else. I shall onely therefore just mention one or two passages out of his *Timæus*: as where he says, ^a that the *Ψυχὴ* (Soul) is before and elder than the Body; where he reckons up the diseases first of the Body, then of the *Ψυχὴ* (Soul,) in both which places, as well as all the rest, where he mentions this word, nothing is or can be meant by it, but what we commonly call the *Soul* or *Spirit*. The word *Νοῦς* every body knows stands for the *Mind* or *Intellect*, and by it, when taken in a proper and not metaphorical sense, is never signified any thing else, but that Power or Faculty of the *Ψυχὴ* (Soul) which is called the understanding. Sometimes indeed in a derived and secondary sense, we find it taken for some of those Properties and Perfections of the Soul, which result from the Understanding. *Suidas* tells us that *Pythagoras*, from whom *Plato* took his notions of these things, reckon'd it among the faculties of the Soul. His words are: *c Pythagoras affirms the Soul to have three faculties.* And among these the *Νοῦς* (Understanding) is afterwards reckon'd as one. *Pollux* tells us that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon it as one of the Powers of the Soul. His words are remarkeable. ^d *Every Man*, says he, *is made up of a Soul and Body* (we find here no third part or principle of his Composition) *The Soul is a Spirit, and its Faculties are the Νῆς* (Understanding) *the Concupiscible and Irascible Appetites.* Whe-

α Ο δὲ καὶ ἡσυχία, ἡ ἀρετὴ πλεονεξία, ἡ προσευχή, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ σωμάτων, ὡς διαπό-
τι καὶ ἀρξάντων ἀρετῶν συνίσταται. *Timæus* p 34. b Καὶ πάλιν πάλιν ὁ σῶμα νο-
σηματα, ταῦτα συνίσταται γυνώμενα. πάλιν δὲ πάλιν ψυχὴ καὶ σώματα ἐν τῇ &c.
Timæus. c In voce νῆς. d συγκαταταί μιν δὲ ὁ πῦρ ἀνδρῶν ἐν ψυχῇ πάλιν
σώματα καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πάλιν — μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς νῆς πάλιν πάλιν γυνώμενα. *jul. Poll.*
Onomast. p 123

ther this be a Just division of the Faculties of the Soul I am not concern'd to determin. Thus much is evident from this Testimony that he here affirms that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* reckon'd the Νῦς (*Understanding*) to be nothing but a faculty of the Soul. Nor does *Plato* himself in any part of his works, take it in any other sense. Particularly in his *Timæus*, where he says 'tis Impossible for Νῦς (*Understanding*) to be where there is no ψυχὴ (*Soul*) he supposes the Understanding to be a Power of the Soul, which can no more be without it, than a Faculty can exist without it's proper Subject to support it. And in his *Phædrus* where he tells us that the Soul is to be govern'd by the Νῦς (*Understanding*;) meaning no doubt onely that which is commonly said that the Understanding is as it were the Eye of the Soul, which guides and conducts it in all it's Operations. The word Λόγος also is used for nothing else but the Acts and Operations of this Faculty, most commonly for the second or third, that of Judgment or Reasoning, or else for such a Composition of words or sounds, by which either of these Operations is to be express'd. In the former of these senses it is called by *Aristotle* Λόγος ἐνδὲς, in the latter Λόγος περὶφορικός. The same sense *Plato* uses this word in throughout his works, whenever he applies it to Man; onely in his *Theætetus*, where he particularly distinguishes the several significations of this word, he adds a third, by which it stands for the Essential Difference of any thing, as it may be express'd by it's Definition, which *Aristotle* calls Λόγος εἰσίας. From hence it may in some measure appear what *Plato* must be supposed to mean,

a Νῦς δ' αὖτε ψυχῆς ἀδιώτατον παραρροΐσθαι τῷ *Timæus* p. 30.

when

when when he distinguishes $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. $\text{N}\tilde{\epsilon}\varsigma$, $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\textcircled{\text{C}}$, namely that he Understands by the first the Substance of the Soul in general, by the second the particular Power or Faculty of that Substance, called the *Understanding*, and by the third the proper Act, or Operation and Exercise of that Faculty. These three being commonly and easily distinguishable in every substance whatsoever: as for example we find in the substance of the Sun the Qualities or Powers of Light and Heat, and likewise the proper acts and operations of these Powers to enlighten and warm. You had very little reason therefore to say that *Plato* distinguishes the $\text{N}\tilde{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ or $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\textcircled{\text{C}}$ from the $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, intimating thereby, as if the $\text{N}\tilde{\epsilon}\varsigma$ and $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\epsilon\varsigma$ were one thing and the $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ another, since he plainly distinguishes the $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ from the $\text{N}\tilde{o}\upsilon\varsigma$, as much as he does the $\text{N}\tilde{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ from the $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. As for any other distinction between these words, besides that I have mention'd, I cannot find any foundation for it, either in this or any other of *Plato's* writings. And because you have not cited nor made the least reference to any particular place in the *Timæus* I can only guess at the passages which might possibly be the unhappy Occasion of your falling into this Mistake. The chief of these is that where he says, *That God placed Understanding, Nες, in the Soul, and the Soul in the Body.* p. 30. But certainly these words can be capable of no other sense, but this: That when God created the Soul he gave it this Power or Faculty of Understanding, as when the Body was made, he gave to it a Soul. The word $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\textcircled{\text{C}}$ is often made use of in the works of *Plato*, but always, I think, in the senses I have explained it. As where he says in the *Timæus* p. 37. That, $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\textcircled{\text{C}}$, Reason, when conversant about such things as are of a fixt and permanent nature

nature is Science, but when employed about such as are not it is only Opinion.

Another thing I proposed was, to shew that *Plato* asserts the *ψυχή* (Soul) to have been created by the Supreme God. It is *Plato's* constant Opinion throughout his works, and a Principal Argument by which he proves the Immortality of the Soul, that it is ἀ-γέννητῃ ingenerable and therefore ἀλυτῇ indissol-veable and Immortal. This way of argumentation plainly supposes it to have been created; it being evidently opposed to the opinion that the Soul is derived, *ex traduce* as they say, from the Parent, as the Body is. So that the only Question will be, by whom *Plato*, thought the Soul to have been created; whether by the Supreme God, or by those lower common People of Deities, whom you call *Demiurgical*? I wish you had refer'd us to the place in the *Timæus*, where, as you say, *Plato* affirms the Soul to have been created by these inferiour Deities: for I cannot find throughout the whole Treatise that he says any such thing. And I am inclined to believe he does not; because I think I have place before me now wherein he says the quite contrary; expressly affirming the Soul to have been created by the Supreme God, and the Body onely by these inferior Deities. His words are these *When therefore, says he, all the Inferiour Deities, as well those*

ἂ Ἐπὶ ἐν παντί, ὅσοι τι περιπολῶσι φανερῶς, ἔ' ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι
Θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχον, λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν, ὁ τὸ δὲ τὸ πᾶν γένεσας, ταὶ δὲ. Θεοὶ δὲ αὖτ' αὐτῶν
δημιουργοὶ, πατήρ τε ἔργου. αἱ δ' ἐμὰ γυναικὶ ἀλυστα ἐμὰ γὰρ θέλοντες. τὸ μὲν ἐν
δὴ διδόν πᾶν λυτὸν, τότε μὴ καλῶς ἀρμωσθῆναι, ἔ' ἔχον εἶναι, λυεῖν ἐθέλων κακῶς. δι' αὐτὴν
ἐπείπερ γὰρ γένεσιν, ἀγανταὶ μὲν ἐκ ἐστὶ, ἐδ' ἀλυστοι τὸ πᾶμπαρ. οὐ μὲν δὴ λυθῆ-
σιν δι' αὐτὴν, ἐδ' ἐκ τούτου γένεσιν μίαν, πῶς ἐμὰς βυλῆσιν μίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῶν
πυρρῶς λαχόντες ἀκρίων, οἷς ὅτ' ἐξήμενοι συνιδέσθαι. νῦν ἐν ὁ λέγει περὶ ὑμῶν ἐν-
δεκνύμεν μὲν μὲν διηγεῖται ἐπὶ γένεσιν λοιπὰ τῶν γένεσιν. τῶν ἐν μὴ γινόμενων, οὐ-

which are visible as those which are invisible, any further than they please to discover themselves to us, were created God who made the Universe spoke thus to them. You Inferiour Deities, that are descended from the Gods attend to what I shall now say to you. All those things, of which I am the Author and framer, depend solely upon my will, and Pleasure, and therefore are indissolweable, because they have been made by me. For tho' whatever is made be capable of being dissolved, yet it is not the part of Goodness to annihilate, that, which has been once framed and established by Wisdom; therefore altho' because you have been produced, you cannot be Incorruptible and Immortal, yet you shall never perish, nor stand obnoxious to Death; because you depend upon my Will, which is a much stronger Basis to support your Existence upon, than that you were settled upon by your Creation. And now attend diligently to what I shall further inform you of. There are you must know three kinds of Creatures, still to be made, which must be generable and therefore Mortal, without which the Creation would not be Perfect, as not comprehending all sorts of Animals, which it ought in order to its perfect completion. But if these things should be made by, and have Life from me, they would be equal to the Gods. That therefore they may be Mortal, and the World Compleat, I would have you set about the creating these Animals, according to the Laws of Nature, imitating herein the Power I manifested in creating you. And as

ἰανὸς ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσ. α. τῇ 25 ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ὡς ἐξ ἑ. δι' δὲ ἐμὲ καὶ τι-
 λει⁹ ἰκανῶς εἶναι. δι' ἐμὲ δὲ ταῦτα ἡγοῦμαι ὅτι βίη μετατρέπονται, οἷος ἰσχυροί⁹
 εἰ. ἢ στήθεα τῇ ἢ, τό τε πᾶν οἷον ἄσπευ ἢ, τρεῖς ποταμοὶ καὶ φύσιν ὑμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τῷ ζώ-
 ον δημιουργήσαν, μεμάρμερον τῷ ἡμῶν διαταμί. ὅτι τῷ ὑμῶν ἡντινέν. καὶ κατ' ὅσον
 αἱ κτῆν ἐπὶ σπέντοις ἐμάνοντο οἷον σπέντονται; οἷος λαοὶ ἡντινέν, ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐπὶ αὐ-
 τοῖς τῷ ἀνδρῶν, ἐμάν ἡντινέν ἡντινέν, σπέντονται καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῷ πᾶσι τοῖς
 τοῖς δὲ λαοῖν ὑμῖν, ἀντιμετρεῖται οἷον ἀντιμετρεῖται, ἀντιμετρεῖται ὡς καὶ ἡντινέν
 &c. Timaeus p. 41.

for that one sort of these, which is to be called Divine and to have something of the Nature of the Immortal Gods, which is to be a lover of Justice and Worshiper of the Deity, I will give to you the Principle of Life and beginning of him, and do you finish the work by framing and adding that which is Mortal to the Immortal part, that I shall give you &c. From this passage of the *Timæus* I think it is evident, that God created the Soul, and that these inferiour Deities, onely framed the Body, and united the Immortal part, the Soul, which they received from the hands of the Supreme God, to the Mortal part, the Body, which themselves had framed. And this is also further apparent, from what follows in the next words, where 'tis said that God took out of the Cup in which he had made the Soul of the Universe, something out of which he made the Soul of Man. And therefore *Serranus*,^a in his marginal Observation upon this place takes notice, that tho' God commits the framing of Bodies to second Causes (of which he interprets these inferiour Deities to be meant) yet the Power of making Souls he reserves wholly to himself. I hope I shall be excused if from this passage of *Plato* I make an observation, which tho' not so pertinent to the point I am now upon, yet is agreeable enough to the general Subject of these Papers, namely, That we may from hence learn, in what sense God is said to be ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασία, viz. because he has Immortality solely and independently from himself, whereas all Created Beings, whether Angels

^a Corporum creandorum curam causis secundis tribuit Dens: ipse vero sibi soli Auctoritatem animorum creandorum reservavit: ne quid potestatis in animos nostros de insanorum hominum sententia tribuamus. And *Minutius Felix* representing *Plato's* Opinion concerning God, tells us he looked upon him as Animæ Artifex the framer of the Soul.

or the Souls of Men, tho' they be ever so much Immortal in their own Nature, by having none of those Principles or seeds of Corruption in them, which render Bodies obnoxious to decay and dissolution, yet are they still dependent upon the Will of God, who, by onely withholding the general concurrence of his Providence, by which their existence is upheld, can immediately make them sink into nothing.

From all this that I have here said, and a great deal more that might have been said, it cannot I suppose, be any longer doubted what *Plato's* Opinion, Notions and Language have been upon this point of deriving Immortality from the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*.) And this makes me not so very solicitous to know how far his Philosophy was received and approved in the Apostolic Age: notwithstanding it must, I think, be confess'd to be that System, which then was most admired, and chiefly prevailed. *Philo* and *Josephus* often allude to the Notions, and sometimes make use of the Terms of the *Platonic* Philosophy: the Apocryphal writers more rarely. The Hellenistic stile does not require, that we should acknowledge any of the *Platonic* Language to have been mix'd with it, (which nevertheless may sometimes have happen'd) since it's difference from the ordinary Greek is onely this, that it being most commonly writ and spoke by Jews, abounds very much with the Idiotisms of the *Hebrew* Tongue, and barbarisms, which such as wrote it, before they thoroughly understood it could not but be guilty of. The New Testament writers, excepting onely *St. John*, rarely, if at all, make use of any Terms of Philosophic Writers. They, Good Men

Men, contented themselves with the most plain simple, unaffected manner of writing making use most commonly of such forms of Language as were most vulgarly received. When they spoke even of the Mysteries of our Faith, they never went about to explain their Notions of them, according to the doctrine of any admired System of Philosophy, or made use of the Cant and Jargon of any School, but as they received these Truths in the native Simplicity of them, so they deliver'd them down to others with the same Simplicity. There is therefore no need, at least in this Controversy, to derive the Notions we meet with in Scripture concerning the Soul as far as *Plato* and *Pythagoras*. But if you will allow these terms $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, $N\tilde{\alpha}s$, and $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron s$ to be meant in the signification I have given of them, and I believe it will be found a hard matter to prove that they are ever used in any other, I don't greatly care if I grant to you that $\pi\nu\tilde{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha$ in Scripture, when 'tis applyed to Man, does sometimes stand for the same as $N\tilde{\alpha}s$ and $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron s$ in *Plato*. As *1 Cor. II. 11. What Man knoweth the things of a Man, save the Spirit of a Man that is in him*: that is, tho' no one can perceive another's thoughts till they be manifested by some signs, yet the Spirit or Understanding of a Man is always conscious to his own thoughts. But most commonly in Scripture $\pi\nu\tilde{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha$, when spoken of Man, is to be understood in the same sense as $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (*Soul*), as might be shewn, were it needful, by a great number of Instances.

You say the reason why the Scripture calls *that* by the name $\pi\nu\tilde{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha$, which the *Platonists* call $N\tilde{\alpha}s$ or $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron s$ is because the Scriptures ascribe that *superior Power* in Man, which the word $\pi\nu\tilde{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha$ signifies to a
Divine

Divine Breathing Gen. II. 7. Here I am at some loss to know what you mean by the *superior Power* in Man. If you mean by it the $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (Soul,) then I perfectly agree with you, that the Soul is in Scripture sometimes called $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, and for that very reason which you mention, and think the learning that follows, which you have drawn from the Heathen writers, to be very well and properly applyed. But then I am quite at a stand to find how this observation can any way be thought pertinent to the Design you profess to drive at in this Section. But if, as I rather think by this *superior Power* in Man you mean something distant from, and independent upon the Soul, namely, that divine Spirit, which you say is communicated to the Faithfull at their Baptism, and upon which their Hopes of Immortality are entirely founded, then I cannot imagin how you will be able to reconcile your observation in this place, with the Hypothesis you advance throughout this Dissertation. For if Man received this $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, this *Superior Power*, or Divine Spirit, when God breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, then it plainly follows he does not receive it by his Baptism, or second Birth, but by his Nativity, or first Birth. This and the like inconsistencies, which in this Dissertation you frequently fall into, make me with sorrow think, that your Case in this dispute is not altogether unlike *Cæcilius's* in *Minucius Felix*, and to take the Liberty of applying to you what *Octavius* says concerning him: *Nec dissimulabo ita Natalis mei errantem, vagam, lubricam nutasse sententiam, ut sit nobis ambigendum, utrum tua eruditio turbata sit, an vacillaverit per errorem.*

From *Plato* you go on to *Philo Judæus*, and say,
That

That He as nearer to the Apostles, whilst they were under the Prejudices of their Jewish Education, comes nearer to them in his Expressions upon this Matter. What ground you had to think the Apostles were of your Opinion, as to the Natural Mortality of the Soul, or as to our receiving Immortality from the Divine Spirit I have already consider'd. And in order to discover more certainly what *Philo's* Notions were concerning this matter I shall do these two things. *First*, shew in what sense *Philo* uses the words $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (*Soul*), and $\Pi\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*Spirit*) and what Notions he had concerning the things signified by these words. *Secondly*, I shall consider how far those passages you have cited from this Author, and the Arguments you have rais'd from his Doctrine make out the truth of your Opinion of Immortality by the $\Pi\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*Spirit*.)

As to the first of these the word $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ stands always in *Philo*, as it does in *Plato*, to signify the *Soul*, that other Substantial part of Man, which together with the Body, makes up and constitutes the Human *Compositum*, and I believe there is no place to be found in *Philo*, when he speaks of Man, wherein this word can signify any thing else. And therefore I think it needless to endeavour to prove *that* by alledging places out of this Author, which, I am sure, no one that has been ever so little conversant in *Philo's* writings will have the confidence to deny. By the word $\Pi\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (*Spirit*) he commonly understands the Spiritual or immaterial Nature of the Soul of Man, and therefore he often makes use of this word for that which may not improperly be call'd the Essence of the Rational Soul. Thus in a Treatise, concerning the Sacrifices of *Cain* and

Abel

Abel, intituled *de eo quod deterius potiori insidiari solet*, speaking concerning the formation of Man: ^a *When first, says he, the frame of Heaven and Earth, and the Elements was finished he that made the other Animals, making Man also, is said to have Breathed into his Face the Breath of Life, and this Breath of Life was the enlivening Soul. The Scripture designing to teach us that the [soul] the Essence or Substance of the Soul consists in it's being a Spirit. And a little further speaking more particularly concerning the Soul's being infused by God. ^b That Soul, says he, which proceeds and comes forth out of the rational Fountain, or, as one may say, out of the heap of Souls, is a Spirit, not a mere Breath or motion of the Air, but the Image and Representation of the Divine Power which Moses very properly calls the Image of God, intimating to us, that God is the Archetype of the rational Nature, and Man only the Image and Representation: by man not meaning the Animal made up of those two natures, but that which is most excellent in the Soul Understanding and Reason: the Soul therefore that piece of Divine Workmanship by which we Reason and Understand, is, according to Philo's reasoning in this place properly the Man, and not that which is made up of Both. From these and many more places which might be produced to this Purpose, I think it very plainly to appear, that Philo by $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\pi\acute{\nu}\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ meant nothing else but the rational Spiritual Soul, in respect of which, accord-*

a Οποτι δὲ πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν καὶ γῆς, καὶ τῇ μετὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ἀνδρῶν ποτὶ ὁ ζωοποιός, φησὶν, ὅτι ἐνέφυσεν εἰς τὸ ὡσεύσπον αὐτῷ πνεῦμα ζωῆς, καὶ ἐξήλθον το εἰς ψυχὴν ζωῆς, πάλαι λέγει τὸ παλαιόν, ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐστὶ ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία. b Ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς ἀπορρίπτειται πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα, οὐκ αἴμα κινῆμεν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον καὶ χαρακτηριστικὰ δοῖας διὰ τὴν οὐρανίαν κυρίαν Μωϋσῆος εἰκοσι καλεῖ, δηλῶν ὅτι ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα λογικῆς ὁ Θεὸς ἐστὶ, μετὰ τὸ ἵε ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνδρῶν, οὐ τὸ δι-
φως ζῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀρτι εἶδος, ὁ νῦν καὶ λόγος κυκλῆται p. 132. Edit. Genev.

ing to his Opinion, we are said to be made after the Image of God, and to bear his Resemblance. The Immortality of which, arising from it's Spiritual Nature, as derived from God, he frequently asserts. Particularly in his Treatise of Dreams, where he comments upon that part of *Jacob's Dream* wherein God appeared to him and promised to bring him back again to the Country, from whence he fled *Gen. XXVIII. 15.* after his Mystical and Allegorical way of Interpretation, he tells us : *That by God's promising to bring Jacob back may be intimated the Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality. In as much as the Soul, leaving its Heavenly abode, goes into a strange Country. And therefore the maker of it promises that he will not suffer it to be detained in the Prison of the Body, but mercifully loosing the bands of it's union with it, and having set it at Liberty, will bring it back again to it's Heavenly Country.* Now tho' I neither approve of our Author's interpretation of this place of Scripture, nor yet of his reasoning from it, yet I think it a very proper and sufficient declaration, of his Opinion and Judgment in this matter. Indeed *Philo* being a *Platonist*, and therefore holding the Preexistence of the Soul, we find him frequently affirming the *Πνεῦμα* or *Soul* to descend from Heaven into the Body it informs, and from thence arguing and inferring it's return thither again. And this, it may be, was the unhappy occasion of your fancying this *Πνεῦμα*, *this divine Spirit*, which in *Philo* is always, when applied to Man,

α' Ἰσως δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς ὑπερίπτεται δόγμα Ἀλφ. τῶν. ἀπολιπὼν
σε μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἐράνιον τόπον — καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐνὶ χρεὶν ἤλθε τὸ σῶμα. φησὶ δ' ἐμὲ
χρεὶν πάντος καθεργαζέμεν αὐτὸν ὁ θρόνος πρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' οἷός τις λα-
τρεῖν λυθεὶν τὰ δεινὰ, καὶ ἐλθεῖν ἄχρι τῆς μητροπόλεως, ἀσφαλῶς παραπίμψον. p.

to be taken for the Soul, to be something distinct from it, which descending into it made it live for ever.

Hitherto I think it is plain that *Philo* is so far from being of your Opinion in this matter, that he speaks very full and home against you. Let us therefore in the next place consider those citations you have made out of him, and see whether they can be thought to give in any plainer evidence and surer verdict to your Opinion in this dispute. The first place you alledge is in his Treatise concerning the Creation of the World, where commenting upon those words, and God breathed into his Face the Breath of Life, he says, that the sacred Historian in those words manifestly declares *a very great difference to be between the Man that was then framed, and the image according to which he was made. For that the Man which was framed was visible and sensible, had qualities, was made up of a Body and Soul, was either Man or Woman, and naturally Mortal. But that, after the Image of which this was framed, was only an Idea, or Form, or general Representation of Man, intellectual, incorporeal, neither male nor female, and naturally incorruptible. But he tells us that the Composition of the particular visible Man was of an earthy substance, and divine*

α Εναρξίσταται καὶ διὰ τὸτο παύσασθαι ὁπδιαφορὰ πάμμιζήτης ἐν τῷ πῶν πλα-
στῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ μεγάλου ἀετοῦ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλ-
πλαστῆς καὶ αἰσθητός, μιμητικὸς ποιότητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνίσταται, ἀνὴρ
ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός. ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα πᾶς, ἢ ἄλλος, ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός,
ἀσώματος, ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφ' ὧν φέρεται φύσει. τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητοῦ ἐπὶ μέρος
ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατὰ φύσιν συνήθειαν εἰς αὐτὸν φησὶ ἐκ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὅτι, ὅτι πνεύματι δίδωται.
μεγαλύνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν σῶμα, γὰρ τὴν πᾶν λατύνεται, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ αὐτοῦ
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πᾶν τὸν δὲ ψυχῆν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φέρεται τὸ παρὰ τὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν πα-
ρῶν καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν. τὸ γὰρ εἰς φύσιν, οὐδὲν ἢ ἵππερ ἢ πνεύματι δίδωται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
κατασκευάζεται καὶ ἐκ αἵματος ἐκείνης φύσεως. ἀπὸ τοῦ πᾶν ἐκ αὐτοῦ φέρεται ὅτι
ἐκ γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αἱ καὶ θνητοὶ ἐκ κατὰ τὴν ὁρατὴν μετρίαν κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀόρατον ἀ-
φανισμένην. p. 23.

Spirit. (For his Body was framed by the great Artificer, who taking Earth fashioned it into a human shape. But the Soul was made of no created matter, but proceeded from the Father and Governour of all. For as to what he says, he Breathed &c. nothing else can be meant by it, but a divine Spirit proceeding and coming from his Blessed and Spiritual nature, sent into our Bodies as into a Colony for the advantage of Mankind, who altho' as to their visible part they are Mortal, yet as to their invisible part are Immortal.) In this place *Philo* plainly indeed makes a distinction between the Man that was framed out of the Earth, and the Image or Idea in the divine Mind, according to the pattern of which the other was made. And this is, in truth, all that *Philo* in this and most other places of his writings means, when he distinguishes between the ἀνδρῶν αἰσθητῆς, and ὁ νῦν ἀγαπᾶσθαι, the sensible Man, which then at the Creation was framed, and the ἀνδρῶνος κατ' εἰκόνα, the Ideal Man, if I may so speak, after the Image and Resemblance of which the first Man was made. This Image or Idea is said to be ὁ πρότερον γεγονῶς to be made first for no other reason but this, because the Deity is according to this Philosophy supposed to have conceived in his mind the exemplar or pattern of the work before he set about the performing it. And that this (which is very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Plato*, whom *Philo* followed) is all, that is meant by this distinction appears plainly from *Philo's* own words. For when he describes these two Men (if I may so call them) does he not expressly say that the first is onely an *Idea*, or general Representation or signature (σφραγίς) of Man purely intellectual, incorporeal, neither Male, &c. but the other, that is the Man framed according to this Idea or Pattern

is sensible, corporeal, has qualities? &c. If it be said that Philo declares his opinion clearly enough concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, by affirming that this second Man is φύσει θνητός naturally Mortal, we shall find that in the words immediately following he very fully explains what he means by that: "Therefore, says he, Man may properly be said to partake both of the Mortal, and Immortal Nature, and to be both Mortal, and Immortal; Mortal, as to his Body, and Immortal, as to his Soul." And therefore if when you here affirm, what you say Philo owns, that by the Benefit of the Πνεῦμα Θεῖον, the divine Spirit, the more ignoble part becomes immortal, you mean by the divine Spirit the Soul, and by the more ignoble part the Body, I readily agree this to be a true representation of Philo's sense, he always understanding by the Spirit, when he speaks of Man, nothing else but the Soul: but then I cannot imagin how this can be to your purpose to prove the Soul naturally Mortal, or that all our title to Immortality is by the Πνεῦμα (Spirit) as something distinct from the Soul.

And from hence we may easily learn what the Platonists mean by their παραδείγματα, their ιδέας, their εἰκόνες, the Exemplars, Ideas, and Images of earthly things, which they say are in the divine λόγος, or mind, namely, nothing else but such Representations or Patterns of them, as were in the divine Mind, before he created the World, and according to the Model, if I may so speak, of which, all things were made. These Archetypes are indeed Incorruptible and Immortal, because they exist no where, but in the Di-

α Διὸ καὶ κελεύειν ἂν τις εἴποι, τὸν ἀνδραποῦ θνητῆς καὶ ἀθνητῆς φύσεως εἶναι μέγιστον, ἑκατέρως ὡςτις ἀναγωγὴν εἰς μετέχουσα, καὶ ἀλλοτρίωσιν θνητῶν ὅμως ἐκ ἀθνητων, θνητῶν μὴ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ δὲ τῇ ἀλγομένῃ ἀθνητων. Ibid.

vine Intellect. And that this is all which *Philo* means by his twofold *Νεὺς* (*Mind*) we have the Opinion of one, who certainly was as great a Master of the *Platonic* Philosophy as any in these later times, I mean *Augustinus Steuchius Eugubinus* who tells us * *That when Philo introduces two Minds one above us, the other our own, he means by that above us, the Archetype of ours according to the Pattern of which ours was formed.* It must likewise be confess'd, That the *Ectypes* or things framed after this model, receive their *ἰδιότητες*, their essential differences, according to these Patterns, and that particular Men have likewise their Immortality with their *τὸ πᾶν*, or their being framed after these Patterns, in as much as they have an Immortal Soul, thereby infused into them. It cannot indeed be denied that the sacred Writers of the New Testament derive all Human Immortality from the *λόγος*, the second Person in the Blessed Trinity. But then by human Immortality we must be obliged to understand the Immortality of the Man, and not of the Soul onely. And the reason is very plain, because Christ by Dying and Rising again deserved to be constituted supreme Lord of the Dead and the Living; since by having thereby the Keys of Death and Hell deliver'd to him, he has from thence the Power given him to Raise our Bodies from the Dust, and to reunite them to our Souls, whereby the whole Person will be made Immortal. But from these forms of Expression and Notions of the Platonists, *Philo*, or the New Testament Writers, it cannot I think with the

a Duas mentes inducit Philon, alteram supra nos, alteram nostram, quæ supra nos nostrum dicit esse Archetypum, nos ad similitudinem ejus esse creatos. De perenni Philosophia lib. I. cap. 8.

least probability be inferr'd that our Title to Immortality as to our Souls depends upon any thing but the nature of the Soul : which being a Spirit, and of so noble an Extraction as to be an irradiation, as it were of the Divinity it self, and to proceed from God, tho' it does indeed, as all other things do, depend upon the will of it's maker, yet is incapable of Dissolution from any Principles of Corruption within it self, or from any influence or operation of any thing from without it.

You say, *Philo owns the distinction of the two Men elsewhere.* And for this you refer us to p. 49, 50, 56, 57. of the *Paris* Edition of his works, where in his Book of Allegories he mentions indeed two Men, the *ἄνθρωπος πεπλασµένος* and the *ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα*, whom tho' he understands here in somewhat a different sense, from that in which he meant them in the above cited places, yet his meaning here is such as will by no means serve your Purpose. Indeed this whole Book containing the most Mystical, Abstruse, and Allegorical Interpretations of Scripture, as it is very difficult in many places of it to understand the true sense and meaning of this Author, so I take this to be a very improper Treatise to found an Argument for any singular opinion upon. I cannot however see any Reason, why we may not understand *Philo's* two Men here, of one and the same Man, onely under different Circumstances and Habitues: as we commonly speak concerning any one that is very much alter'd in the Circumstances either of his Body or Mind, that he is not the same Man as before. In like manner the *ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα*, or the *ἐκαστος τῶν ἰδεῶν γεγονώς* in those places can I think be understood of no other than the first Man, as he came

pure and perfect out of the hands of his Maker, endowed and adorn'd with all those Graces and Virtues, which, if he had not fallen, would have exalted his nature to the highest degrees of Perfection, and made it plainly divine. What else can be the meaning of those words? ὁ μὲν ἔν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν γενο-
 ῦναι, & μόνος ἐν ταῖς Φυτουργίαις τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐξετάζεται, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἐργασίας αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐφύλαξ. *He that was framed after the Idea of God, is not onely to be look'd upon as the very Seed-Plot of Virtue, but also to be an exact Practiser and faithful Observer of Virtue.* Whereas the other Man is not indeed another, but the same, onely alter'd by the fall, and made different from what he was, whilest in a state of Innocence, Virtue, and Perfection. Therefore he here calls him φυγὰς ἀρετῆς, one that has fled from Virtue. And if this be not the true sense of these very obscure and allegorical places in *Philo* I think it not worth the while anxiously to enquire what is: since the private Opinion or Authority of *Philo* will weigh but little with those, who can never be satisfied with any thing less then sound Reason or plain Scripture to make good so great a Paradox as this concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, which is not onely so much beside, but even against the common sense of Mankind. But if this be *Philo's* meaning here, we ought not to wonder that he gives the Name of *Adam* to both these Men, or rather to this same Man consider'd under these different Circumstances. This Interpretation likewise will give a very easy & probable Account how this Man, when he became φυγὰς ἀρετῆς, might very properly be said to fall from the Λόγος, and how it may be the Duty, as you express it, of the Λόγος to restore him to the same dignity again

again, whether by the *Λόγος* be to be understood the essential rectitude of the divine Nature, or whether we be to understand by it the second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. For in both these senses Man by his fall may be properly said to have departed and fallen from the *Λόγος*, and in both senses but especially in the last *Christ* was to restore us, as far as in this state we are capable, to that rectitude of our Nature, which by the fall of our first Parents, and our descent from them we have unhappily lost. And when *Philo* speaks concerning the *Coloni* that are sent down from the *Λόγος*, he means nothing but the Souls of Men sent into their Bodys as into a Colony, to cultivate and improve them by Virtue. And this is what in other places he calls the Agriculture of the Soul. But I do not find that he any where makes these *Coloni* to be any sort of Principle superadded to the Soul, by which it becomes Immortal. Nor does *St. Peter 2 Ep. I. 4.* by *the divine Nature* mean any thing besides a Holy and Divine Life, instituted according to Rules of the strictest virtue: since he plainly tells those to whom he wrote that they are made partakers of it upon no other Condition, than their *having escaped the Pollution that is in the World thro' Lust*. As to what you apply to this purpose out of *Dan. 11. 11.* who tells us concerning the Holy Gods, whose Spirit alone could discover to *Nebuchadenezzar* his Dream, and the Interpretation of it, that their *dwelling is not with Flesh*, and out of *Homer* that they are *δούματα δέματ' έχοντες* I cannot, I must confess, divine to what end or Purpose you should mention these Passages. For does *Daniel* speak any thing in this place concerning the Soul? Nay does he not speak expressly

expressly concerning the Deities whom the *Babylonians* worshipped? so v. 28. he tells the King *there is a God in Heaven that revealeth secrets.* And again Chap. V. 11. the Queen speaking to *Belsazzar* concerning *Daniel* tells him, that *there was a Man in his Kingdome in whom was the Spirit of the Holy Gods --- and Wisdom like the Wisdom of the Gods was found in him.* In all which places there is nothing less without all doubt meant than what you apply this Text to. Nor can *Homer* be understood to speak of any thing else, besides those Deities, which, according to the Mythic History of the Poets, have their distinct seats, residence, and as it were mansion Houses in their Fabulous Heaven. And tho' by the advantage of a heated imagination some have fancied they have found I know not what Prophetic Mysteries in *Virgil's* fourth Eclogue, and that by the *nova progenies* &c. there nothing less than our Saviour's Nativity could be meant, yet I must confess I can see no reason to think any thing more to be there understood, than what the obvious sense, & natural Construction of the words does import. The Poet designing nothing more by them than to pass a strong Compliment upon *Asinius Pollio*, upon the Birth of whose son he made those Verses. How far the Sibyll, from whose Verses this thought was taken and applied by *Virgil* to *Pollio's* son might be inspired is not my Business to enquire, and, be that as it will, it seems by what goes before *Fam redit* &c. which glances upon *Augustus*, in representing the happiness they enjoyed under his Government, that nothing of that sense which you give to these words could be meant by them. *St. Paul* alledging the Authority, and making use of the Phrase

of

of *Aratus* does indeed call us the Offspring of God, but certainly in no other sense than as we are created by him. And in this sense Men are frequently represented in Scripture to bear the relation of sons to God. Thus *Isaiah* LXIII. 16, *Doubtless thou art our Father, tho' Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not.* And so the Prophet *Malachi* represents God expostulating with Men. *If then I be a Father, where is my Honour?* In which places, and many others which might be mention'd, God is in no other respect said to be our Father, than by his having created us.

CHAP. IV. ad §. 8.

Our Authors weak reasoning from the Heath'n Originals (as he calls 'em) of Scripture. The true Notion of the Heathens concerning Hades and Tartarus. All wicked Souls were supposed by the Poets, and are represented in the Scriptures to be punished in Tartarus. A future Judgment and punishment for the wicked known, tho' not so certainly, before the coming of our Saviour. The Devil known to be and proclaimed a Traitor before the Preaching of the Gospel. Our Author's weak Reasoning from Matt. XXII. 12. Man said to be equal to the Angels upon account of his Soul, and not upon the Score of any adscititious Spirit. The true sense of 1 Pet. III. 19. No argument to be thence drawn to our Author's Purpose.

AFTER having done with *Plato* and *Philo*, your next step is to shew §. 8. that Immortality by the πνεῦμα is also agreeable to those Heathen Originals, from whence the Phrases of the New Testament concerning this matter are derived. Such is the Title you give to this Section, which otherwise I could hardly

ly have thought you could have design'd to be a proof of this Position. The arguments in it are so far fetched, and hardly applicable to the point you drive at, that 'tis no easy matter to understand how they can infer, or so much as remotely have any respect to it. However, as far as I understand them, I think the first of them, may amount to thus much. You say that this divine Spirit of Immortality was *τῆς Φύσεως*, and such as thro' an ill use of their free will might make Men deserve and incur a punishment which was as unlimited and infinite as that duration to which by this Spirit they were intituled. Thus, you say, it was in the case of *Saturn*, and the Poetical *Titans* and *Giants*, and those Hellenistical *Giants* mention'd *Gen. VI.* and those sons of *Seth*, who you say, were Angels, and from whose congress with the daughters of *Cain* these Scripture *Giants* were descended. All these, together with the Apostate Angels, were you say condemned to be thrown into *flaming and eternal Fire, into Tartarus, the nethermost Hell, and deepest part of Hades.* And this place, you say, the Poets represent as intended for Immortal Criminals, and not for ordinary Souls: intimating, as I suppose, thereby, that such ordinary Souls as were not condemn'd to this place were not so Spiritualized as to become Immortal. Before I consider your notion concerning *Hades* I think it necessary to observe what the force of the Consequence you here deduce may arise to. Your Argument, if I rightly apprehend it, stands thus. Such Souls as were condemned to the nethermost Hell, or the outward Darkeness were *Pneumatical*, and thereby Immortal; therefore, as I think you infer, such as were not condemn'd to this part of Hell were Mortal. But where, in the name of

of *Aristotle*, lies the Logic of this inference? How can you with any shadow of reason conclude that because those Souls were Immortal, therefore others were not so? Would it not be much more probable reasoning to infer the Immortality of all the Souls in *Hades* from the Immortality of these, rather than the contrary? But you will perhaps say these were Immortal not because condemned to that place, but because they were *Pneumatical*. If by their being *Pneumatical*, you mean that they were Spirits, the same I affirm concerning the other Souls in *Hades*. But if you mean by their being *Pneumatical* that they had received I know not what Immortalizing Spirit superadded to, and distinct from the spiritual nature and substance of their Souls, this is begging that which is to be proved, and therefore may be as easily denied, as 'tis by you asserted. And indeed the ordinary Souls in *Hades* are supposed by the Poets to be equally *Pneumatical* with these *Giants* and *Titans*: These having no advantage over the other, having been Men as well as they, tho' perhaps of a larger size, and having been made up of the same substances, of Soul and Body as other men are. As to *Hades*, nothing else was meant by it in general among the writers of the Mythic Story, besides the place of departed Souls, and it is by the Poets, and more especially by *Virgil*^a represented as divided into two parts: one call'd *Elysium* for the good and happy Souls, the other call'd *Tartarus* for such as were to be punished. This

a Hic locus est partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub moenia tendit,
Hac iter *Elysium* nobis: at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas & ad impia *Tartara* mittit.

Aeneid. VI. 540.

^a *Hesiod*,

^a *Hesiod*, ^b *Homer*, and after them ^c *Virgil* represent to be within the Earth, as far below the surface, as that is below the Heaven. And therefore *Hesiod*, and *Homer* call it *Τάρταρον ἡρόεντα*, *dark Tartarus*, and ^d *Apollodorus* tells us it is the darkest place of *Hades*. *Virgil* ^e indeed supposes, that the *Titans* were tormented in the very lowermost part of *Tartarus*, but then he describes ordinary Souls to be there punished, as well as these: such as the *Lapitha*, *Ixion*, *Pirithous*, and others, who are represented as being punished there either for wanting affection for their Brothers, or duty to their Parents, or for being Covetous, &c. So that *Tartarus* is by the Poets represented as the common place of punishment, not onely for such as, you say, were *Pneumatical* and *Immortal*, but even for those which you call ordinary Souls. There

a Τάρταρον ἡρόεντα ὡς τὸ γῆς, ὅσον ἑρπιδὸς ἐστὶ δὲ γαίης

Ἰσὺν γὰρ τὸ δὲ γῆς ἐστὶ τάρταρον ἡρόεντα. *Hesiod. Theogon. v. 720.*

b Τάρταρον ἡρόεντα ὡς τὸ γῆς, ὅσον οὐρανὸς ἐστὶ δὲ γαίης. *Homer Iliad. O. v. 16.*

c Tum Tartarus ipse

Bis patet in præceptis tantum, tenditque sub umbras

Quantus ad ætherium cæli suspectus Olympum. *Aeneid. VI. 577.*

Indeed *Virgil* has a little improved the thought he received from the antienter Poets, and made *Tartarus* in this place to be twice as far distant from the surface of the Earth, as that is from Heaven. And *Milton* makes it still farther,

As far removed from God, and light of Heav'n

As from the Center thrice to th' utmost Pole.

d Τὸν δὲ Νέερος ἡρόεντος ἐστὶν ἐν ἡδὺς. *Apollod. Biblioth. lib. i. cap. i.*

e Hic genus antiquum terræ, Titania pubes,

Fulmine dejecti, fundo volvuntur in imo.

Ubi sup. v. 580.

f Quid inemorem Lapithas, Ixiona, Pirithoumque?

Quos super atra ferox jamjam lapsura, cadentique

Imminet adfunilis. ——— And a little further

Hic quibus invili stantes, dum vita manebat

Pulsatusve Parens, & fraus innexa clienti:

Aut qui divitiis soli incubuere repertis

Nec partem posuere suis. ———

Quique ob Adulterium cæsi, quique arma secuti

Impia, nec veriti dominorum fallere dextras

Inclusi panam expectant. ———

Ubi supra.

can therefore be no inference made concerning the diversity of their natures from the diversity of their places of Punishment : since I think it plainly appears from the Authorities I have produced that *Tartarus* was thought to be the common place of Punishment, as well for those, which you call Immortal Criminals, as for those which you call ordinary Souls.

Nor do the sacred Writers, whether of the old or new Testament make any difference between the Place, where the Apostate Angels were punished, and that where the Souls of Wicked Men are tormented till the Day of Judgment; tho' they make some difference between the degrees of their Punishment. True indeed it is, what the Scriptures of the New Testament assure us that Hell was prepared for the Devil and his Angels, primarily and chiefly, but yet not onely for them, or exclusively of Wicked Men. For as we are assured in Scripture, that the Righteous have had a Kingdome prepared for them from the Foundation of the World (which, tho' they will not be admitted to the full Possession of till the Day of Judgment, yet have all Righteous men, ever since the Foundation, of it been, upon their Departure out of these Bodies, admitted to some share of) so we ought not to doubt, but that the Wicked have had a Portion and Punishment as long laid up in store for them to undergo with those Apostate Spirits, for whom it was at first prepared. And accordingly we find an everlasting Punishment threaten'd to the Wicked even in the old Testament, long before the Preaching and Promulgation of the Gospel, and this such as has never been understood of any other than that they were to share with the Devil and his Angels. Innumerable are the Places in the Old Testament

Testament; which the Antient Fathers interpreted in this sense. As *Deut. XXXII. 22.* where God to deter the Jews from Idolatry tells 'em: *That a Fire was kindled in his Anger, and should burn unto the LOWEST Hell.* A Jewish Expofitor interprets in his *Anger* by *in medio Gebenna, in the middle of Hell.* And *St. Hierome*^a in his Commentary upon *Isaiah LXIII.* tells us that the sense of this place is: *That the Fire and Vengeance of God shall always burn and pursue sinners even to Hell.* Such as was the rich Man in the Gospel, who was Clothed in Purple, who was Tormented in everlasting Flames. So all those places in *Job*, and the *Psalms* where the LXXII. translate the Hebrew word *Sched* by *ἄδης*, have always been understood to be meant not of a Temporal onely, but of an Eternal Death, as that signifies an Eternal Punishment in Hell. Thus *Psalms IX. 18.* *The Wicked shall be turned into Hell, eis τὸν ἄδην, and all the Nations that forget God.* And again *Psalms LX. 15.* *Let Death seize upon them, and let them go down quick into Hell eis ἄδην ζῶντας; for wickedness is in their dwellings and among them.* And so *Solomon*, representing the wretched Fate of such simple ones, as turn in to the strange Woman says *Prov. IX. 18.* *But he knoweth not that the Dead are there, and that her Guests are in the depths of Hell.* The Translation, which the LXXII. give us of this place is somewhat peculiar: *ὁ δὲ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι γηρεῖς παρ' αὐτῇ ὁλλώμεται καὶ ἐπὶ πέτρων ἄδης συναντᾷ.* But the Prophets, and especially *Isaiah* are frequent in such Expressions as plainly declare, the everlasting Fire of Hell to be

^a Testimonii illius *Dem. XXXII.* sensus est quod ignis atque vindicta semper ardeat peccatoribus, & eos usque ad inferos persequatur. Qualis erat & Dives ille in Evangelio Purpuratus, qui eternis torquebatur ardoribus. *Hieron. Comm. in Esai.*

pared for all Wicked Men. Thus *Isaiah* Chap. V. representing the Covetous and Luxurious Life of many of the Jews tells 'em vers. 14. *Therefore Hell has enlarged her self, and open'd her Mouth without Measure, and their Multitude, and their Pomp, and he that rejoiceth shall descend into it.* And again Chap. XIV. where the Prophet represents the Exultation and Triumph of the Israelites, for their deliverance from their Captivity, he introduces them with great Elegance prophetically describing the downfall and ruin of the great oppressour of Nations, the Proud Tyrant of Babylon. vers. 8, 9. *Since thou art laid down no feller is come up against us. Hell from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming it stirreth up the Dead for thee, all the chief ones of the Earth, it hath raised up from their Thrones all the Kings of the Nations.* And then vers. 13. 14, 15. *For thou hast said in thine heart I will ascend into Heaven--- I will ascend above the heights of the Clouds,---- Yet thou shalt be brought down to Hell, to the sides of the Pit.* This, I think, is so plain and evident an assertion, that Wicked Men, who lived before the Preaching of the Gospel, are to be everlastingly punished in Hell, as cannot with the least colour of Reason admit of any evasion. And if we take the Authority of the translation of the LXXII. to be of any force, it is yet more exprefs for the Eternal Punishment of the Wicked in Hell. For they translate, *it stirreth up the Dead for thee*, by *οὐρανὸν ἑγείρει* *οἱ πέντες οἱ γίγαντες*. *All the Giants rise up to thee:* from which it appears that the haughty Monarch of Babylon was to be condemn'd to that place, that same Everlasting Fire, where the *Giants* were punished. And again vers. 15. what is in the Hebrew, *Yet thou shalt be brought down to Hell &c.* they render thus, *נָזַח דָּבָר עַל*

αἰδην κατὰβῆσιν, εἰς τὰ θεμέλια τῆς γῆς. But now thou shalt descend to *αἰδης*, to the very Foundations of the Earth: which seems to denote what you call the nethermost Hell, or lowermost part of Tartarus. This is that Tophet which was ordained and prepared of Old, for Wicked Men, as well as the Apostate Angels, the Pile thereof is Fire, and much Wood, and the Breath of the Lord like a Stream of Brimstone doth Kindle it. *Isaiah XXX. 33.* And further to shew that the Wicked, who lived even before the Promulgation of the Gospel, were to be concerned in this Eternal Punishment, and therefore that their Duration was to be eternal, it may not be improper to mention that Notion, which I find the Jews before the coming of our Saviour had concerning the Second Death. This they supposed to be a punishment in the Life to come. And the *Chaldee* Paraphrase, as the learned *Bp. Pearson* assures us, often makes mention of it. As where he expounds the Text, *Deut. XXXIII. 6.* *Let Reuben live and not die*, thus: *Let Reuben live in Life in the World, and not die the second Death*: So the *Targum* of *Onkelos*. But the *Jerusalem Targum* more expressly: *Let Reuben live in this World, and let him not die the second Death, which the Wicked die in the World to come.* What this second Death is, and that it is not an utter extinction of Being, *St. John*, evidently alluding to this Notion of the Jews *Revelat. XXI. 8*, will sufficiently teach us: *But the Fearful, and the Unbelieving and the Abominable, and Murderers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolaters, and all Liars, shall have their part in the Lake, which Burns with Fire and Brimstone; which is the second Death.* From hence, I think, it may by this time sufficiently appear, that before the Revelation of the Gospel it was abundantly known, that ordi-

ordinary human Souls were made Obnoxious to Eternal Punishments, and this not by virtue of any Spiritualizing Principle, but purely by the force of their own natural Immortality. For, by your own Confession, there is no mention made, nor the least intimation given, of any such Principle, in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, nor could such, as lived before the publication of the Gospel, receive this divine Spirit by any other way than one, which, as I shall hereafter shew, is almost as improbable and extravagant as your *Hypothesis* it self. And as for the Writings of the New Testament, we find them altogether as silent concerning this matter. If the Penmen of those sacred Volumes had designed to reveal a thing, which you confess was utterly unknown before, we cannot suppose they would have done it in any but the most express and clear Terms. But all the arguments you have brought from Scripture to this Purpose, are nothing but some remote Conjectures, founded upon some critical Interpretations of some few words, which after all hardly any one else I believe will be prevailed with to understand in the sense you have put upon them.

It cannot indeed be denied, but that this natural Immortality of the Soul, tho' not first brought to light, yet was set in a clearer and brighter light by the Revelations of the Gospel, which have discover'd to Mankind more of the particular Circumstances, both of the future General Judgment, and of the state and condition of the Good and Bad in the other World, than they could before have been acquainted with. And to this purpose are all those several Texts, which represent Christ's coming to Judge the World, and the punishment of the Wicked to consist in an

exclusion from the Beatific Vision, and their being to suffer Eternal Torments with the Devil and his Angels in the Lake of Fire and Brimston. This punishment, tho' it never was so certainly known till the coming of our Saviour, yet was it not altogether unknown to the World before the Preaching of the Gospel. The Nature and Reason of the things themselves, and the present Frame and Constitution of the Universe, made a future Retribution both for Good and Bad Men appear so highly probable, that Mankind has always lived in a sure hope, and certain Expectation of it. The New Revelation of the Gospel gave indeed greater certainty and evidence to the Truth of that, which by human Reasonings they were before convinced of, by bringing an attestation to, and description of this future State from God himself; but it cannot by any means be thought first to have discover'd it to Mankind. 'Tis true indeed that the Devil, that old Serpent, was more formally and solemnly declared an Enemy to Christ and his Kingdom, by the Promulgation of the Gospel; and therefore 'twas no doubt more highly criminal to joyn with him after that denunciation than before. But it cannot with any probability be from hence inferr'd that it was no sin to joyn with him before, or that he was not known to be an Enemy to Mankind before. The Jews, who were acquainted with the History of the Fall of Man, knew well enough that there was an Immortal Enmity between the Seed of the Woman, and that of the Serpent. They could not be ignorant, that it was the Devil's affecting and endeavouring to Rival and equal the most High, which was the Occasion of his being tumbled down
from

that pitch of Glory, wherein he was first created, into that state of Punishment, wherein he now is, and of his being transform'd from a Beautiful Angel of Light, into a deform'd and infernal Dæmon. They were well acquainted that ever since this fall he bore a most implacable enmity to the Almighty, and that by all means he endeavour'd to oppose and defeat his gracious Purposes and Designs, for the Good of Mankind; and therefore could not be ignorant, that it was a crime of the deepest dy, and which deserved the severest Punishment to join with him. The History of those calamities that befell Holy *Job*, is a sufficient Demonstration, that the Devil was then known to be a Rebel and Traitor to the Almighty; and therefore that it could be no less than High Treason against God, to be of his Party, or to Abet his Cause. And this, no doubt, was the reason that Idolatry was a sin so detestable to God: because as *Moses* assures us, *Deut. XXXII. 17.* when the Israelites sacrificed to strange Gods, *they Sacrificed to Devils, and not to God*: which the Apostle also repeats, and confirms *1 Cor. X. 20.* where he says that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, *they sacrifice to Devils and not to God*. If the Gospel therefore did more loudly, and solemnly proclaim the Devil a Traitor to God and Goodness, it was not certainly to inform Mankind of what they were ignorant of before, but onely to render it more notorious, and by that means to make Men more cautious and wary to avoid his Intrigues and Wiles, and the more diligent and resolute to resist and conquer his Temptations. So that I think from hence we may fairly conclude, that to join with the Devil was as much a Crime, tho', upon ac-

count of some circumstances purely accidental, not so great a one, before as since the Promulgation of the Gospel; and consequently might equally deserve an Eternity of Punishment, tho' not perhaps in so high a Degree.

I agree with you that it was first revealed by the Gospel that our Blessed Lord himself was appointed by God to be the Judge of, and at the last Day to pass sentence upon, *these Apostate Angels and their Accomplices*. But cannot think it will with any force of Argument from hence follow, that such as lived before our Saviour was thus declared to be a Judge, both of the Visible and Invisible World, were to have no relation to, or concern in this Judgment. Our Saviour was doubtless in the foreknowledge and decree of God appointed a Judge from all Eternity: And what if this Decree were not declared till a certain time, does it therefore follow, that such as lived before this time, are to be exempted from his Jurisdiction? You may as well, by the same method of reasoning, restrain the Benefits of our Lord's Death to those onely who lived since the Promulgation of the Gospel, and had it preached to them, as limit his Judicature onely to these. No: most certain it is, that our Lord was from all Eternity design'd, and in the fullness of time declared to be Judge both of the Quick and Dead, of such as lived before, and never heard of the Gospel, as well as of such as have lived since, and have had the Opportunities of enjoying the Advantages of it; and therefore all must have the same relation to and an equal concern in his Judicature.

It is indeed true, what you observe, that our Lord's sentencing him, who came to the Marriage Feast

Feast without the Wedding Garment, to be bound hand and foot, and cast into outer darkness, does intimate, tho' perhaps obscurely, that bad Christians are to share with the Devil in his Punishment. But to what purpose do you make this common observation? Would you conclude from hence that such as either were not invited to the Feast, or being invited did not come, were not liable to punishment? You may with as much Logic infer that because some particular Crimes are threatned, in some places of Scripture, with an eternity of Punishment, that therefore onely those that are guilty of such Crimes shall be eternally Punished. I own that by the Apostate Angels being represented by *St. Jude* as held in chains is implied not onely their confinement to that place whither they stand condemned, but also that if they were not chained they would endeavour to regain the Blissfull seat, from which they are fallen, and to which their Heavenly and Divine Original did at first entitle them. But how, I pray, does this prove, that this is owing to any divine ingredient different from their Spiritual constitution? Is it not their being Spirits, which renders them naturally Immortal? And whilest they are in being (which they must be to all Eternity) how is it possible for them to avoid desiring, tho' without hope of obtaining (which is part of their Torment) to be restored to that state of happiness they have lost? And are not the Souls of Men equally Spiritual, tho' perhaps not so glorious Spirits as the Angels? And therefore does it not from thence follow, that they are of their own nature Immortal, as well as the Angels?

But, you say, *that when human Souls are made equal*

to the Angels by the addition of this adscititious Spirit, they are then qualified for this higher degree of Punishment. I think I have already shewed, that before they could possibly receive, according to your own Hypothesis, this adscititious Spirit, as you call it, Men were threaten'd with, and consequently must have been liable to an eternal Punishment. And further I will venture to affirm that human Souls being equalized to the Angels does not depend upon their receiving any such Spirit. 'Tis upon no other score than their Original Spiritual Nature and Constitution, that they are said to be upon a Level with and equal to the Angels. When God created Man he design'd to join the Visible and Invisible, the upper and lower World together, by framing such a Creature which should partake of both. Man therefore in respect of his Body is of the same nature with the material visible World, and tho' upon account of the far greater dignity of his shape and form he seems, as it were by nature, design'd the Lord of the other Animals, yet in other respects, if we consider onely his Body, he is not superiour to them. But 'tis in regard of his Soul, and the Understanding Reason, and Spiritual Nature of that, by which he is set so far above the Visible Creation, and advanced to the state and Dignity of an Angel. And accordingly the antient Fathers, when they speak upon that Nice and Curious Question, which is more excellent a Man or an Angel, never make the least mention of this adscititious Spirit, which they would certainly have done if it were upon this Account onely that Men become *ιοιζυελοι*, but refer all either to his being framed after the Image and similitude of God, or else to his receiving his Soul
imme-

immediately from him, when he Breathed *into his Nostrils the Breath of Life*, or to his Dominion over the rest of the visible creation, or lastly to his being redeemed by the Merits of Christ. ^a

You will have the Spirits in Prison 1 *Pet. III. 19.* to be the Souls of those *Giants*, who were born to the Sons of *Seib*, by the Daughters of *Cain*: these you think to be partly Divine, and partly Human. Divine as they were descended from the Sons of *Seth*, whom you suppose to have been Angels, Human, as descended from the Daughters of *Cain*. The use you would make of this Observation I suppose is to infer, that these might be condemned to an Eternity of Punishment, because, by being descended from Angels, they were in part *Pneumatical*, or had this adscititious Spirit, which render'd them Immortal. This Text of *St. Peter* is one of the *δυσερμηνεύματα* of the New Testament, which is so hard to be understood, that Expositors, whether Antient or Modern, have been more divided about it than about any other Text I believe whatsoever: for I have observed no less than nine or ten different Interpretations of it. I think it needless to examine or enumerate all those several contradictory Expositions that are given of this very Obscure place, and therefore shall onely endeavour briefly to esta-

a Nam etsi Angelus qui seduxit, liber & suæ potestatis qui seductus est: sed imago & similitudo Dei fortior Angelo: sed adflatus Dei generosior in spiritu materiali, quo angeli constiterunt. Qui facit, inquit, Spiritus Angelos, & apparitores flammam ignis. Quia nec Universalitatem homini subjecisset infirmo dominandi, & non potiori Angelis, quibus nihil tale subjecit. *Terull. Contra Marcion lib. cap. 8.* Redemptio sanguinis Christi hoc fidelibus contulit ut filii Dei, sociique Angelorum efficerentur. *Ambrosii Comment,*

blish what I judge to be the genuine sense and true meaning of it. But before I do this I cannot but profess my Wonder that you should chuse so obscure, difficult, and controverted a Text to favour and support your Proofes concerning the Soul's Natural Mortality. Such as read your Book may with great Reason conclude, that your being so very destitute of other arguments to help forward and establish your point with, made you fly to this, which of all others does the least serve your Purpose. And this, I must make so free with you as to tell you, will be no small prejudice to your Cause, and I hope hinder the spreading of an Opinion which, I think, I may be bold to say, is directly contrary to the sense and judgment, as well as the hopes and desires of the greater part of Mankind.

It is an Opinion of some, that by the Spirits in Prison, which were disobedient in the days of *Noah*, we are not necessarily obliged to understand the Souls of those Men when Dead, but their Persons when alive upon the Earth. And that Christ might then be very properly said to preach to them, by, and thro' the ministry of those Preachers of Righteousness, whereof *Noah*, may be said to be the Eighth, whom he sent amongst them. And this Opinion seems to be favour'd by a reading of the Vulgar Latin, which in some copies instead of *Carcere* has *Carne*. But what further confirms this Interpretation is, that it gives the best Account, wherein the sin of their disobedience consisted, namely in rejecting that Grace and Mercy, which was offer'd them in Christ. For you will not I suppose deny but Christ as the second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity was from the Creation of the World concern'd in
the

the Oeconomy and Administration of it. And therefore that as he is said to have been with the Church in the Wilderness, and that such as were then disobedient are said to have grieved Christ, so also he may by his Servants the Prophets be said to have been present to the Old World before the Flood, and to have Preached to the Men of that Generation. And this Interpretation *St. Augustine* has embraced before any other. For in his Epistle to *Euodius*, giving the several senses this place has been taken in, he is so stagger'd and foiled with the difficulties that attend them, that he is forced at last to conclude with the present Exposition. ^a *You may, says he to Euodius, however consider, whether what St. Peter here says concerning the Spirits in Prison, that did not believe in the days of Noah, can be at all applied to the state of the Dead, and must not be understood to refer intirely to the times of which he speaks, which the Apostle applies to these times.*

But notwithstanding I think these words may very properly be understood to refer to the state of the Dead, and by the Spirits in Prison the Souls in *Hades* of all such, whether Good or Bad, as had departed out of this Life before this appearance of our Saviour among them, were intended by the Apostle. To these our Saviour's Soul may be supposed to have gone, after it was by the Violence of the Cross separated from his Body, between the time of his Death and Resurrection; and Expositors do conclude that by his being said to have

^a Considera tamen ne forte totum illud, quod de conclusis in carcere Spiritibus, qui in diebus Noë non crediderant Petrus, Apostolus dicit, omnino ad inferos non pertineat, sed ad illa potius tempora, quorum formam ad hæc tempora transtulit Ep. 99. ad *Euodium*.

Preached to these Spirits is meant, that he then made known to them, what he had done and suffer'd for the Redemption of Mankind, by Vertue of which such of them, as had lived suitably to those Laws and Rules they were obliged by, would be admitted to an eternity of far greater Happiness, than they then enjoyed. This sense, which might be supported with very great Authorities, I think at least as probable as any is given of these Words. But as I know of no Authority, so neither can I find any reason for your restraining the sense of these Words to the descendants of *Seth*, and making the Spirits in Prison to be no other than the *Giants*, nor do you in this place offer at any Argument to make it Good. Indeed in another Treatise concerning Marriages &c. p. 166. you seem to endeavour at something of an Argument, where you say that those, whom *St. Peter* here calls Spirits in Prison, he calls in his second Epistle Chap. II. 4. Angels. If this assertion had been indeed true there had been something in your Argument. But *St. Peter* in this place speaks onely of the Apostate Angels, who fell before the Creation of Man, as appears most evidently from his distinguishing the Angels that sinned vers. 4. from the Ante-diluvian World vers. 5. in which last onely the *Giants* are comprehended. Upon so slight not to say rotten a Foundation do you now and then build Opinions of the greatest moment and importance.

As little ground likewise have you for your saying that the Sons of *Seth* were Angels. For does not your owning those which *Gen. VI.* are called the Sons of God, to be the Sons of *Seth*, prove plainly that they were of Mortal and not Angelic Extraction

fraction. And therefore such as were of Opinion that these Sons of God, were Angels or *Demons*, never owned them to be, but distinguish'd them from, the Sons of *Seth*. But Expositors have generally agreed that, by the *Sons of God*, can be meant nothing but the Posterity of *Seth*, which are called the Holy Line, because *Abraham*, the Father of the Faithful, was descended from them: it being, to say the least of it, hard to understand how the Angelic Nature could have such Conversation with human kind as the Text supposes. And as for their being called the *Sons of God* the reason of that is plainly given at the End of the fourth Chapter. So that from hence it evidently appears that neither the Spirits in Prison were the *Giants* onely, and that they could have nothing Divine or Angelic in them besides their Souls, in as much as by both Father and Mother they were descended from the human Race.

Thus I suppose it may by this time appear that those which you call the Heathen Originals, from whence, you say, the Phrases of the New Testament concerning this matter are derived, do not mention or suppose the Immortality of our Souls to proceed from the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*.) And moreover if you had proved that *Tartarus* was onely made for the *Titans* and *Giants*, and that the Apostate Angels and Scripture *Giants* are represented in Scripture as condemned to a place called *Tartarus*, it would be the wildest inference in the World from thence to conclude, that because these were Immortal Criminals, that therefore the Scripture Supposes other Souls, which were not condemned hither to be Mortal.

CHAP. V. ad §. 9, & 10.

Rules to be observed in using the Writings of the Fathers in Controversies of Religion. In what sense the Fathers take Mortality and Immortality. Justin Martyr being a Platonist, not likely to think the Soul Naturally Mortal. His true Opinion concerning the Nature and Immortality of the Soul. The passages our Author has cited out of him consider'd. Tatian whilst the Disciple of Justin most likely to be then of his Opinion His Opinions after Justin's Death Heretical. He asserts however the Natural Immortality of the Soul. The passages cited out of him shewn not to this Author's Purpose.

AFTER having endeavoured to shew your Opinion not to be Unscriptural, you proceed in the next Place to justify it by Principles you call Catholick, and endeavour to make the antient Fathers speak, and give in a Verdict for you Cause.

Before I descend to those particular Fathers, whose Writings you have alledged in this Controversy, I think it may not be improper to make a short Observation or two concerning the true use of the Fathers in this Controversy, as well as others of this kind. And

First, The Authority of the Fathers is never to be made use of by way of Argument, but according to the Analogy of Faith, and in Confirmation of such Doctrines as are contain'd in Scripture. The Scriptures are the onely adequate Rule of our Faith, and the sole standard whereby we are to judg of revealed Truths. Whatever is not contained in them, or cannot be thence deduced by a plain and evident Consequence cannot pretend to be received as a divine Revelation, with how great Authority soever it may be

sup-

supported. When the Scriptures were composed, they were designed to contain all things necessary for a Christian to know and believe, and therefore nothing can be bound or imposed upon us to be assented to as a matter of Faith, but what is formally, or at least virtually and eminently comprehended in them. We justly condemn the Papists, for admitting another Rule of Faith distinct from the Scripture and for endeavouring to advance their unwritten Traditions to an equal degree of Authority with the Written word of God. The Fathers indeed in all Ages have been always look'd upon to be the Witnesses and Keepers of this sacred Depositum, this *Faith, which was once deliver'd unto the Saints*; and therefore from them we are to learn both how many, and what the inspired Books of the sacred Volume are, and likewise to seek from their writings the true sense and meaning of them. They having lived nearer the Times when these Books were written, must be acknowledged to be better acquainted with the *Style, Phrase, and Manner of speaking* used in Scripture, as well as with the Customs and Historys which are there alluded to, than any writers can be, who lived at a greater distance of time from them, when the Memory of these things was wholly lost and forgotten. The Traditions likewise of the Church, derived from the Apostles, and handed down by word of Mouth, as well as writings were, in so near a Remove from them, more clear, certain and unmix'd; which cannot but give the greatest weight and authority to these Interpretations of the Fathers, which upon this account could be no other than what the Apostles themselves gave of their own writings. Afterwards indeed this Tradition

dition as it flowed still further from it's Fountain, was less certain, and grew still fouler, as it was more mix'd and blended with the uncertain Reasonings or Fabulous Legends of later times, till at last it quite vanished and disappeared, and is no where to be found, unless we will suppose some remainders of it to be still left in the genuine writings of the earliest Fathers, who when they speak according to the Analogy of Faith, and represent the received Interpretations of Scripture, and Customes of the Church, are without all doubt to have the utmost regard and deference paid to their Authority, Writings, and Doctrine.

Secondly, Another Rule to be observed in making use of the Fathers is to cite them so, as to make them consistent both with themselves and with one another. The Testimony of the Fathers as it is managed by *Tertullian*, and *Vincentius Lirinensis* is truly of the greatest Force, as giving an attestation to the general Opinion of the Church in the Ages concerning which they write. *Quod semper & ubique* &c. that which has always and in all places where Christianity has obtained been received and assented to, has certainly the highest probability, and surest marks and tokens of it's being Apostolical and Divine. Those Doctrines therefore that the Fathers constantly teach, and are unanimous in asserting, are certainly such as later Ages ought to receive with the profoundest Veneration, to look upon as infallibly derived from the Apostles themselves, and to believe without all doubt to be contained in the sacred Oracles. But as to those points wherein the Fathers either differ from themselves or from one another, their Authority seems to be

liable

little more than that of a private Doctor; who hold and propagate Opinions, which the Church neither holds, nor can therefore be Answerable for. For it must indeed be confess'd, since it cannot be conceal'd, that the Fathers, like other Men, at different times, were of different Opinions, according as Experience, Study, and Years had ripen'd, and improved their Judgments. Onely our Saviour could dispute with the Doctors at twelve years Old: and the Writers onely of the sacred Oracles, by virtue of that Inspiration they recieved from on high, were at once compleatly instructed and skilled in the whole Mystery of Godliness. Their successors being not assisted with the like degrees of infallible inspiration, cannot but be less steady in their Doctrine, often altering their Judgments, and in their advanced Age retracting what they had affirm'd in their Youth. I need not mention *St. Augustin's* Books of Retractations, or the difference every one observes to be, in the matter as well as style, between those Epistles *St. Hierome* wrote when a younger Man, and those which he wrote when arrived at greater maturity of Age and Judgment, nor what the same *St. Hierome* tells us concerning *Origen*, that in the later part of his Life, writing to *Fabianus* Bishop of Rome, he professes that he repented of many things, which he had writ and taught in his Youth, since the writings of almost all the Fathers abound with instances and examples which demonstrate the Truth of this Assertion. The onely proper use therefore that can be made of any Citations out of the Fathers, is by alledging such opinions of theirs, which, as *Vincentius* says, *Constanter docuerint, & in quibus permanserint*, they constantly taught and continued in. But it is not

enough that we quote the Fathers onely for such Opinions as themselves were steady in and constantly maintained, but we must also have a regard to the Opinions of the other Doctors and Fathers of the Church, and onely alledge such places as flow with the common Stream, and concur with the general Voice of Antiquity. As the Fathers have this common infirmity of Mankind sometimes to differ from themselves, so do they more often differ from one another; but then it cannot be denyed that in the most fundamental points of Faith and Practice there is a perfect Agreement and Harmony betwixt them. It is therefore the Unanimous suffrage of these great Men, that ought to be principally sought after, and where they appear for any Doctrine with a joint consent, concurrent Approbation, and united Force nothing ought, nothing can oppose, or give check to their Authority. But when any one of them stands by himself, he is to be supposed to speak his own sense, and not to convey the Traditions of the Church, and in this case his reasons and arguments, setting aside his Authority, are to be examin'd and canvassed with the same care and impartiality as another Mans, and to be embraced if found strong and conclusive, or rejected if weak and inconclusive. And this brings to my mind a third Rule I would recommend in using of the Fathers, and that is

Thirdly, Not to alledge their Authority in matters of pure Reason and Morality, where every one is capable of Being, and every one ought to be his own judge. These things depending not upon Tradition and Authority, but the Force of deduction and argument it is perfectly needless and vain to alledge

alledge any great Name in defence of them. Such Truths as these shine with their native Lustre, and recommend themselves no otherwise to our Assent, than by their Inherent, Intrinsic Perspicuity and Brightness. So that to think by citing of Authorities to give greater clearness, or add more strength to Propositions of this sort, is the same ridiculous attempt, as to endeavour to increase the brightness of the Sun, by the dim light of a Taper, or to support a strong and stately building by propping it up with a Reed. When things of this Nature come into debate, our Minds will not rest satisfied with any thing less than Argument, nor do we make a surrender of our Assent upon any other account, than because the overpowering evidence and strength of reason forces it from us. True indeed it is that the Fathers often speak upon these points, but then it is after the same manner as all others do, by proving and confirming them with Argument and Reason, and by recommending the Practice of these Duties to Mankind by motives and arguments drawn from their Usefulness and Advantage to Men. And these things every Man of a sound Mind, and ripe Judgment is as able to determin upon as they, and consequently here their Authority is not of the least force or use.

After these short observations concerning the right use of the Fathers in matters of Controversy, I must add something in general, before I descend to particulars, about the Notion and Opinions the Fathers entertained concerning *Immortality* and *Mortality* in general.

In the first place therefore we are to observe, that the Fathers when they speak of *Immortality*

very often understand by it the absolute, independent, indefectibility, and immutability of the divine Nature, which God has entirely from himself, and cannot communicate to any created Being. And by Virtue of this Attribute of his Nature, which arises from his having his Existence from all eternity from himself alone, He, and He onely, is by the Fathers said to be *ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ* essentially Immortal; whereas all other things, tho' they certainly will never cease to be, yet have their Immortality by a way, which they call *μετεσσία*, that is, by a Participation from the supreme Being, upon whose Pleasure therefore they must depend for the Perpetuity of their Duration. And in this sense, as I remarked before out of *Plato*, God is said by the Apostle to be *ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασία*, *who onely has Immortality*, namely, as he has it from himself alone, and does not depend upon the Will of any thing else, that can take it from him. And thus *Theodoret* tells us in his third Dialogue: *a That God is said onely to have Immortality, because he is ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ essentially Immortal, and not μετεσσία by Participation, as having received his Immortality from any other.* And in this sense the Author of the Questions to the Greeks in *Justin Martyr* speaking, according to *Aristotle's* Scheme, concerning the Incorruptibility of the Heavens, says: *b they are not Incorruptible after the same manner, or in the same sense as God is. For God from his own Nature and Substance without creation has from all Eternity his State of Incorruption and Immortality. But the Heavens are Incorruptible by Creation and dependently upon*

a Οὐσία ἀθάνατος, ἢ μετεσσία, ἢ γὰρ παρ' ἑτέρου, ἀθανάσιον ἔχει λαβόν. *b* Καὶ εἰ ἀφθαρτὴν λέγουσιν τὴν ἑρμὴν τὸ νῦν, οὐ συνονόμως αὐτὸν τῷ Θεῷ ὀνομαζόμενον ἀφθαρτον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ Θεὸς ἀκτίως ἐκ τῆ αὐτῆς οὐσίας, καὶ αἰδιῶς τὸ ἀφθαρτον ἔχει· ὁ δὲ ἑρμὴς κτίως ἐκ τῆ Θεοῦ βεβλήσας ἔχει τὸ ἀφθαρτον.

his Will. Immortality, in this sense, is an incommunicable Attribute of the divine Nature, and neither the Souls of Men, nor Angels themselves can in this acceptation be said to be Immortal, but must be and are very frequently by the *Fathers* in opposition to this sort of Immortality confessed to be Mortal. This independent Immortality is represented by some of the *Fathers* as founded upon the Immutability of God. And according to this Notion *St. Augustin* tells us that ^a *God is said alone to have immortality, because he alone is immutable.* And in opposition to this Immutability both the Souls of Men, and sometimes the very Angels themselves are said by the *Fathers* to be Mortal, because they be mutable. So *St. Augustin* : ^b *This very mutability, says he, may be properly styled Mortality, according to which sense the Soul may be said to die, not as if it could be turned into a Body, or into any other substance, but whatever in it's substance is or has been different from what it was, in as much as that ceases to be which was, 'tis in that respect said to be Mortal.* Now he explains this Mortality of the Soul in another place by it's being changed from a habit of Virtue to one of Vice, or *Vice versa*, from Vice to Virtue. ^c *The Soul, says he, being alienated from the Life of God, so dies, as not to cease to live in it's own nature; so that tho' it be found Mortal in one respect it is very justly said to be Immortal in another.*

a Immortalitatem autem Deus dicitur habere solus, quia est immutabilis solus. Augustin. contra Maximinum de Lib. Arbitrio Cap. 12. b Ipsa mutabilitas non inconvenienter mortalis dicitur, secundum quam & anima dicitur mori: non quia in corpus, vel in alteram aliquam substantiam mutatur & vertitur: sed in ipsa sua substantia, quicquid alio modo nunc est aut fuit, secundum id quod destitit esse quod erat, mortale deprehenditur. de Trinitate. cap. 9. c Sed quod ita moritur alienata à vita Dei, ut tamen in natura sua vivere non omnino desistat: ita mortalis ex aliqua causa invenitur, ut etiam immortalis non sine ratione dicatur. Ep. 28.

Secondly, Those things are said to be *Immortal* by the *Fathers*, which tho' they depend so intirely upon the Will of God for their very Being, that if he should suspend or withhold that Concurrence and Influence, by which their existence is supported and preserv'd, they must immediately cease to be, yet cannot undergo any substantial change, or be reduced to nothing by any created Being. This is that sense in which the *Demiurgical* Deities in *Plato* are represented as Immortal, and 'tis in this sense, and no other that all who have ever spoke or writ of this matter have affirm'd the Souls of Men as well as the Angels to be naturally Immortal, namely, that they cannot be destroyed or dissolved by the influences of any created Being, but onely by the Will and Pleasure of him that made them. And according to this sense the Souls of Men as well as the Angels are sometimes said by the Fathers to be Mortal, agreeably to the Doctrine of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, where the supreme God tells the inferior Deities: *"That since they had been made, they could not possibly be immortal and indissolveable in themselves, but yet should be so by his Pleasure."* But this sort of Immortality, is not in the least inconsistent with the Natural Immortality of the Soul, as being opposed onely to that absolute and independent Immortality, which is the peculiar Perfection, and incommunicable Attribute, of the eternal and immutable God, Blessed for evermore. And 'tis in this sense that *Epiphanius* proving the eternity of the Son of God, from his having no beginning, infers the

α Δι' α κ' ἐποίησε γένεσθαι, ἀθάνατοι μὲν ἐκ ἰσῆ, εὐδ' ἄλλοις τῷ πάμπαν, ἐπ' αὖ μὲν δι' ἀνθρώπων γὰρ, εὐδ' ἰσῆσιν θανάτου μοίρας. &c. *Plato in Timæo ubi supra.*

Mortality of every thing else: ^a *Every thing*, says he, *that has a beginning will have an end, if he pleases, who, when it began to be, made it to exist.*

There is another sense, which is Moral and Metaphorical, wherein *Philo* very often, and the *Fathers* sometimes speak of the Mortality and Death of the Souls of Men, and even of the Angels, and that is when they fall and are separated from the Life of God, by a revolt and defection from him in disobedience and sin. That eternal Punishment likewise which the Wicked endure by being deprived of the enjoyment of God, and for ever Tormented in the miserable place and portion of the Damnd, is very often in Scripture and the Writings of Antiquity call'd the Mortality and Death, as the everlasting rewards of Heaven are called the Life and Immortality of the Soul. These are all the senses, I can recollect, in which the Fathers ever speak concerning the Mortality or Immortality of the Soul. I shall therefore having thus cleared the way, proceed to examin those particular *Fathers*, whose Writings you have alledged to favour and support your Opinion.

The first you mention is *Justin Martyr*, and in order to discover how far this Antient Father has advanced your Hypothesis, before I examin those passages you have cited from him, I shall lay before you his true Sentiment concerning the Nature and Immortality of Human Souls.

All that have transmitted to Posterity any Memoirs concerning this truly Great and Good Man repre-

^a Επειδήπερ πάν τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔχον, καὶ τέλος ἔχει, εἰ βούλεται ὁ τὸ ἔσθαι τῷ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰληφέντι παρρησιασμένος. Epiphan. Hæres. 76. p. 940. Edit. Colon.

sent him, after having run thro' all the Sects and clans of Philosophers of the Age, wherein he lived, at last to have joined himself and closely adhered to the followers of *Plato*. And if we may probably guesse what Men's Opinions are from the System of Philosophy, which they embrace, we may from hence with Reason infer, that this Father could never think the Soul to be naturally Mortal. For don't we find him representing it as his Master *Plato's* Opinion, that all Souls were Immortal, ^a Πλάτων ψυχὴ πᾶσαι ἀθάναται καὶ κίεραται. *Plato affirm's every Soul to be Immortal*. If then he had this Opinion, that the Soul was naturally Mortal, it's certain *Plato's*, Philosophy, never taught it him, nor could he find any thing amongst his Successors in that Schoole, which might probably lead him into this sentiment. And tho' it cannot be denyed that Christianity alter'd his Notions in many things, yet most certain it is, and I hope by this time pretty evident, that it must rather confirm than weaken his Opinion concerning the Soul's Natural Immortality. And accordingly in all Places, where he speaks of the Human Soul, we find him either affirming expressly, or making use of such Arguments as necessarily suppose and imply it's Immortality. To this purpose is that, where he says expressly: *That the Soul is Divine and Immortal, and a part or emanation of that mind which Governs all things*. And this is according to the sense and language of *Plato*, in whose writings the most common Epithet for the Soul is that, it is *Θεῖα*, *Θεοπάση*, *Divine*, most *Divine*;

^a Ad Græcos Cohort. p. 7. Ed. Paris b Η ψυχὴ θεία καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐστίν, ἐκ τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶ βασιλικὴ οὐδὲ τι μίσηται. p. 221. Ed. Par.

may he goes so far as to affirm, that it is μετὰ Θεῶν Θεότατον. *The most Divine thing next the Gods.* And the affirming this Divinity of the Soul, was a plain declaration of its Spirituality and consequently Immortality: and therefore it is we find these two Epithets, as here in *Justin*, so in *Plato* most commonly following close upon one another, when he speaks of the Soul. His affirming that the Soul survives the Body, and is capable of existing in a state of Separation from it strongly implys it to be Spiritual, and therefore Immortal. This is a Doctrine which he frequently inculcates. As in his second Apology, where he bids those, to whom he addresses this Apology, ^a *Consider the common lot of all the Roman Emperors, who were forced to undergo the common Fate of all Mankind.* And if afterwards there were nothing but a state of Insensibility, this would indeed be highly advantageous to all wicked Men. But since all Men go into a state of Sensibility, and an eternal Punishment is laid up for ill Men he advises them not to neglect &c. and in the following words pursuing the same Argument he at length concludes: ^b *And now, says he, since we affirm that the Soul survives the Body and exists in a state of Sensibility; and since the Souls of ill Men are tormented, but those of the Good free from Punishment, do we not affirm the same as your Poets and Philosophers?* Now tho' it cannot be denied that you own thus much, where you confess the Fathers

^a Αποδείκνυται πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς βασιλείας, ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι γέννητον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅτι εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἔχεται, ἡμεῖς αὖν ἢ τοῖς ἀδικοῖς πᾶσι ἔπειτα ἀποδοῦναι πᾶσι γινώσκουσιν [Leg. ἀπογινώσκουσιν] μίαν, καὶ ἡλικίας αἰωνία ἀπικέται, καὶ ἀμειλίχεται &c. p. 64, 65. ^b Τῷ δὲ ἐκλαβεῖν αἰὲν ἀμειλίχεται, καὶ μετὰ γέννητον οὕτως πᾶσι τῶν ἀδίκων ψυχῶν, πᾶσι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπικέται πᾶσι πᾶσι ἀμειλίχεται καὶ φιλοσοφῶνται αὐτῶν ἀμειλίχεται ἀμειλίχεται p. 66.

to be Unanimous in asserting the actual survival of Souls, after the Dissolution of their Bodys, yet your fault is that you do not consider this assertion under all it's just and necessary consequences: since it plainly supposes or infers the Immateriality, and consequently Immortality of the Soul. For if the Soul were a part of the Body it could never survive but must die and perish with it: since the Life of every part depends you know intirely upon it's vital union with the whole, so as that if it be separated from the whole it immediately becomes lifeless and insensible. Wherefore the certainty of the Souls existence when separated from the Body evidently demonstrates that it is of a Nature different and contradistinct from all gross corporeal Concretion, and, in a word, that it is a pure Spirit. Now it's being a Spirit clearly infers it's Immortality, in as much as it assures us, that the Soul can have within it self none of those Principles and Causes of Corruption and Dissolution which break, and separate the continuity and compages of Bodies, nor can be either changed or annihilated by any agency or influence of material things. And this I suppose is all, which such as have clear and determinate conceptions of this matter mean, when they affirm such a natural and necessary connexion to be between the Immateriality and Immortality of Soul, that they mutually suppose, and jointly infer one another. Those passages likewise, where he says that God cannot be apprehended with the Corporeal senses, but onely with the Mind or Soul, seem to suppose it to be a Spirit; which, having some sort of cognation with the Deity, by reason of it's spiritual Nature, easily contemplates and understands that, which is of the

the same Nature with it self; even as the Bodily senses perceive onely corporeal Objects. To this purpose is that which he says in his Dialogue with Trypho: *a That the Divinity is not perceivable with our Eyes as Animals are, but onely by the Mind as Plato affirms, to whom he assents.* And again, answering to that Question, whether a Man whilst he is in the Body, or when he is out of the Body sees God, he says, *b That, whilst he is in an human shape, he has a Power of Seeing the Divinity by his Soul, but when he is once freed from the Body, and as it were dwells with himself, he sees him always, and enjoys him whom he loves at any time.* Now this way and manner in which the Holy Father speaks in these and other places concerning the Soul is to me a clear Indication, that he thought the Soul Incorporeal, Spiritual and Immortal.

How far and in what respect the Soul depends upon the Will and Pleasure of it's Creator will appear upon considering those passages, you have cited and alledged out of this Father to support your Opinion; which you here say is: *That the Soul is not Immortal in it's own Nature, and that it's continued survival is not for ever, without a New Indulgence of God, above what he had granted it at it's Creation.* And in favour of this Opinion you cite several Places out of the Holy Martyr's Dialogue

a Αλλ' ἐκ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἢ δ' ἐγὼ, αὐτοῖς, πᾶσι θεοὺς τὸ θεῖον, ὡς καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ κατὰληπτοι, ὡς φησι Πλάτων, καὶ ἐγὼ κείδομαι αὐτῷ. p. 221. *b* Εκείνο δὲ μοι εἰπὶ, ὡς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, βλέπει, ἢ ἀπαλλαγῆσαί τετα καὶ ἔως μὴ ἐν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδη; δυνατὸν αὐτῇ φημι ἐκκρίνεσθαι Δεῖ δ' οὐ. μέγιστα δὲ ἀπαλυσθεῖσα τῷ σώματι, καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ ἑαυτὴν γινώσκουσα, τυγχάνει ἑ ἑαυ, πάντα τὸν χρόνον πάντων. p. 222.

with Trypho. As first, where he says, *The Soul ought not to be said to be Immortal.* And again: *But neither do I say that all Souls die, This would indeed be very Advantageous to the Wicked. What then? The Souls of the Righteous live and remain in some better, place, and the Souls of the Unrighteous and Wicked in some worse place, both expecting the last Day of Judgment, and by this means those which shall appear worthy of God, will die no more, but the other will be punished: since 'tis by God's Pleasure that they both exist and are punished.* This is the order of the Words, as they are placed in this Dialogue; and I believe it will appear upon examination, that they make much less for your Purpose in this their natural order, than they seem to do, as you have transposed them in your Citations of them; which would have made me think, if I had to do with any body besides your self, whom I know to be incapable of those little tricks, which writers of Controversy are so commonly and frequently guilty of, that the citing that first which in the Father comes after, was done with design, by breaking the Connexion, to confound and obscure the sense, and so by hiding the true meaning, to make a mistaken one more easily pass upon the Reader. He says here, *That the Soul ought not to be said to be Immortal.* Now that you may the better understand in what sense the Fa-

a Οὐδὲ μὲν ἀγίατοι χρὴ λέγειν αὐτῶν. p. 222. b Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ δόξειεν ὅτι φησὶ πᾶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ἰσῶ. ἱερμαῖον γὰρ ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖν κακῶς. ἀλλὰ τί; τὰς μὲν τῶν εὐσεβῶν, ἐν κρείττονι πο χορᾷ μένειν, τὰς δὲ ἀδίκας ἔ πονηρὰς ἐν χειρόνι, τὸν τ' κρείττους ἐκδιχομένης χρόνον τοτ'. ἔ τως αἱ μὲν ἀγίαι ἔ Θεῷ φανεῖται, ἐκ δὲ πρὸ νησκασι ἐπ' αἱ ἡ κολάζονται; ἐν αὐτῶς ἡ εἶναι ἡ κολάζεσθαι ὁ Θεὸς ἦελε p. 223. B. I have alter'd the Interpretation a little from what it is in the Paris Edition, which puts no stop after the word κολάζονται. But any one that considers the sense will quickly see, the place requires one.

ther here takes the word *Immortal*, I must desire you to remember what I have a little above premised in general concerning the several senses of the words *Mortal*, and *Immortal* in the writings of the Fathers. For since, as I have just shewn, *Justin* expressly affirms the Soul to be *Immortal*, no further off than the page before that out of which these words are taken, we cannot suppose him to mean any thing more by this assertion here, than that the Soul is not *Immortal* in the same sense as God is, *viz.* absolutely and independently. In which sense no created Being, not even the Angels themselves can be *Immortal*. And that this, which seems the most probable meaning, is certainly intended by the Author in this place appears plainly from the reason he gives of this assertion in the very next Words. ^a If says he, *The Soul were ἀθάνατος & Immortal, it would certainly be ἀκίνητος & uncreated*; which latter cannot be affirmed of it, and therefore not the former. Because according to *Plato's* Scheme of Philosophy, which as I shall presently further shew he here evidently argues from, what ever is *created* must have a beginning, and consequently must be capable of having an end, tho' perhaps it can never actually cease to be, because it depends upon the Immutable Will and Pleasure of it's Creator, that it should not. Some indeed, as he tells us in the next Words, who were called *Platonists*, but either did not understand, or did not receive *Plato's* Notions, ^b affirmed the Soul to be both uncreated and Immortal, and to these he tells us he himself being a true Platonist,

^a Οτι εἰ ἀθάνατος ἴσθι, καὶ ἀκίνητος δηλαδὴ. ^b Ἀκίνητος δὲ καὶ ἀθάνατος ἴσθι κατὰ πᾶς λεγόμενος πλατωνικῶς.

^a does not assent. He does not, as you affirm, blame *Plato* any where, that I can find, for asserting the Souls Natural Immortality, but onely passes a censure upon, and dissents from some, λεγομένης πλατωνικῆς, who were called *Platonists*, but were not so, who affirmed both the World, and the Souls of Men, to be uncreated, and therefore Incorruptible and Immortal. And in answer to this Opinion he goes on ^b in the next words very excellently proving the World to have proceeded from some Principle, and to have had a beginning, and from thence infers that the Souls of Men were created, and had a beginning too, and from hence it is that he concludes that they are not *Immortal*, that is, no doubt, in the same manner and sense as God, who is uncreated and from Eternity, is *Immortal*. But then least any one should from hence infer that the Soul is therefore Mortal, and will actually die he immediately subjoins: *But I do not say all Souls die &c.* In these words affirming the natural Immortality of all human Souls, and not, as you imagin, implying the actual Mortality of any: since in the very next words he assigns to all Souls, which he divides, by the most comprehensive distribution, into the Good and the Bad, their several places of abode till the general Judgment, to the Good a better and to the Bad a worse place than they had in this World. And then he says the Good will die no more, according to that of *St. John Revel. XXI. 4. There shall be no more Death, neither Sorrow, &c.* but be admitted to a happy Eternity, and the bad will be punished: since their existence as well as

α Οὐ μὲν τοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς συγκαταθήμεν ἐγώ. β Τίνα γὰρ λόγον ἔχει, σῶμα ἔτι αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ἀπύκνιστον ἔχει, καὶ σώζεται καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ φθινόν, ἢ γαιόμενον ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος &c.

punishment depends upon the Will of God, after the same manner, and in the same sense, as all created Beings, even those which are of the most exalted kinds, subsist by virtue of the same Power still supporting, which at first created them. So that the Eternity of their Punishment may be *imputable*, as you express it, both to their own Natures, and to God's Will: *To their own Natures*, in as much as the Spirituality of that secures them from all Dissolution, by any influences or operations proceeding either from themselves or any external Agents, and *to God's Will* continuing to all Eternity the concurrence of that Power, by which they were at first made, and are still preserved.

And that he can be understood in no other sense but this, appears most undeniably certain from the very next words to those I have been considering; which you have cited onely in part. *Therefore*, says Justin to his good Old Man, *is not your Hypothesis here concerning the Soul the same with that of Plato in his Timæus, concerning the World? Who tells us the world is corruptible, because 'tis created, but shall not actually be dissolved and perish* (the very words of Plato) *because it depends upon the Will of God. Does not this seem to be determin'd concerning the Soul, and all created Beings? Whatsoever besides God, is or shall be, is of a corruptible Nature, and is capable of ceasing to be. For*

α Ἀρα τοῦτόν ἐστι ὁ λόγος, ὅσον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ ἀνίσταται περὶ τῆς κόσμου, λόγων. ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ φθαρτὸς ἐστὶν ἡ μέντοι, ἐκδηλοῦται δὲ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ θανάτῳ μείρας, ἀλλὰ τίω βαλῶναι τὸ Θεῷ; τὰ αὐτὸ σοὶ δοκεῖ εἰ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντων περὶ λήξεως; ὅσα γὰρ ἐστὶ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον, ἢ ἐστὶ ποτὶ ταῦτα φύσιν φθαρτὴν ἔχειν, εἰ οἷα ἐξαφανισθῆναι, καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ. μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόντης εἰ ἀφάρτερος ὁ Θεός, καὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ Θεός ἐστι. ταῖς λοιπαῖς πάντα μετὰ τούτων γινώσκται καὶ φθαρτὰ. τὰς χάριν καὶ ἀποδείκνυσθαι αἱ ψυχὰς καὶ κολάζονται, γ. 223. In translating the last part of these words I have taken the liberty to Paraphrase them a little, but I hope I have strictly kept to the genuine sense of them.

onely

only God is uncreated, and therefore incorruptible, and by this he is God. But all other things besides him are created and therefore corruptible. And 'tis in this sense that Souls, are [said to be] Mortal, and [tis upon this account that they will exist for ever to] be punished. Here you see is an expreis declaration that *Justin* was of the same Opinion with *Plato* concerning the Immortality of the Soul. Now in regard *Plato*, as you own held the Natural Immortality of the Soul, notwithstanding his making it to be Mortal, as that is opposed to and contradistinguished from the independent Immortality and Indefectibility of the divine Nature, it will from hence unavoidably follow that *Justin* must hold the natural Immortality of the Soul too.

Now that this will of God, upon which the Soul, tho' in it's own nature Immortal, depends for its existence, is not to be understood of any *new Indulgence*, besides and above what was granted it at it's creation, will plainly appear from the *Timæus* of *Plato*, where he introduces the supreme Being, declaring that nothing that was made by him, could be dissolved or perish. Now because the Soul is there represented as made by God, it's continued existence to Eternity depends plainly upon nothing else but the continuance of that Power to support it, by which it was at first created. Here is not the least mention made, or intimation given, either in the expressions of *Justin* or the Notions of *Plato*, of God's preventing their natural Mortality from taking place, by virtue of any new and extraordinary act of his Power and Providence. Such a thing as this we could hardly have believed, tho' these great Men should have asserted it, if it had

not been very plainly and expressly revealed in Scripture. For since no just Reasoning from those Natural Notions we have concerning God's creating Power or ordinary Providence can bring us to this conclusion, and since it is not discover'd by Revelation, it must have been supposed to be onely a fanciful invention and conceit of these Men, without any Argument or Reason to support it. But since *Plato* expressly declares against any new Indulgence of this kind, and since *Justin* is silent upon it, I am utterly at a loss to know from whence you could receive a Notion, which, for ought that hitherto appears, has so little ground either from Reason, Scripture, or Antiquity to support it.

In the same sense undoubtedly the Holy Father is to be understood, as to what he says in the following citations, concerning the Life and Death of the Soul, which can be intended onely of a possible, Hypothetical Death, on condition God should restrain, or withdraw that general Support, by which the Existence and Life of the Soul, as a created Being, must be preserved. It is undeniably evident that, in the former of these citations, the *Father's* design is to distinguish the Life and Existence of the Soul, from the Existence and Immortality of the Deity; the former of these he endeavours to shew to be by participation from, and dependently upon God, the latter absolutely, independently and intirely from himself. *That Being, says he, which receives something from another, must be different from that being, whence it receives that thing.* Intimating here-

α Επειρον δὲ π τὸ μετέχον πρὸς, οὐκ εἶναι ἢ μετέχει. Ζωὴς δὲ ψυχὴ μετέχει, ἐπεὶ ζῇ αὐτῇ ὁ Θεὸς βλάσται. ἄρα αὐτὴ καὶ ἢ μετέχει πρὸς, ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ τὸ ζῆναι δίδωται ζῆν. p.224.

by that the Immortality of the Soul, is not the same with that of Deity. *But the Soul*, as he goes on, *has Life, because God Wills that it shall Live; and therefore it would cease to partake of Life if God, should will that it shall not live.* That is, if God should take away the general support of his Power and Providence, upon which all created Beings depend, they would without all doubt return back to their original Nothing. And, I pray, is this any thing more than what may be very truly and justly said and argued even concerning the Blessed Angels themselves, notwithstanding they be, by the Confession of every Body, in their own Natures Immortal, that their Life and existence depends so upon the Will of their Creator, that if he should withhold or restrain those emanations of his Power, by which they are preserv'd, they would cease to live and to be? And that this is all he means himself expressly declares in the very next words, which you did not think it to your purpose to cite, and which he gives as the reason of what he had said before: *For the Soul*, says he, *has not Life from it self, as God has.*

The following passage it must be owned is somewhat more difficult; but yet I think may be tolerably well accounted for from the Principles I have here laid down. For why may not the ζωνὸν πνεῦμα here be meant of nothing else, but the general concurrence of Providence? And so the sense of this place will be, that when this ceases the Soul will be no more. But then you can no more from hence infer, that the Soul is naturally Mortal, than that Angels are so, who would for the same reason cease

to be, if God should withdraw from them the concurrence of his Pleasure, which is that sure Basis, that is the support of their Beings too. Besides the *Father* does not say they will be no more, as that implies an utter ceasing to exist. For he says that when the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα departs from the Soul: ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἐκείσε χωρεῖ πάλιν, *it returns thither from whence it was taken*, agreeably to that of the Wise Man Eccles. XII. 7. *Then shall the Dust return to the Earth as it was, and the Spirit shall return unto God who gave it.* But if after all, this should not be the sense of this very obscure and difficult passage (and if it be not I confess I know not well what is) yet certainly to conclude from one intricate place, which it's hard to make any consistent sense of, concerning an Author's Opinion, contrary to the stream of all his other Writings, and several express places, which declare him to be of another sentiment, is a way of proceeding which will very hardly be allowed to be just, if it were used toward any Author whatever, and much less when used towards the Writings of the Fathers. ^a

From *Justin Martyr* you proceed to his Disciple *Tatian*, whom you would have us believe to have

^a Οὕτως καὶ ὅταν δὴ τὴν ψυχῇ μνηστὴν εἶπας, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ' αὐτῆς τοῦ ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα, ὅτι ἐκ' ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἐκείσε χωρεῖ πάλιν. Upon second thoughts I am rather apt to suspect, that by ψυχὴ here is meant the life of the Animal, as it frequently signifies in the Hellenistical style of the Old Testament, and by the ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα is meant the Soul, and then the sense of this place will be: That when the Soul departs from the Body the life ceases. There is likewise a third sense of this place, which is this. Let us suppose by ψυχὴ to be here meant the Animal Soul, that is the animal Functions of the Soul, and by the πνεῦμα ζωτικὸν the rational. And then the sense of this place will be this: That when the Soul leaves the Body and the Body dissolves it will cease to exert it's animal functions. If any or all these senses were intended by the Author, it will make this passage very easily consistent with the Natural Immortality of the Soul.

been of the same Opinion, you have represented his Glorious Master to be of. It is indeed most probable that he was of the same Opinion with this Blessed Martyr, ^a before he wrote that Oration against the Greeks, we have of his, that is, before the Death of his Master, and then I think 'tis pretty plain he could not be of the Opinion that the Soul was naturally Mortal. While Justin was alive this Father was not more remarkable for his Learning, than Orthodoxy, ^b but after his Death he very much revolted from the Faith he had been taught, and was the Author and Spreader of several very detestable Errors and Heresies. ^c He affirm'd the first Man *Adam* to be Damn'd: ^d He introduced certain *Aeons*, very much like those of the Heretic *Valentinus*: ^e He con-

^a 'Tis plain Tatian wrote his Oration to the Greeks after the Death of Justin Martyr, because therein he mentions himself to have been in great danger of his life, when the Martyr lost his, by the Contrivances of Crescens the Cynic, who was the chief agent in bringing about the Death of Justin. *ὡς καὶ Ἰουστίνος ὑπομνήματα* καὶ ἐμὴ, ὡς καὶ τῷ θανάτῳ περιεσπῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ^b Tatian's defection from the Faith deliver'd to the Saints was not till the Death of his Master, the veneration he bore to whose Authority was the chief thing that kept him firm to those Principles he had been instructed in. So Irenæus assures us: *ὁς (Tatian) Ἰουστίνου ἀποστόλου μαθητὴς, ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν σωτὴρ ἐκεῖνος, ὅθεν ἐξέφυγε τοῖς τοῖς, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μαρτυρίαν διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔμελλεν διδασκαλίας ἐπαρθεῖς καὶ τυφλῶν. Irenæus lib. I. cap. 31.* ^c Epiphanius more expressly: *Τὰ πρῶτα καλῶς φερόμενος, καὶ τῇ πίσει ἐρρωμένος ἐν τῇ ἰσχυρίᾳ, ὅσον ἦν τῷ τῷ ἀγίῳ Ἰουστίνῳ τῷ μάρτυρι. ὅτι δὲ ἐπιλείπει Ἰουστίνῳ ὁ ἀγίος, ὥσπερ τυφλὸς χειραγωγούμενος τῷ τῷ χειραγωγῷ καταλειφθεῖν, καὶ καταλειφθεῖς ἐπὶ κρημνὸν ἰαυτοῦ ἐκείνου, ἀπὸ τῷ τῷ σπῆσθαι αὐτὸν τυφλῶν, καὶ περιφέρειται ἀπὸ τῆς πίσεως, εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν κατακλιθεῖς, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς. Epiphanius Heres. XLVI. p. 391.* ^d This Irenæus affirms of him: *Ἀντὶ τούτου τῇ ἑκείνου πρῶτον καὶ σωματικῇ, καὶ τότε οὖν ἐξελθὼν παρ' αὐτοῖς Τάτιανος πρὸς πρῶτον τῶν τῶν ἐκείνου κατὰ τὴν βλάβην. He speaks here of the Heretics called Encratites of whom Tatian was the Founder Irenæus lib. I. cap. 30, & 31.* ^e This likewise the same Irenæus in the same place affirms of him: *αἰνῶς πᾶσι ἀρετῶν ὁμοῖος τοῖς ἀπὸ Οὐαλιντινίου μυθολογῶν. And so the Author of the appendix to Tertullian's Prescriptions. Totus, says he concerning Tatian, Valentinum sapit. This appendix which, 'tis demonstrable, is not Tertullian's the Oxford Editor of Tatian cites as his. e This Epiphanius tells us of him τὸν δὲ ζῶντα περιεσπῶν καὶ φθορὰν ἔχοντα φάσκει μηδὲν ἀφ' ὧν τῶν περιεσπῶν τοῖς ζῶντι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Ibid.*

demn'd

demn'd Marriages as no better than Fornications and Adulteries; after the Example of those grand Hereticks *Marcion* and *Saturninus* or *Saturnilus*:^a He forbid as unlawful to drink Wine or eat Flesh; and therefore in the Blessed Sacrament of our Lord would have nothing but Water made use of. Nay he was sunk so deep into Heresy as to affirm,^b that the divine λόγος, the second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity, was not from Everlasting, but to have been created in time, and to excell the rest of the Creatures onely in this, that he was created before them. To this he added the impious Opinion of *Valentinus*, concerning the human Nature of our Lord, affirming that it was not truly and really born of the Blessed Virgin; but onely passed thro' her Holy Body, as water passes thro' a Tube. And, to compleat all, he endeavour'd lastly^d to corrupt the Holy Scrip-

a It was upon this and the former account that his Followers got the Name of Encratites, as Theodoret tells us Heret. Fab. lib. 1. cap. 20. Εγκρατίται δὲ, ὡς μήτε οἶνον πίνοντες, μήτε τῶν ἐμψύχων μεταλαμβάνοντες. ἀπάρχονται ἢ τέταν, ὡς παντὶν μυσταφειδμοί. b This is evident from his Oration to the Greeks, where he says: Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ. τῷ ἢ ἀρχῇ λόγῳ διώομαι παρελθόντα. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς τῶν ὅλων αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων ἔκ παντὸς ἢ ὑπόστασις, κατὰ μὲν τὴν μεθέπειν γαβρομήνῳ πείσῃσι μόνῳ ἦν καὶ δὲ πᾶσι διώομαι ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀσώγιτων αὐτὸς ὑπόστασις ἦν, σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα. σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς διωόμενης αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὑπέστη. Οὐδέποτε ἢ τῷ ἀπλήτῳ αὐτῷ ἀσώγιτῳ λόγος. ὁ ἢ λόγος οὐ κατὰ κινῶ χωρίσας, ἔργον ἀσώγιτων ἔκ πείσῃσι γίνεται. And therefore the Anonymous Scholiast upon this place, from hence very rightly concludes, that Tatian was not far removed from the Arian Heresy, upon account of his making the Son onely the Instrumental Cause of the Creation. His words are: Εἰκὼν ὁ ἔστος ἀνὴρ μὴ πᾶσι ἀπὸ ἀσώγιτων ἢ ἀρεσκῆς ἐκείνης, ἀρραυγῆς αὐτῷ ὑφίσταται ἢ ἦν, ἐν αἷς φησι. καὶ πᾶσι &c. ἰδὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ μὲν ἢ ἀνθρώπου μακρὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρεσκῆς μόνον εἰσάγει τῷ Θεῷ ὅτι αἱ ἔχοντα ὡς αὐτῷ τῷ ἢ ἔστος εἰσάγει, ὡς περὶ ἢ ἢ ἢ αὐτὸ δόγμα ἀρεσκῆς. φασὶ γὰρ ἔτοι τὸ. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ πατέρα φέρεται ἐν ἀρχῇ. c And therefore in his Diatesaron composed out of the four Gospels he has intirely omitted the Genealogy of our Lord, intimating thereby that he did not believe him born of the Blessed Virgin, nor descended from the house and lineage of David. This Heresy notwithstanding he did not fall into till a good while after he had writ his Oration to the Greeks. d Nay we are told by St. Hierome, that he even rejected some of St. Paul's Epistles especially that to Titus.

tures themselves, not onely by pretending to correct and mend the Style of the divine Penmen, and especially of *St. Paul*, and by rejecting some intire Books of the Old Testament, but also by composing one Gospel out of the Four, which is therefore called by the Writers of Antiquity *Tatian's* *Διὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*, and thereby adding to and rejecting what he pleased out of the Gospels, in order to make them speak his own sense, and seem to be of his Opinion. If when *Tatian* was thus overrun with Error and Heresy, which he began to be as soon as his Master died, and before he wrote this Oration against the Greeks, he should chance to be found to favour your Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, it would give but very little strength to your Cause: since of how great Authority soever this *Father's* (shall I call him) or rather Heretick's, Writings were upon account of his great learning in the defence of common Christianity, against the charge of Novelty objected to it by the Greeks, they can be of none in reference to his honesty and fidelity in conveying the Traditions of the Church. And moreover I would gladly know, why this Notion of his concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, if indeed he had this Notion, which I shall presently shew he had not, may not with as great probability be thought the result of his human Reasoning, when he was now disposed to introduce his Heresies, as you confess that other Opinion of his to have been concerning the Soul's sleeping from the time of the Death to that of the Resurrection of our Bodies.

But there is no great Occasion, as I suppose, to have recourse to these Answers in the point before us: since I hope to make it undeniably clear that *Ta-*

tian

tian, far gone as he was in Heresy, was notwithstanding never so wholly forsaken by his Reason, as to deny the Natural Immortality of the Soul. And in order to make this more plainly appear I shall *First*, lay before you this Father's true Opinion concerning the Soul. And *Secondly*, give the genuine sense of those Passages you have cited out of him. As to the former of these it is indeed true that this Father's Opinion concerning the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (Soul) was somewhat peculiar, and has very evidently a tincture from the *Gnostic* and *Valentinian* Heresies. He affirms Man to be composed of three Natures, of Matter, $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\upsilon}\lambda\eta\varsigma$, of the the Animal Soul, $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$, (for in this sense he commonly understands the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, which, he says, has it's Original from matter, or, as the *Aristotelians* speak concerning their substantial Forms, *educitur è potentia materiæ*) and of Spirit, $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\nu}\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, which is a nobler Principle, according to this Father's Opinion, than the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (Animal Soul) as proceeding from God himself, when he Breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and according to which, he tells us, we are made after the Image and similitude of God. And therein no doubt consisted *Tatian's* Error concerning the human nature, and not in his affirming the Spiritual Rational Soul, which he signifies by the word $\pi\acute{\nu}\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, to be naturally Mortal, which indeed he no where does, as we shall presently see, but in his making two material corruptible mortal Principles, besides the Soul, *viz.* the $\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\eta$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, and which he plainly distinguishes from the Soul. And it is, I think, evident beyond dispute, that the Father took this Opinion not from his Tutor *Justin*, but from the *Gnosticks* and *Valentinians*, after the Death of his Master, and

when he had lifted himself into their Heresy, who so often, in I know not what affected Jargon, and unintelligible sense distinguish their *Hylicals*, *Psychicals*, and *Pneumatics* from each other, in that mad account they give of their *Aons*, as appears by the first Chapter of *Ireneus's* first Book against Heresies. So that in order to know what *Tatian's* Opinion concerning the Soul was, we must carefully observe, that when he means the Soul, in the sense we commonly take it, for the rational Spiritual part in Man, he always I believe expresses himself by the word πνεῦμα, understanding by the word ψυχὴ something distinct from the Soul, namely, a certain vegetable and animal Principle, common to Man with Brutes, and of the same nature with the Body, which tho' he in a few places calls likewise a Spirit, yet 'tis undoubtedly in a large and improper sense, as the word Spirit is sometimes extended to signify the purer and more refined sort of matter. *We acknowledge*, says he, *two sorts of Spirits, one of which is called the ψυχὴ (Animal Soul), but the other is more excellent, the Image and Resemblance of God. Both these were given to our first Parents, (and consequently to us) that in respect of the former they might be material, but in respect of the latter have something in them above matter.* In these words the Father expresses himself clearly enough, that he thought the Animal Principle in Man, which he calls ψυχὴ, to be corporeal, and the rational, which he calls πνεῦμα, to be something above matter, that is, a Spirit. And this latter in

ἡ Δοξολογία Ἀποστόλου ἰσμεν ἡμῖς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν καλεῖται ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ μίζον μὲν ψυχῆς, οὗτο δὲ ὁμοιωσις. ἐκαστὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τοῦ ὅτι ὅτι ὅτι, τὸ δὲ ἀνωτέρω τῷ ὅτι.

the

the clearest and most express Terms imaginable he affirms to be of it's own nature Immortal. *That celestial Word*, says he, *which is a Spirit, begotten of the Father, and the very Word proceeding from the Power of the Father producing it, in imitation of the Operation of the Father, which begot it, made Man the Image of it's own Immortality, that as Immortality belongs to God, so man having a part of the Divine Nature might be also Immortal.* This Θεὸς μοῖρα, part of God, in *Tatian* is no doubt the same with the τοῦ βασιλικῆς νοῦ μέρῳ in *Iustin*, and can signify nothing but the rational Soul, that Breath of Life, which God breathed into him, after he had framed his Body out of Clay. And in another place he calls the Soul ἐπένδυμα τῆς θνητότητος, not as it gives any Immortality to the ψυχῇ, animal Soul, which according to this Author's Opinion corrupts and dissolves with the Body, as being a part of it, and with the Body will be revived again at the Resurrection, but as in respect of it the whole Man may be said to put on, and be clothed with Immortality.

Having thus shewn what *Tatian's* Opinion was concerning the Soul, I proceed now to examin and give the genuine sense of those passages you have cited from him. The first passage runs thus: ^b *The*

α Λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τὴν ἑνότητα αὐτὸν πατρὸς μίμνησι, εἰκόνα τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀνθρώπον ἐποίησεν ἵνα ὡς αὐτὸς ἡ ἀφθαρσία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον Θεὸς μοῖραν ἀνθρώπου μεταλαβὼν ἔχη καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον. ὁ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀθάνατος, Ἀνδρῆς, Εὐδῆλις, ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, θνητὴ δὲ ἄλλα δύναται ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ληθῆσκειν. Οὐδὲν μὲν γὰρ καὶ λύεται μεταρρώματῳ μὴ γνώσκουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀνίσταται δὲ εἰς ὕψιον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἡ ἡσέμα συν τῷ σώματι θάνατον ἀπὸ πτωρίας ἐν ἀθανασία λαμβάνουσα. πάλιν τι ἐδήσκει, καὶ ὡς καιρὸν λυθῆναι ἐπὶ γνώσειν ἡ Θεὸς πίπτον μὲν. Here I am forced to take notice of the Ingenious Editor of *Tatian* at Oxford, who in a small additional Note upon this place of *Tatian* falls into the same mistake with Mr. Dodwell, with this difference however that he has added two or three more of his own. He understands by ψυχῇ here what is properly called the rational Soul, which cer-

tainly

Animal Soul, O Greeks, is not Immortal, but yet capable of existing to Eternity. For tho' the Souls of such as know not the Truth die and are dissolved with their Bodies, yet they will rise again at the End of the World, and endure Death by Punishment to Eternity. And the Souls also of such as have knowledge of the Truth, tho' they will for a time be dissolved, yet will they not die for ever. If indeed the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in this place were to be understood of that other part of the human *compositum*, the spiritual rational Soul, which is wholly different from, and opposed to the Body, it would be very difficult to reconcile this place with the natural Immortality of the Soul. For tho' it be observed that the words $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$ are wanting in some of the Copies of *Tatian*, yet those very expresse terms, $\sigma\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota\tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\theta\upsilon\eta\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ leave no room for another Interpretation. But most certain it is, that by $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ here the Father does not understand the rational part of Man, but the Animal Principle onely, which he plainly makes the same

tainly if he had read that note of Gesners which is printed in his Edition, together with his own, or reading consider'd it well he would never have done. For 'tis there the Scholion is to be found which puts it out of all doubt what is here to be meant by the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. Upon this mistake he founds another that *Tatian* received this Opinion from *Justin Martyr*: Whereas 'tis plain *Justin* speaks of the rational Soul and *Tatian* of the animal Principle, which if *Justin* knew any thing of 'tis certain he did not mean in the place the Annotator cites. Then he supposes *Justin* (and hooks *Theophilus Anuiochenus* into the same scrape) to reason that because the Soul was generated it was therefore Mutable and Corruptible: not knowing that by $\theta\upsilon\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is frequently understood, to be sure in this place of *Justin*, the same with created, and that it does never infer any such Mutability or Corruptibility, as our Annotator dreams of, but onely a Corruptibility and Mortality as that is opposed to the absolute independent Immortality of God, in the sense I have explain'd. And lastly he expresses himself so incautiously or inaccurately concerning the sense of the Father's about the Soul's Immortality, as to seem to represent them all to be Pluchopannuchites, telling us, that they thought it enough, whatever I suppose became of the Soul in the mean time, That God at the End of the World should bestow Immortality upon them.

with

with the Body. For does he not expressly say that it dies with the Body, and will rise again with the Body, plainly implying thereby that it must be a part of the Body? I do not say this Father was in the right, nay I am perswaded he was mistaken, in affirming such a Principle distinct from the Soul to be in Man. All that I affirm here is that when he tells us the Soul is *not Immortal, but Mortal*, he does not mean the rational Soul, that Principle or Part, which distinguishes Man from the rest of the Animal Creation, concerning which we are debating. And this sense is further justified by a Greek *Scholion*, which in some of the MS. copies of *Tatian* has been found inserted in the margin over against this place. It runs in the following words: *ψυχὴ θνητὴ. τὴν ζωογόνον λέγει δυνάμιν, ἣτις κοινὴ πάντων ζώων ἐστίν, ἣ καὶ σωφθέρεται τοῖς αἵμασιν, ὧν μὲν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐξέρχεται ἀφ' ἧς αἱ τέχναι, ἣ καὶ ἐπιστήμαι ποιεῖσθαι ἄλλονται.* *By the mortal Soul, says the Scholiast, he here understands the Animal Power, which is common to Man with all other Animals, which is also dissolved with the Blood, and not the rational Soul (which must be excepted) from whence Arts and Sciences proceed.* So that according to the Opinion of this Scholiast *Tatian's* sense in this place amounts to thus much, that the Animal Principle or Life was dissolved and ceased to be with the Death of the Body, yet for ought

a Here again I think myself obliged to animadvert upon the Oxford Annotator, who instead of αἵμασιν would have us read σπέρματι, which seems to be quite different from and contrary to the Hellenistical Style and Notions, which the Fathers in their writings very much follow; which represents the ψυχὴ to be in the Blood. Thus Gen. IX. Πλάω κτίας ἐν αἵματι ψυχῆς. He has likewise so printed this Scholion that 'tis hard to make Grammar or sense of it, as he has pointed it. For whereas ψυχὴ θνητὴ are the words of which the Scholion is an Interpretation, he has represented them as if they were a part of it.

he here says to the Contrary, nay he seems to suppose that, the rational Soul is of it's own nature Immortal, and will exist for ever, by his explaining what *Tatian* here says onely concerning the animal principle, exclusively of the rational Soul. As to the distinction the Father here makes between such as know, and do not know the Truth, he can I think mean nothing more by it, than to shew, that all men are to share in the Resurrection; since he positively avers that tho' the animal Principle will be dissolved and die for a time in all, yet will it at the final Consummation of all things revive and rise to eternal Life. I cannot therefore but wonder that the Learned *Nourry* in his Dissertation upon *Tatian* should make this passage so difficult to be understood, and should imagine, as he seems to do, that the Souls of such as were ignorant of the Truth, should perish with their Bodies since he plainly affirms that the Souls, as understood of the Animal Principle onely, of both, will at Death be dissolved, and at the Resurrection live again.

The next place which you alledge is indeed wholly Mystical and Allegorical, but yet I think as much of it as may be understood makes directly against your *Hypothesis*. The words are: *For the Soul does not save the Spirit, but is saved by the Spirit*. The difficulty of this Place lies in this, how we shall know what is here meant by the word *Spirit*. Now by the *Spirit* I think nothing else can be understood in this place, but the assistances of the Holy Ghost, communicated to us by the means of the second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. This Spirit, which the Fathers suppose to have been in some degree communicated to all good Men as well such as

α ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἱσωσεν, ἰσωθὴ δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

lived before, as since the Gospel, ^a leaving, as he says, Mankind brought such a blindness upon their Minds, that they were not able to discern the true God, and so fell into Polytheism and Idolatry. Which can be understood of nothing else, but those assistances of the Spirit of God, by which the Understandings of Men are enlighten'd to discern and know the Truth. And again 'tis undoubtedly concerning the same Spirit that the following words are to be understood: ^b *This Spirit of God*, says he, *is not communicated to all, but onely to such as live honest good Lives*: (according to that of the Book of Wisdom: *The Holy Spirit of Discipline will flee deceit, and will not abide when unrighteousness cometh in*) *Into the Souls of whom it insinuates it self, but it communicates hidden things to others by prophetic predictions, and such as obey the admonitions of this Wisdom, will acquire for themselves the same Spirit, but such as disobey and reject this Minister of the Suffering God, seem to be rather fighters against, than worshippers of God.* Nothing, I think, can be more plain than that by the Spirit here is meant the Assistances of the Holy Spirit, enlightening our Understanding, leading our Will, and governing our Affections. So that when he says *the Soul is saved by the Spirit*, he understands no doubt the Man, who by the Assistances of this Holy Spirit performs his Duty, and so acquires Salvation. And in this

α Τὸ ὃ Πνῦμα ταύτῃ ἐπιδαὶ μὴ βυλομένην αὐτῇ καταλείπει — καὶ διὰ τὸ χωρισμὸν τὰ τέλει καθορᾷ τὰ τέλει καθορᾷ μὴ δυναμένη ζητῆτον Θεὸν καὶ πλάνη ποτὲς Θεὸς ἀνιπύων. β Πνῦμα ὃ τὸ Θεὸ παρὰ πάντων μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶν παρὰ ὃ τίσι θεῖς δικαίους πολιτοδομένοις καὶ ἀγαπῶν, καὶ συμπληρομένοις τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ ἀσφαλισμένης τῆς λοιπῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κεκρυμμένον ἀνέχεται. ε αἱ μὲν πειθόμεναι σοφία σφίσι αὐταῖς ἐφείλχοντο πνῦμα συγγενὲς, αἱ δὲ μὴ πειθόμεναι, εἰ τὸ δίκαιον εἰ πιπρῶντο Θεὸ παρὰ τὸ μέγα, ἡμέτεροι μέλλον, ἢ περ θεοτόκας ἀνφαίνοντα.

lense

sense it may be very true what you say, that he owns it as due to the Spirit, that the Soul does not actually die, as that may be understood of Death Eternal by Punishment. In the same sense undoubtedly must we understand your next Citation, where the Father tells us: *That the Soul being joined to the Holy Spirit is thereby not without help and assistance, but will come to those Regions whither the Spirit will lead it: for the habitation of the Spirit is above.* It is I think certain and evident beyond Contradiction, that nothing can be meant by the Spirit here, but the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. For how is it possible that those Words, *his Habitation is above,* should agree to any thing else; much less can they be applied to that *adscititious Spirit*, which you speak of. There is no doubt but the οἰκητήριον here is meant of that Place from whence the Angels fell, but then I cannot agree that the σωτηρία is to be understood of a freedom onely from the depressions of ὕλη: since it evidently has a regard to the Punishment of the other World, which, by Following the dictates of the Holy Spirit, we may put our selves into a capacity of escaping. And 'tis in Opposition to this, that the desertion of the Spirit may be said to be the cause of Death: because by such a Desertion we are left exposed to the Temptations of the Devil, by obeying which we shall incur Death Eternal, as that signifies an Eternity of Punishment.

In the same sense likewise of the divine Assistances of the Holy Ghost, no doubt is to be understood the

α συζυγίαι δὲ κακῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐν Θεῷ πιδύμεναι, ὅσα ἐν ἀποσπῆσθαι, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ὁδηγίᾳ χωρὶς τὸ πνεῦμα, τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οἰκητήριον.

following place where he tells us: *That this perfect Spirit is the wing of the Soul, which falling off by Sin, it flutters onely for a while, like an unfledged Bird, and then falls to the Ground.* What is plainly meant by this place is, that when the Holy Spirit deserts the Soul it can no longer mind Heavenly things, but it's thoughts and desires tend to the Earth, and Earthly enjoyments. And thus he explains himself in the very next Words: *b For, says he, when the Soul leaves it's familiarity with heavenly objects, it must needs desire commerce with low earthly things.* So that we see here is nothing else can be understood, but a defection from a Divine and Heavenly Life by sin; and so by that means an utter extinguishing and casting from us, in the Phrase of Scripture, the Gracious Influences of God's Spirit, by which we might be enabled to live such a Life as would in the end advance us to Heaven. Nor does *Plato*, from whom the Father took his Language and Nozions, mean any thing more by this manner of expression, as appears plainly from several places, but more especially from his *Phædrus*, where he says: *That every thing that is wise and good nourishes and increases the wing of the Soul, as what is otherwise, and contrary to these, corrupts and destroys it.* So little reason have you either from this passage of *Tatian*, or from those of *Plato*, from whence the Fathers, and especially this Father, takes both their expressions and images to fancy any thing was here meant of an *adscititious Spirit*, distinct from the common and ordinary assistances of the Blessed Spirit of God.

a Πίρωσις γὰρ ἡ τ' ψυχῆς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ τέλειον, ὅτι δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, ἔσθ' ὡς περὶ νοσὸς, καὶ χαμαίπτης ἐχθροῦτο. b Μισθωσὶ δὲ τ' ἕρως συνουσίας, καὶ ἰλαττικῶν μετεσίων ἐπιπόθησι. c Τὸ δ' ὁθεῖον, καλὸν, σφ'ν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, τῷ τοῦτο, τῷ τοῦτο δ' ἐξίστη καὶ αὐξάνει μέλλει τὸ τ' ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. *Plat. in Phædro*

And from hence it will appear that your next Citation is not at all to your purpose; which onely infers from the great disadvantages of losing the assistances of the Blessed Spirit our obligations to endeavour to acquire it: *“We ought, says he, for the future to endeavour to acquire that we have lost, and to join our selves to the Holy Spirit, and by this means to endeavour to perfect a conjunction with God.”* Which words contain without all doubt a very great Truth, and enjoin a very necessary Duty, both which were very proper to be urged and inculcated by one, who was vindicating the Truth, and asserting the necessity of the Christian Religion. But I do not see how they can any way be applyed to the purpose and design of this Section. It may indeed very fairly be from hence proved that in order to obtain the Gracious Assistances of this Blessed Spirit, it is necessary to join in that Communion which has a Power to bestow it, and make use of those Ordinances by which 'tis conveyed. But is it possible to suppose any, even the remotest, intimation to be here given of the Spirit, as taken for I know not what Immortalizing Principle?

As much am I in the dark to find out the Pertinency of your last citation; which tho' it excellently well shews the sin and danger of joining in an unlawful or Idolatrous way or communion of Religion and Worship, and points out how a Contagion of Guilt may be derived even upon those, who are not so deep in such a Religion as others, yet does it not in the least mention or so much as intimate any thing concerning your *Adsci-*

^a Καὶ χρὶ λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς ὅπου ἔχομεν ἀπολαύσεσθαι, τὸ τοῦν ἀναζητεῖν, ζῶντες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς προσώπου τῆς ἀγίας, ἢ τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν συζύγιον πραγματευόμεθα.

titious Spirit. ^a As he, says the Father, who so much as eats with a Thief, tho' himself be not a Thief, yet because he has so far commerce and conversation with him, may perhaps be liable to punishment; after the same manner a Good Man mixing himself with Ill Men, tho' it be for a good End, upon the score of this Commerce, shall be punished by God, when he judges him. This is indeed a passage, which seems to be very pertinent and full against what is commonly called *Occasional Conformity*, and would have suited well enough with a discourse of that Kind. But it seems altogether Heterogeneous to the Subject both of your Book, and this Section, and looks as if it were thrown in onely to encrease the Number, and not to add to the weight, of your Citations and Arguments drawn from this Author.

α Καθ' ἡμῶν δὲ τῶν λησδόντων συνδικηνομένων, καὶ μὴ λησῆς αὐτὸς ἢ, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀφ' ὅτι συνδικηνομένη τιμωρίας μεταλαμβάνει, τῶν αὐτῶν, ἢ ὁ κληρὸς, τῶ δὲ φωνῶν ἀναμνηστικῶς πρὸς τὸ νομιζόμενον καλὸν συγχρησάμενος, διὰ τὴν εἰς αὐτὸν κριτικὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ κληρικοῦ τῆς Θεοῦ κληρονομίας.

I CHAP.

CHAP. VI. *ad* §. II.

Irenæus's Notion concerning the Parts of the Human Compositum. He believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul. What he meant by the Spirit. Mr. D's Opinion very like to some Doctrines of the Gnostic and Valentinian Heresy. Irenæus and St. Augustin improperly joined together. Mr. D's citations out of Lib. II. Cap. 64. to prove the Soul to depend upon the Pleasure of God, not to his Purpose. In what sense the Soul depends upon the Will of God. This not only consistent with, but supposes it's Natural Immortality. The learned Pearson speaks less accurately concerning this matter. Life in one part of this Chap. of Irenæus to be understood of happiness only. The Passage Mr D. has cited out of this Chap. makes entirely against his Hypothesis. His citation out of Lib. V. Cap. 4. expressly asserts the Natural Immortality of the Soul. What Irenæus means by the Spirit, and a Perfect Man Lib. V. Cap. 6. The distinction he makes Lib. V. Cap. 12. between the Breath of Life and the quickning Spirit not to this Author's Purpose. St. Augustin believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul. In what sense his Reasoning, that whatever is $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ must be $\phi\varsigma\alpha\pi\tau\acute{o}\nu$, is to be understood.

THE next Father you make use of is *Irenæus*, who wrote after, tho' he lived before, *Justin Martyr*. This Father's Writings you seem to take a great deal of pains to bring over to your sentiment, but after all have not been able by art or force to make him speak to your purpose. Nay I believe it to be very clearly evident, even from those very passages you have cited from him, that he thought the soul to be in it's own Nature Immortal. But before I proceed to examin your citations, and discuss your Arguments, I shall premise a word or two,

to

to shew what *Irenæus's* Notions were concerning Man and the parts of his Composition.

It is I think certain beyond Contradiction, that *Irenæus* made an intire and perfect Man, as such, to consist of but two Principles, or Parts. The Flesh, or body, and Soul, or Spirit; taking Spirit for the same as Soul in this place. The former of these as it is in it's own nature Corruptible and Mortal, so he affirmed the latter to be of it self Incorruptible, and Immortal. ^a Thus arguing against the *Valentinian* emissions of *Ennoea* from God and of *Nus* from *Ennæa*, and then of *Logos* from both these, he affirms Man to be compleatly made up of Body and Soul. And again: ^b *Man*, says he, *is a composition of Soul and Flesh, being formed after the similitude of God, and framed by his hands, that is by the Son and Spirit, to whom he said let us make Man, &c.* And as to the Immortality of that Principle called the Soul, nothing can be more expresse than ^c where he shews the absurdity of those Heretics, who introduced another God the Father, besides the Maker of Heaven and Earth, who tho' he was said by them to give Life and Immortality to the Soul, which the Father positively says *is of it's own nature Immortal, as having from it's own nature that it lives*, yet because he was incapable of giving Immortality to our Bodies which needed his help after they were dissolved by Death, intimating

^a Cum sint compositi (Homines) natura ex corpore & anima subsistentes lib. II cap. 16. ^b Homo est Temperatio Animæ & Carnis, qui secundum similitudinem Dei formatus est: & per manus ejus plasmatus est, per filium & Spiritum, quibus & dixit: *Faciamus hominem* &c. lib. IV. in *Pref.* ^c Quis potentior, & fortior & vere bonus ostenditur? Utrum Dmiurgus, qui totum vivificat hominem: an falso cognominatus ipsorum Pater? Qui ea quiden quæ sunt natura Immortalia, quibus à sua natura adest vivere, fingit se vivificare: quibus autem opus est ab eo adjutorio ut vivant, non vivificans ille benigne, sed relinquens illa negligenter in mortem lib. V. cap. 4.

Mortal, plainly implying them by these words to be the same, and of equal Immortality. Nor does *Irenæus* in these places, as you would insinuate, affirm the Soul to be Immortal, onely as that is opposed to a critical notion of Mortality and Death, as those words signify onely a ceasing to breath, but explains and proves it natural Immortality from a very significant and cogent allusion to the Life and Death of the Body. For the force of his Argument, which you seem desirous to conceal, is evidently this: That as the Life of the Body consists in it's Breathing, and it's Death in ceasing to breath, so the essence or substance of the Soul, being represented in Scripture as consisting in it's being the Breath of Life, it follows that it can therefore no more cease to live than it can lose it's essence, and consequently must be in it's own nature Immortal, as that is implied by always continuing to breath. Now tho' this argument may not be directly conclusive, yet does it plainly shew what this *Father's* Opinion and Judgment in this matter was. And as for his saying that the Soul is incorporeal, if compared with our Mortal Bodies, 'tis evident he means, what indeed you represent him to understand, *viz.* that it does not consist of contrary Principles, which make it tend to dissolution, as the Body does: which is all you are desired to grant, and is in effect nothing less, than directly giving up your Cause: since this is all that is or can be meant by the Natural Immortality of the Soul.

This was *Irenæus's* Notion in short concerning

plainly removes the same sort of Mortality from the Soul, which the *Apostle* affirms to be in the Body. And therefore the Proposition here amounts to this much: That the Soul is not in it's own nature Mortal and perishing as the Body is; which is all that any body means by the Natural Immortality of the Soul, because it does most plainly and strongly imply that it will never actually cease to be.

Man, and the Immortality of the Soul: which I might further confirm and illustrate, as from many other parallel and corresponding places of this Father, so from several reasonings he makes use of against the Heretics, taken from the Nature of the Human Soul. But this is the less needful, because these places are so common and obvious: and I think it more necessary to take notice of what indeed ought not to be dissembled, that this Father very frequently likewise makes mention of the Spirit, tho' not as a part of, yet as something adventitious to the Human Nature; not in the sense you would have us believe of an Immortalizing Principle, nor indeed as any thing distinct from the gracious influences and emanations of the Holy Spirit of God into the Souls of Men. And this certainly is all that is meant, in any of those places, where any mention is made of the Spirit, as applied to, or being in Man. Thus where he tells us: *That all, that are to rise to eternal Life, shall come forth, having their own Bodies, their own Souls, and their own Spirits, in and by which they were render'd acceptable to God.* By which Spirit, no doubt, nothing else can be understood, but those holy Operations of the Spirit of God, which are always present to good Souls, by the Power and Virtue of which Men are enabled to lead good Lives, whilst here upon Earth, and will at the last Day be raised from the Dead. And tho' the manner of expressing this, by *their own Spirits*, may seem to imply something else, yet that this is all that can be meant by it appears most evidently from the following words; where

α πάντες οἱ ἐκπαφέντες εἰς ζωὴν αἰωνίου, ἴδια ἔχοντες σώματα, καὶ ἴδιαι ἔχοντες ψυχᾶς, ἐἰς αἰὶν ἀποδοῦναι τῷ Θεῷ.

giving

giving an Account of the Resurrection of the wicked to punishment, who by vitious Actions had quite extinguished and driven from them this Holy Spirit, he makes mention onely of their Bodies and Souls. ^a *But those, says he, who deserve punishment, shall come forth unto it with their own Bodies, and their own Souls,* ἐν οἷς ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῆς τῆς Θεοῦ χάριτος, *in which they revolted from the Grace of God.* Which latter words put it out of all dispute, what is meant by the Spirits of the Good in the former Citation, namely, not any adscititious Immortalizing Principle, which, when once received, you suppose cannot be lost, but the Holy Influences of that Blessed Spirit, which by a final Impenitence, they had utterly deprived themselves of, and which is therefore not mention'd by *Irenæus*, as accompanying *them* in their Resurrection. And this Spirit, which, in this sense, is always present to the Souls of the Virtuous, this *Father* tells us, shall be shed forth upon good Men in larger Proportions, when at the Resurrection they shall become like unto God. ^b *For if, says he, this Earnest of his Spirit, embracing, as it were, a Man within it self, enables him now to cry Abba Father, what will the more plentiful effusions of it do, which shall be given to us, when we shall be made like to God?* ^c And speaking again concerning this same Spirit, he represents such, as live according to the Di-

^a Οἱ δὲ ἑκατάστων ἄνθρωποι, ἀπολαύσονται εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰδίᾳ ἔχοντες ψυχὰς, καὶ ἰδία σώματα ἐν οἷς ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῆς Θεοῦ χάριτος. lib. II. cap. 62.

^b Si enim pignus complectens hominem in semetipsum, jam facit dicere Abba, Pater, quid faciet universa Spiritus Gratia, quæ hominibus dabitur à Deo, cum similes nos ei efficiet? lib. V. cap. 8. ^c Qui ergo pignus Spiritus habent, ac non concupiscentiis carnis serviunt, sed subjiiciunt semetipfos Spiritui, ac rationabiliter conversantur in omnibus, juste Apostolus Spirituales vocat, quoniam Spiritus Dei habitat in ipsis. Incorporales autem Spiritus non erunt homines Spirituales; sed substantia nostra, id est, animæ &

States and Rules of right Reason to acquire it, and such as live otherwise to lose it: which certainly must be understood of the Gracious Assistances of the Holy Spirit, and can never with any shadow of probability be interpreted of your Immortalizing Principle. And to leave no room for any doubt, we find him in other places ascribing several of the known and allowed Acts and Operations of the Holy Spirit to this same Principle you speak of, which demonstrably shews he could mean nothing by it, but the third Person in the ever to be adored Trinity. Thus speaking of that Spirit which descended upon our Lord at the time of his Baptism, and of which all that are Baptized into his Religion partake, he makes it to be no other than the Holy Ghost. He tells us it was *that Spirit concerning which Isaiah speaks* XI. 2. And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom and Understanding, the Spirit of Counsel and Might, the Spirit of Knowledge and of the fear of the Lord: *that same Spirit, which, just before he ascended up on high, he mentions in that Commission*

carnis adiunctio, adsumens Spiritum Dei, Spiritualem hominem perficit. Here we see plainly, that the Spirit is meant of nothing but those further degrees of Grace, which by a good use of the Talents, that are intrusted to us we may acquire. He goes on to describe such, as have not the Spirit, and are therefore by the Apostle called Carnal. Eos autem qui abjiciunt quidem Spiritus Consilium, Carnis autem voluptatibus serviunt, & irrationabiliter vivunt, & effrenati deji-cuntur in sua delideria, quippe nullam habentes aspirationem divini numinis, sed porcorum & canum more vivunt, hos iuste Apostolus carnales vocat, quia nihil aliud quam carnalia sentiunt. a Hunc Spiritum de quo ab *Isaia* dictum est: *Et requiescet super eum Spiritus Dei*, &c. Et iterum potestatem Regenerationis demandans discipulis dicebat eis: *Euntes docete omnes gentes, Baptizantes eos in nomine Patris & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti*. Hunc enim promittit per Prophetas effundere in novissimis temporibus super servos & ancillas, ut Prophetent: unde & in filium Dei, filium hominis factum descendit, cum ipso assuescens habitare in genere humano, & requiescere in hominibus, & habitare in Plasmate Dei, Voluntatem Patris operans in ipsis, & renovans eos a Vetustate in novitatem Christi.

he gave out to his Disciples: to go Teach all Nations, Baptizing them in the Name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. *This Spirit*, he tells us alluding to the Prophecy of Joel, *He promised by his Prophets to pour out in the last times upon their Servants and Handmaids, that they might Prophecy. And for this reason*, as he goes on, *The Spirit descended upon the Son of God, after he was made the Son of Man, that by this means accustoming himself to the Human Nature, and to rest in Men, and to dwell in this Creature of God, he might work in them the Will of the Father, changing and renewing them from the Old Man, to be new Men in Christ.* From hence I think it is beyond Contradiction manifest that *Irenæus* acknowledges no other Spirit to be in Man, than that same which descended upon our Lord at his Baptism; which certainly was no other than the Holy Ghost. He also in this place makes mention of the Principal Office of that Spirit in Man, which is the Regeneration and Renewing of his Mind, and Sanctification of his Nature. And this likewise can agree to no other Spirit or Principle, than the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. It is likewise represented as the office of this Holy Spirit to join us to one another in one Body, and and to unite to Christ the Head. Thus the Apostle tells us 1 Cor. XII. 13. *That by one Spirit we are Baptized into one Body.* And 1 Cor. VI. 17. the same Apostle assures us that *he that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit.* And this likewise this Father represents as done by that Spirit which we receive from Christ.

^a *The Lord, says he, promised to send the Comforter which*

a Dominus pollicitus est mittere Paracletum, qui nos aptaret Deo. Sicut enim de arido tritico massa una fieri non potest sine humore, neque unus panis; ita nec nos multi unum fieri in Christo Jesu poteramus, sine aqua quæ de cælo est.

Should

should unite us to God. For as a heap of dry Wheat cannot be made one Masse of Bread without moisture, so neither can we, who are many, be made one in Christ, without that water which comes down from Heaven. Again, growing and increasing in Grace and Virtue is always to be looked upon, as proceeding from the Blessed assistances of the Holy Ghost. This also *Irenæus* ascribes to the Spirit, that same Spirit which Christians receive at their Baptism. ^a For seeming to allude to that River of the Psalmist, *the streams whereof make glad the City of God*, as well as to *Heb. VI. 4.* he tells us: ^b*That as the dry Earth, unless it receives moisture does not fructifie, so we being at first dry wood, could never have fructified to Life, if this rain from above, had not descended upon us. For our Bodies receive a Principle of Immortality by the Laver of Regeneration, and our Soul by the Spirit.* The Immortality here mention'd can be understood of nothing else, but that Eternal Happiness, which by the assistances of the Blessed Spirit enabling us to perform good Actions, we are made meet to be partakers of. And a little after, not to mention all the passages to be found to this purpose in this Father, which would be endless, ^ctaking his Image from the story of *Gideon*, and comparing the descent of the Holy Ghost in general into the mind of Man to that of the rain into a fleece of Wool, and to the drops that water the Earth, he tells us, That this Holy Spirit which was not before in so

^a Et sicut arida terra, si non percipiat humorem, non fructificat: sic et nos lignum aridum existentes, primum nunquam fructificaremus vitam, sine superna voluntaria pluvia. Corpora enim nostra per lavacrum illam, quæ est ad Incorruptionem, unitatem acceperunt, animæ autem per Spiritum.
^b Hanc muneris Gratiæ prævidens Gedeon ille Israelita &c. *The following part of this Chapter clearly shews that nothing but the divine assistance of the Holy Ghost can be here meant by the Spirit.*

full and extensive a measure communicated to the World, our Saviour sent into all the World. In a word, the whole ninth Chapter of the fifth Book, where the Father shews in what sense the Apostle is to be understood, where he says that Flesh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, contains so full and clear an explication of what he means by the Spirit, that I cannot but wonder that one of your Sagacity and Judgment could possibly mistake him in so gross a Manner.

It being so very evident from this that I have alledged out of *Irenæus*, and from many more passages, which I think it needless to trouble you withal, what he means by the Spirit, and that he can never be understood to intend it in the sense you imagin, it put me upon considering what other places or notions there might be found in this *Father*, besides those you have cited, which I shall presently examin, that might give you some probable ground for this Error. I cannot be perswaded you could take this Opinion from the *Gnosticks* and *Valentinians*.^a They indeed made I know not what distinction between the Soul and Spirit, affirming the Soul to be the οἰκητήριον of the Spirit. They frequently affirm, in their Platonic Cant,^b the human Nature, both in the Man Christ

^a Επεὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξ ὑστέρηματος, ἔστι τὸ πνεῦμα ὅσῳ ἂν οἰκητήριον. *lib. I. cap. 18.* ^b Τριῶν ἂν ἡδὴ τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατ' αὐτὸς, τὸ μὲν οὖν πνεῦμα, ὃ ἐν ὅλῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἰσχυροφίας, ὃ ἦν τὸ ψυχικόν, τὸ δὲ ὁ ἀπικύρῃσι, τυττῇ τὸ πνευματικόν. *lib. I. cap. 1. §. 9.* And again: Τριῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὕλην, ὃ καὶ ἀριστὸν καλεῖται, κατὰ ἀνάγκην ἀπικύρῃσι λέγουσιν, ὅτι μηδὲ μίαι ἰσχυροφίας πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν διωκόμενοι. τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν ὃ ἐδύο ἐστὶν ἐκτελέσει, ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ πνευματικόν καὶ ὕλην, οὕτως ὡς ἐν τῇ ἐκτελέσει ποιήσεται, τὸ δὲ πνευματικόν ἐκπικύρῃσι, ὅπως εἴη τὸ πνεῦμα σύζυγόν μορφῶν, συμπικύρῃσι αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ἀνατροφῇ. §. 11. I would not be thought so much as to insinuate that Mr. D. took his Notion from these Hereticks; but every one must be sensible, that reads these words, what a great affinity there is between his Opinion and that of Valentinians.

Jesus, and all other Men, to be made up of three Principles, of *ὑλη* or *Body*, the *ψυχὴ* or *animal Soul*, and the *πνεῦμα* or *Spirit*. But this is one of those Errors, which as it appeared very early in the Church, so was it as soon condemned as understood; and therefore you would, no doubt, be very cautious of entertaining an Opinion, which borders so close upon a Heresy, that was censured and condemned in the earliest and purest times of Christianity. *Irenæus* indeed often mentions three things in Man, the Body, Soul, and Spirit. But then he always understands by the Spirit, either the assistances of the divine Spirit, as I have already explained it, or else that Power and Faculty of the Soul, by which it discerns and Judges of Spiritual things, and which to speak properly and intelligibly is nothing but the understanding, assisted and enlighten'd by the Divine Grace, employed in and contemplating upon Spiritual Objects. To this purpose is what he says alluding to the Apostle 1 Cor. II. *That the truly Spiritual Disciple, who has received the Spirit of God, which from the beginning was present to Men, under all the Dispensations of God, relating past, shewing present, and fortelling future things, judges all, but is judged of none.* But it being so evident what this *Father* means by the Spirit, in these and the like places, I cannot think you could be lead into this Opinion by them, and therefore must refer it wholly as taken from those places you have cited, which I come now to examin.

And here you say that *Irenæus* admits of *St. Augustin's*

a Talis Discipulus vere Spiritualis, recipiens Spiritum Dei, qui ab initio in Universis Dei Dispositionibus affuit hominibus, & futura annuntiavit & præsentia ostendit, & præterrita enarrat, judicat quidem omnes, ipse autem a nemine judicatur. lib. IV. cap. 53.

Reasoning

Reasoning that whatever is *γεννητὸν* (created) must *φθαρτὸν* (corruptible). I can't but wonder a little at your joining these two Fathers together, who lived at so great a distance of time from each other, especially since you have expressed it so, as to represent *Irenæus* owning the Doctrine of *St. Augustin*. Whereas since *Irenæus* lived so long before *St. Augustin* it had I think been more natural to have introduced *St. Augustin* allowing the Opinion of *Irenæus*. One would be apt also to have expected, by your saying *Irenæus* owned *St. Augustin's* Opinion, that you had before given some very particular Account what *St. Augustin's* Opinion concerning this matter was: since every one, that shall read your Dissertation, may not perhaps be so well acquainted with his Writings, as to know what his sentiment has been, from that general Intimation you afterwards give of it. These observations I must confess are little, and such as may perhaps be misinterpreted to be made out of a desire to cavil and carp, as is the custom of many writers of Controversy, at some small thing, when there is nothing greater to object against. But I do assure you they had not been made by me, if you had not seem'd to endeavour to give some greater strength and weight to the Authority of *Irenæus*, by representing him of the same opinion with *St. Augustin*; which I think it can by no means do: since *Irenæus* living, so long before, could admit no doctrine of *St. Augustin's* as his. What *St. Augustin's* Opinion was concerning this matter, has been in part shewed already, and, since you have here mention'd him, I shall further shew it to be so far from being to your purpose, that it makes very much against you, after I have first consider'd those

those citations and arguments which you have drawn and taken from *Irenæus*.

And here the first thing you insist upon is, that the Souls of Men depend upon the Pleasure of God for the continuance of their existence. And to confirm this you alledge several passages out of the sixty fourth Chapter of *Irenæus*'s second Book. As where he says, that the existence of all created Beings is *continued and extended to any determinate duration by the Will of their Creator God*. And a little after speaking concerning human Souls and applying what he said before concerning all things to them he says: *they continue in their existence as far, and as long as God pleases*. And again: *Life is not given to us from our selves, nor from our own nature, but by the Grace of God*. And from hence he infers: *That he who is ungrateful to the Almighty Donor of all Good, deprives himself of this eternal Life*. And lastly: *That our Souls, notwithstanding they had a beginning, will continue to exist, because God has willed, that they shall both exist and continue their Existence*. These are all the Places you have cited out of this Chapter: which that I may give the true and genuine sense of, and shew that they make not in the least for the purpose you have alledged them, it is necessary we should take a small step back, and consider a little the occasion and Design of this Chapter. It's design is to shew, that notwithstanding human Souls are created and have a beginning, they are both Incorruptible and Immortal. And it seems directed against those, whom *Justin Martyr* calls λεγομένους Πλατωνικούς, who were accounted *Platonists*, who not understanding *Plato*'s Philosophy, could not give a very good Account how the Hu-

^a And therefore the Title of this Chapter is: Quomodo animæ, cum sint generabiles

man Soul could be created and have a beginning, and at the same time have no end, but remain Incorruptible and Immortal. And therefore they either said that it must be ἀσύντητον, as *Justin Martyr's* word is, or as *Irenæus* expresses it, *innascibilis* (uncreated), that it might be Immortal, or else being σύντητον (created) it must be φθαρτὸς (corruptible) and die with the Body. To solve which difficulty he seems to take a middle way, and making use of the Notions and Language of *Plato* in that famous passage of his *Timæus*, which I have above explained, he affirms them to be created, and notwithstanding Immortal, tho' not after the same manner, and in the same sense as God is Immortal, who, being without beginning as well as end, is always the same immutable God, yet after the same manner as Creatures, even those of the most noble kind, are capable of being Immortal, that is, dependently upon the Will of God. And therefore he goes on to explain what his sense and Opinion of this matter is, where he says: * *That all things besides*

nerabiles in futurum incorruptibiles perseverant. And in this sense, that very laborious and learned Commentator upon this Father, *Feuardentius* understands this Chapter: who represents *Irenæus's* Opinion no otherwise, than that the Immortality of the Soul depends upon the Will of God, after the same manner as does it's Essence. His words are: quandoquidem ut ejus Essentia, sic & jugis Immortalitas à divina voluntate perpetuo dependet. a Quæ autem sunt ab illo omnia, quæcunque, facta sunt & fiunt, initium quidem suum accipiunt generationis, & per hoc inferiora sunt ab eo qui ea fecit, quoniam non sunt ingenta perseverant autem & extenduntur in longitudinem seculorum secundum voluntatem factoris Dei: ita ut sic initio fierent, & postea; ut sint eis donat. Quemadmodum enim cælum quod est super nos Firmamentum & Sol Luna & reliquæ Stellæ, & omnia ornamenta ipsorum, cum ante non essent facta sunt, & multo tempore perseverant secundum voluntatem Dei: sic & de spiritibus & omnino de omnibus his quæ facta sunt cogitans quis, minime peccabit: quando omnia quæ facta sunt initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem quoadusque ea Deus & esse, & perseverare voluerit. It is I think evident beyond dispute, that the design of the Father in the former part of these words is not to speak so much concerning the continuance of the duration of things, as concerning their dependence upon God for the Preservation of their Beings. And that he speaks onely of this general dependence appears plainly from his

him, whatsoever they be, that either are or have been, having a beginning of Existence, are upon this Account inferior to him that made them, because they are not uncreated, but they continue and are extended in their Duration, according to the Will of their Creator God: who as he at first gave them their Being, so afterwards by the same Gift continues those Beings. As the Heavens which are above us, the Firmament, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, with all their Beautiful attire, were made out of nothing, and continue for ever by the Will of God, if any one should affirm the same concerning Souls and Spirits, and concerning every thing that is made, he will not mistake: since every thing that is created, as it has a beginning of it's existence, so that existence is extended as far and continues as long as God wills it to be, and to continue. From this place of Irenæus, which that you might the more easily see the true sense of, I have thus cited at large, I think it evidently appears, what sort of dependence upon the Will of God he supposed all created Beings to have, namely, no other than what the Schooles assure us all second Causes have upon the first, for the continuance of that existence, and those Powers and Faculties, by the general concurrence of God's Providence, which he at first gave them. For since the parts of the Duration of all Beings are independent upon each other, & it does not follow that because a thing exists this Minute, it must therefore exist the next, nothing less can continue the existence of things to any assigned duration than the

h is applying it to all created things. It is therefore a very unhappy misrepresentation of Irenæus, which Mr. D. has here made, in citing what Irenæus says onely concerning the dependence of the second Causes upon the first, as if it were spoke concerning the Continuance of their duration, which is here no further intended to be mention'd than was necessary to shew them dependent.

same Power interposing to uphold and preserve, which first gave them their Beings. And therefore a very large sect of the Schoolmen ^a make it, and, for ought I know, very truly and properly, the same act of divine Power which preserves, that first made all things, and that the upholding things in their Beings is but one continued act of creating them. This then being the common condition of all created Beings, it was the design of the Father in this Chapter to shew, that both the Human Soul, and the Angels themselves were not exempted from it; and that the continuance of even *their* Existence was not independently upon the first Cause. And this, he thought, might very well account for their Immortality, without supposing them, as some who were called *Platonists* did, to be uncreated. Since natural Immortality does not imply an utter impossibility of ceasing to exist (which indeed cannot be suppos'd concerning any creature; because, if God should withhold his preserving Power, every created thing without all doubt would be immediately annihilated) but onely that there be some Creatures, such as Angels and the Souls of Men, which cannot be destroyed or perish by the Virtue, or Energy of any created Being. And agreeably to this Notion it is that our Lord bids his Disciples, *not to fear them who could kill the Body, but after that had no more that they could do*. So that when *Irenæus*, and the rest of the Fathers assert so often, that Souls depend intirely upon the Pleasure of God they designed no doubt more strongly

^a It is well known that some among the Schoole Divines affirm'd the Act of Creating things to be really distinct from that of Preserving them. Against whom Thomas Aquinas and all his followers affirm the Act of Creation to be the same with that of Preservation.

to imply, that they were altogether independent on all created Beings, so as that they cannot be destroy'd in their Essence, or alter'd in their Powers and Faculties, by any created influences whatsoever. And that this is all *Irenæus* intends in these places appears most clearly from that passage of the *Timæus*, from whence, as you rightly observe, the Philosophy and Language of this Chapter is evidently taken. There the Supreme God tells the inferior Deities, that they were ἀλυστὰ ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος, undissolveable and immortal by his Will, continuing to them that act of Power by which they were at first made. This the *Father* before us expresses by *perseverant & extenduntur secundum voluntatem factoris Dei*, which is in effect a full assertion of their Natural Immortality, when applied to human Souls. For since they were made of such a Nature as not to be capable of perishing with the Body, or by any external Force, but to depend intirely upon the Will of God, and since God willeth to continue this their Existence, which cannot otherwise be destroyed than by God's ceasing to will it, it unavoidably follows from thence, that they must be in themselves Immortal, and that therefore there was no need to suppose them, as some did, to have been uncreated, in order to make them Immortal. And this plainly appears to be the full and onely force of his Argument from those words, where he says, that as the Heavens, and the Celestial Bodies, which *Plato* somewhere calls Gods, and throughout his Philosophy supposes naturally incorruptible, tho' they had a beginning, yet continue for ever by the Will of God, so the Souls of Men, and Spirits, notwithstanding they were created, are by the same Will preserved to Eternity. 'Tis further

further observeable too, that the Father in this place reckons the Souls of Men to be upon the same level, in point of duration, with the Blessed Angels themselves; which being confessedly in their own Natures Immortal, the same, with as good reason, and in the same sense, may be said concerning the human Soul.

And indeed the Holy *Father* in this Chapter very fully and roundly affirms, what the Title of it supposes, which seems to take it for granted that the Soul is Immortal, but then proposes to shew how this was to be reconciled with it's being generable or created. For by his telling us that it depends intirely upon the Will of God, he is so far from implying that it is, in it's own nature Mortal, as by that fully to assert it's natural Immortality. For may it not be fairly affirm'd that this utter independence of the Soul's of Men upon any thing but God supposes them not to be liable to any created influences, so as to be alter'd or destroyed by them, and that they will continue to exist, what created virtue soever be withdrawn from them? And therefore I cannot but wonder, that the very Learned, and most Judicious *Pearson*, in the Passage you have put into the Title Page of your Book, should Counterdistinguish, as he seems to do, these two things, the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and an Immortality by the Will and Pleasure of God, since they are not onely coincident, but do mutually suppose and imply one another. For what can an Immortality by the ordinary Pleasure of God mean besides this, that human Souls were so framed, as of themselves to exist for ever, provided the ordinary concurrence of

God's Providence be afforded to them? And, according to this Notion, I cannot find that the Fathers any where oppose an Immortality by the Pleasure of God, to an Immortality by Nature, but onely to such an absolute independent Immortality, which can agree to nothing but God.

As to the following citations, you have made out of this Chapter: that *Life is not given us from our selves, nor from our own nature, but by the Grace of God*: by *Life* here we can understand nothing else but *eternal Life*, as that signifies *eternal Happiness*. After *Irenæus* had affirmed the Natural Immortality of the Soul, or which is the same thing, it's Immortality by the Pleasure of God, he proceeds to insist upon an Eternity of happiness, telling us, ^a *That the Prophet speaking concerning the Salvation of Man, said, He asked Life of thee and thou gavest it him, even length of Days, for ever and ever: implying that the Father of all gives this Life, and that it is to endure for ever and ever to those who shall be saved. For 'tis not from our selves, nor from our own Na-*

a Et iterum de salvando homine sic ait: *Vitam petiit à te, & tribuisti ei longitudinem dierum in seculum seculi*: tanquam Patre omnium donante, & in seculum seculi perseverantiam, his qui salvi fiunt. Non enim ex nobis, neque ex nostra natura vita est: sed secundum gratiam Dei datur. Et ideo qui servaverit datum vitæ, & gratias egerit ei qui præstitit, accipiet & in seculum seculi longitudinem dierum. Qui autem abjecerit eam, & ingratus ex stiterit factori, ob hoc quod factus est, & non cognoverit eum qui præstat, ipse se privat in seculum seculi perseverantia. Et ideo Dominus dicebat ingratis existentibus in eum: *si in modico fideles non fuistis, quod magnum est quis dabit vobis?* significans quoniam qui in modica temporali vita ingrati existerunt ei qui eam præstitit, iuste non percipient ab eo in seculum seculi longitudinem Dierum. *There may perhaps be some difficulty, what is meant in this place by the datum vitæ, which, as I take it, must be understood onely concerning the Grace of God. For we find that he speaks afterwards of such as have cast it away, abjecerint eam: which I think can hardly be applyed, with probability, to any thing but that Grace and those Favours which in this life are bestowed upon Men; from the good uses and advantages they make of which, their happiness hereafter entirely depends.*

ture, that we have this eternal Life, but 'tis given us by the Grace of God. And therefore whoever preserves this Grace, and gives thanks to him who bestows it, shall receive a long Life even for ever and ever, But whoever casts it away, and is ingratfull to his Creator, for having been made by him, or does not acknowledge him: who gives it, deprives himself of this length of days for ever and ever. And therefore our Lord said to those who were ungratfull to him: If ye have not been faithfull in a little, who will give you that which is great: intimating to us that whoever is ingratful for that short temporary Life to him who gives it, may justly be deprived of that happiness, which consists in a length of days for ever and ever. Since the Holy Father here speaks expressly concerning the Salvation of Man, and concerning such as forfeit this Salvation by their ingratitude to their Creator, he cannot I think with any Probability be understood to mean any thing by *Life* here, but *Happiness*, nor any thing by the continuance of this *Life for ever and ever*, besides the prolongation of this *Happiness* to Eternity. It is without all doubt to the Salvation of Man, as that signifies his Redemption from Eternal Punishment, that he applies those words of the *Psalmist*: *He asked Life of thee, and thou gavest* &c. This he represents, and that very truly, as the free gift of God the Father of all, bestowed upon us out of his abundant kindness without any merit on our side to deserve it of him. And this without all doubt is the meaning of those Words, which you have cited, as it seems to me, without a due regard to their coherence with, and dependence upon the Context. ^a And in this sense

^a Nothing but this can be the Father's sense in this Place; unless we will make him plainly contradict himself: since in another place he expressly affirms the Soul to be

it is no doubt very true that *Life*, that is, the rewards of eternal Life, is *not from our selves*, will not be bestowed upon us for the merit of our own Actions, nor upon Account of any Excellency and Dignity in our own Nature, but by the Grace and Favour of God. And from hence he very justly infers that whoever preserves and improves the Grace that is afforded him in this Life, and is thankfull to him who bestows it, shall enjoy an happiness in the other World, which will last *for ever and ever*. But he who rejects this Grace, and is not grateful to his Creator, for having been made by him, and will not acknowledge him who is the giver of these things, will deprive himself of this Eternal Happiness. That by the *in sæculum sæculi perseverantia* here, which such as are ingratefull to their Almighty Creator are said to *deprive themselves* of, cannot be understood primarily and principally the existence and duration of Souls but onely secondarily and implicitly, as that is implied by an Eternity of happiness, appears plainly from this consideration; that otherwise this most substantial Absurdity would follow from these words, namely, that it was *Irenæus's* Opinion, that such Ill Men as were not sufficiently thankful for those Favours God had bestowed upon them, would after a certain time be deprived of this *Perseverantia*, this continuance of their Beings, *i. e.* would be annihilated: than which nothing can be more inconsistent with the Analogy of Faith, more contrary both to Catholick Tradition and the Doctrine of this Father in particular, we have before us, as well as to your own Hypo-

natura Immortalis, and among those things quibus à sua natura adest vivere.
See above.

thesis.

thesis. But if by these words, *ipse se privat in seculum seculi perseverantia*, be understood (as no doubt we ought to understand them) that such ingrateful Men deprive themselves of the eternal Rewards of Heaven, and withall incur everlasting Punishment, this is a sense which is easy, obvious, and consistent with the known and most uncontested *Dogmata* of Faith. Whereas, if they be taken to signify a final annihilation or ceasing to be, they must necessarily contradict the whole stream and current of Christianity, as making, ingratitude to God, or an ill use of that *Life*, and those other Benefits we have received from him to be punished onely with an utter extinction of Being, if not presently with the Body, yet at least after the Soul has existed a certain Period of time, separated from it. Which seems to be an Opinion not very much unlike the Heresy of *Origen*, by which he made the Punishment of the Damnd not to be eternal, but that after a certain determinate time of Punishment all Wicked Men, and even the Devils themselves would be made happy; with this difference however, that if *Irenæus* be to be understood in the sense you have put upon his words, their Being must end, as well as their Punishment; whereas *Origen* would onely have their Punishment, and not their Existence, to terminate after a certain time. This same sense is also further evident from the Words which follow those you have cited, where the Father, applying that saying of our Lord (which is not to be found in the order here cited, except in the Gospel according to the *Ægyptians*, and in *Clemens's* Epistle to the *Corinthians*) *if you have not been faithfull in a little who will give you that which is great* to this subject of ingratitude, plain-

ly supposes nothing can be meant by the *longitudo dierum in sæculum sæculi*, but a Blessed Eternity of consummate Happiness, as the Reward of our Good Actions. You had therefore very little Reason to cite these Passages in favour of your Opinion concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, which all impartial Readers may by this time see to be so far from strengthening, that they do indeed very much weaken and even overturn your Hypothesis.

The last citation which you have made out of this Chapter, *That our Souls, notwithstanding that they had a beginning, will continue to exist, because God has willed that they shall both exist, and continue their Existence*, will be found, by a due attendance to the coherence and connexion it has with what goes before, and follows it, to be far less to your Purpose than any thing, which you have yet alledged out of this Father. And in regard what he here says, contains as express and full a declaration, as he any where makes, concerning the Nature and Immortality of the human Soul, it will not I hope be thought improper or unnecessary to represent the whole stress and series of his Argument, as it lies before us in the latter part of this Chapter. *As*, says he, *the Animal Body is not*

a Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam, quoadutque Deus vult: sic & anima ipsa quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam vitam. Unde & Propheticus sermo de Protoplasto ait: *factus est in animam vivam*; docens nos quoniam secundum participationem vitæ vivens facta est anima: ita ut separatim quidem anima intelligatur, separatim autem quæ erga eam est vita. Deo itaque vitam & perpetuam perseverantiam donante capit & animas primum non existentes, dehinc perseverare, cum eas Deus & esse & subsistere voluerit. Principari enim debet in omnibus & dominari voluntas Dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere, & subdita esse, & in servitium dedita. Et de factura quidem & perseverantia animæ huc usque dictum sit. *The chief difficulty in this place seems to be what is here meant by Vita, by the participation of which the Soul is said to be made living. And I think any one that attentively considers the series* of

the Soul, but has the Animal Soul united to it, as long as God pleases, so the Animal Soul it self is not the Life, but has Life given it by God. Therefore the divine Spirit speaks concerning the first Man, that God made him a living Soul: teaching us that the Animal Soul was made living by it's receiving Life. So that the Animal Principle may be look'd upon as a thing distinct from that [human rational] Principle, which gives it Life. God therefore giving Life and Immortality to the Soul, it will from thence follow, that tho' Souls had a beginning of their Existence, they may however continue for ever; since God Wills both their existence and continuance. For the Will of God ought to have the chief Rule and Dominion in all things, and every thing else ought to give place, be subject to, and obey it. And thus, as he concludes, have I spoke concerning the Creation, and eternal duration of the Soul. From this passage it is, I think, very plain that this Father makes a distinction, how truly, is not much to my purpose to determin, between the Animal Soul, and the Principle of Life, which I call the rational Principle, or that which is properly the human Soul; and that he ascribes not onely Life, but Immortality to this Principle. So that from hence I think it evident beyond contradiction, that he never dreamt of the πνεῦμα, as an Immortalizing Principle: since he so clearly and expressly ascribes Life and Immortality to the πνοή or Breath of Life, which in another place he tells us is given indiscriminately to all Men, and which I have shewn^b to be nothing else but the human Soul. This Prin-

of the argument will easily and quickly be convinced, that nothing else can be meant by it, but the πνοή ζωῆς the Breath of Life Gen. II. 7. For does he not plainly affirm that the Life was that Principle by which Man was made a living Soul? which certainly can be meant of nothing but the Breath of Life. a Lib. V. cap. 12 b Chap. I p. 6.

ciple of Life he tells us comes from God, and has *perpetuam perseverantiam*, everlasting duration from him. And therefore tho' there was a time when it began to be, yet may it notwithstanding by the same Will, by which it was at first made, continue for ever. By this, asserting a natural, and at the same time a dependent Immortality to the Soul. And that this was his principal aim, and all that he meant in this place, appears plainly from those words, which he immediately subjoins: *Principari enim debet in omnibus &c.* For the Will of God, that supreme absolute independent Will, which is the Basis and Foundation that supports all created Being whatsoever, ought to have the chief Rule and Dominion in all things: since every thing, of what nature soever it be, doth depend upon it for it's essence, and existence, and all manner of Operations that proceed from it. So that from hence it is I believe very clear, that *Irenæus* in this place speaks of no other Will and Pleasure of God, then what the Schoolmen call the ordinary concurrence of his Power and Providence, in preserving and supporting all created things in, and according to such a duration as properly belongs to their several Natures and Constitutions.

From the second you proceed to the fifth Book, where your first citation out of the fourth Chapter being to the same purpose as those you have made out of the second Book, namely, to shew that *it is not from it's own nature, but from an extrinsecal favour granted it by the Father, that it exists after the dissolution of the Body*, I shall speak to it here by itself before I go on to examin those other citations, which you alledge out of this Book, to prove a point diffe-

different from this. The design of the Holy Father in this Chapter is to shew that those Hereticks were in a mistake who affirm'd there was another Father, besides the *Demiurgus*, the Creator of the World, whom they called the good Principle, in Opposition to the Framer of all things whom they made an evil Principle. Against these Heretics *Irenæus* argues, That in regard they said our Bodies did not receive Life from this their God the Father he must be either a Weak, Useless, and Negligent, or which was worse a malicious and envious Deity. ^a For, as he goes on, *since they say that the Soul and Spirit, and such things*

a Latent autem semetipsos, qui alterum affingunt Patrem præter Demiurgum, & bonum eum vocant; infirmum, & inutilem & negligentem inferentes eum, ut non dicamus, quoniam lividum & invidum, in eo quod dicant non vivificari ab eo nostra corpora. Cum enim dicant ea quæ omnibus sunt, manifesta quoniam perseverant Immortalia, ut puta Spiritus & anima, & quæ sunt alia, quoniam vivificantur a Patre, illud autem quod non alias vivificatur, nisi illi Deus præstet, vita derelinqui; aut impotentem & infirmum ostendit Patrem ipsorum, aut invidum & lividum. Demiurgo enim & hic vivificante mortalia corpora nostra, & resurrectionem eis per Prophetas promittente, quemadmodum ostendimus, quis potentior & fortior & verè bonus ostenditur? Utrum Demiurgus qui totum vivificat hominem, an falso cognominatus ipsorum Pater? Qui ea quidem quæ sunt natura immortalia, quibus à sua natura adest vivere, fingit se vivificare; quibus autem opus est ab eo adjutorio ut vivant, non vivificans ille benigne, sed relinquens illa negligenter in mortem. *The Heretics whom the Father opposes and refutes in this Chapter, who affirm'd the World not to be created by the Demiurgus, the great Creator of all, but either by some other Principle, or else by Angels were the Gnostics and Valentinians, the Cerinthians, Carpocratians, Marcionites and many others. If it be objected that because the Demiurgus, the great Creator of the World is here said to give life to the whole Man, that therefore he gives it likewise to the Soul, it may be answered that tho' the Soul has, as without doubt it has, it's life, or rather being from God, yet it by no means follows from thence that 'tis in it's own nature Mortal, or that it will ever cease to live. The Angels without doubt have their being and life from God, but it cannot be from thence infer'd that they are therefore in themselves Mortal. But when the Father here says that God gives life to the whole Man he means nothing more than that he gives a vital union to Soul, and Body: since the life of the whole Man consists in nothing but such an union. And therefore it will not follow that the Soul has it's life or being after the same manner, as the Man who is compounded by a vital union of Soul and Body, is said to have it.*

as these, which all Men have and which are plainly to continue for ever, have Life given them by their God the Father, but that which cannot have Life otherwise than by God's bestowing it upon him, is pass'd over by him, this evidently shews this Father of theirs to be either Impotent and Infirm, or Malicious and Envious. But since the great Creator of the World doth both give Life to these our Mortal Bodies, and likewise promises them by the Prophets a Resurrection, as I have already shewn, it is no difficult matter to judge, which is more great powerful, and truly good, whether the great Creator of the World, who gives Life to the whole Man, or this Deity, who is by them falsely called the Father, who, as they pretend, gives Life to those things, which be in their own nature Immortal, as having it from their own nature, that they Live, but as, for those which want his assistance to give them Life, he is not so kind as to bestow it upon them, but carelessly leaves them to their own natural Mortality. Every one who reads these Words will easily see, that what you cite from this passage, which I have thus represented at large, as containing *Irenæus's* sentiment concerning the Soul, is indeed nothing else but an account this Father gives of the Opinion of those Heretics, he in this Chapter opposes and confutes, concerning the Power and Operations of that other Principle or Deity, whom they called the Father, distinct from the Creator of the World, and to whom they ascribed the Creation of the Soul. For does he not introduce those words you have cited with *Cum enim dicant &c.* Since they i. e. the Heretics, say? And is not the word *Father* here indisputably to be understood of their other Principle, whom they affirm'd to be a better and more powerfull Deity than the *Demiurgus*, the Creator of the World?

So

So that had these words been ever so much to the purpose to which you have cited them, as to their sense and meaning, they could never have given the least advantage to your Cause; because they do not contain *Irenæus's* own Opinion, but the account he gives of the Opinion of those Heretics, he in this Chapter sets himself to confute. But indeed this whole passage, if taken all together, in it's true and genuine sense is so far from serving the purpose you apply it to, that it is at once a most express declaration that *Irenæus* believed the Soul to be naturally Immortal, and likewise contains some very pregnant proofs of it's natural Immortality. Does not his Distinguishing the Body from the Soul by this criterion, that the Body cannot have Life any otherwise than by God's bestowing it, plainly suppose, that the Soul has Life some other way, namely, from it self, in as much as it's Being and Essence consists in it's living? Nay does he not expressly say that it is in it's *own nature Immortal*, and that it is *from it self that it Lives*: which last expression imply's indeed a most cogent Argument to prove it's Immortality. For if be it from it self, and it's own Essence that it lives; then it can no more cease to live than to be, and must lose it's Existence when it loses it's Life: but in regard it cannot lose it's Existence, except God either by a positive act of his Power, or by withholding and restraining the general concurrence of his Providence do quite destroy, and utterly annihilate it, from hence I think it unavoidably follows, that since we can have no reason to believe that God by any of the fore-mention'd ways will destroy it's Essence, that it must exist and live to Eternity.

If

If it be doubted what the meaning of the word *Spiritus* in this passage is; I take it to be understood, in the relation it stands here, of the human rational Soul, and to signify the same as the $\piνοη\ \zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$, the *Breath of Life*. And tho' the Father does not ordinarily take it in this sense, yet I cannot see but this place may very well bear this Interpretation. Or perhaps by the *Spiritus* may be meant the gracious Influences of the Blessed Spirit of God, which, (as from what I shall presently say will further appear) this Father, as well as the rest, supposes upon the surest ground of Revelation, to be always present with, and in an intimate manner united to such pious Men, as make it their care to prepare a fit habitation for it in their Souls, by cleansing themselves from all filthiness of Flesh and Spirit. Or lastly by *Spiritus* & *Anima* no more may possibly be understood than *Anima Spiritualis*, the Holy Father in this place by a common form of speaking expressing $\epsilon\nu\ \alpha\lambda\epsilon\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\iota\nu$, one thing and it's nature or property by two substantives. Nor do the Verbs *perseverant* & *vivificantur*, to which these words relate being in the Plural Number, hinder this Interpretation: because not onely the Conjunction, but also the words *quæ sunt alia*, which are, I suppose, designed to comprehend the Angels, which are here, as every where else, put in the same rank with human Souls, as to their future existence, may sufficiently, as I suppose, account for that.

Your design, in what you have hitherto cited out of *Irenæus*, was to prove that the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal, because it depends upon the Will of God for it's Existence. How far, and in what sense *Irenæus* thought it to depend upon the
Pleasure

Pleasure of God, and that such a dependence not onely is consistent with, but also strongly implys and supposes it's Natural Immortality, has been already I think abundantly shewn. Your next step is to endeavour to shew that Man is made up of three Principles, the *Body*, the *Soul*, and the *Spirit*, being willing to have it from hence believed, (for indeed it neither has any apparent connexion with this Notion, nor do you endeavour to strengthen this Consequence by any Arguments, nor does *Irenæus* infer any such Consequence, but rather affirms the contrary) that the Soul is in it's self *Mortal*, and becomes Immortal onely by it's union with the Πνεῦμα (*Spirit*).

The first citations you have made to this Purpose are taken out of the sixth Chapter, where he tells us, ^a *That a Perfect Man is made out of a Conjunction*

a The whole passage as it lies together with the context runs thus : Per manus Patris, i. e. per Filium & Spiritum Sanctum fit homo secundum similitudinem Dei, sed non pars hominis. Anima autem & Spiritus pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam. Perfectus autem homo commixtio, & adunio est animæ assumptis Spiritum Patris, & admixta ei carni, quæ est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei. Propter quod & Apostolus ait : Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos : perfectos dicens eos, qui perceperunt Spiritum Dei, & omnibus linguis loquuntur per Spiritum Dei, quemadmodum & ipse coquebatur : καὶ τῶς ἐ ποικῶν ἀκρόασι ἀδελφῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ πνευματικῇ χαρῆς μετὰ ἰχόντων, καὶ παντοδαπαῖς λαλῶντων ἀλλήλοις ἐν ψαλμοῖς καὶ ᾠδαῖς καὶ πνευματικαῖς ᾠδαῖς, καὶ τῇ κρυφίᾳ τῇ ἀνδρώπων εἰς φανερὸν ἀγῶντων ἐπὶ τῷ συμφέροντι, καὶ τῇ μετῴχῃ τῷ Θεῷ ἐκδοτικῶν, quos & Spirituales Apostolus vocat, secundum Participationem Spiritus existentes Spirituales, sed non secundum defraudationem & interceptionem carnis, & nude hoc ipsum solum. Si enim substantiam tollat aliquis carnis, id est, Plasmatis, & nude id ipsum solum intelligat, jam non Spiritus est Homo, est, quod est tale, sed Spiritus hominis aut Spiritus Dei. Cum autem Spiritus hic commixtus animæ unitur Plasmati, propter effusionem Spiritus, Spiritualis & perfectus homo factus est, & hic est qui secundum imaginem & similitudinem factus est Dei. Si autem defuerit animæ Spiritus, animalis est vere, qui est talis, & carnalis derelictus imperfectus erit, imaginem quidem habens in Plasmate, similitudinem vero non assumens per Spiritum. 'Tis remarkable that whoever was the Author of the Titles which are prefixt to the Chapters of Irenæus he thought it to be Irenæus's Opinion, that an intire and perfect Man (meaning I suppose natural-ly)

and union of the Soul, taking to it self the Spirit of the Father, and of the Flesh or Body joined to it, which was made after the Image of God. And again, a little way further : When this Spirit, says he, being infused into the Soul is united to the Creature, the Man by reason of this effusion is made Spiritual, and perfect : and this is he who is made after the Image and Similitude of God. But if this Spirit be wanting to the Soul, the Man who is in this Condition is truly Animal, and being left carnal, will be imperfect, having indeed the Image of God, in what is created, but not his Similitude by assuming the Spirit of God. As to the former of these citations, where the Holy Father tells us that a *Perfect Man* is made up of a union of the Soul, having the Spirit of the Father, with the Flesh, methinks the very words in which he expresses himself, when he calls this Spirit, the Spirit of the Father, might even without the help of the context, have been a sufficient clue to have guided you to the true sense of them. For what can the Spirit of the Father in this place mean, but the Holy Spirit of God, the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity, which being united to, and dwelling in the Soul, makes Men, in a moral and religious sense, perfect, even as the Father who gives it is perfect? And that this and nothing else can be meant by the Spirit in this

ly) consisted onely of a Body and Soul, and that by the Spirit, nothing else was meant but the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. For thus the Title of this Chapter runs. *Integrum & Perfectum Hominem, corpore & anima constantem, saluum faciet Deus; quum eum verbum adsumplerit, & donis Spiritus Sancti ornauerit, cujus corpora nostra templa sunt & dicuntur.* The same distinction the Holy Father here makes between the Image and Similitude of God the School-Men also make; who tell us that the former consists in the Powers of the Soul, and the latter in those Gifts and Graces, and the Blessed effects of them, which are communicated by the Spirit of God.

place

place, will appear most evidently from the context, that lies between the two places you have cited; which you did not think it to your purpose to take any notice of, notwithstanding it contains so clear and full an explication both of what is meant here by the *Spirit*, and what by the *Perfect Man*. For this reason therefore, as he tells us in the words immediately following those you have cited, in the first place, *the Apostle says*: We speak Wisdom among them that are perfect, affirming them to be perfect who had received the Spirit of God, and spoke in all sorts of Tongues by the Spirit of God, as himself also spoke. As we hear also that there be now many Brethren in the Church, who have Prophetical Gifts, and thro' the Spirit speak with all sorts of Tongues, and for the advantage of the Church, discover the secrets of Men, and explain the Mysteries of God, these the Apostle calls *Spiritual*. &c. From these words I think it is clear beyond contradiction, that *Irenæus* could not mean by the *Spirit* here any thing besides the ordinary or extraordinary effusions of the Holy Spirit of God, which in a very wonderfull manner were shed abroad upon the Apostles and first Professors of Christianity, for some Ages in the Primitive Church. And as to the ordinary communicatitions of it, they are we know still continued in the Church, and derived upon all such as duely prepare their hearts for the reception of this Blessed Guest. Nor by a *Perfect Man* is it possible for us to understand him to mean any thing more than a moral and religious, and not a natural or physical Perfection. Such a Perfection whereby we are enabled to overcome the World, to resist all those Temptations which assault us, either from within or from without. Such a Perfection, whereby

we make our selves like to God in Virtue, Purity, and Holiness, and, according to this Father's Notion, add to that Image of God we receive by nature, a certain more express and lively similitude and resemblance of him, which we receive by Grace, and carry on to perfection, by a continued Practice of Virtue and Piety. And in this sense a *perfect Man*, no doubt, includes, and must necessarily comprehend these three, as being indeed essential to a Spiritual Man: since it's impossible to become Perfect and Spiritual, in this Religious sense, without these Holy Communications of this Blessed Spirit. But *Irenæus* never dreamt of your Immortalizing Principle, any further, or otherwise, than as this Spirit is a Principle enabling us to perform such Actions, by which we may deserve Immortality, as that signifies eternal Happiness. And hence he calls it, in the words immediately preceding those you have cited in the second Place, the *Spirit of God*, and distinguishes it from the Spirit of Man, or the human Soul. *For if*, says he, *any one should suppose these three to be separated, and consider onely the Spirit, in such a case he would not speak properly to say the Man was Spiritual, but he must call it either the Spirit of Man, or the Spirit of God.* And from hence argues; *But when this Spirit being infused into the Soul is united to the Creature, the Man by reason of this Effusion &c.* Since he speaks here of the *Effusion* of this Spirit, which seems to be a word peculiarly appropriated to express the communication of the Holy Spirit of God, I cannot but wonder that you should understand him in any other sense. It is certainly no other way, than by the communication of this Spirit, by which he represents the Man to become
 Spirit-

Spiritual: as he tells us a little before, that the Apostle calls those *Spiritual*, who had received the extraordinary *Effusions* of this Spirit, which enabled them to discover the most recondite Secrets, and to speak in Languages they had never learnt. It is therefore nothing but this same Spirit, which, *Irenæus* tells us, makes Men *Perfect*, in the sense I have already explained of a Moral and Religious, and not Physical or Natural Perfection; a Perfection of Quality not of Essence, which compleats the Religious, without giving any thing besides a quality, and, what arises from it, a Denomination to the natural Man. And when such Men as these are called *Perfect*, we must take care not to understand any consummate Perfection, which indeed in this Life they are incapable of, but onely that being by this Spirit freed in a great measure from the Corruptions of the World, they enter into a course of Holiness and Perfection, which, by the conduct of the same Blessed Influence, will at last bring them to the highest Perfection both of Grace and Glory in the other world. It is indeed true, what you observe *Irenæus* to affirm, that all Men have not actually this Spirit: because some may either never have received it, by not at all, or not in a due manner using those ordinances, which are appointed and set apart to convey it, or having received it, by a vitious and ungodly Life, may utterly have deprived themselves of all the Benefits and Advantages of it. For most certain it is that the *Spirit of God will not always strive with Man*, and the day of Grace is sometimes shorter than that of Life. In such a case as this, when these kindly Influences from Heaven are withheld, and the Holy

Motions of this Blessed Spirit cease, and are quite extinct, the Man may then be truly said to be Animal, left under the Dominion, and carried away by the wild Impulses of his animal Nature; he is carnal, sold as it were a Bond-slave under Sin; and therefore, no doubt, imperfect, as a defect of Holiness and Virtue is always the greatest Moral Imperfection, which can be incident to the human Nature. Such a Person as this has indeed the Image of God, because he was made after his Image, but as to that more perfect resemblance and likeness, which is acquired by attaining to some degrees of that Perfection of Justice, Holiness, and Goodness, which is in the divine Nature, being thus deprived of the Spirit it is impossible he should ever have the impress of it in his Life and Actions. But such as have, and keep this Spirit united to their Souls and Bodies, thereby acquire a more lively resemblance of God by Virtue, than they can have by Nature. And this, without all doubt, and no other is the Perfection which the Holy *Father* both in this Chapter, and other places speaks so much of; which appears also further evident from the description he gives of this perfect Man, in the Explication he makes of what *St. Paul* says, 1 *Thess.* V. 23. concerning the *Spirit, Soul* and *Body* of Men. For he here tells us, that those are *perfect*, who have the Spirit of God continuing in them; which implies that he thought some might not have it continue in them; which cannot I think well agree to your Im-

a Propter quod & perfectos ait eos, qui tria sine querela exhibent Domino. Perfecti igitur, qui & Spiritum in se perseverantem habent Dei, & animas & corpora sine querela servaverint; Dei, id est, illam quæ ad Deum est fidem servantes, & eam quæ ad proximum est justitiam custodientes.

mortalizing

mortalizing Principle, but is very consistent with the manner of the Holy Spirit's Operating in Men. Again he clearly enough explains what he means by the *Spirit*, by applying ^a to it what the Apostle undoubtedly speaks 1 Cor. III. 10. concerning the divine Assistances of God's Spirit, telling us that the Apostle expressly and plainly calls our Bodies Temples in which the Spirit dwells: as our Lord spoke concerning his own Body, when he said: *destroy this Temple, and in three days I will build it up.* And indeed all his Arguments and Citations out of Scripture, which follow to the end of this Chapter, run so clearly upon nothing else, but the gracious assistances of the Holy Ghost, mortifying our Corruptions, and sanctifying our Nature, that as I cannot but wonder they could be applyed to any thing else, so I think it perfectly needless to insist any longer upon it.

Your design in the next Citations, which you make out of the seventh and eighth Chapters of this same Book, is to shew, that *Irenæus* ascribes the *Resurrection*, and that Immortality, which is consequent thereupon, to the *Spirit*. This you prove by what he says Chapter the seventh: *That by the Spirit our Rising Bodies will be made Spiritual, and will have by the same Spirit Immortal Life.* And again Chapter the eighth: *This earnest of the Spirit dwelling in us makes us Spiritual, and that which is Mortal*

a Unde & Templum Dei Plasma esse ait: *Nescitis, dicens, quoniam Templum Dei estis, & Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis?* &c. Manifeste Templum Corpus dicens in quo habitat Spiritus. Quemadmodum & Dominus de eo ait: *Solvite hoc Templum, & in tribus diebus excitabo illud.* &c. Et non tantum Templum, sed & Templum Christi sit Corpora nostra, Corinthiis dicens sit: *Nescitis quoniam Corpora vestra membra Christi sunt.* &c. And a little after he calls our Bodies the Temple of God, in which the Spirit of the Father dwells.

is swallowed up of Immortality. Now I readily grant the design of *Irenæus* in these Chapters, and the true sense of those Places you have cited from them to be what you have represented it, *viz.* to prove that the Resurrection of our Bodies will be perform'd by Virtue of the Holy Spirit, that is the third Person of the ever Blessed Trinity. That same Spirit, whose Holy Inspirations and Influences we have the Advantage of, whilst we are in this Union with our Bodies, will, after the Death and Dissolution of them, recollect our scatter'd dissipated Dust, make it up into a more Beautifull Glorious and Spiritual Frame, and reunite it by the most indissoluble tie to our Souls, never again to be separated from them. And accordingly the Holy Father, in this seventh Chapter, first of all parallels our Resurrection with that of our Lord, and tells us: *a That as Christ rose from the Dead in the substance of his Flesh, and shewed to his Disciples the Print of the Nails, and the wound in his Side (for these were the marks and tokens of it's being his very Body which arose from the Dead) so shall he raise us, as the Apostle tells us, by his Power. And then applying that of St. Paul: But if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the Dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the Dead, will also quicken your mortal Bodies, to this Subject of the Resurrection, he plainly supposes nothing to be understood here by the Spirit, besides the Holy Ghost. After this he*

a Quomodo igitur Christus in carnis substantia surrexit, & ostendit Discipulis figuram clavorum, & apertionem lateris (hæc autem sunt indicia carnis ejus quæ resurrexit à mortuis) sic & nos (inquit) suscitabit per virtutem suam. Et iterum ad Romanos ait: Si autem Spiritus ejus qui suscitavit Jesum à mortuis habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Christum à mortuis, vivificabit & mortalia corpora vestra.

sets himself to shew, that this Resurrection is not to respect our Souls, which are in themselves Immortal, but onely our mortal Bodies, proving that since nothing can be said to rise, but what is fallen and Dead, the body onely, which is mortal and must drop into Corruption, can be the Subject of the Resurrection. And thence he affirms that the Apostle ^a 1 Cor. XV. undoubtedly taught, when he said, *it is sown in Corruption, it is raised in Incorruption, it is sown in Weakness, it is raised in Power, it is sown a natural Body, &c.* that what he there spake, concerning the Resurrection, was to be understood neither of the Soul, nor of the Spirit, but onely of our *Dead Bodies*. For these Bodies, he says, of ours are *Animal*, that is, have the *Anima* (*Soul*) united to them, which when they lose, they die: but then, as he says in the words you have cited, *by the Spirit our Resurrection Bodies will be made Spiritual, and by the same Spirit render'd Immortal*. From this general View I have here given of the Process of the Argument in this Chapter, and of the connexion the words, you have cited, have with what goes before them, it is I think indisputably evident that the Holy Father speaks here onely concerning the Resurrection of the Body, which he affirms, most agreeably to the Analogy of Faith, is to be wrought by the Power of the Spirit, that same Spirit which raised up Jesus from the Dead, and which presentiates it self to, and always dwells in well disposed Minds. He is so far from supposing, by what he here

a *Seminatur corpus Animale, surgit corpus Spirituale*. Indubitate docuit quoniam neque de Anima neque de spiritu sermo est ei, sed de mortificatis corporibus. Hæc sunt enim corpora Animalia, id est, participantia Animæ: quam cum amiserint mortificantur: deinde per Spiritum surgentia sunt corpora Spiritualia, uti per Spiritum semper permanentem habeant vitam.

says, the Soul to be naturally Mortal, or that the Life and existence of it is owing to the same Spirit, by which the Body is raised and endued with Immortality, that he expressly affirms it to be in it self Immortal, and that the Resurrection for that reason cannot have any respect to it. He says that it cannot be mortal because 'tis the *Flatus vitæ*, the *Breath of Life*, he affirms that it is incapable of being dissolv'd, because it is simple and uncompounded. And that he cannot be understood in any other sense but this, even the very title of this Chapter sufficiently declares, which, what Authority or Antiquity soever it may be supposed to have, may however be justly esteemed to give a genuine and fair account of the sense, purport and intent of the Father in it. This tells us it was the design of *Irenæus* to shew: *That because Christ rose from the Dead in our Flesh, therefore we shall rise in the same: since the Resurrection promised to us, is not to be refer'd to our Souls, which are naturally Immortal, but onely to our mortal Bodies.* From all this I cannot forbear observing, that the most express Declarations, that are any where to be met with in the Writings of this Father, for the Soul's Natural Immortality happen to be found in this very Chapter, out of which you have unluckily made a citation for it's Natural Mortality.

Nor is the citation you have made out of the

^a The title of this seventh Chapter runs thus: *Quia Christus in carne nostra resurrexit; consequitur nos in eadem resurrecturos: Quum etiam Resurrectio nobis promissa ad Spiritus naturaliter Immortales referri non debeat, sed ad corpora ex se mortalia.* If any one should doubt whether by Spiritus be meant the Human Soul, this doubt will immediately vanish, not onely by considering that 'tis here opposed to our mortal Bodies, but also if he but onely will look into that part of the Chapter to which the Spiritus naturaliter Immortales refers, where he will find the word *Anima* made use of, and a natural Immortality ascribed to that.

eighth Chapter any more to your purpose: since the Father plainly speaks here concerning no other Spirit, but the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity, whose Gifts and Graces are communicated to us. Hence the Title of it tells us the design of the Father in it is to shew: *^a That these Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which we receive, prepare us for Immortality, that they make us Spiritual and separate and distinguish us from those who are carnal.* And accordingly in the beginning of it, the Holy Father himself assures us; *^b That we now receive some part of this Spirit in order to our Perfection, and to prepare us for Immortality, by little and little accustoming our selves to re-*

^a The Title of the eighth Chapter is this: *Dona Spiritus Sancti quæ recipimus præparant nos ad Incorruptelam, Spiritualesque reddunt, & a carnalibus discernunt.* ^b Nunc autem partem aliquam Spiritus ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem & præparationem Incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere & portare Deum: quod & pignus dixit Apostolus hoc est partem ejus honoris qui à Deo nobis promissus est, in Epistola quæ ad Ephesios est dicens: *In quo & vos audio verbo veritatis, Evangelio salutis vestræ, in quo credentes signati estis Spiritu promissionis Sancto, qui est pignus hereditatis nostræ.* Sic ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam Spirituales efficit, & absorbetur mortale ab Immortalitate. *Vos enim (ait) non estis in carne sed in Spiritu siquidem Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis.* 'Tis remarkable that what was peculiarly said of St. Ignatius, and which also gave him the surname of Θεοφορ is here attributed to all Christians, that they may be said to bear God about with them. The reasons that are given why Ignatius was called Θεοφορ are various. As first, because he bore so ardent a love to his Saviour, that he might not improperly be said to carry him in his Soul. This reason is given us by Elias Cretensis, and the Menæon of the Greek Church, for this Name being given to this Holy Martyr. But another reason and which is more commonly known is, That St. Ignatius was carried by our Lord, he being that very Child which our Lord took and set in the midst of his Disciples when he assured them that unless they were converted, and became as little Children, they could not enter into the Kingdom of God. This reason is given by the Acts of Ignatius, the liturgical Books of the Greek Church, Anastasius, Nicephorus Calistus, and one Peter of Antioch, but was utterly unknown to St. Chrysostom, who in his Oration in praise of this Saint, makes no mention of it. Why may we not add a third reason of this surname, which this place of St. Irenæus affords us, namely, that he was therefore called Θεοφορ, because he was full of the Holy Ghost, and might for this reason in an improper, and metaphorical sense, be said to carry God about with him.

*ceive and bear about with us the Deity: This the Apostle calls a Pledge, that is a part of that honour, which is promised us by God, telling us in that Epistle he wrote to the Ephesians; In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of Truth, the Gospel of your Salvation: in whom also after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of Promise, which is the Earnest of our Inheritance. Ephes. I. 13, 14. It is therefore this Earnest, as he says in the Words you have cited, which dwelling in us, maketh us Spiritual, and so that which is Mortal is swallowed up of Immortality. And then he cites what the Apostle says, Rom. VIII. 9. For ye are not in the Flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. From this passage thus fairly represented at large in it's true light, which it receives from what goes before and follows it, we may plainly see that the Holy Father speaks here onely concerning those communications of the Gifts and Graces of the Holy Spirit of God, which well disposed Souls receive and carry about with them. These divine Irradiations of this Blessed Spirit are to be sure a present Pledge of future and greater Favours, an Earnest which gives us a title, if we hearken to his dictates, and obey his admonitions, to that Inheritance which is purchased for us, and which we shall then enter into the full Possession of, when, upon the morning of the Resurrection, Mortality shall be swallowed up of Life. 'Tis this Pledge that gives us the greatest hopes and assurance of the Resurrection of our Bodies, when we find that Spirit to be communicated to, and dwell in them here, by the Virtue and Energy of which we are assured they will be raised at the last Day. 'Tis no other *pignus* but this, that
the*

the Holy Father here speaks of, namely the Earnest and joyfull assurance of that Kingdome, which is laid up for us, and of which even in this Life we receive the ravishing foretaste, by the consolation and joy of that Holy Spirit abiding in us. So that tho' *Irenaeus* in these places you have cited from him ascribes the Resurrection of our Bodies, and that Immortality, which is consequent thereupon to the *Spirit*; yet if by that *Spirit* nothing else can be understood, as I think I have pretty plainly shewn, but the Holy Spirit of God, the third Person in the most Glorious, and ever to be adored Trinity, this can make nothing for that Immortalizing Principle which you speak of, as something distinct from the ordinary Communications of this Blessed Spirit. Or altho' *Irenaeus* could be supposed to mean by the Spirit, which I think it is clearly evident he cannot, this your Baptismal Immortalizing Principle; yet since 'tis onely concerning the Resurrection of the Body, and Immortality, not of the *Soul*, which he affirms to be in it's own nature Immortal, but of the *Man*, that he speaks in these places, I think you had no reason to cite them to this Purpose, nor do they contribute any thing at all to strengthen the Proposition you have undertaken to prove in this your very extraordinary Dissertation.

From the *eighth* you pass to the *twelfth* Chapter of this fifth Book, wherein *Irenaeus* makes a distinction, between the *πνεῦμα ζωῆς*, the *Breath of Life*, and the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν*, the *quickening Spirit*, as you say, in the Greek of *Genesis*. The former of these you urge that he represents as making the Man onely *ψυχικόν*, *Animal*, or *Natural*, in regard that the *Flatus vitae*, the *Breath of Life* is, you say, with him, the same

the *Anima* or ψυχή. This Principle, you further urge, is all that *Irenæus* owns to be given to all Mankind: since the πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν, the *quickenning Spirit*, he here speaks of, is onely given to such as are so qualified as he there represents them that are fit to receive this Spirit ought to be. From hence you conclude, that *Irenæus* does not allow to all Mankind that Principle, which alone can entitle them to the Resurrection and Immortality of their Bodies. As to the first of these Assertions, that *Irenæus* makes a distinction between the πνοὴ ζωῆς, the *Breath of Life*, in *Genesis*, and the πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν, the *quickenning Spirit*, *Cor. XV.* I readily grant it, but not that he does it with any regard to the Conclusion, it is for your Purpose thence to deduce, viz. that the Soul would die of it self, if it did not receive this *quickenning Spirit*. His words are: *“The Breath of Life is one thing, which constitutes the Natural Man, the quickenning Spirit another, which renders him Spiritual.* The Father’s design in this distinction is evidently to introduce a discourse concerning the Resurrection, which, most agreeably to the Doctrine of the Holy Scripture and the Analogy of Faith, he in the following part of this Chapter ascribes to the πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν, the *quickenning Spirit*, that same Spirit, which our Saviour is said *1 Cor. XV.* to be made to us, in as

α Ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ πνοὴ ζωῆς, ἡ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀπὸρραζομένη τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔστι πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν, τὸ ἐκ πνεύματος κινεῖ αὐτὸν, ἀντιπλεῖν καὶ διὰ τῆτο Ἠσαΐας φησὶν, ἔγω λέγει κύριος, ὁ ποιῶν τὸν ἐρεβὼν καὶ περιώσας αὐτὸν, ὁ ποιῶν τὴν γλῶσσαν καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁ διδῶν πνοὴν τῷ λαῷ τῷ ἐκ αὐτῆς, ἔκ πνεύματος τοῖς πατράσιν αὐτῶν. τὴν μὲν πνοὴν παντὶ κοινῶς τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς λαῷ φήσας διδῶν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἰδίως καταπατεῖ τοῖς ζωῶν ἐκιδυμίας. διὸ καὶ πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς Ἠσαΐας ἀφασίζων τὰ σθενηνῆρα φησὶ. Πνεῦμα γὰρ παρ’ ἐμῶ ἐξελθούσιν, ἔκ πνοῆς πάντων ἐγὼ ἐποίησα. τὸ πνεῦμα ἰδίως ἐπὶ τῷ Θεῷ τῷ ἐκ κινήσεως αὐτὸ ἀφ’ ὑποστάσεως ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν δὲ πνοὴν κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῷ κτίστω.

much

much as thro' him the Holy Ghost is derived upon us to sanctify our Natures, whilst we live here, and by the Power and Virtue of which our Dead and Dissolved Bodies will be raised at the last Day. But here is not the least mention made, or so much as the remotest insinuation given, that our Souls are Immortalized by this same Spirit. It is likewise very true what you say that *Irenaus* affirms, this πνοή ζωής, this *Breath of Life*, which I have shewn is truly and properly nothing else but the human Soul, must be given to all Mankind, and the πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν the *quickening Spirit*, onely to such as overcome the World, and trample under foot their Earthly Lusts; but it does not with any force of Consequence from hence follow, that such onely as receive this Spirit in the sense the Father here means, will be partakers of Immortality and the Resurrection. For when the Holy Father here says, that the Holy Spirit is given onely to such as *trample under foot their Earthly desires*, he means, as from what follows is beyond contradiction evident, nothing but those further degrees of Illumination, Sanctification &c. which such Men receive from the Holy Ghost. For does he not plainly tell us, alluding to the Prophecy of *Joel*, that by the Spirit he understands, those more, plentiful effusions of that Spirit, which in the last Days was poured out upon Mankind. These he tells us are given to all such as trample under foot *terrenas concupiscentias*, their *Earthly desires*. That by this cannot be understood the Baptismal Renunciations onely, as you seem willing to have us believe, seems most evident from that explication the Father himself gives of them in what follows. For are not the *terrenæ concupiscentiæ* here the same with the

concupiscentie carnis ^a a little further, which he tells us are meant of such kind of Vices, as the Apostle *Coloss. III. 5.* reckons up? By these gracious Assistances of the Holy Spirit, these are still more and more mortified and Subdued, and at last by a long continued course of Virtue almost entirely vanquished. To the Power and Energy of this Spirit he ascribes indeed the Resurrection and Immortality of the Body, plainly and expressly excluding the Soul, which he knew had Immortality from it self from receiving any Principle of Life or Existence from it. For in the following part of this Chapter explaining what part of the Man receives Life by the Spirit, he evidently restrains it to the Body in these words:^b *It is not, says he, one thing that dies and another that is made alive, as it is not one which is lost, and another which is found; but our Lord found that sheep which was lost. What is it therefore that dies? No doubt the Body; which losing the Soul becomes without Life, and Dead. Our Lord therefore came to give Life to this; that as [in respect of this] all Die in A-*

a Deponentes non Plasma Dei, sed concupiscentias carnis, — quæ autem sunt hæc, ipse exposuit: Fornicationem, Immunditiam. &c. These indeed are renounced in Baptism, but to be sure not under that form of stamping with the foot, which you seem to think *καταπατήσαι* implies: since this came in long after the time of this Father. b Non enim aliud est quod moritur, & aliud quod vivificatur: quemadmodum neque aliud quod perit, & aliud quod invenitur; sed illam quæ perierat ovem invenit Dominus exquirens. And least any one should doubt of what he means this, he speaks most plainly and expressly in the next Words. Quid ergo erat quod moriebatur? Utique Carnis substantia, quæ amiserat afflatum vitæ, & sine Spiramento & mortua facta. Hanc itaque Dominus venit vivificaturus, uti quemadmodum in Adam omnes morimur, quoniam Animales in Spiritu vivamus quoniam Spirituales. The Death which he here speaks of that we all die in Adam is evidently nothing but the death of the Body; and therefore the Life, which we have by the Spirit can be understood of nothing but the Life of the Body: and therefore 'tis in this respect onely that this Spirit is said to be a quickning Spirit.

dam,

dam, because they are natural, so [in respect of the same] all may live by the Spirit, as being made Spiritual. And a little afterwards in this same Chapter he says: ^d *The Advantage of the Operations of the Spirit is the Salvation of the Body. For what other apparent advantage is there of the Spirit, which does not appear, but to make the Body capable of, and fit for Immortality?* And more there is, in the following part of the Chapter, to the same Purpose. From these Places it is I think evident beyond dispute that the Body alone, and not the Soul, is concerned in what the Holy Father here speaks concerning this *quickenning Spirit*; which will by it's visible mighty *Power* raise the Bodies both of such as have, and of such as have never felt it's invisible and gracious Influences. For altho' to such as these he is not indeed communicated in those Blessed and happy irradiations and influences, which the Faithfull receive by his being in them and dwelling with them; yet he will most certainly be communicated to them in the amazing Effects of his Omnipotent Power, when he shall raise the Bodies of all Mankind from their Graves, in order to punish *them* with Eternal Misery. From hence I suppose it by this time pretty plainly appears how little the Conclusion, you deduce from this Chapter of *Irenæus*, in these words, *Plainly therefore he does not allow all Mankind that Principle, which can alone in his Opinion entitle them to the Immortality of their Bodies, and the Resurrection*, is to your purpose: since,

a *Fructus autem operis Spiritus est carnis solus. Quis enim alius apparet fructus ejus qui non apparet Spiritus, quam maturam efficere carnem. & pacem Incorruptelæ.* The apparet fructus here is no doubt meant in opposition to those secret and invisible operations the Holy Spirit of God has upon our hearts and minds

as I have before observed, to conclude that the Life and Immortality of the Soul is to be ascribed to the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*), because the Holy Scripture and Fathers ascribe the Resurrection and Immortality of the Body to it, is such a Childish piece of Sophistry, as has sufficiently convinced me, that the greatest Men, when they undertake the defence of a bad Cause, may not be exempted from falling in- to the greatest Mistakes.

Thus have I examin'd all those citations you have produced §. 11. out of *Irenæus*, and must leave it to others to Judge how far I have confuted the Arguments you have thence raised to prove the natural Mortality of the Soul, and because you have thought fit to join him and *St. Augustin* together, I shall now proceed as briefly as I am able, to represent the true sense and Opinion of *St. Augustin* concerning the natural Immortality of the Soul. That *St. Augustin* firmly believed and was a strenuous asserter of the Soul's Immortality, is a thing so well known, and generally acknowledged, that it seems almost needless so much as to mention it, and much more superfluous would it be largely to insist upon the Proof of it. The two Treatises that he wrote, and which are still extant among his Works, the former in his younger years immediately after his *Soliloquies*, about the year 387, the other in his Advanced Age, about the year 419 in answer to *Vincentius Victor* concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul, are so flaming an Evidence of his Opinion in this point, as leaves no room for any doubt or uncertainty about it. His main design in both these Treatises, but especially in the former, was to prove the Immortality, or Eternal
future

future duration of the Soul; and tho' in doing this he sometimes makes use of such arguments, which himself upon a Review, as appears by his Retractions, could not think to be directly conclusive; yet, whatever his Premises were, he abundantly shews throughout both of them, that he stedfastly adhered to the Conclusion. This then being so plain and uncontested a Truth, the onely thing, I can think my self obliged further to insist upon, is, in what sense *St. Augustin* believed the Soul to be Immortal. Now I think it very plain, both from those two Treatises already mention'd, and likewise from a far greater Number of Places to this Purpose, than I shall think it is necessary to cite out of his other voluminous Writings, that he believed the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal; so far as that implies a freedom from all Principles of Corruption within it self, and a being incapable of Dissolution by the influence and agency of any external second Cause: which is all that any Body, who knew what was meant by the Natural Immortality of the Soul, ever affirm'd concerning it. To this purpose is what he endeavours to prove, §. 3. and 4. of his Book *de Immortalitate Animæ*, that the Soul notwithstanding it moves the Body, and is moved with it, is however not so affected by it, as to receive any change in it's Nature or Essence, but continues still immutably the same: "Therefore, says he, if there be any Change in our Bodies made by the Operations of the Mind, how much soever the mind may be

a Non igitur siqua mutatio corporum movente animo sit, quamvis in eam sit intentus, hinc eum necessario mutari, & hoc etiam mori arbitrandum est. §. 4. p. 389. Edit Bened.

affected with it, it will not from hence follow that the mind must be also changed, and for this reason die. And again he argues §. 8. That whatever Changes it may undergo upon account of it's union with the Body, it's nature is still the same; as Wax, whether it be hard or soft, or whatever figure is impressed upon it, is still Wax, so the Soul, however it may be affected by, and with the Body, continues still the same in it's Nature and Essence. And from hence he infers, §. 9.^a That none of those changes, that are made in it either by the Body, or which may proceed from the Soul it self (altho' he says, 'tis a great doubt whether the Soul can be the Cause of any mutation within it self) can act so far, as to change it's nature, or make the Soul, as he expresses it, not to be the Soul, that is, as he a little before explains himself, not to live. The same argument he further pursues, §. 16. against such as might perhaps object, that tho' the Soul cannot be annihilated, but by God himself, it may however even of it self cease to live: ^b The Soul, ~~says~~ he, is the Life, by which every thing that has Life is said to live, and every thing that is without Life,

^a Nulla autem illarum mutationum quæ sive per corpus sive per ipsam animam fiunt (quamvis utrum aliquæ per ipsam fiunt, id est, quarum ipsa sit causa, non parva sit quaestio) id agit ut animam non animam faciat. *And a little above:* nec nisi viva anima potest esse anima. §. 9. p. 391.
^b Est autem animus vita quædam, unde omne quod animatum est vivere; omne autem inanine, quod animari potest, mortuum, id est vita privatum intelligitur. Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus, sed animatum aliquid est. Quod si absurdum est, multo minus hoc genus interitus timendum animo, quod vitæ certe non est timendum. Nam prorsus si tunc moritur Animus, cum eum deserit vita illa, ipsa vita quæ nunc deserit multo melius intelligitur animus; ut jam non sit animus quicquid à vita deseritur, sed ea ipsa vita quæ deserit. Quidquid enim vita desertum mortuum dicitur, id ab anima desertum intelligitur: hæc autem vita quæ deserit ea quæ moriuntur, quia ipsa est animus, & seipsum non deserit, non moritur animus. §. 16. p. 394.

being capable of it, is said to die, that is to be deprived of Life. The Soul, therefore cannot die. For if it could be deprived of Life, it would not be the Soul, but something animated with a Soul. But if this be absurd, then the Soul cannot be capable of that Death, which that which is Life it self ought not to fear. For if you suppose the Soul then to die, when Life is departed from it, that Life which forsakes it ought more properly to be called the Soul, and so the Soul will not be that which is forsaken of Life, but the very Life it self which departs. For whatever being forsaken of Life is said to be dead, that must be understood to be forsaken by the Soul. But in regard the Life which departs from such things as die is the very Soul it self, therefore since the Soul cannot be parted from it self it cannot to be sure Die.) Now altho' it must be confess'd that *St. Augustin's* reasonings in these places are rather subtile than solid, and have more of Metaphysical Nicety in them, than demonstrative Proof; yet do they sufficiently declare what his Opinion was, concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul. For does he not here expressly affirm that the Soul cannot suffer any such Alteration and mutation either from any thing without, or any thing within it self, as to make it cease to live? Does he not expressly say 'tis Life it self, that is, that to live is the Nature and Essence of it; and therefore that it can no more cease to live, than to be? But, in regard it cannot cease to be, unless God by a Positive act of his Power, or by restraining the concurrence of his Providence annihilate it, consequently it cannot cease to live but by one of these Ways, and therefore must be in it self Immortal: No other Will or Pleasure of God being, according to this reasoning of *St. Augustin*, necessa-

ry to preserve human Souls in those Beings which were first given them, than is necessary to preserve even the Blessed Angels themselves, which have been by almost all Men, and are by your self, I think, *Premon. §. 4.* confessed to be in their own natures Immortal. Again St. *Augustin* affirms throughout his Works, that the Soul is incorporeal, and nothing but a pure Spirit; not as receiving any adscititious Immortalizing Spirit or Principle, but in it's own nature and essence, and this I suppose you will own to be a most conclusive Argument of it's Immortality. For this supposing it to be perfectly free from all material extension and concretion must necessarily infer it to be indiscerpible, and therefore utterly incapable of that dissolution, which Bodies are liable to. And as to any other way of ceasing to live, or to exist, which any one may perhaps suppose peculiar to Spirits, since we neither know any thing of it, nor can possibly understand or conceive it, I think we may very fairly reject as absurd and impossible. Now that St. *Augustin* held the Soul to be incorporeal and perfectly Spiritual, tho' it be so often asserted and proved in almost all his Writings, where he speaks concerning the Soul, yet I hope I shall be excused, if in so confessed a point I however just mention one or two passages wherein he expressly affirms it. And these I shall take out of his Epistles, where we may suppose him to speak his true sense without so much guard, or reserve, as he may use in his other writings. The first is taken out of one of his Letters to St. *Hierome*, where he mentions several Opinions concerning the Nature and Origin of the Soul, and professes his own to be that it is incorporeal

corporeal, ^a which, he says, altho' Men of slow apprehensions are hardly persuaded of, yet himself was thoroughly convinced of. The second is to be found in his Epistle to *Optatus*, where he speaks with a great deal of care and nicety concerning the Soul, distinguishing what is certain about it from what is uncertain. In this Epistle, reckoning up what is certain, and ought to be undoubted concerning the Soul, ^b he affirms it's being a *Spirit, and not a Body* to be one of this later kind. So that whether we consider what St. *Augustin* expressly affirms concerning the Immortality, or those descriptions he gives us of, and reasonings from the Nature and Essence of the Soul, we cannot but infallibly conclude that he thought it in it's own nature Immortal.

If therefore he makes use of this Reasoning, that whatever is *συνητόν* must be *Θεαπτόν*, whatever is created must be capable of ceasing to be, I cannot think it is possible for him to use it in any *other* way or sense, than *that* I have already explained, which is easily consistent with the natural Immortality of the Soul: in as much as this reasoning does not deny it to be in it's own nature Immortal, but onely implies and asserts it's general dependence, as a Creature, upon the Will of God. You have neither cited, nor refer'd to any place of St. *Augustin*, where this Reasoning you speak of is to be found, and therefore I can onely guess at those places upon which you have grounded this assertion, that St. *Augustin* thought whatever was created was naturally

^a Incorporream quoque esse animam etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasum. *Tom. II. p. 584.* ^b Nec eam corpus esse, sed spiritum, non Creatorem utique sed Creatum. *Tom. eod. p. 701.*

Mortal and Corruptible. Did that place in his Epistle to *Marcellinus*, where excusing and vindicating his delaying to give his Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul, he says, *“He does not at all doubt but it is both Immortal, if not in the same sense as God is, who onely hath Immortality, yet after a certain manner of it's own, and that it is a Creature and not the substance of the Creator,* give you occasion to say he thought the Soul was naturally Corruptible? But it is evident that *St. Augustin* here expressly affirms the Immortality of the Soul, and onely denies that sort of Immortality to belong to it, which is in God: Since he gives this reason for it, that it is not a part of the Divinity, as some affirm'd it was; but onely a Creature, and, as such, must be dependent upon the Will of it's Creator, and so capable of ceasing to be, if he should cease to support and uphold it. Again, in another place, he speaks much to the same purpose, expressly affirming the Souls Immortality in general, and onely removing from it that sort of Immortality, which inseparably belongs to the divine nature: *“The Soul of Man, says he, is Immortal, according to it's own way of Immortality. For it is not altogether Immortal as God is, who is said onely to have Immortality.* But is

Cum omnino non dubitem & immortalem esse animam, non ita ut Deus; qui solus habet Immortalitatem, sed modo quodam sui generis, & eam esse Creaturam, non substantiam Creatoris. Tom. eod. p. 466. b Anima hominis immortalis est secundum quemdam modum suum. Non enim omni modo sicut Deus, de quo dictum est quia solus habet Immortalitatem. Tom. eod. p. 584. In the following words he indeed, as I have before observ'd, makes mention of the Death of the Soul, but then is in a moral and metaphorical, and not in a proper and natural sense 'Tis a death of Sin, in Opposition to a life of Righteousness and Holyness he here speaks of. And in this sense no doubt the Soul may die, but yet so as never to cease to live and exist.

this

this, I would gladly know, any more than what is truly and commonly affirm'd of all the communicable Attributes and Perfections of the divine Nature; that they are not in the Creatures, after the same manner, and in the same degree as they are in the Creator, that they are in God formally, eminently and independently, but in the Creatures onely virtually, derivatively and dependently?

As to the opinion of this Father concerning the *Spirit*, he can never I believe be found to use this word, nor indeed do you pretend that he any where does use it, in any sense, besides either for the Holy Spirit of God, or else sometimes when applyed to Man for the Soul it self. There is not the least Footstep of an adscititious, baptismal, immortalizing Principle, distinct from the ordinary communications of the Holy Ghost to be any where met with in all his Numerous Writings: and I think I may affirm that till now, this Notion was never heard of in the Church of Christ. Whether the *Gnostics* and *Valentinians* had this Notion or no I must confess I cannot certainly determin; it being no easy matter to make a clear discovery what their Opinions were under all that unintelligible Cant and Jargon, with which they have clothed them. But yet I think it pretty certain, that if they did not hold this Opinion of yours, under all those restrictions and limitations you have made to it, yet that they believed some Opinions that were so extremely like it in the general, that it would prove a difficult matter to distinguish it from them. This I believe might be pretty clearly made out by comparing them together. But I forbear to make the Invidious Parallel as not thinking it just, that a Person

of

of your great Innocence, Piety, concern and zeal for the Honour of Religion, and the Dignity of the Clergy, however you may have unfortunately happen'd to espouse a very dangerous Error, should be placed in any other Class, than with the best of the Primitive Christians, much less should be ranked with the most infamous and abandon'd Body of Heretics that ever infested the Christian Church.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII. ad §. 12, 13.

Athenagoras's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul. He both supposes and expressly asserts it's Natural Immortality. Mr. Ds. first Citation out of this Father consider'd. The true meaning of Νῆς and Λόγος in this place. This sense confirm'd by the Tenor of the Father's Argument in this place. The Parts of Man are onely meant of the Soul and Body. The Resurrection cannot be ascribed to the Πνεῦμα (Spirit) any otherwise than as the third Person in the Trinity is signified by it. The Passage cited out of the Legation consider'd. The Sin of the fallen Angels was not carnal conversation with Women, but Pride. The Opinion of the Fathers concerning the Place to which they were condemn'd. Nothing can be deduced from what Athenagoras here says to Mr. Ds. Purpose. Theophilus Antiochenus's Opinion concerning the Spiritual Nature and Immortality of the Soul. What Theophilus understood by the Πνεῦμα (Spirit.) The true sense of the first passage cited out of this Father, and shew'd to be an express Testimony for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. In what sense Adam is said to have been naturally, neither Mortal nor Immortal. Our Author's Reasoning from this notion consider'd. Whom Theophilus understood by the many who he said believ'd the Soul Immortal from Genes. II. 7. The other passages cited out of this Father examin'd.

TO St. Irenæus you join Athenagoras, who lived indeed and flourished no more than about ten years after him, and whose works, especially his Book concerning the Resurrection of the Dead, have ever been esteem'd as some of the best and most Authentic Monuments of Primitive Antiquity, which have been preserved to our times. This Holy Father, being as appears by these Writings of his, perfectly

ly acquainted with and skilled in, not onely the Christian and Gentile Theology, but also all those Arts and Sciences, which were then in greatest Reputation and Vogue, was no doubt thought a very fit and proper Person to write an Apology to the Emperors *M. Aurelius Antoninus*, and *L. Aurelius Commodus* in behalf of the Christian Religion; which he has done with so much strength of Argument, and so much Christian freedom and boldness, but withall with so much respect and piety to the Emperors, that 'tis no wonder this piece has always been esteem'd as one of the most valuable remains of Ecclesiastical Learning. His little Treatise concerning the Resurrection is writ with the same Spirit as well as design, and is a most persuasive Proof and excellent Vindication of the Doctrine of the Resurrection, against all the doubts and objections which either unbelievers or Heretics used to make against it. The Opinion of this Father is so clear and evident for the Immortality of the Soul, sometimes positively affirming it, but more commonly taking it for granted and reasoning from it, as a thing universally known, and allowed, that I must confess it was not without some wonder and astonishment, that I first saw his Name in the Number of those Fathers you had produced to favour your Notion concerning the Soul's natural Mortality; which wonder however quickly ceased, when I saw the Authority of others also alledged, who were altogether as far from giving any Countenance to it, as I am pretty confident *Athenagoras* will upon Examination appear to be.

As to this *Father's* Opinion concerning the Soul we frequently find him either expressly asserting,

or else in his arguments and reasonings from it supposing it to be perfectly incorporeal and a pure Spirit. For does not his affirming the Soul to be in it self perfectly free from all those passions affections and wants, to which either the Man or the Body by it self is liable evidently suppose it to be in it's own nature perfectly free from all corporeal mixture, and nothing but a pure Spirit? ^a If, says he, we suppose the Passions, as we ought, not to belong onely to the Body, but to the Man, as a Creature composed from the vital Union of Soul and Body, we cannot say that these things agree to the Soul consider'd by it self; if we have onely a clear conception what it's peculiar nature is. For if the Soul can never want any thing of Nourishment, it can never desire those things, which are not necessary to it's being, nor can have any inclination towards those things, which by it's nature it can stand in no need of: so neither can it be grieved for the want of Riches and Possessions, since these things do not at all belong to it. And moreover it being impossible it should be destroyed it fears nothing as able to kill it. It dreads neither Famin, nor Sickness, nor Wounds, nor Maiming, nor Fire, nor Sword: since it can never be injured or hurt

a Ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μόνον ὁ σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ θῶμα εἶναι τὰ πάντα, λέγοντες ὁρῶντες ὅτι τὸ μίαν ἐξ ἀμφωτέρων εἶναι τὴν τέτη ζῶν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τῇ ψυχῇ ταύτῃ συνεσθῆκεν φύσις, ὁποῦται καθαρῶς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῶν φύσιν. εἰ γὰρ πάσης κατὰ πᾶς τῶν φύσεως ἐστὶν ἀνένδεος, οὐκ ἂν ὀρεχθεῖν ποτὶ τέτων ὡς ὑδαμῶς δέεται αὐτὸς τὸ εἶναι, ἔτ' ἂν ὀρμήσκει ἐπὶ τὰ τέτων, εἰς μὴδ' ὅλως χρῆσθαι πέφυκεν. ἀλλ' ἔδ' ἂν ληπτέον δι' ἀπορίας χρημάτων ἢ κτημάτων, ὡς ἔδιν αὐτῇ συνεσθῆκεν. εἰ δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς ἐστὶ κρείττον, ἔδιν φθορῆται τὸ παραπάνω, ὡς φθαρτικὸν ἰαυτῆς, ἡ γὰρ δίδωκεν καὶ λιμὸν, ἡ νόστον, ἡ πῆρωσιν, ἡ λῶσιν, ἡ πῦρ, ἡ σίδηρον, ἡ πῆρ μὴδὲ πᾶσαι οὐ τέτων δύναται π βλαστῶν οὐτ' ἀλλοτρίων, ἔχ' ἀποτομῶν αὐτῆς τὸ παραπάνω οὐτε σωματικῶν οὐτε σωματικῶν δυνάμεων. p. 209. I cannot but here observe that the Oxford Editor of Athenagoras has let slip uncorrected a very grievous fault in the Version of this place: The Author of it Translating τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν by propriam ejus materiam, which perhaps to unwary readers, that content themselves with translations without ever casting an eye to the Original, might be an inducement to believe that Athenagoras thought the Soul to be Material.

by

by any of these ways, because 'tis impossible for Body or any Power or Faculty of Body any way to touch or affect it. In this place, which I have thus cited at large, that you might the more clearly see what the Holy Father's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul was, he affirms, as plainly and copiously as can well be expressed, that the Soul is perfectly immaterial; that it not only does not stand in need of any of those things which are necessary to support the Life of our Bodies, but also that it cannot be affected by Body, or any Bodily Impressions; by thus removing from it all the affections and properties of Body, as fully and plainly as words can well express, affirming it to be perfectly immaterial, that is, a pure Spirit. His saying also, agreeably to that of our Lord: *Fear not them who kill the Body, but after that have no more that they can do* &c. that the Soul cannot be hurt or destroyed by any of those Accidents or Violences, which dissolve the compages of the Body, tho' it does not indeed directly prove it's Immortality, which I do not alledge it for, yet it sufficiently declares, that he thought it of a nature wholly different from the Body: since all the parts of them, tho' wrought up to the highest degree of purity and fineness must notwithstanding be, and infallible experience assures us still are, liable to all those mischiefs and disorders from which he here exempts the Soul. On the other hand he affirms here and in other places that the Soul needs none of those things which are necessary for the Body, which plainly supposes it to be of a nature and constitution quite different from the Body, that is, of an Immaterial and Spiritual Nature. For speaking concerning the difference between the Soul

Soul and Body, he says : *That Gold, Silver, Cattle &c. and whatever else is desired by, because usefull to, us needy Creatures, is perfectly useles to the Immortal Nature of the Soul.* The force of this Argument here, and in the Place before cited is this, That the Soul, being in it self Immortal, requires none of those helps and repairs which our decaying Bodies, that are still wasting and hastening to Dissolution, stand in need of, which strongly implys that they do not wast, or in the least tend to Dissolution. Again he distinguishes the Soul from the Body by this difference, that whereas the Body is liable to Change, and therefore to corruption, the Soul is immutable, continuing always in the same unchangeable condition of Nature, in which it was at first created, and therefore must be in it self Incorruptible : ^b *The Soul, says he, is and continues uniformly in the same nature, which, when it was created, it received, and performs what it's nature requires, and the Body having a tendency to that which is natural to it, receives those Changes, which when it was created it was designed to undergo.* And this I think very strongly also implys the natural Immortality of the Soul. For if it be, as the Father here affirms it is, of such a nature as to continue still the same and not to admit of any Change or alteration in it's essence and substance, then 'tis evident it can never perish ; since 'tis impossible for any thing to be destroyed, but by some Change in it's Nature and substance. It is also remarkeable that the *Father* here speaks of those Changes from Youth to old Age, which are inci-

α Αχρεῖον γὰρ ἀθανάτω φύσει πᾶν ὁπότεν τοῖς ἰνδύοις ὀρακτὸν, ὡς χρῆσιμον. p. 214. Ed. Oxon. β Καὶ τὸ μὲν ψυχῆς οὐσης τι ἐ ἀφ' αὐτῆς ὁμοιωτὶς ἐν ἡ γένηται φύσει, ἐ ἀφ' αὐτῆς ἀ πύουκιν — τῷ δὲ σώματι ἐ κινητὸν καὶ πύουκιν ὡς ἀ πύουκιν, ὡς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς διχομύου μετεωλῆς &c. p. 180.

by any of these ways, because 'tis impossible for Body or any Power or Faculty of Body any way to touch or affect it. In this place, which I have thus cited at large, that you might the more clearly see what the Holy Father's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul was, he affirms, as plainly and copiously as can well be expressed, that the Soul is perfectly immaterial; that it not only does not stand in need of any of those things which are necessary to support the Life of our Bodies, but also that it cannot be affected by Body, or any Bodily Impressions; by thus removing from it all the affections and properties of Body, as fully and plainly as words can well express, affirming it to be perfectly immaterial, that is, a pure Spirit. His saying also, agreeably to that of our Lord: *Fear not them who kill the Body, but after that have no more that they can do &c.* that the Soul cannot be hurt or destroyed by any of those Accidents or Violences, which dissolve the compages of the Body, tho' it does not indeed directly prove it's Immortality, which I do not alledge it for, yet it sufficiently declares, that he thought it of a nature wholly different from the Body: since all the parts of them, tho' wrought up to the highest degree of purity and fineness must notwithstanding be, and infallible experience assures us still are, liable to all those mischiefs and disorders from which he here exempts the Soul. On the other hand he affirms here and in other places that the Soul needs none of those things which are necessary for the Body, which plainly supposes it to be of a nature and constitution quite different from the Body, that is, of an Immaterial and Spiritual Nature. For speaking concerning the difference between the Soul

Soul and Body, he says: *That Gold, Silver, Cattle &c. and whatever else is desired by, because usefull to, us needy Creatures, is perfectly useles to the Immortal Nature of the Soul.* The force of this Argument here, and in the Place before cited is this, That the Soul, being in it self Immortal, requires none of those helps and repairs which our decaying Bodies, that are still wasting and hastening to Dissolution, stand in need of, which strongly imply that they do not wast, or in the least tend to Dissolution. Again he distinguishes the Soul from the Body by this difference, that whereas the Body is liable to Change, and therefore to corruption, the Soul is immutable, continuing always in the same unchangeable condition of Nature, in which it was at first created, and therefore must be in it self Incorruptible: ^b *The Soul, says he, is and continues uniformly in the same nature, which, when it was created, it received, and performs what it's nature requires, and the Body having a tendency to that which is natural to it, receives those Changes, which when it was created it was designed to undergo.* And this I think very strongly also implies the natural Immortality of the Soul. For if it be, as the Father here affirms it is, of such a nature as to continue still the same and not to admit of any Change or alteration in it's essence and substance, then 'tis evident it can never perish; since 'tis impossible for any thing to be destroyed, but by some Change in it's Nature and substance. It is also remarkable that the Father here speaks of those Changes from Youth to old Age, which are inci-

α Αχρεῖον γὰρ ἀθανάτου φύσει πᾶσι ὁπότεν τοῖς ἐνδύσιν ὀρατὸν, ὡς χρήσιμον. p. 214. Ed. Oxon. β Καὶ τὸ μὲν ψυχῆς οὐσης τι ἐ ἀφαιρέσεως ὁμαλῶς ἐν ἡ μέγα φύσει, ἐ ἀφαιρέσεως αὖ πύφκειν — τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ κινεῖται κατὰ φύσιν ὥστε αὖ πύφκειν, καὶ τοῖς ἀποκλήρωθῆναι αὐτὸ διχομήρη μεταβολῆς &c. p. 180.

concerning the Immortality of the Man, but then he does this in reference to, and upon supposition of the natural Immortality of the Soul, which by reason of the unchangeableness of it's nature, remains unhurt and untouched by the dissolution of the Body; and upon the score of it's perpetual duration is here represented as contributing towards the Immortality of the Man, whereas the Body, in this Fathers esteem, does this onely by Virtue of it's being capable of a Resurrection, and of being made of such a nature as to continue for ever after in in a vital union and conjunction with the Soul. Again in another place he tells us: *That by the Will of the great Creator, Man is made up of an Immortal Soul, and a Body.* And altho' this Passage may at first sight seem to make in some measure for your Opinion, in that the Father may be thought by these words to ascribe the Immortality of the Soul to the Will and Pleasure of it's Creator, yet this doubt will quickly vanish when we consider not onely that this, as has been already abundantly shewn, is very easily consistent with it's natural Immortality, but also that the Holy Father, how true soever the thing may be in it self, does not however in these words primarily and principally intend to ascribe the Immortality of the Soul to the Will and Pleasure of God. For the thing which he chiefly asserts here is onely that it was the Pleasure of God that Man should consist of these parts, supposing, as it were, and taking it for granted, that the Soul is in it self Immortal. In another place likewise, which is near that very passage you have cited out of this Father,

α Τῇ δὲ δημιουργήσαντι ἡμᾶς γνώμῃ, καὶ ὡς ἐποίησεν ἀνδραπονεῖν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατης καὶ σώματος. p. 181.

he

begins an Argument thus: ^a *If, says he, the Human Nature in general be made up of an Immortal Soul, and a Body which by it's Creation is fitted to it, &c. The Holy Father we see in this place either, expressly affirms, or rather, which is more full to our purpose, takes it for granted, that the whole Human Race in general, and consequently every Individual Man in particular, is made up of an Immortal Soul and Body &c. And this I take to be an Assertion which fairly and fully militates against, and indeed directly contradicts your whole Hypothesis. For if it belongs to Man, as such, which he here either plainly asserts, or, which comes to the same thing in effect, supposes, to have an immortal Soul; then I think there can be no Room, I am sure there is no occasion, for your Immortalizing Principle, and it must be false what you in some places expressly assert and throughout your Dissertation endeavour to advance, that some Souls are in themselves Mortal, and may actually die and cease to be.*

If after all this you will still say, that tho' this Father asserts the Immortality of the Soul, yet he no where says that it is in it's own nature Immortal, I answer in the first place, That in the last passage I have laid before you, as well as in another which I shall presently cite, he does, as plainly and clearly as can well be expressed, at least imply and suppose the Soul to be in it self Immortal: since what he there says in both those places, supposes Immortality to belong to all Human Souls as such. But in the next place I affirm that neither does this Father any where ascribe their Immorta-

^a Εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κτίσις ἢ ἄνθρωπος φύσις, ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθάνατος, καὶ τῷ ὁρᾷ τῇ ζῆσθαι αὐτῇ συναρμολογῆται· σῶματ' ἔχει τῇ φύσει. p. 186.

lity, or so much as by the remotest insinuation imply, that it is owing to your adscititious, Immortalizing Principle. I cannot find, after a carefull perusal of his Works, with a very particular regard to this matter, that he any where uses the word πνεῦμα (*Spirit*), but either for the good or evil Angels, or else for the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. And certainly if he really had ever thought of this your imaginary immortalizing Principle, we can hardly suppose but he would some where or other have given some intimation of it (especially since he so frequently mentions the Immortality of the Soul) which yet I cannot find he any where does; and this I take to be a most convincing Proof that he had no notion of it.

Thus have I given as short an Account, as I have been able, what *Athenagoras's* Opinion was concerning the Nature and Immortality of the Soul, and shall now proceed to examin the Citations you have produced from him, §. 12, and those Arguments you there made use of, to establish your *Hypothesis* upon. And the first Citation you make is that, where he says : *That what is the subject of understanding and reason is the Man, and not the Soul by it self. Therefore the Man consisting of both must exist for ever.* In these words, you would make us believe, that *Athenagoras* designed to represent those three parts you had before mention'd, as requisite and necessary to make up such a perfect Man, as should be capable of existing to Eternity. From hence, I suppose, being willing to have it infer'd, that these three parts are necessary to be in conjunction in order to our Immortality. You say likewise that the words νοῦς, (*Mind*) and λόγος

N

(*Reason*)

(*Reason*) may be applied to signify the same thing, and that in this place of *Athenagoras* they mean the same as πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) in Scripture, with this difference however, that, as you say, the πνεῦμα (*Human Spirit*) is call'd λόγος, when consider'd as distinguished from the third Person in the Trinity, but Νοῦς when compared with the *Human Soul*, or ψυχή. And this *Human Spirit*, which, you say, is signified here by the words Νοῦς and λόγος, is, as you affirm, in this place *plainly contradistinguished from the Soul, as that which cannot make a Man, with the Soul alone, without the Body.* Now in order the more clearly to understand what the Holy Father's true sense and meaning in this place is, it will be necessary in the first place to fix and determin what the genuine signification of the words Νοῦς and λόγος in this passage is. And I believe it will appear too evidently, to be denied or disputed by any one, that considers the context and coherence of this Passage with the whole Argument, as it goes before and follows it, that by these words cannot possibly be understood any part or Principle of Man distinct from the Soul, but onely those Powers or Faculties of *Understanding* and *Reasoning*, which belong to Man as a Rational Creature. *Athenagoras*, both here, and in many other places of this short Treatise, endeavours by a great variety of Arguments to demonstrate the necessity of the Resurrection of the Body, and of it's reunion with the Soul. This he does by arguing, that since the human Nature is made up of a conjunction and union of an immortal Soul with a mortal Body, and since whatever Passions or Affections, whatever Actions or Thoughts are existent in, or exerted

by

by either of these parts, are not to be refer'd to it consider'd by it self, but to the Person or Man compos'd of both, upon account of the Harmony and Sympathy that is between them; he thence very reasonably infers, that the same end and the same state of Rewards and Punishments must await both these together. But in regard this cannot be done, unless these parts of Soul and Body, however separated by Death, be at last reunited, and the same Man, consisting of the same Principles, and endued with the same Faculties, be again restored, he thence infer'd the necessity of the Resurrection, as the onely way by which such a reunion and restitution can be brought about. Immediately after this he proceeds to another argument to prove the same thing in these words: *ἂν* If, says he, *Νοῦς* : (Understanding) and *Λόγος* (Reason) are given to Men that they might discern and know not onely substances, but also intellectual Objects, such as are the Goodness, Wisdom and Justice of the Almighty giver of all things, it must necessarily follow that since those things still exist, for the discerning of which these rational Powers are given to us, that these Powers themselves also should continue to exist : but 'tis impossible these should continue, if that which is the proper Subject in

α Εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ λόγος δίδεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀκριβοῦς νοητῶν, οὐκ οὐ-
σῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τῷ δένει ἀναστροφῆς ἐσοφίας, καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀνάγκη ἀ-
μφρόντων ὧν ἔστιν ἡ λογικὴ δίδεται κρίσις, ἐαυτῶν ἀφαιρῶν, τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς δό-
ξῃσιν. ταύτων δὲ διαμίνειν ἀδύνατον, μὴ τὸ δεξιόφρων αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ ἀφ-
αίρεσις φύσις. Then follow the words you cite. ὁ δὲ ἐν νῦν ἐ λόγον δεξιόφρον ἐστὶ
ἀνθρώπων, οὐ ψυχὴ κατ' ἑαυτῶν. ἀνθρώπων ἄρα δεῖ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὅτι ἀφ-
αίρεσις εἰς αἰ' τῶν δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀφαιρῶν μὴ ἀναιδέως γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντες,
οὐκ ἂν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἀφαιρῶν φύσις. τὸ δὲ τὸ ἀνθρώπων φύσις μὴ
ἀφαιρῶν, μάλιστα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ συντηρεῖται τῇ ἐσώματι ἐνδείκναι, καὶ τοῖς τῆς πα-
ρῆσι. — οἱ δὲ πάντων καὶ πτωχεύουσι, ἀπλήλσταται τῶν ἔργων ἐδεῖ, καὶ τῶν ὕψ-
εῖς διδιδόμενοι δειρῶν τὸ μέγατον, δεῖ πάντως τῷ τὸ ψυχῆς ἀπιδότητος σωθῆναι
ἵζειν τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀφαιρῶν κατὰ τῶν ἰδίων φύσιν. p. 189, 190.

which they exist, does not also exist. But in regard it is the Man (these are the words you cite) and not the Soul by it self, which is the Subject of *Noûs* (Understanding) and *Λόγος* (Reason); therefore the Man consisting of both Soul and Body ought to exist for ever, but this is impossible, unless there be a Resurrection. For if there be no Resurrection it is impossible the nature of Man, as Man, should continue for ever. But if the nature of Man does not continue for ever, the Soul is in vain so fitted to the Body, as to be liable to it's necessities, and affections &c. And a little after with a great deal of clearness and strength he sums up his argument, and infers the Conclusion he had been all along driving at, in these words: But if God can perform none of his Works, nor bestow any of his Gifts in vain, it will necessarily follow that the existence of the Body, according to it's proper nature, should be equal to, and commensurate with the everlasting and endless duration of the Soul. There will I believe be hardly any one, who shall read this place of *Athenagoras*, as I have thus fairly represented it at length, who can have the least doubt what is meant in the Passage you have cited by the words *Noûs* and *Λόγος*, namely not any adscititious immortalizing Principle, nor indeed any thing else besides those Powers and acts of the rational Soul, which are commonly known to be meant by *Understanding* and *Reason*. For do not *Noûs* and *Λόγος*, in this passage you have alledged, evidently signify the same as they do in the beginning of what I have quoted out of this *Father*? And do they signify any thing else there, but *Understanding* and *Reason*? Does he not expressly say, that *Noûs* (*Understanding*) and *Λόγος* (*Reason*) are given to Man to enable him to know and discern not onely visible Sub-

Substances, but also things purely intellectual, such as the Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness of God? But can these be known, and discern'd by your immortalizing Principle, or indeed any other way than by those Powers and Faculties of *Understanding* and *Reason*, which God has endowed the rational Nature withall? Is it possible for any one, that has his Eyes open, and his Understanding not wholly blinded, to imagin, that here can be any room for an immortalizing Spirit in the sense you take it? Again if we consider the thread of the Father's Argument in this whole Place we shall see it to be plainly impossible, that he could mean any thing by the words *Νῶς* and *Λόγος*, besides the Understanding and Reason of Man. He is here endeavouring, as I said, to prove the necessity of the Resurrection. This he does after this manner. *Understanding* and *Reason*, says he, were given to Man, that he might discern and contemplate, the Wisdom, Justice and Goodness of God: but these Objects continue for ever, and from hence he infers, how justly is not to our purpose to determin, therefore these Faculties ought to continue for ever. But since these Faculties cannot continue for ever, unless that which is their proper subject continues for ever, therefore he concludes, in the place you have cited, that since it is the Man composed of Soul and Body, and not the Soul by it self, that is the proper subject of these Faculties, he must, Body as well as Soul, διαμένειν εἰς αἰῶν, *exist to Eternity*. And this, in the following words he affirms cannot be, unless there be a *Resurrection*. But now if we should take the words *Νῶς* and *Λόγος* in the sense you would fix upon them, for I know not what immortalizing

lizing Principle, it would make the whole Argument to be nothing but a heap of Absurdity and Nonsense; as will very evidently appear to any body who will onely take the pains to substitute the words *Immortalizing Principle*, in the Place of *Understanding* and *Reason*. There is not the least ground given you by *Athenagoras* to suppose those three parts you here mention; nor does he acknowledge any more than two parts, which it's plain can be understood of nothing but the Soul and Body, in the conclusion he deduces: *ἀνθρώπων ἅρα δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντα διζήμεν εἰς αἰὲν. Therefore Man consisting of both Soul and Body (and not the Soul by it self) must exist for ever.* Which indeed as it very rightly proves the Necessity of the Resurrection, so it gives not the least colour or pretence for your third Part or Principle in Man. As to what you say, that what is signified in Scripture by the word πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) being expressed by this Father, by the words Νεὺς and Λογος, as terms more commonly approv'd and known by the Heathen Philosophy, how far it is a true and just observation may in some measure appear, by what I have already said concerning the genuine signification of these Words in the Writings of *Plato*. Nor did the other Philosophers ever make use of them in any other sense, when they applied them to Man, as might abundantly be made appear by a great Variety of Instances, which might be alledged to this Purpose. *Aristotle* in his Treatise concerning the Soul, never I think makes use of Νεὺς in any other sense but for the *Understanding*. This is so evident and confess'd a Truth that it almost supercedes all manner of Proof. * When he

α Δυνάμεις [Ψυχῆς] δι' αὐτὸν, ἡσυχαστὴν ἀσθητικόν, ὁρμητικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον,

reckons up the Faculties of the Soul, the *Διανοητικόν* the *Intellectual Power* is mentioned as one. And again having told us that some Creatures have onely one of these Faculties, and others more, he mentions Man as having all of them. ^a In some, says he, as for instance in Men, and if there be any thing else more noble than Man, to the foremention'd Faculties is added Understanding and Mind. He afterwards insists largely upon this Faculty, not onely distinguishing it from all other Faculties of the Soul, but also dividing it into, and fully explaining it's several Acts and Operations. And altho' in that place where he gives an Account of the Opinions of some of the Antient Philosophers he mentions some of them as distinguishing *Νοῦς* (*Mind*) from *Ψυχὴ* (*Soul*), yet this is plainly and expressly with relation to that supreme Mind, which at first created and still Governs all things. That the word *Λόγος* likewise is never taken in the writings of the Antient Philosophers, when applied to Man, in any other sense than that I have already explained, is so undoubtedly clear, that I should even affront the Reader's Judgment, who has the least insight into these matters, if I should so far distrust his Skill and Understanding, as the setting about the the Proof of so plain a Truth must necessary imply. So that if *Athenagoras* makes use of the Terms *Νοῦς* and *Λόγος*, as more commonly received by the Heathen Philosophers to whom he writes, he can never be understood to mean by them the same

πὸν Διανοητικόν. lib. II. cap. 3. α *Ἐπίσης δὲ ἔτὶ τὸ Διανοητικόν τι καὶ νῦν εἶον ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἐν τοῦτων ἰσὺ ἵππων ἢ ἐ πνεύματιον*. *ibid.* The Philosopher seems by these words *ἐν τοῖσιν* &c. to have acknowledg'd some rational Beings superior to Man, whom he likewise endows with Understanding.

as you would have us believe, the Scripture understands by πνεῦμα (*Spirit*:) since 'tis, I suppose, already pretty evident and might easily have been made much more so, that they never understood any thing like your *adscititious Spirit* by these Terms. And therefore your saying, that the *Human Soul* is called Λόγος with Relation to the diviner Spirit, the third Person in the Trinity, but Νῆς when compared with the Human Soul, is altogether so precarious and groundless a supposition, which, as you have not offer'd the least proof of, so I dare venture to affirm, it can never be supported with any thing that is to be found either in Ecclesiastical or Profane Antiquity; so that I cannot but profess my Wonder it should ever fall from the Pen of one, who is so well acquainted with both. As to what you say, that this your *Human Spirit* is in this respect contradistinguished from the Soul, that with the Soul alone it cannot make the man without the Body: I readily grant, that supposing there were such a thing as this *Human Spirit*, tho' it would be very true in it self what you here assert, yet I must at the same time affirm that *Athenagoras* makes no such inference or distinction. His design in this place was onely to affirm that the ψυχὴ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, *the Soul by it self*, was not the Man, and therefore, in order to make up the Man, it was necessary it should be joined to the Body; but this could not be, unless there were a Resurrection. He makes not the least mention of any Union of the Soul with any thing but the Body. Nay he is so far from speaking in this place of any Union of Νῆς and Λόγος with the Soul, that tho' it be most certainly true that they are united to, or rather exist

exist in the Soul, as all Powers and Acts of those Powersexist in their proper and immediate Subjects, yet he does not affirm, nor indeed would his Argument have been in the least conclusive if he had affirm'd, that Νῦς and Λόγος are in the Soul, but in the Man, as their remote and mediate Subject, in as much as through the mediation of the Soul, these Faculties may be very properly said to be in the Man. For are not these his very words? οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγον δεξιμόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔ ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτῷ. *It is the Man, and not the Soul by it self, that is the Subject of Understanding and Reason.* And 'tis upon this Account onely that he infers the Necessity of the Resurrection. And therefore altho' it be in it self most true, and by all Acknowledged, that upon the score of our Title to that Spirit, which by the second Adam, the Lord from Heaven, is bestowed upon us, the σῶμα ψυχικόν, the *natural Body*, will be raised and changed so as to be made a σῶμα πνευματικόν a *Spiritual and Immortal Body*, yet *Athenagoras* in this place, neither expressly asserts, nor any way, but very remotely, so much as alludes to, any such thing; nor, if he did, could it be in the least to your purpose, not onely because the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) which is by the Apostle represented, as constituting the Spiritual Body cannot be meant of any *human Spirit*, as you call it, but of the Holy Spirit of God, the third Person in the Trinity, but also because he here speaks of the Resurrection of the Body, and the Immortality not of the Soul, but of the Man. It is indeed true, that no body ever pretended, or I believe ever so much as dreamt, that the Soul alone, as you express it, was sufficient for, or did in the least contribute to the Im-

mortalizing

mortalizing of the Body, but then you say *it was a received Opinion among Christians, that the Πνεῦμα or Λόγος, as derived from Christ, the fontal Λόγος, added not to the Ψυχὴ alone, but to the σῶμα ψυχικόν, was sufficient for it, to change our vile Bodies, and to make them like his Glorious Body, from whom all Men (who could pretend a good Title) were (by the Apostle's Reasoning) to derive their Title to the Resurrection.* If by the Πνεῦμα or Λόγος you understand here the third Person in the Blessed Trinity, whose Holy Influences by our Union with the Λόγος, the second Person in the Trinity, we receive whilst we are in this Life, there is no doubt to be made but that our Bodies by his omnipotent Power will at the last day be raised, changed, and become Spiritual and Immortal: but then I cannot understand how this can be in the least to the Purpose of your Dissertation. But if by the Πνεῦμα or Λόγος you understand your *human Spirit*, 'tis not onely a false, but I fear an Opinion that borders upon little less than Blasphemy, to ascribe the Business of the Resurrection, and the changing and Immortalizing of our bodies to it. For is not this a work, which nothing less than the same Almighty Power, which first produced our Bodies out of nothing, can possibly effect? Can any thing that is inferior to God, who at first made and form'd this our mortal Frame, remake and reform it after it is once dissolved and crumbled into Dust? And for this reason it has ever been thought one of the best Arguments to prove the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost, that the Scripture in several places ascribes the Resurrection to them; which is a thing, that nothing less than an omnipotent Power can be able to perform. If there-

therefore you attribute the Resurrection to this Spirit, you must make it something more than an human Spirit, it must be most divine, nay God himself; which yet you deny in this very Section, where you say that the third Person in the Trinity is a diviner Spirit than this your *human Spirit*.

Athenagoras, you say, proceeds on the same Principle ^a of deriving Immortality from the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) in his *Legation*; where he gives an Account of the fall of the Angels by too familiar a Converse with the Daughters of *Cain*, who being thus fallen the Father represents, *as conversant about the Earth and the Air, and that they can never more be capable of ascending to Heaven*. This place in the Air, which is next to Heaven, you say, is assigned them, because they were Originally *Pneumatical*, or Spirits; but having forfeited this by their Fall, they are disabled from mounting up to Heaven again. But as for the *Giants*, who were the Sons of those Angels by the Daughters of *Cain*, the Father represents them, as *Devils that wander about the World*, by this, as you would have us believe, denoting, that they wander to and fro in the Earth, ^b as the Scripture, and one of the Heathen Poets

^a Mr. Dodwells's words are: The human Spirit is λογος with relation to the diviner Spirit, that is, the third Person in the Trinity: which words I think very plainly shew that he makes this his human Spirit to be different from, and inferior to the third Person in the Trinity. ^b Job I. 7. II. 2. The place in Hesiod which Mr. D. refers to is in the ἔργα καὶ ἡμίμαι, v. 24. and it must be confessed, that however Eustathius and the old Grammarians, may have understood these lines (of which what Mr. D. alludes to is a small part) of the Heroes, and not of the Demons, yet it is too plain to need any Proof that they are to be understood of the Demons. The Verses are these

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κεν τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα καλύψῃ
 Τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες εἰσι, Διὸς μισαῖα ἄε βέλαι,
 Ἑθλοὶ, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.
 Οἱ γὰρ φυλάσσουσιν τι δίκας καὶ χεῖρτιν ἔργα
 Ἥρα ἰσοδάμοιο, πάντα φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν
 Πλατύνεται.

expres-

expresses it. And upon this ground you would have it believ'd that these *Dæmons*, the Souls of the *Giants*, are confined to a lower place, or one farther removed from Heaven; because they have less of your divine Spirit in them, as being of a mixt nature *Spiritual* by the Fathers side, but onely *Psychical* by the Mothers. From all which you would I suppose have infer'd (for you neither deduce the Conclusion your self, nor yet express your meaning so clearly as to make it an easy matter to understand what it is, which by this way of Reasoning you drive at) that this your πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) is that which enables such Beings as are so happy as to have it to ascend to Heaven; and that they are further from, or nearer to that Blessed Place as they are more or less *Pneumatical*, that is, as I suppose you mean, as they have more or less of your divine Spirit in them. This I think is the Substance of your Argument, and what you must be supposed to aim at in this place, so far as I am able to discern it through all that obscurity and darkness, with which you have encompassed it. In answer to it, I shall in the first place represent as briefly as I can, the true sense of *Athenagoras* and some other of the Fathers upon this point, and then consider how far it may any way be serviceable to your *Hypothesis*.

As to the former of these it must be confess'd to have been an Opinion amongst many of the most antient Fathers, as *Justin*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatian*, *Tertullian*, *Lactantius*, and others, that the sin, which occasion'd the fall of the Angels, was their carnal Conversation with the Daughters of *Cain*. The Fathers, that were of this sentiment, supposed that these Angels being appointed by God to take care of

of the Affairs of this Lower World, fell in Love with Women, and having lain with them, were for that Impiety and Wickedness thrown out of Heaven, and for ever debarr'd from the Blissful sight, and ravishing enjoyment of God. And in this sense they interpret *Gen. VI. 1, 2*, where it is said, that *when Men began to multiply upon the face of the Earth, and Daughters were born unto them, that the Sons of God saw the Daughters of Men, that they were Fair, and they took them Wives of all which they chose.* And of these we are told verse 4th. the *Giants* were born. Now instead of *υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (*Sons of God*), as the common Text of the Septuagint has it, some Copies and among these the *Alexandrian*, as appears by the Collation of it in the English Polyglott, read *ἄγγελοι τῷ Θεῷ* (*Angels of God*).^a And so *Philo Judeus*, *Eusebius*, and *St. Augustin* read it. And some others of the Primitive Writers, who knew of no other Reading than that of *υἱοὶ τῷ Θεῷ* (*Sons of God*), yet interpreted these *Sons of God* to be meant of the *Angels*, as appears be that censure and confutation, which *St. Chrysostom* and *Theodoret* have given us of this Opinion. And both *Philo* and ^b *Josephus* tell us plainly that the *Angels* had a carnal familiarity with the *Daughters of Men*. Whether this Opinion, which without all doubt was commonly received about the time of the two last mentioned Writers, was that which gave occasion to this Reading of the Text, or whether this Reading was before the times of these Authors, is hard at this Distance of time to determin;

^a *Philo* in his Book concerning the *Giants* reads *Ἀγγελοι τῷ Θεῷ*, and so does *Eusebius de Præparatione lib. 5. p. 111.* Edit Rob. Steph. & *St. Augustin de Civitate cap. 23.* See *St. Chrysostom* and *Theodoret* upon *Gen. VI. 2.*
^b *παῖδες γὰρ ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ γυναικὶ συμμιγάντες ὑβριστὶς ἐβλήθησαν παῖδας, & πύστις ὑπὲρ πύστις καλοῦ &c.* *Archæolog. lib. I. cap. 4.*

but however I cannot deny but that it evidently obtained and prevailed in the earliest times of the Primitive Church. That it was the Opinion of *Justin Martyr* appears clearly from both ^ahis Apologies, but more especially from that place of the second, commonly reckon'd the first, where he tells us: *That God having created this Universe, and Subjected both the Earth, and the Elements, which were designed for the production of fruits, to the use and service of Man, for whom they were created, and having adorned all with variety of seasons, and established the Divine Law by which all is govern'd, he committed the Care of Man and every thing below the Heavens to the inspection of such of the Angels, as he set over this Affair; but those Angels deserting their Post, were overcome by the love of Women, and had by them Sons, who are those that are called Demons.* And agreeably to this Notion of *Justin*, is what *Athenagoras* delivers concerning this matter but a little before the Places which you have cited with this difference however, that this *Father* supposes God to have set one chief and ruling Angel over the rest, and that this Prince of these Angels fell and forfeited happiness by his carelessness and neglect of the Charge committed to him, but the other by falling in love with women: His words are;

^a In the first commonly reputed the second Apology we have this same Opinion himed, where he says: τὸ πᾶσι δαίμονες φαῦλοι, ἐπιφανείας ποιησάμενοι, & νομαίης ἐμειχρόσαν, καὶ πάσης διφθέραν. But the second is much more express in these words: Ὁ Θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας, καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια ἀνθρώπων ὑποτάξας, & τὰ οὐρανια τεύχεα εἰς αὐξήσιν καρπῶν καὶ ἁρῶν μεταβολαῖς χρημίσας, & Θεῶν τῶτον νόμον τίξας, ἃ & αὐτὰ δι' ἀνθρώπου φαίνεται πιπτοικῶς, τῷ μὲν ᾧ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ᾧ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὄντων αἰθέροις, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἱερεῖς παρίδωκεν οἱ δὲ ἀσέλοισι παραδόντες τῷ δὲ τῷ τάξιν γυναικῶν μίξις ἐτήλησεν, καὶ πάντας ἐτίκυσαν. οἱ οὖν οἱ λιγύμενοι δαίμονες. p. 44. Ed. Par.

^aSome of the Angels, notwithstanding that when God created them he endowed them with freedom of Will, yet continued in that state, which God made and appointed them for: but some acted unsuitably to their Natures, and neglected this Administration that was assigned to them, namely, both he that was appointed as Prince and Chief over the whole material World, and likewise those others who had their Post about the first firmament. These by falling in Love with Women, and being overcome with the Lust of the Flesh, but that other by neglect and unfaithfulness in the trust committed to him. By those that fell in love with Women were the Giants born. And then a little after follow the Words, which you have cited: These Angels therefore falling from Heaven, being conversant about the Air and the Earth are not capable of ever ascending to Heaven: and the Souls of the Giants are Demons, which wander about the World. This Opinion

α Οἱ ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλοι αὐθαίρετοι δὲ, οἳ καὶ γέγοναν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔμειναν ἐφ' οἷς αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν καὶ διέταξεν ὁ Θεός. οἱ δὲ ἐνυπόκριτοι καὶ τῆς τ' οὐσίας ὑποστάσεις, καὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ. ὅτι τὸ τ' ὕλης, ἔστι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰδὼν ἄρχων, καὶ ἔπειτα τ' περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ το σιρίωμα — αὐτοὶ μὲν εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν πισόντες πηρέων, καὶ ἥτις σκεπὸς ἐρεθίστης οὗτο δὲ, αἰμαλίαις καὶ ποτηρὸς περὶ τῷ, τ' πεπιδυμέναν γλῶσσαν διοίκησιν. καὶ ἄλλοι οὖν τ' περὶ τὰς πηρέωντες ἔχοντων οἱ καλέμενοι ἐλθονήθησαν γίγαντες ἔτοι τοι νῦν οἱ ἄγγελοι οἱ ἀκαπισόντες τ' οὐρανῶν, περὶ τὴν αἶρα ἔχοντες καὶ τὴν γῆν, ἐκίπ εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ ἑράνια ὑπερκύψαν δαίμονες, καὶ οἱ τῶν γιγάντων ψυχὰς οἱ περὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰς πλανώμενοι Δαίμονες. p. 99, 100, 101. Ed. Oxon. To alledge passages out of all those Fathers, who held this Opinion, would in so clear a point be a needless burthening of the Page, and therefore I shall confine my self onely to two or three more. As Clemens Alexandrinus where he says Pæd. lib. II. cap. 2. δειγμάτων τῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ καλῶς καταλείδοντες ἄλλ' καλῶς μετασπόμενοι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐρανῶν καταπισόντες χάμα. See likewise Strom. lib. III. & lib. V. The next is Tertullian where he tells us: Angelos esse illos desertores Dei, amatores Feminarum, proditores etiam hujus curiositatis, propterea quoque damnatos à Deo. de Idolat. cap. 9. The last I shall mention is Eusebius, who in the above cited place of his Book de Præparatione affirms the Giants to have been the Sons Angels. Justin Martyr is likewise full of this Doctrine, in his Apologies, where he not onely more than once asserts it, but also adds a peculiar fancy of his own, that these Angels gave names both to themselves, and to the Children that were born of them.

concerning the fall of the Angels, tho' it were indeed received in the earliest times of the Church, yet seems to stand upon no good Foundation. And therefore whatever might occasion the Reading in the Text of *Genesis* of *Angels of God*, for *Sons of God*, there being so many and strong reasons why it cannot be understood of the Angels, it will not I hope be thought any reflection upon Antiquity, if I reject this Notion, notwithstanding it is patronized by so many of the most Antient Fathers, as a most absurd and groundless Opinion. And in this I shall do no more than what some of the Fathers of the greatest Name, tho' not of so antient date, in the Church have done before me. *St. Chrysostom* rejects this Opinion as a *Blasphemous Tale*, and *Theodoret* calls the asserters of it by no milder an Appellation than that of *ἐμβρόντηται τινες*, ἔαρον ἡλίθιοι, *some very foolish and stupid People*. And *Philastrius Brixienfis* goes so far as to reckon it among the Heresies. And indeed when we consider those many Arguments, which may be brought against it, both from Reason and Scripture, we shall find that there are the most cogent considerations in the World to reject and condemn it. If we consider the Angelic Nature, as it is in it self, free from all material concretion whatsoever, that it is purely Spiritual, and therefore altogether incapable of those Actions, and Passions, which corporeal things, or such things as tho' they may be purely Spiritual, are yet more closely united to Bodies, are liable to, we shall easily be convinced that this thing is in it self impossible. For tho' we should suppose what is indeed not impossible, and what those Fathers who were of this Opinion thought to be most certainly true, that those Angels were embodied,

bodied, yet we cannot suppose it likely for them to have been so closely united to these Bodies, or to have had such kind of Bodies, as to make them liable to the same Passions and Affections, as Beings perfectly Human are capable of. And altho' it must be confessed, that for ought we know of the Powers of Angels, they may assume and join themselves to what Bodies they please, yet since this Union is perfectly arbitrary, and as it was taken up at Pleasure, so may be again laid aside at Pleasure, we cannot with Reason suppose them to be affected with the same Domineering Overruling Influence from their Bodies, as we are from ours. It being likewise supposed both by these Father's and by your self, that the station which was assign'd to these Angels, was in the Air next to the Heavens, we must infer that their Bodies could not possibly be of the same make and frame as ours are, which are made for this low thick Atmosphere: since it would be impossible they could Breath and Live in such Bodies in an Air so thin and pure as that is, which fills those Regions that are at so great a distance from the Earth. And moreover since the great Creator of the World, gave to Man that Inclination and Propensity, which either sex has to the other, *onely* for this End, that by this means they might continue and propagate their kind, and so constantly supply and repair those defects and ruines that are necessarily incident to the human Race, by it's being obnoxious to Mortality; and since the Angelic Orders were never supposed to stand in need of such supplies, upon Account of the Indefectibility and Immortality of their Nature, it is the highest Absurdity to think that they can be touched with such de-

fires as Mankind are subject to. If we likewise further reflect and consider, that this Opinion is utterly inconsistent with that Account the Scripture gives us of the fall of Man, we shall find we have the greatest Reason to lay it quite aside, notwithstanding that it was received and approved so early in the Church. It is I suppose Universally agreed, as founded upon the most sure word of Holy Writ, that the *Old Serpent*, which is called likewise in the Revelations *Satan* and the *Devil*, which tempted our first Parents, and has ever since been the Author of all the Error and Disobedience, that Wretched Man has labour'd under, was one of the Apostate fallen Angels. This is a Truth so evident as to admit of no doubt or denial, and so important that the whole Scheme of Christianity seems either to suppose, or to be built upon it. But this can never be true, if the Angels did not fall before this pretended conversation with the Daughters of Men; which was not till a great while after the fall, when Mankind had exceedingly encreased, and not very long before the Flood. It is therefore the more commonly received Opinion among the Fathers, that no other Sin but that of *Pride*, and a desire to Rival and Equal the most High, occasion'd the fall of those once glorious Spirits. So *St. Athanasius*: ^a *Satan*, says he, *was thrown out of Heaven, not for Fornication, or Adultery, or Theft: but Pride cast him down to the lowermost part of Hell.* And this Opinion is as easily reconcileable with, and may be as well thought to have been intended by, what *St. Jude* says concerning

^a Ο ὃς Σατανᾶς ἐκ' ὅταν πορνείας, ἢ μοιχείας, ἢ κλοπῆς κατηχῆθη ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν. ἀλλ' ἡ ὑπερηφάνια αὐτὸν κατέβη ἐν εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς Αἰῶνος. de Virginitat. See also *St. Cyril of Jerusalem Catech.* II. §. 3.

those Apostate Spirits, that they *kept not their first Estate, but left their own Habitation*, as the other: Since their aspiring to a greater Height and Excellence of Power, than what at their creation was given to them, may most properly be expressed by their deserting their *first Estate*, and their *own*, or proper *Habitation*. And there can no reason I believe be assigned, why the ἀρχὴ (*Estate*) and the οἰκητήριον (*Habitation*) here ^a may not as well be understood of that order which those Angels obtained in the Celestial Hierarchy, before they endeavoured to acquire a Dignity above that they were created for, as of any post or charge which was assign'd them in this World. And their leaving this their proper Station, and endeavouring after a greater height, was their Sin and their Folly, and the cause of their being cast out of Heaven, and condemn'd to the Infernal Regions. What place is to be understood by these Infernal Regions, and whether the fallen Angels be chained up in Hell, till the Judgment of the great Day, or whether they be in some more free Custody, and permitted to wander in the Air, and about the Earth, is a more nice than necessary or usefull Question, and there being such diversity of Opinions about it, and what is said upon it being seldom any thing else besides mere conjecture, as it cannot be a proper Principle to deduce any Conclusion from, so much less can it afford a good Foundation to build any singular Opinion upon. But because curious and inquisitive Antiquity has left us a great deal writ upon this Subject, it will not I hope be thought either impertinent to the Subject in hand, or a needless

a Αἰχμὴς τε τῆς μὴ τηρομένης πλὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπολειπόντες τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον. εἰς κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας, δομοῖς αἰδίοις ὑπὸ ζόφου πύρρην.

stepping out of the way, if, since you have mention'd the opinion of *Athenagoras*, I here represent the true sense of the Antient Church, concerning this matter.

Whatsoever were the Sin of the fallen Angels, whether it were Lewdness with Women, or Envy at the Dignity and Excellence of the human kind, as some imagin, or lastly whether it were Pride, which made them not contented with the Station they were created for, but to aspire to a higher Post, it was the Opinion of many of the Antient Fathers, that they were not immediately thrust down to Hell, but had a free liberty to range about this lower World, tho' it was impossible for them, as *Athenagoras* expresses it, ever to mount up to Heaven again. This, it's plain from the Places you have cited, was the Opinion of this Holy Father, in which it is as evident he does not dissent from that of many others, who lived in, or near his time. *Justin Martyr* asserts, agreeably to the Analogy of Scripture, that the Devils were not yet punished by the Fire of Hell, this being reserved for them untill the Day of Judgment, when they, and all wicked Men, were to be cast into everlasting Flames. *The Devils*, says he, *shall meet with a just Punishment and Recompense, when they shall be shut up in everlasting Burnings. For since they be now subdued even by Men, through the Name of Jesus, 'tis a great Argument to teach them, that there is a future Punishment in everlasting Fire, which awaits them, and all that serve them.*

α Οἱ τὴν ἀξίαν πόλιν ἔτι τιμωρίαν κομίσονται, ἐν αἰῶνι πυρὶ ὑγνυμένοι; εἰ
 γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἤδη ἀλγὺν ὀνομαζομένην τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑπέστησαν, διδωγμένοι ἐν τῇ κα-
 ταστάσει αὐτοῖς, καὶ τοῖς λατρίουσι αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρῶς ἐν περὶ αἰῶνα καλῶναι. *Justin*
Apolog.

From

From whence it is evident that according to this *Father's* Opinion, the Devils were not to be confined to that close Prison of *Tartarus*, untill the Judgment of the last Day. The same also is plainly supposed in many other places, where he speaks of the future confinement and punishment of the Apostate Angels, from which we may justly infer, that in his Opinion at least they were not yet confined. The Place where they are conversant till that time, is supposed by the Fathers to be the *Air*, as *Athenagoras* tells us, or, as he expresses himself concerning the *Dæmons* in more general terms, *about the World*, understanding, I suppose, by that comprehensive term, more especially that System, of things, which relates to the Earth. Thus *Philo* tells us concerning the *Dæmons*: ^a *That they are Souls flying about the Air.* And so also *Tertullian* speaks concerning both the good and bad Angels: ^b *That the whole World is a place for them, and they can as easily tell as know what is every where done.* And a little way further he speaks as if the *Air* were their more settled and fix'd abode: ^b *Their inhabiting, says he, in the Air, and their Neighbourhood to the Stars, and their commerce with the Clouds, make them perfectly understand the Dispositions that are in the Heavens.* And lastly, not to mention a multitude of Places which might be alledged to this Purpose, *St. Augustin* is yet more express and particular where he says: ^c *In which part of the Air*

a Those Beings which other Philosophers call *Dæmons*, are as he says, *ψυχαι νεκρῶν αἰετα πτόνδρας* b Totus orbis illis locus est; quid ubi generatur tam facile sciunt quam enuntiant. — Habent de incolatu *Aëris*, & de vicinia siderum, & de commercio nubium Cœlestes sapere paraturas &c. *Apologetic. cap. 22.* c In qua fortassis parte si fuerunt ante Transgressores Angeli cum Principe suo nunc Diabolo, tunc Arch-angelo (nam nonnulli nostri non eos putant cœlestes, vel supercœlestes angelos fuisse) non mirum si post peccatum in hanc sunt detrussi caliginem; ubi tamen & *Aër* sit &c.

(meaning the upper and more serene part) if these fallen Angels were, together with their Prince, who is now the Devil, but was then an Archangel (For some among us think those Angels were not celestial or supercelestial) 'tis not to be wonder'd at, if after their Sin they were thrust down into this Darknes, where notwithstanding there is Air, &c. And a little further he tells us: ^a That these Devils are not supposed to possess themselves of the upper and purer parts of the Air, but onely of these low dark parts, which is a kind of Prison to them till the Day of Judgment. And for this Reason the Chief of these Apostate Spirits is in the Language of Scripture, and most agreeably to this Notion, called in one Place, *John. XIV. 30.* ^b The Prince of this World; and in another *Ephes. II. 1.* ^c The Prince of the Power of the Air. And again this same Apostle *Chap. VI. 12.* of this Epistle calls this Apostate Crew, and their Chiefs, and Leaders, ^d Principalities, Powers, the Rulers of the Darknes of this World, and Spiritual Wickedness in high Places. The Original, which is render'd High Places, is, *ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς*, in *Cælestial Places*. This *St. Hierome* interprets of the Air, and adds: That it is the Opinion of all Learned Men, that the Air, which lying between the Heaven and the Earth is commonly called the void space is full of these contrary Powers. From all which taken together it may not I suppose seem altogether improbable what you assert, that the fallen

^a Nec Aëris saltem spatia superiora atque puriora, sed ista caliginosa tenere permitti sunt: qui eis pro suo genere quidam quasi carcer est, usque ad tempus Judicii. *Augustin. de Gen. ad Literam cap. 10.* ^b ὁ ἡγεμὼν τούτου αἰῶνος. ^c Κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ αἵματος. ^d Πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους, καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμῶνας καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ αἰῶνος τούτου, καὶ τὰ πνευματικὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς. Hæc autem omnium Doctorum opinio est, quod Aer iste, qui Cælum & Terram medius dividens inane appellatur, plenus est contrariis fortitudinibus. *Hieron. in loc.*

Angels or *Demons* have their chief place of abode and residence in those Regions of the Air and Æther, which lie about that System of things, in which our Earth bears no inconsiderable part. But then here arises no contemptible Difficulty, how this Notion is to be reconciled with what *St. Peter* and *St. Jude* expressly affirm, and some other parts of Scripture plainly suppose, concerning the fallen Angels being hurled headlong into the lowest Hell, and there detained till the Day of Judgment. Thus *St. Peter. Ep. 2. Chap. II. 4. For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down to Hell, and deliver'd them into Chains of Darkneß, to be reserv'd unto Judgment.* And *St. Jude* with the same expressiveness and force of Language verse 6. *And the Angels, which kept not their first Estate, but left their own Habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under Darkneß, unto the Judgment of the great Day.* To answer and satisfy this Objection, some think it necessary to suppose, and these are, I think, several of the Fathers of the next remove from the earliest, that *Hell* and *Tartarus*, in these places may not improperly be understood of the Air about this Earth, and so it will be very easily made to consist with the Hypothesis of the Devils having their Residence in the Air and about the Earth. But then some other of the Fathers, who were of Opinion Hell was either properly within the Earth, or at least that the Air could not be supposed to be that Place, in order to reconcile these seemingly contradictory passages of Scripture, affirm, that the greatest part of these Apostate Spirits were driven down into the lowest Hell, but that some of them were left upon the Earth and about in the Air to exercise and illustrate the

Virtue

Virtue of such Men, who should resist and conquer their Temptations. And of this Opinion I find *Eusebius* to have been: who in his Treatise *de Preparatione*, after having proved and illustrated the fall of the Prince and chief of the Apostate Angels, by alledging places out of the Prophetic Writings, affirms that innumerable other Angels, who were partners with him in his Crime, fell with him, most of which were condemned to Hell, but some were left upon the Earth. His words are: *There were an innumerable company of Angels of another order, which were subject to him [the chief of the Apostate Angels] that were involved in the same Crimes; who for their Impiety being excluded from the Society of the good Angels, by the just Judgment and condemnation of God, were forced to exchange those splendid and divine Glories, with which they were before encircled, and that place of honour, which they obtained in the Court of Heaven, and that happy Life they lived in the Blissfull Choir of Angels, for Hell, a state and Habitation more fit for those wicked Spirits, which the Scripture call the Abyss and Darknes, not like that of this world, but such as the Scriptures mean. A very small number of these having been left about the Earth and the Sublunary Air for the tryal and exercise of Virtue and Piety, were the Cause of that Superstitious Error, which introduced a multitude of Deities, and which does not at all differ*

α Μυσίον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔθνεϊ ὑπὸ τούτοις τοῖς παρεπληθυσίαις ἔρχον πλημμυγμένον.
 ὁ δὲ δυοστιχίας χεῖρας, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἀπεπείσθη λήθης, ἀπὲρ τὴν πάλαι φασαυδῆς, καὶ
 Θεοπύρας περὶ αὐτῆς, τὴν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις πηγῆς, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις, καὶ ἀγγέλικοις
 χοροῖς Ἀγγέλους, τὴν ἰσχυρὰν τοῖς δυοστιχίαις χεῖρας, κρείσσει δικαίᾳ καὶ ἀποφά-
 ρει ἢ μὲν αὖτε Θεῶν, πᾶσι τῶν αἰώνων, διὰ αὐτοῦ οἱ Θεοὶ λόγοι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ
 ἐκείνῃ, ὅτι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῷ Θεῷ λόγιον δαλῶνται, ἀνταποκρίνεται, ἐν
 βραχὺ καὶ μικρῷ ἀποκρίσας γυναικί χεῖρας τῶν δυοστιχίας ἀδελφῶν, ἀμφὶ γὰρ
 ἔστι ὑπὸ σπλάγχθων καταλειφθῆναι, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς πλάττει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄ-
 γασται Ἀφροδίτης, γυναικὸν γέρον. p. 194. Ed. Steph.

from

from *Atheism*. Some others likewise of the Fathers I find to have been in the same sentiment, whose Testimonies for Brevities sake I omit. So that upon this Bottom, this Difficulty may be pretty easily accounted for, and the difference between the Fathers compromised, if we suppose most of the Apostate Angels to have been confined close Prisoners in what is properly call'd *Tartarus* or *Hell*, but others to be permitted more freely to be conversant about the Earth and Air, and to mix and concern themselves in Human Affairs, so far onely as God is pleased to permit and allow of.

Having thus, as I think, fairly and fully represented the true sense of Antiquity concerning these matters, let us in the next place consider, how far what may hence be deduced does any way serve your *Hypothesis*. And here you would have it believed, that since *Athenagoras* represents the fallen Angels, as conversant about the Air, but the *Giants* their Offspring, as wandering about the World, that he therefore thought they had their several Stations (as heavy Bodies are placed in the Earth nearer to or further from the surface according to their specific Gravity) nearer to, or further from Heaven according as they were more or less *Pneumatical*. And therefore that the fallen Angels, being of a *Pneumatical* Original, tho' by the forfeiture of the Spirit, and the *πνευματικὴς* that followed upon it, they were disabled from ascending to Heaven again, yet upon account of their Spiritual Original, are supposed by the Father here to be placed in the Air next the Heaven. But the Souls of the *Giants* their Offspring being of a mixt nature, *Spiritual* by the Father, but onely *Psychical* by the Mother, are therefore to be placed

placed yet lower than the fallen Angels, being said by *Athenagoras* to be *Dæmons* that wander about the World; and this you would understand as relating to the Earth, these Wanderers being, as you would insinuate, the same as the wandering Stars in *St. Jude*, which go to and fro in the Earth, in the Language of Scripture and one of the Heathen Poets deceiving Mankind. The foundation of this Notion and of the inference you would make from it I take to be, that, since the Holy *Father*, as you say, represents the Station of the fallen Angels to be in the Air near to Heaven, but that of the *Giants* upon or near to the Earth, that therefore he thought the former to be more *Pneumatical*, or to have more of your adscititious Spirit than the latter. But this which you here take for a Principle, I must make so free with you as to affirm, is nothing but a mere precarious supposition, which this *Father* gives you no ground or Authority to make, either in those passages you have cited from him, or any where else, throughout his Writings. For does he not expressly affirm in those very Words you have cited, that these fallen Angels have their Habitation, not onely in the Air, but also about the Earth? And does not this most plainly suppose, that they are as much conversant about the Earth, as about those superior Regions of the Air; and consequently that the latter can no more be said to be their proper and peculiar Station than the former? And this is indeed most agreeable to Scripture, which constantly represents him, who is called *Satan*, and the *Devil*, by way of Eminence, who is the Chief of the Apostate Spirits, and who *St. Augustin* tells us was an Arch-angel, and therefore must be according to your own Notion

more

more *Pneumatical*, than any of the rest: ^a *To go to and fro in the Earth, and to walk about in it, as a Roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour.* Again I am quite at a loss to find what it was that should make you imagin it to be *Athenagoras's* Opinion, that the *Dæmons* or Souls of the *Giants* were more properly conversant in or near the Earth: since I am sure the place you have cited to this purpose from him, could not give you the least ground to think so. He says indeed that the Souls of the *Giants* are *Dæmons*, which wander about the World. But why must the word (*κόσμος*.) which is a word of so large a signification, as to comprehend intirely the whole System and Compages of the Universe, be restrained to so small and comparatively inconsiderable a part of it, as is that Earth we live upon? Any one that considers those two Passages you have cited out of this Treatise of *Athenagoras*, ^b as they lie in the Context one close upon the other, would I believe be apt to think, that in the latter there is a greater latitude and liberty of abode given to the Souls of the *Giants* than to the fallen Angels. For these seem to be confined, according to this Father's Opinion, to the Air and Earth, but those have a free liberty given them of wandering all over the

^a Thus Job. I. 7. Satan, who is here supposed to be the chief of the fallen Angels answers God asking from whence he came? From going to and fro in the Earth and from walking up and down in it. And so again Job. II. 2. Which places plainly I think suppose that the Earth was the chief place of his Abode and Residence. See Pet. V. 8. ^b *Aliho* I have before cited these passages, yet it may not be amiss again to lay them before the Reader: Οὔτοι τοίνυν οἱ ἀχρεῖς οἱ ἐκπίπτει τῶν ἀρ-
γων, περὶ τὸν αἶρα ἔχοντες, ἢ πῶς γὰρ, ἐκτε εἰς τὰ ὑπεράνω ὑπερῶψα διωκόμενοι.
Ἐ αἱ τῶν Γιγάντων ψυχαὶ οἱ δὲ τὸν κόσμον εἰς πλανώμενοι δαίμονες, ὁμοίως κινή-
σας &c. p. 101. Some Copies instead of περὶ τὸν κόσμον read περὶ τῶν κόσμων
which seems to enlarge the signification of the word, and extend it to those other worlds
which are at the greatest distance from that where we live.

World.

World. And as to your applying to them what *St. Jude* says concerning some among the Christians to whom he wrote, that they are ἀσέπες πλανήται, *wandering Stars*, authors of Error, and then tacking to that what is mention'd in *Job*, without any reference to the *Giants*, as being spoke not concerning them, but the Chief of the Apostate Angels, I cannot see how it can be in the least to your Purpose. For not to mention that *St. Jude* does not speak in this Place concerning evil Spirits, but evil Men, who were spots in the Christian Feasts of Charity, this expression of *wandering Stars*, if it were applyed to the *Demons*, would be so far from importing their wandering about in or near the Earth, that it rather might imply their fix'd Station to be at a very great distance from it, as the Spheres or Orbits of the Planets, were always known to be at a very great Distance from the Earth. But if that sense, which you have endeavoured to fix upon *Athenagoras* in this place should be true, and the Station of the fallen Angels should be in the Air, at a very remote distance from the Earth, but that of the Souls of the *Giants* near to, or upon the Earth, I cannot I must confess see, why we should therefore suppose one to be more *Pneumatical* than the other. For why may not this be Accounted for as well by the Will of God disposing and ordering them to these several Posts, as from the different Constitution of their Spiritual Natures? True indeed it is that the Bodies of which the Universe is composed most commonly lie further from, or nearer to that central point, towards which they gravitate, according as they have a greater or less quantity of matter within the same or equal extension, but we cannot

not certainly with any shadow of reason argue after the same manner concerning Spirits, and conclude that they are nearer to or further from the Earth, as they are more or less pure and Spiritual. And indeed there can no reason be assigned why we should suppose that there is any difference between Spirits as to the greater or less purity and Spirituality of their Natures; since it is so highly probable, that all Spirits as such, must have the same degrees of purity of Nature, tho' they may not have the same Powers and Faculties, or at least equal degrees of the same. The fallen Angels therefore, and the Souls of the Giants must have been equally *Pneumatical*, there being no difference that we can know of, betwixt the Spirituall Nature of an Angel, and that of an human Soul. Nor is there any difference betwixt them upon Account of their Original; since the Souls of the *Giants* had certainly the same Original, as the fallen Angels, they being both created by God. What you say therefore concerning the *Giants* being *Spiritual* by the Father, but *Psychical* by the Mother, were it true, can never be understood of their Souls, concerning which *Athenagoras* in this place speaks, but onely of their Bodies, which alone in the ordinary way of Generation are derived from the Parents; unless you will say that the Soul as well as Body proceeds *ex traduce*, from the Parent, which is an Opinion not onely contrary to sound Philosophy, but also to that Account the Scripture gives us *Gen. II. 7.* concerning the Creation of Man. From all this that I have said it cannot I suppose but very plainly appear by this time, that you had very little reason to infer or insinuate any thing concerning the dif-

ferent natures of such Beings, as you call more or less *Pneumatical*, from the different places of their Abode.

The next Father, whose Authority you make use of is *Theophilus* Bishop of *Antioch*, who lived and flourished much about the same time, or but very little after *Athenagoras*, that is, a little after the middle of the second Century. He was a great Master in all the Learning of the Heathens, having lived for a good part of his Life a strict devotee to that Superstition, till afterward he embraced and was a strenuous Asserter of the Christian Faith. His writings are not many, and of these onely those three Books he wrote in defence of the Christian Religion to his Friend *Autolycus*, who was a most bitter enemy to it, have come down intire and uncorrupt to these times. In these Books he doth not often make mention of the Soul, but yet I think there is enough to be found in them to shew that he believed it to be both Immaterial and Immortal. The Spiritual Nature of the Soul he very plainly supposes, where he argues, that as corporeal Objects cannot otherwise be perceived than by the corporeal senses, so God, who is a Spirit, cannot otherwise be apprehended than by the Soul, which he therefore by this way of Reasoning supposes to be of the same spiritual Nature with the Divinity. His words are : *As with the Eyes of the Body we see the Course and Way of Human Life and Action, and with-*

ἡ ὁμοίωσις γὰρ οἱ βλέποντες τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ σῶμα, κατανόουσι τὴν ὕβριν καὶ ἐπίγειον πραγματείαν, ἅμα δοκιμάζοντες τὴν ἀφαιρούμενην φύσιν, ἢ σκέτῃ, ἢ λινοῦ καὶ ἢ μέλαν, ἢ ἀσπίς, ἢ ὑμνοῖς — ὅπως ἔχει αὐτὴ καὶ περιετὴ τὰ τῆς καρδίας, καὶ τὰς ὀφθαλμοῦς τὰς ψυχῆς, διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐκλεγχόμενοι. βλέποντες γὰρ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς διωαυτοῖς αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν, ἵπκων ἔχοντες τὰς ὀφθαλμοῦς ἀποκαλύπτει τὴν ψυχῆς. pag. 70.

all discern the sensible differences of things, of Light and Darknes, of White and Black, of Beautifull and deform'd &c. and then he goes on to argue after the same manner with reference to the other senses, and at last concludes in a Metaphorical stile that it is the same as to the Ears of the Heart and the Eyes of the Soul: since with them God may be seen. For God is seen of such as have the Eyes of their Souls open to behold him. This Argument and comparison which the Fathers frequently make use of, seems to go upon, and suppose a certain sameness or at least similitude of nature between the Object and the Faculty. And therefore as we might justly infer the Eyes or Ears to be Corporeal, because they are fitted to be affected with, and to perceive Corporeal Objects; so since the Soul, according to this Father's Reasoning, is so framed, as to be capable of perceiving the most bright and perfect of Spiritual Objects, we may thence fairly conclude that he thought it could be nothing else in it self but a pure Spirit. But if this Father here and in other places supposing in his Arguments the Spirituality of the Soul, be not enough to shew that he thought it Immortal, to put it beyond all doubt of what Opinion he was in this matter we shall find him in some places most expressly asserting it's Immortality. As where he says: "God will raise the Body and make it see him, if you now believe in him, and then you shall know that you have unjustly spoke against him." The words, ἀνεγείρει σε τὸν σῶμα ἀθάνατον σὺν τῇ ψυχῇ plainly suppose that the Immortality which the Body is to have after the Resurrection,

α Ανεγείρει γάρ σε τὸν σῶμα ἀθάνατον σὺν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ Θεός. Ἐπεὶ ὅψαι ἡρώ-
μας ἀθάνατος, ἵνα νῦν πιστεύσῃς αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε ἐπιγνώσῃς ὅτι ἀδίκως καταλέλθοις
αὐτῷ. p. 74.

will be equal to that the Soul has before from it self, and it's own nature, yet dependently upon God: For as I shall presently further observe, he mentions no other way by which it can be supposed to be Immortal. Again those words, τότε ὅψει θεόμορφος ἀθάνατος, *Thou shalt then see him when thou shalt be made Immortal*, are evidently introduced upon that way of Reasoning which I mention'd before, that as we cannot see the Spiritual Immortal God with these corporeal mortal Eyes, whilst we are in this state, but with our Minds we may, which are in themselves Spiritual and Immortal, so when our Bodies also are made Spiritual and Immortal in another state we shall then perceive God even with our Bodily senses. So that *Theophilus*, as likewise the rest of the Fathers, plainly supposes that our Soul's are Immortal, because with them we see and apprehend God, even whilst we are in this Life, which with our mortal perishing Bodily senses we are not capable of here, but shall be then able to do it when after the Resurrection even they shall be made Immortal. Again, speaking concerning that impure Atheistical Philosopher *Euemirus*, who denied the existence of the Deity, and affirmed the World to be framed by Chance, he tells us that he did notwithstanding *discourse concerning the Unity of God, and the Soul of Man, which he supposed Immortal and therefore Contradicted himself*. The manner in which the Father here speaks concerning *Euemirus* seems to suppose that all who were of his Atheistical Principles, believed the Soul to be mortal, but such as were not, believed it Im-

α Πάντων δι' ὅσα ταῦτα εἰπὼν περὶ μοναρχίας Θεοῦ, ἔ φησιν ἀνθρώπων, φάσκον ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐκ αὐτὸς ὕπερ τοῦ ἐπίσταται ἰκαντὶα ἑαυτῇ λίγων. p. 121.

mortal: and therefore he says, that his owning the Immortality of the Soul was running counter to himself, and contradicting his own *Hypothesis*. Some other places might have been here produced out of this *Father* to shew what his sentiment upon this point was, if you had not prevented me by alledging some passages out of his Writings for your Opinion, which not onely make the most that can be against it, but also contain very positive assertions of the Soul's Natural Immortality; as I shall presently shew, when I come to examin and discuss what you have produced out of, or gather'd from, this *Father*, to countenance and support your Notion.

If in the mean time it should be ask'd, what was *Theophilus's* Opinion concerning the πνεῦμα (*Spirit*) I do not remember that he any where uses that word but either for good or evil Spirits, or else for the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. Concerning this Holy Spirit, as I take them, these words are to be understood, where he says: ^a *He therefore, who is the Spirit of God, the beginning [ἀρχὴ] the Wisdom, and the Power of the most high, descended upon the Prophets, and by them spoke concerning the Creation of the World, and all other things.* It is true indeed that altho' his calling this Spirit here the ἀρχὴ of the most High, as well as what goes before in the Context concerning the Λόγος, might seem to lead us to refer what is here said concerning the Spirit, not to the third, but second Person in the Trinity; yet what he here so expressly says concerning this Spirit descending upon the Pro-

^a Οὗτος οὖν ἐστὶν πνεῦμα Θεῶν, καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ σοφία, καὶ δυνάμις ὑψίστη κατήρχατο εἰς τοὺς Προφῆτας, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐλάλει τὰ περὶ τῆς κτίσεως κόσμου, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπάντων. p. 88.

phets, and speaking by them concerning the Creation of the World &c. does most plainly restrain it to the Holy Spirit of God, whose distinguishing Character, and peculiar Office, is represented both in Scripture and Antiquity to have been, that he *spake by the mouths of the Holy Prophets, ever since the world began.* And further to confirm this, if we go a little way back, we shall find him speaking concerning the same Spirit more expressly where he says: *^a That those Holy Men of God, who carry about with them the Holy Spirit, being Prophets were inspired by God himself, and being endued with Wisdom from on high, were taught of God, and became Holy and Just.* Again it is concerning the same Holy Spirit that he speaks where he represents the more ordinary influences and assistances of it upon the Minds of the Faithfull: *^b Onely we Christians, says he, can receive the Truth, who are taught by the Holy Spirit, which spake by the Holy Prophets, and hath foretold all things.* He also applies this Word πνεῦμα (Spirit) to signify evil Spirits. For mentioning that wonderfull Power of casting out Devils, which was continued to the Church in this Father's time, and a great while after, he says; *^c That these seducing Spirits confess'd themselves to be Devils.* You cannot, I think, but be by this time sensible, that neither in these Places I have produced is to be found, nor if I should lay to-

^a Οἱ δὲ ἅ ὅσοι ἀνδρες πνευματοφόροι πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, καὶ Προφήται ἡσέμενοι, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἁ ὁμοῦ ἐμφοδίζονται, ἔσφιδίζονται, ἐχέουσι Θεοδίδακτον, ἔσσι καὶ δικαιοί. p. 87. ^b Μόνες δὲ Χριστιανὲς τὴν ἀληθεῖαν κηρυχθῆναι, οἷσις ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου διδασκόμεθα, ἡ λαλήσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις Προφήταις, καὶ τὰ πάντα περικταγυλόντες. p. 110. ^c Ἦτοι γὰρ οἱ πειπτηῖ, Ομηροῦ δὲ καὶ Ἡσιόδο, ὡς φασιν, ὑπὸ μυσῶν ἐμφοδίζονται, φαντασία καὶ πλάνη ἐλαλήσαν, καὶ ἐ κηρυξὶ πνεύματος, ἀλλὰ πλάνη· ἐκ τέτα δὲ σαφῶς δεικνύται, εἰ καὶ οἱ δαημογῶντες ἰνίσσι, καὶ οἱ δαημογῶντες ἰνίσσι, καὶ μίχρη ἡ διῦρο ἐξεκρίζονται, κατὰ ἡ ὁνοματὶ τῷ ὄντι· ὅτι, καὶ ὁμολογί αὐτὰ τὰ πλάνη πνεύματα εἶναι δαίμονες p. 87.

gether all those passages in the Writings of this Father wherein this word Occurs should we ever find, the least mention made or remotest intimation given of your Adscititious Immortalizing Principle. There is every where the Profoundest silence about it. And how far he either expressly mentions, or any way supposes it in those Passages you have cited, I shall now proceed to consider.

And here you assert, in the first place, *That Theophilus Antiochenus reckons Man as neither Mortal nor Immortal of his own Nature, but capable of either, according to his Behaviour.* And to make out this you alledge two passages out of his second Book to *Autolycus*. The first where he affirms; *That Man is of a middle Nature, neither intirely (ὁλοκληρῶς) Mortal, nor intirely (τὸ κατ' ὅλῳ) Immortal; but capable of both.* Than which I think there cannot be a Passage alledged which speaks more fully and expressly for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. The Holy Father is here giving an Account of the Creation and Fall of Man, and according to his Allegorical way of interpreting Scripture he frequently endeavours to squeeze a Mystical or Moral sense, out of the literal meaning of the Text. Thus, in the words immediately following those you have cited, he makes Paradise, in the which the first Man, concerning whom he here speaks, was placed to be *Eternal*, (ἐχὼν αἰδιότητα) and to be situated between Heaven and Earth, or at least (for he does not speak clearly) to be of, a middle nature between, and as it were to partake of, both. Agreeably to this place or this nature of Paradise he affirms the first Man, to be partly of a Mortal Corporeal Nature, and partly of an Immortal, and Spiritual Nature, but to be

intirely, or as to both Parts of his Composition, neither one nor the other, but as to different parts capable of both, of Mortality, as to his Body, if he fell, and of Immortality, as to his Soul. And that this is all can be meant by it appears most evidently, not onely from considering the natural sense and construction of the Words, but also from the absurdity and falsehood of his Assertions, in each of the Propositions herein contained, supposing your Notion true, that the Soul is naturally Mortal. For if it were so, that the Man were Soul and Body capable of Mortality, with what truth or probability could *Theophilus* affirm that he is not in his own nature (*ὁλοκληρῶς*) *intirely* Mortal. No doubt therefore when he made this Assertion he must have had a Regard to the Soul, which he knew to be in it's own Nature Immortal, as the Body is Mortal. Again, when he affirms that Man is not *intirely* (*τὸ καθόλου*) *Immortal*, he must suppose and imply that he is *in part* Immortal, that is, no doubt, with regard to his Soul, if we will onely admit him to speak here with any Propriety of Language, or Consistence of sense; And if he be understood in this sense, it is no doubt very true what he says at last, that Man is (*δεκτικὸς*) receptable of both, (so as that to speak in the Language of the Schooles, either may be predicated of him *in concreto*) of Immortality, if consider'd with reference to his Soul, and of Mortality, if consider'd with reference to his Body. But if these words be to be understood, as the Context seems to restrain them, with regard to *Adam* onely, as he stood in a state of Innocence before his fall, I should rather think that by *Mortal* and *Immortal* in this place the *Father* could mean nothing

nothing but that *Death*, which was threatned as the Punishment of his Disobedience, and that *Life*, which would have been bestowed upon him for his constant Obedience. And so the sense will be, that *Adam* was neither naturally and necessarily liable to punishment, or absolutely secure of Reward; but capable of either, as he behaved himself. And if the words be taken in this sense, this passage will be as far at least from proving the Soul to be naturally Mortal, as I must confess it is from proving it to be naturally Immortal; but if they be taken in the former sense, nothing could be alledged more full and clear for it's natural Immortality.

The next Passage you have cited to make good your Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, is where he says: *But some one may*

α Αλλὰ φήσει ἢ τις ἡμῖν, θνητὸς φύσει ἐρῶντο ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ἢ δαμῶς. τί ἔν ἀθά-
νατος; ἔδὲ τὸτο φανερὸν, ἀλλὰ ἱερὶ τίς ἐδὲν ἐν ἐρῶντο; ἔδὲ τὸτο ἐρῶ μὴ. ἔτι ἔν φύ-
σει θνητὸς ἐρῶντο ἔτι ἀθάνατος. εἰ γὰρ ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπιποιήκει Θεὸν
αὐτὸν ἐπιποιήκει. πάλιν εἰ θνητὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιποιήκει, ἰδοὺ αὖ ὁ Θεὸς αἶπος εἶναι τῇ θη-
νάτῃ αὐτῇ. οὐτε οὖν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν, ἔτι μὴ θνητὸν, ἀλλὰ, καθὼς ἐπάνω
ἀσθενήκαμεν, δικτικὸν ἀμφοτέρω. ἵνα ἢ ψῆ ἐπὶ τὰ τ' ἀθανάσιος, τηρεῖται τὴν ἐντολὴν
τοῦ Θεοῦ, μὴ δὲν κομίσεται παρ' αὐτῇ τὴν ἀθανάσιαν, καὶ λήσεται Θεὸς εἰ δ' αὖ τεταπῇ ἐπὶ
τὰ τῇ θανάτῃ πράγματι, παρακῆστος ὁ Θεὸς, αὐτὸς ἰαυτῷ αἶπος ἢ τῇ θη-
νάτῃ. ἐλὼθῃ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐξέσιν ἐποίησιν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὁ ἔν ἰαυτῷ περι-
ποι ἦπατο δὲ ἀμειλείας καὶ παρακῆς, τὸτο ὁ Θεὸς αὐτῷ νυνὶ δαρεῖται ἀπὸ ἰδίας φι-
λανθρωπίας καὶ ἐλεημοσύνης, ὑπακούσας αὐτῷ τὸς ἀνθρώπος. καθὼς γὰρ παρακῆ-
στος, ἄνθρωπος θάνατον ἰαυτῷ ἐπιστάσαστο. οὕτως ὑπακούσας τῷ θελήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ,
ὁ βελόμῃ δυνάμει περιποιήσασθαι ἰαυτῷ τὴν αἰώνιον ζωὴν. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῖν
νόμος καὶ ἐντολὰς ἀγίας. ὡς πῶς ὁ ποιητὴς δυνάμει σὺν ἡμῖν καὶ τ' ἀναστῶντος τοῦ
κληρονομῆται τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν. p. 103, 104. This whole Passage, is I am persuaded,
very much corrupted and faulty both in the words and pointing, I have however I
hope so render'd it, as to give a sound and consistent sense of it. Whether according
to your conjecture for ἐρῶ μὴ, we ought rather to read ἐρῶμεν for ἐρῶ οἶμαι, as it may
be sometimes in the stile of Dialogues, I think it not worth the while to consider; since
the sense will not be very different, which way soever it be read. But I think that
instead of ὁ ἔν ἰαυτῷ περιποιήσαστο ought to be read either ὁ δὲ ἰαυτῷ περιποιήσα-
το or ὁ οὖν ἰαυτῷ ἐ περιποιήσαστο; since otherwise it will be hard to make any thing
of a consistent sense of it, the word περιποιῶν being never taken in the sense it
must bear, if there be no negative in the sentence.

ask, was Man [or the first Man] made Naturally Mortal? By no means. Was he made Immortal? Neither do I say this. Therefore some one may say, nothing was made. But neither do I think so. He was therefore made naturally neither Mortal nor Immortal. For if he had made him at first Immortal, he must have made him God. Again if he had made him Mortal, God would have seem'd to have been the Author of this Death. Therefore he made him neither Mortal, nor Immortal, but, as I said above, capable of both: That he might by degrees arrive at Immortality, and by keeping that command which was enjoined him, might be rewarded with Immortality and be made a God: and also on the other hand, if by disobeying God, he acted so, as to deserve Death, he might be the Cause of his own Death. For when God made Man he endowed him with a free Will, and gave him Liberty of Action. That therefore which the Man did not acquire for himself by reason of his neglect and disobedience, God now gives out of his kindness and mercy to such as obey him. For as the first Man by disobedience drew Death upon himself, so now by obeying the Will of God, who ever pleases may purchase for himself Eternal Life. For God has given unto us a good Law and Holy Commandments: which whoever shall observe and keep is capable of being saved, and by Means of the Resurrection, of inheriting Immortality. In this passage, which in order to make the true sense of the Father more clearly apparent I have thus cited more at large than you thought it proper to do, Theophilus evidently speaks concerning the first Man, when he came fresh out of the hands of his Maker, and was first placed in Paradise. And entering upon this subject from the words, which immediately precede those you have cited, in the first plac

place he tells us : ^a *That God translated Man from the Ground out of which he had form'd him into Paradise, giving him Advantages of Improvement, that by still growing and increasing in Virtue, and at last becoming Perfect, he might be thence translated into Heaven. For Man is &c.* After this he goes on to shew the Reasonableness of the Command that God gave him, and of his punishing him with Death for the Transgression of it; not onely upon account of the Power God had to impose his Commands upon him, and to require his Obedience, but also because when by his disobedience he had forfeited that Immortality, which was promised to his Obedience, and made himself of a Mortal Perishing Nature, as to his Body, he had provided a way by which he might notwithstanding obtain Immortality, namely by the Resurrection. And to this Purpose is what he says, not far before the second Passage which you have cited, where having affirmed, that Man by his own Disobedience was the Cause of that Mortality, which is incident to the human Nature, he tells us: ^b *And this, says he, God designed as a very great good to Man, that he should*

α Μὲτ' ἡμῶν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἧς ἐκράνθει, εἰς τὸν παράδεισον, διδὼς αὐτῷ ἀφορμὴν σωτηρίας, ὅπως αὐξάνων καὶ τέλειος γλυκύματος, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ Θεὸς ἀναδείκνυται, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕρποντα ἀναστῇ. μέγας γ' ο. α. &c. p. 101. b Καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγαλεῖον εὐεργεσίαν παρέχεται ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ μὴ ἀφ' ἑμῶν, αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἐν ἀμαρτίᾳ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τῶσπ' ὅτι ἐν οὐνοῖσιν ἐξορισμῷ ἐξιστάμεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν παρωδεῶν, ὅπως ἀφ' ἐκπνείας, περὶ ἀποτίσεως χρόνου τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, καὶ παρὰ δούλους ἐξ ὑστέρῃ, ἀνακληθῇ. διὸ καὶ πλαδίζονται ἀνθρώποι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τέττα μυστηριωδῶς ἐν τῇ γένεσι γάρραται, ὡς διὰ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ πῆνται. ἵνα τὸ μὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἡ πηλὴ φερόμενον ποτὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸ δὲ δούλων μὴ καὶ πληρῶς μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ὁ Χριστός. ἔμελλ' ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πρὸς τοῦ π, ἐπὶ τὴν πλαδίζον αἰτίαν πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνακατασκευάζει, ἢ ἀναπλαστικῶς εἰς τὸ γλυκὺ καὶνὸν καὶ ἰσοκλήρον, οὕτω γίνονται ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀφ' ἡμέρας. διδάσκει, γὰρ τίθεται, ἵνα ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ὑμῶν εὐρεθῇ, λέγει δὲ ἀσπλῶ, καὶ δικαίῳ, καὶ ἀθλίῳ. Then follows something altogether to a different purpose from what I have here cited; but then he resumes the same subject again in the words you have cited. The words ἐξ ὑστέρῃ ἀνακληθῇ have something of force and elegance in them, and might well enough have been express'd in the Translation by postliminio jure restitue-

not continue for ever under the dismal Effects of his sin, but in some sort, and as it were by way of Banishment, for a time cast him out of Paradise, that having satisfied for his sins the appointed time, and being brought to a better mind he might at last be recalled. And therefore when Man was framed and placed in the World it is mystically recorded in Genesis, as if he were twice put into Paradise. The first placing there was fulfill'd when he first was put into Paradise; and the second, when after the Resurrection and Judgment he shall be carried into Heaven. As therefore it may happen to a Vessel, which the Artificer thinks fit to alter and make anew, when the first fashion of it is spoil'd; the same happens to Man by Death, which takes away his Powers that they may be restored more strong and vigorous at the Resurrection, and that the Man may be Unspotted, Just, and Immortal. And then after a few lines follow the words you have cited. From hence I suppose it is clearly manifest that all which the *Father* here speaks can be understood of no other than the first Man. And 'tis no doubt concerning him alone that he proposes this Question, whether Man were made naturally Mortal or Immortal? Both which he expressly denys. So that under this single view this Passage appears to make no more for the Soul's Natural Mortality, than for it's Natural Immortality; since the *Father* equally denys both of *Adam*. But by Mortality

retur. I cannot, I must confess, tell what part of Genesis the *Father* means when he says it is there writen, as if Man were twice put into Paradise, unless he means that it's twice said that Man was put into Paradise, and so indeed it is very true. For Chap. II. 8. It is said, And the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward in Eden, and there he put the Man, whom he had formed. And again vers. 15. And the Lord God took the Man, and put him into Garden of Eden. &c.

any one that considers these Words attentively will find nothing else to be meant in this place, but that Punishment which was inflicted upon *Adam* for his Disobedience, and by *Immortality*, that special and particular kind of Immortality which was to have been bestowed upon him as a reward, if he had continued Obedient. So that when he proposes this Question; *Whether Man were made Naturally Mortal?* It is no more than if he had asked, whether Man were created so, as to be under a natural necessity of falling, and so of incurring Death, the Punishment of his Sin. As on the other hand when he asks, *whether Man were made Immortal*, the sense of it no doubt must amount to this, whether he were made under a natural necessity of standing? and so of acquiring that Immortality which was to be the Reward of his Obedience. And this appears indisputably clear not onely from that general Reason which he afterwards gives for his asserting in this place, that Man was by nature neither Mortal nor Immortal, because *God had furnished him with a free Will, and given him Liberty of Action*, but also from that particular Reason he alledges for each of these *Assertions*. If, says he, God had made him Mortal he would have been the Author of his Death, which surely can never be understood of any other Mortality and Death, than that which was to be the Punishment of his Sin, and which never any Body, besides some Heretics, affirm'd, nor do you indeed affirm it, to be any other Death, than that of the Body. And afterwards where he says, that God out of his Mercy and Kindness gives to Man that which *Adam* by his Neglect and Disobedience had forfeited, 'tis evident he means nothing but the Redemption

demption of our Bodies from the Power of the Grave, since he expressly affirms in the next words, that this is not to be done any other way than by the *Means of a Resurrection*; which we know has a reference to, and can concern nothing but our Bodies. Again the Reason he gives why Man was not created Immortal is, *For then he must have made him God*. Which is a most undeniable Demonstration that by *Immortal* he understands the same as *Immutable*, which is the ground and foundation of that Immortality which is proper to the Divine Nature, as this Immortality likewise is the Cause of that Immutability. And thus we find him arguing in other places concerning the Deity: *a That he is Immutable, because he is Immortal*. And again confuting the Opinion of some *Platonists* who affirm'd matter to be uncreated, he argues against them after this manner: *b For then matter would be Immutable and equal to God, as God is uncreated and Immortal and therefore Immutable*. Now this sort of *Immutability* Theophilus denies *Adam* to have been created with: since if he had, as it would indeed have effectually prevented his Disobedience and Fall, so would it likewise have been altogether inconsistent with, and have utterly destroy'd the freedom of his Choice, and the Liberty of his Action. So that we see the Holy Father denies no other Immortality to have been given to the first Man, than that which is proper and peculiar to God onely, namely an absolute, independent, immutable Immortality, which as never any one, that I know of, (unless they whom *Justin*

*a ἀναδίδωτο δὲ, καθὼς ἀθάνατος ἐστίν. pag. 71. C. b ὁσπερ ὁ Θεὸς ἀβυσσῶν-
τος ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναδίδωτος ἐστίν, οὕτως· εἰ ἔτι ἄλλῃ ἀβυσσῶντος ἦν, καὶ ἀναδίδωτος, καὶ ἰσθμῶς
ἦν. pag. 82. C.*

Martyr calls λεγόμενοι πλατωνικὸι held some such Opinion) asserted, so it would be but a small remove from Blasphemy to affirm to be in any thing but God: since as God has all other Perfections, so has he also Immortality in a way, manner, and measure which is peculiar to himself, and which is infinitely above that in which the most exalted Creatures have them. But to argue and conclude that the Soul is therefore naturally Mortal, or can ever cease to be, because it has not Immortality in the same manner as God has it, is the same ridiculous Sophistry, as it would be to infer that no one is Wise, Just, or Good, because he has not these Perfections in the same Way, Manner, and Degree as God has them.

Hitherto I think it very evidently appears how little this Passage is to your Purpose, I shall now consider how far your Reasonings upon, and the Conclusions you deduce from it may any way contribute to strengthen your Hypothesis. It is not I suppose so material as to deserve an accurate enquiry, nor does it signify any thing as to the Controversy between us, whether what *Theophilus* here says concerning God not being the Author of Death be taken from that place of *Wisdom* I. 12, 13. to which you refer us. The Wise Son of *Sirach* in this place lays down a very prudent Caution, that Men should not by a mistaken course of Action, ruin themselves in this World, or bring punishment upon themselves in the next: *Pull not, says he ver. 12, upon your selves destruction with the works of your hands.* The Greek of which is: Μὴ ἐπαυᾶσθε ὀλεθρον ἔργοις χειρῶν ὑμῶν. And then follows *ver. 13. For God made not Death: neither hath he Pleasure in the Destruction of the Living.* Which doubt-

doubtless is taken from those passages of *Ezekiel* XVIII. 32. XXXIII. 11. Agreeable to this indeed is what this Father in the place before us says, That God is not the cause of Man's Death, but that he was the Cause of his own Death, and that παραχρῆστος θάνατον ἑαυτῷ ἐπισηλώσας, *He pull'd Death upon himself by his own Disobedience.* Now altho' it must be confess'd not to be altogether improbable, that the Father might possibly have this place in his Mind, when he argued thus; yet I can't think it so necessary to be supposed, as you seem to make it, that he must take his Argument from this place. For does not the Principle he there lays down, and upon which his whole Argument in this place turns, that God created Man with freedom of choice and liberty of Action naturally and necessarily infer it? And therefore methinks 'tis a very slight ground you go upon, in concluding that he took this Assertion from this place of *Wisdom*, because in the preceding verse the word ἐπαρᾶδι is used, and the Father here makes use of ἐπισηλώσας. As precarious and improbable altogether is what you say in the next words, That our Promotion to a Divine Nature, as you call it, is derived from *Gen.* III. 22. The Words of this Text are: *And the Lord God said, Behold Man is become as one of us to know Good and Evil. And now lest he put forth his hand, and take of the Tree of Life, and eat and live for ever.* Now I cannot find after a great deal of thought, that here is any the least mention made or so much as the remotest insinuation given of a *Divine Nature* in any sense. It cannot certainly be in the former part of the Verse, because there is described Man's Condition after his Fall, when by your own *Hypothesis* he

he must have lost this which you call the Divine Nature, if indeed he ever at all had it. Nor can it be implied in what is mention'd in the latter part of the Verse, of his living for ever; since that is supposed to have been possible, not by virtue of any adscititious immortalizing Principle, but because if he had not been driven out of Paradise he might have taken of the Tree of Life, and have eaten and lived for ever.

You say that *Theophilus's* Hypothesis is: *That Corporal Death was not designed for Mankind, any more than Corporal Immortality.* This indeed I readily grant is a very just representation of this Father's Opinion, and contains his true sense in the Place we are debating upon: but then I cannot imagine how this can be in the least to the Purpose and design of your Dissertation, which is not concerning Corporal Mortality or Immortality, but concerning the Mortality of the Soul. And as for your saying that he takes it for granted from that place of *Wisdom*, which we have just consider'd, That Corporal Mortality was not designed for Mankind, if by *designed* you mean that God did not naturally and necessarily determin him to act so, as to incur Death I readily grant the Assertion to be in it self true; but then, that the Holy Father takes it for granted from that place of *Wisdom*, which you cite, is what I utterly deny. For does he not expressly and plainly prove it, by affirming that God could not be the Author of his Fall nor consequently of his Death, and that for this very good reason, because he had given him the *ἡ ἀντιθέσις*, freedom of choice and action, and from hence inferring that himself was the Author of his own Death.

You

You proceed and say, that he proves Corporal Immortality not to have been designed, *because God did not at first make Man a God.* Meaning that lower notion of God, which was consistent with his being made a God, supposing however, that even this lower Notion of being a God, would have been sufficient to have secured him from actual Mortality, from which the Nature of that Human Soul, without the Adscititious Divinity would not secure him. In this passage so far as I can understand it, I find you make several Extraordinary Assertions and Inferences. You say that when the Father proves *Corporal Immortality*, not to have been designed for *Adam*, because God did not at first make Man a God, he means such a low notion of God, as might be consistent with a Creature's being made a God. What low sort of Divinity it is you here mean I am quite at a loss to know, nor can I have any Notion of a God in the true and proper sense of the Word, without conceiving him to be a Being of absolute and infinite Perfection. Nor does the Holy Father in this passage we are debating upon, as may be seen from what I have said before, mean this Word in any other sense. For since absolute independent Immutability is a Perfection of the Divine Nature, therefore it is that the Father here affirms the first Man not to have been created Immortal, as that signifies Immutability, because it was not designed that Man should be made a God: which he must have been, if he had been made so as to have been incapable of falling, and of incurring corporal Death, that is if he had been made Immutability. For 'tis hard to tell how any one of the Divine Perfections should be in any Being after an infinite degree, and all not be there.

You

You say again that this lower Notion of Divinity would, if it had been bestowed upon him, have secured him from actual Mortality. To which I reply, That unless you take absolute Immutability into your lower Notion, as you call it, of a Divinity, and so advance it to the highest notion of God it could never have secured *Adam* from actual Mortality. For nothing but this could hinder the possibility of his falling, and so have prevented that actual Mortality of the Body which was consequent thereupon. You go on and say that the Nature of the Human Soul would not have secured him from this actual Mortality without the *Adscititious Divinity*. Thus far this Assertion is very true, that the Nature of the Human Soul, could not secure *Adam* from falling, and thereby incurring Corporal Mortality; and this for no other reason than that the Holy Father here mentions, because freedom of Choice, by virtue of which he might if he pleased chuse Death, was given unto him. But how I pray does this in the least relate to, or any way imply the natural Mortality of the Soul? All that the Father speaks of here, as you confess, is onely the Mortality of the Body, without the least reference to the Soul. And how comes your *Adscititious Divinity* in here? Is there the least mention made, or but the most imperfect hint given of it in the Text of this Father now under Debate. Let any unprejudiced Person read it again and again, and I am sure it will be impossible for him to find any thing like it in what he here affirms, or the least intimation given, or supposition made of it in the Arguments he here uses. And if so, by what Rules of Argumentation will it

it with any probability follow, that because the Nature of the Human Soul did not secure Man from incurring corporal Death, that therefore an *Adscititious Divinity* is necessary to immortalize his Soul. But you go on to strengthen your deduction by saying: *Otherwise God's making him no more than a Man would have determin'd him to be Immortal, contrary to the certain sense of this very antient Author.* I am here in some doubt what the force of this particle *Otherwise* in this place is, and what it particularly relates to. But if you mean by it, and I think you can mean nothing else, if you are but consistent with your self, that if the Nature of the Human Soul, with or without this adscititious Divinity, would have secured him from falling, and so from being liable to corporal Mortality, that then his being made no more than Man, would have determin'd him to be Immortal, which is contrary to the sense of this Father, I grant it to be very true what you here say. But then must ask how this supposes him to have had this *Adscititious Divinity*? Nay do you not here plainly suppose the contrary? For if this *Adscititious Divinity* together with the Human Soul would have secured *Adam* from actual Mortality, I would gladly know how it came to pass that he fell, and became actually Mortal, as to his Body? If you should say that *Adam* had not this *Adscititious Principle*; and that he therefore fell; and would from hence infer that because *Adam* had it not and was therefore Mortal, that such of his Posterity as have it not must be Mortal too, I answer that, besides the mortality here spoken of is onely that of the Body, and so can have no reference to the Soul, *Adam* fell,

fell, according to this Father's Opinion, not because he wanted this your *Adscititious Divinity*; which this Father never dreamt of here or in any other part of his Writings, as I have before shewn, but because he voluntarily transgress'd God's command, and so brought corporal Mortality upon himself, and all his Posterity, from which neither this your Principle, nor any thing besides an Absolute Immutability of nature, which is the proper Excellence and peculiar Prerogative of God onely, could possibly have secured him.

You still further urge, and say: *This Reasoning plainly supposes the Human Soul alone not sufficient for Immortality, without the Accession of this Nobler Divine Principle, and that in conjunction with it all three together are sufficient, so that if God had made them all ingredient in the nature of Mankind, he must have made it necessarily Immortal. And both these particulars are not onely necessary Consequences from his Reasoning, but perfectly agreeable to his Opinion.* The two particulars, which I suppose you here mean, are these: That the Human Soul alone is not sufficient for Immortality; without your *Adscititious Principle*; and that in conjunction with it, all three together, meaning I suppose the Body, Soul, and *Adscititious Principle*, are sufficient for Immortality. To the former of these I answer: That *Theophilus* speaks here concerning the Immortality of the Body, or rather of the Man, as that signifies his being placed in such a state of Impeccability by virtue of which he would never have incurred Corporal Mortality. This the Father denies to have been given to the first Man, because God did not design to make him a God, in the sense I have before explained; not making the least

mention

mention, or so much as supposing any thing of an *Adscititious Principle*. And therefore for you to conclude, as you seem in this place to do, that because the Father affirms Man not to have been made Immutable or Immortal, as to his Body, that therefore he must suppose some adscititious Principle necessary to make the Soul Immortal, is evidently such a precarious, incoherent, absurd inference, as I cannot but profess my self very sorry should ever fall from the Pen of one, for whose Piety and Learning all Good Men have always had so great an Esteem. As absurd, groundless, and altogether Impertinent to the Holy *Father's* Reasoning in this place is your second Particular, which I must make so free with you, as to say you most unreasonably affirm to be a necessary Consequence of his Reasoning, and perfectly agreeable to his Opinion. For where does he say, or suppose, that this *adscititious Spirit* in conjunction with the Soul and Body was sufficient to make *Adam Immortal*. Does he not expressly say, that *Adam* was made capable of both Mortality and Immortality, onely for this End, that he might, by degrees arrive at, and, by keeping that command which was enjoined him, deserve to be rewarded with, Immortality? And afterwards, that by obeying the Will of God whoever pleases may purchase to himself eternal Life, and by the means of the Resurrection inherit Immortality? Let the World now judge, whether here be any mention, or so much as a bare supposal made of your *adscititious Divinity*. Nay the contrary is here positively asserted by his saying that it is by degrees, and by keeping God's commands, and by the means of the Resurrection, that we acquire Immortality. All which can never be made

to consist with your Notion of an *Adscititious Spirit*. For by Virtue of this we should acquire Immortality not by degrees, but altogether; and if we once had this Spirit, there would be no need of keeping the Commands of God in order to keep it, so far as it communicates an eternal duration of the Soul. From all which I can't but wonder what it was should make you mistake the sense and meaning of this Father in so gross a manner, and I can't but reflect, tho' with some sorrow, not onely on the infelicity of Mankind in general, in being so liable to Error, but also think that it may sometimes happen to the understanding which is the Eye of the Soul, as it does to the Eyes of the Body in a certain Distemper, which makes them see every thing in the colour of that malignant Humour, which in too large a Proportion is mix'd with their Blood; so the Mind when 'tis indisposed and distemper'd by an *Hypothesis*, fancies every thing it sees to be like it's darling Opinion, and to make for it's admired Scheme.

You proceed in the next place to another Citation, which you alledge to prove that *Theophilus* did not think the Soul to be *Immortal*. It is the Account he gives of the formation of Man from *Gen. II. 7.* *And the Lord God formed Man of the Dust of the Ground, and Breathed into his Face the Breath of Life, and Man became a Living Soul. And this the Father says, is the reason why most Men think the Soul to be Immortal.* There is hardly any one I believe that reads these Words, who would not at first sight conclude that they contain a good Testimony, as

^a Καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆ γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ, πνεῦμα ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν ὅθιν, ἐαυτοῦ αὐτῆς ψυχῇ ἀνόμενῃ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοι, pag. 97.

indeed they do, for the natural Immortality of the Soul. The Fathers agreeably to the Doctrine of *Plato*, in that famous passage of his *Timæus*, which I have already insisted upon, often assert the Dignity and prove the Immortality of the Human Soul, upon this Account that God Breathed it into Man, inferring from hence not onely that it was made more immediately by him, and consequently must be in it self Immortal, but also that it was a kind of Emanation or Irradiation from the Divinity it self, and therefore the most excellent of all Created Beings. This might largely be made appear, from what they frequently assert and argue concerning the Human Soul, if the Compass I must restrain my self to in these Papers did not forbid it. But now to this Argument you give quite another turn, and because the Father here says that *most Men* do from hence believe the Soul to be *Immortal* would have him very plainly to imply, that himself was not of the Number of those *Many* who thought so. But how, I would gladly know, is this implied? Does the Way and Manner of his expressing himself imply any such thing? No: but the quite contrary. For not to insist upon what I have already shewn concerning *Theophilus* that he certainly thought the Soul naturally Immortal, is not his saying that *most Men* from the Account of the Creation of Man given in *Genesis* believed the Soul to be *Immortal*, and his not excepting himself from them, a good Argument that he included himself in the Number? Certainly if when he wrote this he had indeed believed the Soul to be naturally Mortal, he would here, in this place, where so fair an opportunity is given him, have enter'd his Protest and

Dissent to the common Opinion, and have given his Reasons for it. And as for what you say, that it appears he was not of the Number of those who believed the Soul Immortal from what you have said for him, and from that Distinction, which is to be found in *Irenæus* between the πνοή ζωῆς (*Breath of Life*) and the πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν (*Quickening Spirit*) it is an Argument we must now leave to the World to Judge of: I having largely insisted upon both these, and I think sufficiently shewn that neither what *Theophilus* has writ any where concerning the Soul, nor this distinction of *Irenæus* does in the least prove that either of them thought the Soul to be naturally Mortal.

You say, you cannot easily believe that the (πλείονες) here can be meant of Christians, and therefore you would rather, have it understood of the *Pharisees* the most Popular Sect among the Jews, who believed in opposition to the *Sadducees*, the existence not onely of Angels, but of πνεύματα (*Spirits*) distinct from Angels. But upon second thoughts you are more inclined to the Opinion, that the (πλείονες) here, considering the Adversaries with whom *Theophilus* is here disputing, were the Heathen Philosophers, who, you say, from the times of *Numenius* and *Cronius*, admitted the Jewish *Hypothesis*. But what if they did admit the Jewish *Hypothesis*, is it any way likely that Heathens should be perswaded of any Opinion, much less ground such a point as the Immortality of the Soul, which is so capable of being proved by Arguments drawn from Reason, upon a Text of Scripture? We do not find that any of the Heathen Philosophers, from *Plato* down to *Tully* and afterwards, when they proved the Immortality of the Soul, tho' they might not be Ignorant of what you call the Jewish *Hypothesis*, ever

made use of a Text out of *Moses*, as an Argument, or Motive to induce the believe of this point. It is therefore I think too clear to be denied, that the *πλείονες* here can be meant of no other than the Christians at least, and perhaps some among the Jews; and therefore 'tis evident that himself, as a Christian, must be reckon'd in the Number of those, that believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul. They had the greatest Reason to be perswaded of the Soul's Immortality from that Account the Scripture here gives us of the formation of Man, and accordingly we find the Fathers, as I have before shewn *Irenæus* has done, frequently make use of an Argument drawn from this very Text, from the Soul's being the *Breath of Life*, to prove it's natural Immortality. It was a piece of Conjecture and Criticism of the most extraordinary Complexion I ever knew for you to affirm, that the *most Men* here in this place of *Theophilus*, who were perswaded of the Natural Immortality of the Soul from a Text of Scripture, were neither Christians nor Jews, but downright Heathen Philosophers. It might therefore have been more worthy enquiry, not who the *πλείονες*, the most, were, who believed the Soul to be Immortal, and who most certainly were no other than Jews and Christians, but who those *fewer* were, who did not believe it to be Immortal: the determining of which may perhaps give us the best light to discern, that no body but the Jews or Christians, among the latter of whom we know *Theophilus* himself is to be placed, could be meant by the *πλείονες* here, to be sure that all the Heathen Philosophers could not be meant by them. And I think I have a passage in this Father, now before me, which I have also had

occa-

occasion to make use of before, that may give us some satisfaction as to this matter. It is where he touches upon the several absurd Opinions, of some of the Antient Philosophers, concerning God, the Origin of the World, and the nature of Man, and at last comes to what the Philosopher *Euemerus* taught: *Concerning the Doctrines of which Atheistical Philosopher it is needless, he says, for him to speak: For after having boldly discoursed many things concerning the Gods, he at last utterly denyed their Existence, and affirmed every thing to be govern'd by blind Chance. But notwithstanding this he sometimes discourses concerning the Monarchy or Unity of God, and concerning the Soul of Man, affirming it to be Immortal, by which he plainly contradicts himself.* Here we see that *Theophilus* charges *Euemerus* with speaking inconsistently with himself, and contradicting his avowed Principles, in that he affirm'd the Soul to be Immortal: from whence I think we may fairly infer that it was the known and avowed Principle of such Atheistical Philosophers, as *Critias*, *Protagoras* *Abderites*, whom he mention'd a little before, and this *Euemerus*, that the Soul was not Immortal, and that therefore *Euemerus* contradicted himself, and run counter to his own Principles in affirming it was. So that from hence I think we have a very good Account given us, who those few were, who did not believe the Soul to be Immortal, and whom the Holy Father had in his Mind, as exceptions from this common Opi-

α Τα γάρ περί Ευημέρου τῆ ἀνωτάτης περιόδου ἡμῶν καὶ λέγειν. πολλὰ γὰρ περί
Θεῶν ταλμῶσαι φθιγγαῶς, ἔχοντες ὅτι ἐξέλε μὴ εἶναι Θεῶς, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα αὐ-
τονομίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι οὕτως. πάντες δὲ ὁ τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν περὶ μοναρχίας Θεῶν, καὶ
ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου, φάσκον ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς αὐτὸς ὕψιστος εὐσεβεῖται
ἡμεῖς αὐτὸ λέγειν. p. 131.

nion, when he express'd himself so cautiously, as to say that from this place of *Gen. II. 7. πολλοί* (*many*) believed the Soul to be Immortal.

Having thus, as you think, from those passages you have already cited out of *Theophilus* sufficiently shewed, that to have this your *Adscititious Principle*, is, according to his Notions, necessary to the Soul's Immortality, you proceed to tell us what way *Theophilus* has pointed out to us, whereby to attain this *Divine Principle*. And for this you cite a Passage, which I have also had Occasion to cite a little above, out of this Father, where he speaks concerning the first Man: *That God transplanted him from the Ground out of which he had formed him, into Paradise, giving him Advantages of Improvement, that by still growing and increasing, and becoming perfect he might thence be transplanted into Heaven.* From these words, you say it is plain, that the Title to Immortality depends upon such an *αὐξήσις* (*improvement*;) whereby a Man becomes *πτερόν* (*perfect*.) The *improvement*, you say, is to something beyond what he received at his first Creation, and which all his Posterity, as bearing his Image, and by descent, receive from him. And the *Perfection* here, you say, is no other, than that spoken of by *St. Paul* and *Irenæus*, and which you will have to be nothing else but what Man receives by the addition of your *Adscititious Principle*, which you call the *divine Nature*, and which alone, you say, could make him a God, and entitle him to the Heavenly Habitation. And to strengthen this your Opinion, you cite another passage out of this Father, where he says: *that it is written in Genesis, as if he were twice placed in Paradise; that the first placing of him might be fulfilled when he was first put there, but*
the

the second will be fulfilled after the Resurrection and Judgment. This place I have also before cited more largely with what goes before and follows, which, as will presently sufficiently appear, shews in what sense both this and the preceding Passage is to be taken. From these Passages you argue thus: Paradise is a Symbol of Heaven, and therefore the placing Man in Paradise signifies the conferring on him a Title to Heaven. But his not having been made in Paradise signifies, that barely upon the score of the Human nature, which he received at his first Creation, and which, you say was, transmitted to his Posterity, Man can have no title to Immortality and Heaven. Yet, you say, afterwards God was pleased to confer upon him the Man from Heaven, which both gave him a present Title to Paradise, and thereby a Title in Reversion to Heaven, which was Typified by Paradise. What it is you mean by God's conferring on him the Man from Heaven, you afterwards explain by the Spiritualizing of his Soul, by the Union of the Spirit with it. And then you proceed and say, that the remaining translation mentioned by *Theophilus*, as expected after the Resurrection and Judgment, is no other than that of the Body, when that also was to be cloathed with the Spiritual Body. Till then the *Body* could have no claim to Immortality, or Heaven, or Paradise, as a Type of Heaven. And then you conclude and say; that by this whole reasoning it appears, that neither Soul nor Body was then thought to have any right to Immortality but by the Spirit. Before I proceed to set these citations in their true Light, and to Answer the Arguments you have deduced from them I cannot
but

but observe, what indeed is too obvious to be concealed, that in citing places out of the Fathers, and particularly in making Use of *Theophilus* here, you sometimes very oddly transpose the Passages you make use of, which I think it had been better, and I am sure would have conduced more to discover the true sense of the *Father*, to have quoted in the same order as they lie in their writings. I suppose you were determined to this way of alledging them by the tenor of your thought and the Method of your Argument, but yet I cannot but think it would have been much better to have alter'd a little the Course and Scheme of your Argument to have made it comply with that of the Father, upon whom your reasonings are entirely founded; not onely because by this means your Arguments would have been less obscure, but also you would have freed your self from any suspicion of *design* in this management, which tho' I, who know you to be incapable of a *Trick*, can easily acquit you of, yet others I find there are who will not so easily be satisfied with this your Conduct in this matter. As to the first of these Passages, in order the more clearly to discover the true sense of it, I think it necessary to lay it again before the Reader more at length than you thought it proper to cite it.

But God, says he, placing Man, as we said before in

α ὁ θεὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καθὼς προεκήρυξε, ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ εἰς τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φυλάσσειν αὐτοὺς ἐντεταλαμένον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν καρπῶν ἐσθίου, πληροῦν καὶ ὅτι τῷ ζῴῳ, μὴ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἕως τῆς γένεως ἐντεταλαμένον αὐτοῖς μὴ γούστωσαν. Then follow the words you have cited: μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἧς ἐργάσθαι, εἰς τὸν παράδεισον, διδὼς αὐτοῖς ἀφορμὰν προσηκόντην, ὅπως αὐξάνον καὶ τίλοντες ἁρμόζοντες, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ θεὸς ἀπαγορεύει, ὅπως εἰς τὸν ἄρτον ἀναστροφῆς μὴ φάγοντες. p. 101. And this notion I have here laid down of a moral improvement onely, and which alone the Father means in this place, is further confirm'd by what he expressly says a little way off, where he gives the reason why God forbid Adam to eat of the Tree of Knowledge: ἵνα οὐκ ἐσθίῃ αὐτοῖς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ζήσιν τῇ ἐντολῇ αὐτοῦ

Paradise, for to dress and to keep it, commanded him to eat of all the Fruites, and therefore to be sure of the Fruit of the Tree of Life, onely he commanded him not so much as to tast of the Tree of Knowledge. Now God translated him from the Ground, where he had formed him into Paradise, to give him Occasions of Improvement, that by still growing and increasing [in Virtue,] and becoming Perfect and being made as it were a God, he might ascend into Heaven. We see plainly the design of the Father in this place is to represent the State of the first Man in Paradise, to give an Account of the End, why he was placed there, to shew under what Obligations he was put, and likewise the Reason and Intent of his being laid under those Obligations. And therefore he says, agreeably to Scripture, that he was placed in Paradise to dress and to keep it, and that God allowed him to eat of every Tree, but forbid him to tast that of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. And for this Reason God would not let him continue in the place where he had framed him, but put him into this Garden, as into an Employment and Post of Business, that by Exercising him in the Work he had appointed for him to do, and trying the constancy and steddiness of his Obedience, by the Commands he had laid upon him, he might by this means give him Opportunity and Advantages of Improvement in Virtue, that by still exercising his Obedience, he might at the end ascend into Heaven to live with him for ever. This I take to be the full and one-

αὐτῷ. And then speaking concerning the Improvement in Virtue which Adam might have received by obeying God, and comparing it with the Obedience of Children to their Parents, he concludes: Καταπερὶ γὰρ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς αἰῶνος καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν. Here we find αὐτοὶ used in the same sense as αὐτῶν above.

ly sense of the Holy Father in this place. And therefore tho' I readily grant that the *Improvement*, which the *Father* here speaks of, is to something beyond what he received at his first Creation, namely, as the most perfect, compleat and consummate Habit and Degree of Virtue, is what no Man does, nor even *Adam* himself did, receive at his first Creation, yet I utterly deny, nor I believe will any body that attentively considers this place, be perswaded, that here is the least mention made, or remotest suggestion given of the addition of any adscititious Spirit to the constituent parts of Man. By the ἀφορμή προσκοπῆς (*opportunity of Improvement*) there is nothing, no doubt, can be meant, but those Advantages of proceeding in Holyness and Virtue, by prescribing to him a certain Rule of Life and Action, which is express'd by his setting him to dress and keep the Garden, as well as by his allowing him to eat of all the trees of the Garden, one onely being excepted. Nor does the τελειότης (*Perfection*) in *Irenæus* (as I have already shewn) or here in this Father denote any thing besides a Moral or Religious Perfection, which is to be acquired no otherwise, than by a constant and habitual Course of Obedience. This is indeed what would have made *Adam*, if he had continued in this State, and will make all his Posterity, resemble God himself, and give them the best Title to Heaven, and consequently to a happy Immortality. If the Fathers in general, or this Father in particular, had, as you say, meant any thing of a Perfection, by receiving your *adscititious Spirit*, they would without all doubt have said so, in very plain and positive Terms: but now as we can find them no where affirming any such thing,

so what *Theophilus* here speaks concerning this Perfection plainly supposes the contrary. For if the *Perfection*, here meant, were by the addition of this your adscititious Spirit, it could not be gradual, but must be altogether. Now I dare venture to appeal to any impartial understanding Man, whether it be not a gradual Perfection, which is here spoken of. For 'tis by *increasing* by a *πρὸς ἄνω*, a progress step by step, which in the very nature of it must be done by degrees, that *Adam* was to become Perfect, to be made divine, and so to ascend into Heaven, or to the *Heavenly Habitation*. You say to *Immortality*, and the *Heavenly Habitation*. I cannot but here observe a fallacy, which you are very frequently guilty of, in joining and confounding two things together, which ought to have been carefully distinguished, and separated from each other, namely Immortality and the Heavenly *οἰκητήριον* (*habitation*.) For whatever gives us a Title to Heaven, is by no means therefore to be accounted, as the Ground and Foundation of our Immortality. For our Immortality depends intirely from another bottom, and is antecedent and presupposed to our happiness. And therefore to argue from *this*, to *that*, and to affirm that whatever gives us a Title to eternal Happiness is likewise the cause of our Immortality, is just the same Sophistical way of Reasoning as it would be to infer, that whatever intitles us to any Privilege or Advantage of Life is the cause also of our existing and living to enjoy it.

Nor is the other passage you have cited any more to the Purpose of this your *adscititious Spirit*, which in order to discover the true sense of, I must be obliged to repeat, with a pretty large

context

context preceding and following it. ^a But as, says he, when the Law commands us to abstain from any thing, and we do not obey, it is not the Law, but our own refractoriness and disobedience that is the cause of our Punishment; and as when a Father enjoins his Son to abstain from doing any thing, and the son not obeying his Father's command is beaten, and punished for his Disobedience, and as in this Case it is not the things that are commanded, but the Son's Disobedience that is the cause of his Punishment and Stripes; so 'twas the Disobedience of the first Man that was the cause of his being cast out of Paradise. Not that the Tree of Knowledge had any Evil in it, but Man for his Disobedience was liable to all that Sorrow, Pain, and Labour, and at last fell under the stroke of Death. Now God design'd this as a great Advantage to Man, that he should not for ever continue under the Effects of his Sin, but having been cast out of Paradise, after the manner of Banishment, and suffer'd for his sin the appointed time, he might at last be restored, And for this reason, when Man was formed it is writ in

α Αλ' ὥτε ἐπ' αὐτὸ νόμος κέλευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μὴ ὑπακούῃ, δηλοῦσι
 οὐκ ὁ νόμος κέλευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀπειθεῖα, καὶ ἡ παρανομία. καὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τὴν
 ἀπειθεῖαν ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ νόμου ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἡ ὑπακούῃ τῇ πάτερικῇ ἐντολῇ δέχεται,
 καὶ ἐπιτιμίας τυγχάνει ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι αὐτὰ τὰ πρὸς γὰρ πλῆθος
 εἶσι, ἀλλ' ἡ παρανομία τὴν ἀπειθεῖαν ὑπὸν πειρατοῦται. ἔτι καὶ τὸ πρῶτον λέγει ὁ
 παρανομὸν πειρατοῦται τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ παρανομίᾳ. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ὡς καὶ
 τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἔστι τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς παρανομίας ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐξήντηλσε πόνον,
 ἰδὲν, λύπην, καὶ τὸ τέλος ὑπὸ θάνατον ἵστα. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ Θεὸς μαζάλλω ἐνε-
 ργασίαν παρίσχει τὴν ἀνθρώπου, τὸ μὴ ἀμείναι αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἐν ἀμαρτίᾳ
 οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον τινὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐξελκομένῳ ἐξίσταται αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ παρα-
 νομίᾳ, ὅπως διὰ τῆς ἐπιτιμίας τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου χρόνῳ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, καὶ πῶς οὖτος ἐξ
 ὑπὲρ ἀνακλήσει. διὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ νόμου ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ νόμῳ τῇ μυστηριωδῇ ἐν τῇ
 Γένεσι γάρραται ὡς δις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ παρανομίᾳ πῆγντος. ἵνα τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 παρανομίας, ποτὶ ἵπτη, τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μὲν πλῆθος μὲν τῇ ἀνάστασι καὶ κρίσει.
 ἐν μὲν ἀλλὰ ἐκατέρωθεν σκεῦος τι, ἐπ' αὐτὸν πλῆθος, ὡς τινὰ ἡ ἀνακλήσειται, ἢ
 ἀνακλησέται, εἰς τὸ θῆναι κατὰ τὸ ὁλοκληρὸν οὗτω γίνεται καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπου διὰ
 τῆς ἀνάστασις. διὰ τὴν γὰρ τῆς ἀνάστασις, ἵνα ἐν τῇ ἀνάστασι ὡς ἐν τῇ ἐντολῇ. λέγει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου,
 καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἀθάνατος. p. 102.

Genesis,

Genesis, as if he were twice placed in Paradise: the first was verified when he was at first placed there, and the second will be fulfilled after the Resurrection and Judgment. Now as a Vessel newly framed, if it be not to the mind of the Artificer, is to be cast or moulded again, that it may be new and intire, so it happens to Man by Death. For he is but as it were diseased in his Powers, that after the Resurrection he might be sound and intire, I mean unspotted, just, and Immortal. It is most evidently the design of the Father in this whole passage, to shew that God was not any way the Author or Cause of Man's Fall, either upon Account of his imposing a command upon him, or upon the score of the Command imposed. This he plainly proves and Illustrates by a great variety of similitudes and Arguments, by which he concludes that Man himself, by his disobedience, was the sole occasion and cause of his own Fall, and thereby of all the Disfmal Consequences of it, among which he looks upon corporal Death as one of the greatest. But notwithstanding this he tells us, that God has provided for Man, this very considerable Advantage and Favour, that he should not for ever continue under the direfull effects of his sin, and tho' he were cast out of Paradise, and his Posterity ever since excluded thence, yet both he and they should be put into a capacity of being restored to a better Paradise in Heaven, than that which by his Disobedience they were deprived of on Earth. And further to prove and illustrate this obvious Truth he introduces the passage you have cited, where he tells us, that for this reason it is writ in *Genesis*, as if Man were twice placed in Paradise. The first time he says was accomplished, when Man was first

first placed there after his Creation, and the second time will be fulfilled when Soul and Body, he shall be translated into that state of Happiness and Bliss in Heaven, which I readily acknowledge the Fathers constantly affirm to be Typified by the earthly Paradise. Now tho, if the Fathers assertion upon which he founds his Argument here, that *it is written, that Man was twice placed in Paradise*, be taken literally it is certainly false, since it does not follow that tho' it be twice recorded that Man was placed in Paradise, that therefore he was twice actually put into that place, yet taking it in this sense for it's being twice written that Man was placed in Paradise, I cannot see how what the Father hence deduces can be in the least to your Purpose. For tho' I can easily grant that Paradise was always looked upon by Pious Antiquity as the Type and Symbol of Heaven, and shall not scruple to allow the Consequence, that the Holy *Father* might possibly think, that the placing Man in Paradise might give him a Title to Heaven, in as much as it put him into a capacity of performing what would certainly have procured him the enjoyment of that Blessed Place, yet I cannot see, nor I believe will any one be persuaded that it does from hence at all follow, that Man is naturally Mortal, or that the having your *Adscititious Spirit* is necessary to immortalize his Soul. Afterwards indeed you say, that since the placing Man in Paradise gave him a Title to Heaven, that therefore he had no Title to it by Nature. I have already hinted that the putting Man into Paradise could give him a Title to Heaven onely in this sense, in as much, as it put him into a capacity of Performing, what would at last deserve Heaven.

ven. But if it should entitle him to Heaven in any other way or sense, which can be assigned, yet neither will this serve to prove the point you drive at. For is there not, as I have before observed, a very great difference between Immortality simply and absolutely taken, and a happy Immortality, which is signified by Heaven? And therefore tho' it should be granted that Man was not entitled to Heaven, or a happy Immortality, as that no doubt is by the Fathers thought to be Typified by Paradise, any otherwise than by being placed in Paradise, in order to that end I before mention'd, yet will it not with any force of consequence from hence follow, that he was not entitled to Immortality, especially if that be taken for the Immortality onely of the Soul, concerning which alone we are here debating. This he might have, and no doubt certainly had, from the nature of the human Soul, which was given and united to his Body, when God breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life: and therefore the taking him out of the Ground where he was formed, and placing him in Paradise, can at most signify no more (if it indeed signifies any thing at all more than what it literally imports) than that by virtue of this he was entitled to Happiness, and the Immortality not of the Soul, but of the Man. And as to what you say, that God was pleased afterwards to confer upon him the Man from Heaven, or your Adscititious Immortalizing Principle, by the union of his Soul with which he had a present Title to Paradise, and a Title in reversion to Heaven, let the world judge whether this be not plainly begging the Question: since here is not the least mention

made, or intimation given of any such thing. For does he not expressly say, that the first time of *Adam's* being placed in Paradise fulfilled the first saying in *Genesis*; and that the second will be fulfilled, when after the Resurrection and Judgment he shall be translated into Heaven? So that which way soever we consider this Passage we find not the least Intimation given of your Adscititious Spirit, much less any express mention made of it.

C H A P.

CHAP. VIII. ad §. 14, 15, 16, 17.

The Opinion of Tertullian concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul. He expressly affirms the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal, and that Immortality belongs as much to it's Essence, as Thought, Knowledge, and Freedom of choice. That Tertullian no farther affirms the Soul to be actually Immortal, than as that is implied in it's Natural Immortality. That Tertullian never mentions the communications of the Blessed Spirit for any other purpose than the Effects of its ordinary or extraordinary Gifts and Graces. Tertullian's ascribing the Resurrection and Eternal Happiness to the Spirit no Argument that the Immortality of the Soul is to be ascribed to the same Spirit.

*Mr. D's notion of actual Immortality has no ground in Antiquity. In what respect the Soul may be said to depend upon the Body. The Soul's being derived ex traduce no proof of it's Natural Mortality. In what sense Tertullian believ'd the Soul to be derived from the Parents. The Corporeity of the Soul no argument that Tertullian thought it was naturally mortal. Tertullian's deriving the human Soul from the Breath of Life, Gen. II. 7. no Argument that he thought it in it's own nature mortal: nor his distinguishing this Breath of Life from the *νεψυχη* (spirit.) In what sense Immortality is an attribute peculiar to the Divine Nature, and distinguished from the Immortality of any Creature. This no Argument against the Soul's natural Immortality. Mr. D's Argument from the right the Body has to a Resurrection being attributed to the spiritual Body not to his purpose. No argument to be drawn from the Church not declaring it self against deriving the soul ex traduce for it's natural Mortality. The Opinion of Origen upon this subject.*

FROM the Greek you proceed to the Latin Fathers, and begin with Tertullian, as the most ancient of the Latin Fathers, who wrote in Latin,

now extant, and whom you very justly esteem to be the best witness of the sense of the Occidental Church in that early Age, we are at present concern'd about. This Father, we know, was born at *Carthage* about the middle of the second Century, and perfectly instructed and skilled in all parts of Literature, and especially he was well acquainted with the *Roman Civil Law*. Towards the end of this Century, about the Year 192, he was advanced to the Dignity of a Presbyter in the Church of *Carthage*, and set himself both then, and before, even from the time of his Conversion to Christianity, with a peculiar Zeal and Fervor to defend, advance, and propagate the Christian Faith. He was present at a Council of the Bishops of *Africa*, and *Numidia*, assembled in this City of *Carthage*, under *Agrippinus* it's Bishop, concerning that famous Question, whether Hereticks were to be re-baptiz'd: and wrote a great many Treatises, most of which are even now extant, both in defence of the Common Christianity, as well as upon some particular parts and branches of it. It is indeed true that he quickly fell into *Montanism*, and that all his Treatises, excepting onely that concerning *Baptism*, another concerning *Repentance*, and a third about *Prayer*, were writ after he had professed himself a follower of that detestable Sect. But notwithstanding it be most certain, that tho' the Injuries of the *Roman* Clergy in Condemning and Excommunicating him for a Montanist, before he declared himself one, and the commendable strictness and austertry of their way of Life, had reconciled him to their Sect, yet it is hard to believe that a Man of his great Learning, and solid Judgment

ment could embrace their absurd Opinions, and therefore tho' in Practise he was a *Montanist*, yet no doubt in Opinion and Principle he continued a Catholick, and therefore is to be esteem'd a very fit Person to convey the Traditions of the Church. That he was very far from being of your Opinion, as to the soul, will evidently appear, as well from a fair Representation of his Notions concerning the Origin, the Nature, and Immortality of the Soul, as from a particular Examination, and full Answer to all those several places, you have cited, and the arguments you have drawn from him.

As to the first of these, his Opinion concerning the *Origin* of the Soul, we should indeed have had a more full and particular Account of it, if his Treatise against *Hermogenes*, *de censu Animæ*, concerning the Origin of the Soul, which he mentions more than once in his Book *de Anima*, had not been unhappily lost. Nevertheless it will, I suppose, sufficiently appear from what he frequently says both in this Treatise, and in his other writings, concerning the soul in general, what his true Opinion as to this point was. He affirms the Soul of the first Man, and of all Mankind as descended from him, to proceed and come forth from God, when he breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life; with this difference however, that whereas the Soul of the first man came immediately from God, that of his Posterity comes onely mediately from him, by a kind of traduction thro' all the successive Generations, by which Mankind has been, and still shall be for the future propagated in the World. To this purpose is what he so frequently inculcates concerning the Origin of the

Soul in general, as proceeding and being breathed forth from God. From hence it is that he styles God: ^a *Auctor Animæ, the maker or framer of the Soul.* And hence it is that he says, that his own Opinion concerning the Soul, which he affirm'd to come forth from the divine Breathing, was not altogether unlike that of the *Stoicks*, who, as he says, affirm'd the Soul to be a Spirit. ^b *I also, says he, alledge the Stoicks, who in affirming the Soul to be a spirit, are almost of the same sentiment with us, for as much as the divine Breathing and Spirit have a near Affinity to each other.* And again disputing against the *Valentinians*, who held an Opinion, so extremely like to yours, that I believe it will be pretty difficult to distinguish them, of I know not what spiritual Seed, which was bestowed upon and united to the Soul, he positively avers the Origin of the human Soul to be from God, when he breathed into Man the Breath of Life. ^c *I should not, says he, have longer insisted upon this point, concerning the Origin of the Soul, if it were not for those Hereticks (meaning the Valentinians) who suppose I know not what Spiritual Seed to be bestowed upon it, by the Secret liberality of Mother Sophia, without the knowledge of the maker of it.* Since, as he goes on, the

^a Certe nullum alium potius Animæ Demonstratorem, quam Auctorem reperiet. A Deo discas, quod à Deo habeat, aut nec ab alio, si nec à Deo. De Anima cap. 1. ^b Sed etiam Stoicos allego, qui Spiritum prædicantes Animam, pene nobiscum, quæ proxime inter se status & Spiritus. cap. 5. ^c Nec diutius de isto, nisi propter Hæreticos, qui nescio quod spiritale semen infundant Animæ, de *Sophiæ* matris occulta liberalitate conlatum, ignorante factore, quam scriptura factoris magis Dei sui conficia, nihil amplius promulgaverit, quam Deum flantem in faciem hominis statum vitæ, & hominem factum in animam vivam, per quam exinde & vivat & spiret, cap. 11.

Scriptures, having a greater regard to it's maker God, publish no more concerning it but this; That God breathed into the Face of Man the Breath of Life, and Man was made a living Soul, by virtue of which from thenceforth he lived and breathed. And afterwards going about to prove, that the Soul is always, from the very beginning of it's union with the Body, endued with Understanding, against some who affirmed, that the Souls of Infants wanted that Power, as having onely the Vegetative and Animal, but not the Understanding Principle, he plainly distinguishes the manner by which the human Rational Soul was created, from that by which Vegetative and Animal Souls are made, by this *criterion*, that the latter are onely the work of God, but the former, the Breath of God, affirming also, in opposition to these Men, that it was, when first made, furnished with all it's Powers and Faculties. *The Soul of Man*, says he, *is not, as in Plants and Animals, common to a great number of Species, but something peculiar to Man, not onely as it is the Workmanship of God, as other Souls are, but as it is the Breath of God, which the Human Soul alone is; which we affirm to have been created with all it's furniture of Faculties.* And lastly not to alledge any more places in so clear a point, that Treatise concerning the Origin of the Soul, which he wrote against *Hermogenes*, and is now lost, was onely de-

a Sed ne illi quidem pratererundi qui vel modico temporis viduant animam intellectu Volunt infantiam sola anima contineri, qua tantummodo vivat, non ut pariter sapiat; quia nec omnia sapiant, quæ vivant. Denique Arborea vivere, nec tamen sapere, secundum *Aristotelem*, & si quis alius substantiam animalem in universa communicat, quæ apud nos in homine privata res est, non modo ut Dei opus, quod & cætera, sed ut Dei status quod hæc sola; quam dicimus cum omni instructu suo nasci. cap. 19.

signed, as he tells us himself, to prove and illustrate by a great variety of Arguments this point of the Soul's being created and infused by the Breath of God, in opposition to the Opinion of it's being made out of some Antecedent Matter, *ex substrata materia*, as an *Aristotelian* would say, or *ex materia suggestu*, as *Tertullian* himself expresses it. Thus in the very beginning of his Treatise concerning the Soul: ^a *Having, says he, already engaged Hermogenes only concerning the Origin of the Soul, in as much as he affirmed it to be made of some preexistent matter, rather than to proceed from the Breath of God, I must now proceed to the remaining Questions concerning this point, in which I see I shall have a warm contest with the Philosophers.* And afterwards affirming his own Opinion to be most agreeable to Scripture, but that of *Hermogenes* expressly against it, and likewise giving some account how *Hermogenes* came to believe and affirm the Soul to be made out of matter he proceeds to prove and explain these several things after this manner. *But, says he, I truly and properly affirm the Soul of Man to be the*

^a De solo censu Animæ congressus *Hermogeni*, quatenus & istum ex materiæ potius suggestu, quam ex Dei flatu constituisse præsumpsit, nunc ad reliquas conversus quæstiones, plurimum videbor cum Philosophis dimicaturus, cap. i. in ipso initio. ^b Cæterum adversus *Hermogenem*, qui eam ex materia, non ex Dei flatu contendit, flatum proprie tuemur. Ille enim adversus ipsius Scripturæ fidem, flatum in spiritum vertit: ut dum incredibile est, Spiritum Dei in delictum, & mox in Judicium devenire, ex materia potius anima credatur quam ex Dei Spiritu. Idcirco nos & illic flatum eum defendimus, non Spiritum secundum scripturam, & secundum spiritus Distinctionem, & hic Spiritum ingratis pronunciamus, secundum spirandi & flandi communionem. cap. ii. *And in the preceding Chapter, as well as in this, immediately before the words here cited, he more largely explains in what sense the Soul may be said to be the Spirit of God, namely as that signifies the same as the Breath of God, and as spirare likewise signifies the same as vivere, At enim vivere spirare est, & spirare vivere. Ergo totum hoc & vivere & spirare,*

Breath of God, against Hermogenes, who contends that it proceeds from matter and not from the divine breathing. For he in the first place, contrary to the Truth of Scripture, turns the Breathing into a Spirit, and then because it is incredible, that the Spirit of God should fall and incur damnation, from hence he would have it believed that the Soul is rather made out of matter, than proceeds from the Breath of God. Therefore in that Treatise I proved that the Soul is, according to Scripture, the Breath of God, and not a divine Spirit, as Spirit stands distinguished from Breath; but here I freely affirm the Soul to be a Spirit, in as much as the words spirare and flare may be taken to signify the same thing. From this passage it is, I think, evident beyond dispute, in what sense Tertullian makes the Soul to proceed from, and to be, both the Spirit of God, and the Breath of God, namely, as those words may be, and as he proves are very often, understood to signify the same thing: but then, as the Spirit of God is taken for any thing of a different nature from this divine Breathing, he utterly denies it to have any share in producing the Soul, or to be in any wise a part or principle of the human *Compositum*.

Such, according to this *Father's* Opinion is the Origin of the Soul in general, and of that Soul in particular, which was united to the Body of the first Man.

rare, ejus est cujus est vivere, id est Animæ, cap. 18. And at the beginning of the next Chapter giving the reason why he calls the Soul a Spirit he explains this Notion after the same manner. Nam & flare spirare est. Ita & Animam quam flatum ex proprietate defendimus, Spiritum nunc ex necessitate pronunciamus. He again mentions his proving against Hermogenes that the Soul proceeds from God, and not from matter, where he says: Cætera Animæ Naturalia jam à nobis audiit Hermogenes; cum ipsorum defensione & probatione, per quæ Dei potius quam materiæ propinqua cognoscitur. cap. 22.

From

From which *Flatus*, or *Spiritus*, *Breath of Life*, it must indeed be confess'd that *Tertullian* supposes the Souls of all particular Men to be derived, by way of Traduction, from the Parents to the Children, thro' all the successive generations of Men. This is evident, as from many other places, as where he calls the Soul ^a *a traductitious Breath or Spirit*, and where he affirms that ^b *many Souls are propagated from one*, so more especially from those passages you have cited to this purpose, and others that are to be found in the Chapters out of which you have cited them. At the latter end of the twenty second Chapter of this Book concerning the Soul, after having given a very full and particular definition or description of it's nature, he proposes ^c the Question concerning it's Origin or Beginning, or as himself more fully and clearly expresses it, how all particular Souls could flow and be propagated from one. And after having mention'd, confuted, and rejected the several Opinions of both Heretics and Philosophers concerning this matter, he asserts and endeavours largely to prove, that it can be accounted for no other way than by traduction from the Parents. Thus, as you very rightly observe, he affirms the Soul of *Adam* to be ^d *matricem omnium*, and the Souls of all particular Men to be originally deriv'd, and, if I may be permitted so to speak, tra-

^a Anima flatus est & Spiritus tradux. cap.9 ^b Et nunc plures animæ de una proferuntur. cap. 31 ^c Sequitur nunc ut quomodo ex una redundet consideremus, id est, unde & quando, & qua ratione sumatur. cap.22.
^d Hominis Anima, velut surculus quidam, ex matrice *Adam* in propagationem deducta & genitalibus sæminæ foveis commendata cum omni sua paratūra pullulabit tam intellectu quam & sensu. cap. 19.

duced from his. Again he affirms all particular Souls, however different in capacities, and disagreeing in Inclinations, not to be specifically distinct, but to be onely *sortes naturæ & substantiæ unius*, Lots, shall I call them, or slips taken from that one substance which was given to Adam, when God breathed into him the Breath of Life, and deriv'd upon all Mankind.

^a It appears, says he, from hence what those things are which so greatly diversify that one nature of the Soul, in so much that they are commonly thought to be several natures, when as indeed they be not different Natures, but onely slips of that one nature, and substance, which God bestowed upon Adam, and made the original stock of all the rest: and therefore are they parts and not differing species of that one substance: so as that this moral variety, great as it is, was not in Adam, the first of the human Race. But certainly if this diversity had been natural and not acquired, all this variety ought to have been in him, as the original of the human Nature, and to have been derived down with it. He affirms, as you very truly remark, the Soul to proceed from some seminal Principle of the Parents, and to be conceived, and formed in the Womb, as the Body is. Hence it is that with some sort of heat and zeal he condemns those, ^b who affirmed

a Apparet quanta sint, quæ unam Animæ naturam varie collocarint, ut vulgo naturæ deputentur; quando non species sint, sed sortes naturæ, & substantiæ unius, illius scilicet quam Deus in Adam contulit, & matricem omnium fecit: atque adeo sortes erunt, non species substantiæ unius; ut & varietas ista moralis quanta nunc est, tanta non fuerit in ipso principe generis Adam. Debuerant enim fuisse hæc omnia in illo, ut in fonte naturæ, atque inde cum tota varietate manasse, si varietas naturæ fuisset. cap. 20.

b Nulla interest Professoribus veritatis de adversariis ejus, maxime tam audacibus, quam sunt primo isti, qui præsumunt non in utero concipi animam, nec cum carnis figuratione compingi atque produci: sed effuso jam partu &c. cap. 25,

the

the Soul not to be conceived, formed, and compacted in, as well as produced from the Parent, and to be wrought up together with the Frame of the Body. Hence it is also that he mentions two different sorts of seminal Principles, from one of which as he affirms the Body to proceed, so from the other he supposes the Soul to spring. The Passages by which this is to be proved, and which give a more particular account what the Father's sense of this matter was, I think not so proper to be put into *English*, but the Reader, if he pleases to cast his eye to the bottom of the page, may see them cited more largely and fully than you thought it for your purpose to quote ^a them.

^a *In the beginning of the 27th. Chapter he Proposes this Question: Quo- modo igitur Animal conceptum? Simulne conflata utriusque substantia corporis animæque, an altera earum præcedente? To which he Answers: Imo simul ambas & concipi, & confici & perfici dicimus, sicut & promi, nec ullum intervenire momentum in conceptu, quo locus ordinetur. And again a little further; Porro vitam à conceptu agnoscimus, quia animam à conceptu vindicamus. Exinde enim vita quo Anima. Pariter ergo in vitam compinguntur, quæ pariter in mortem separantur. Tunc si alteri primatum damus, alteri secundatum, seminis quoque discernenda sunt tempora pro statu ordinis, & quando collocabitur corporis semen quando animæ? Imo si tempora seminum dividuntur, & materiæ diversæ habebuntur, ex distantia temporum. Nam etsi duas species consitebimur seminis, corporalem & animale, indiscretas tamen vindicamus, & hoc modo contemporales, ejusdemque momenti. Ne itaque pudeat necessariæ interpretationis. Natura veneranda est, non erubescenda. Concubitus libido non conditio sedavit. Excessus non status est impudicus. Siquidem benedictus status apud Deum: Crescite & in multiudinem proficite. Excessus vero maledictus Adulteria, & Stupra, & Lupanaria. In hoc solemnī sexuum officio, quod marem ac femineam miscet, in concubitu dico communi, scimus & carnem simul fungi; animam concupiscentia, carnem opera, animam instinctu, carnem actu. Unico igitur impetu utriusque, toto homine concusso despumatur semen totius hominis, habens ex corporali substantia humorem, ex animali calorem. Et si frigidum nomen est Anima Græcorum, quare corpus exempta ea friget? Denique ut adhuc verecundia magis petioliter quam probatione, in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo actu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus extre? Atque*

This is, in short, *Tertullian's* true sense concerning the Origin of the Soul. How far it may any way contribute to support and strengthen your Opinion concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul I shall then consider when I come to examine and discuss the Arguments, which may be raised from this Opinion to this purpose. In the mean time I cannot but observe, that this Notion of *Tertullian* supposes all human Souls to be remotely and mediately, though not proximately and immediately derived from God. For since it is most evident, that he supposes the Soul of the first Man to be that *flatus vitæ*, that Breath of Life, which was given him, when he was first created, and that the Souls of all those Men that ever shall descend from him are derived and taken from this *Flatus*, it will from hence unavoidably follow that all human Souls were created with that first Soul, and

Atque adeo marcescimus, & devigescimus cum lucis detrimento? Hoc erit semen animale, protinus ex animæ destillatione, sicut & virus illud corporale semen ex carnis defecatione. Fidelissima primordii exempla. De limbo caro in Adam. Quid aliud limus quam liquor optimus? Inde erit genitale virus. Ex adflatu Dei Anima. Quid aliud adflatus Dei, quam vapor Spiritus? Inde erit, quod per virus illud efflamus. Quum igitur in primordio duo diversa atque divisa, limus & flatus, unum hominem coegissent, confusæ substantiæ ambæ jam in uno semina quoque sua miscuerunt, atque exinde generi propagando formam tradiderunt; ut & nunc duo licet diversa, etiam unita pariter effluant, pariterque insinuata sulco & arvo suo, pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effruticent, in quo rursus semen suum insit secundum genus, sicut omni conditioni genitali præstitutum est. Igitur ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur; observante scilicet natura Dei Edictum: *Crescite & in multitudinem proficite*. Nam & in ipsa præfatione operis unius: *Faciamus hominem*, universa posteritas pluraliter prædicata est, & prælint Piscibus Maris. Nihil mirum repromissio segetis in semine. cap. 27. *It is evident from the latter part of this long Citation, that Tertullian supposed the Souls, or at least the seminal Principles of the Souls, of all Mankind to have been Created with the Soul of the first Man.*

must

must have been virtually and eminently, if not formally contained and comprehended in it. And this without all doubt must be the sense and meaning of what he says, towards the End of the Passage I have just cited. *Therefore*, says he, *this whole number of Souls is derived from one Man's nature observing the Command of God: Increase and multiply. For in those words: Let us make Man, and let them have Dominion over the Fish of the sea, which were the Preface to the work of framing the first Man, the whole Posterity of Mankind is doubtless comprehended and understood to be plurally prædicated.* This Father therefore is not to be thought to deny, that the Soul is created by God, but onely that it is then created and infused into the Body, when it is fully framed and furnished with all it's parts and members, as some of the Philosophers very weakly and absurdly asserted.

The occasion, as it seems most probable, that inclined *Tertullian* to embrace this *Hypothesis* concerning the Origin of the Soul, was his too great care and studiousness to avoid, and get at the greatest distance he could from the opinion of those, whether Heretics or others, who affirmed the Soul, in as much as it immediately proceeded from God, to be a part of the Divine Nature, and of the same Essence with God. This Notion was embraced, not to mention others, ^a by the *Gnostics*

^a The *Gnostics* affirmed every Man to have two Souls, one of which proceeded from the Divine Breath, and, as they said, was a part of the Substance of God. So *Irenæus* lib. 1. cap. 34. ad fin. speaking concerning this their Opinion, mentions those Souls which were of the substance of God, i.e. which proceeded from the Divine Breathing. And *St Augustin de Hæres.* cap. 6. more expressly: *Animarum substantiam Dei dicunt esse naturam.* And as to the *Manichees*, that they held this Opinion, is too evident to need any Proof, not only from a great number

in *Tertullian's* time, and by other Sects of Heretics, as the *Manichees*, and *Priscillianists* afterwards. And it is not unlikely that *Plato's* notions concerning the Origin, and both his and some other Philosophers too strong and lively expressions and descriptions of the nature of the Soul, might be the Ground and Occasion that this Opinion obtain'd no inconsiderable vogue and reputation in the Earliest times of Christianity. Most certain it is, that this was *Tertullian's* sense of this matter, as appears by that very Treatise he has writ concerning the Soul, wherein he so often insinuates that the opinions of the Philosophers were the causes and foundation of most of the Heresies that then infested the Church, and he says particularly concerning *Plato*, that he was, *Omnium Hæreticorum Condimentarium*, one that had given a Taint and Poinancy to all the Heresies. In Opposition therefore to this heretical opinion, that the Soul is a part of God, and nothing less than a Ray as it were, and consequently of the same nature with, the Divinity it self, which *Tertullian* represents *Plato* and others to have embraced, he not onely sets himself in more places than one formally and solemnly to confute it, but also seems to have taken up, and endeavour'd to establish this opinion, concerning the Soul's being derived, *ex traduce*, from the Parent, as the most direct and effectual method and means to confute and over-

ber of places shewing this, which might be alledged out of many of the Fathers, but also from several other places of St. Augustin, and more especially from his Treatise de duabus Animabus cap. 12. The same St. Augustin de Hæres. cap. 70. mentions this also as the Opinion of the *Priscillianists*. Hi (*Priscillianistæ*) animas dicunt ejusdem naturæ atque substantiæ cujus est Deus.

turn it. Hence it is that after having endeavour'd to shew *Plato's* Notion concerning the Soul to be false, because it is inconsistent, as he imagins, with it's being a Creature, and supposes it to be nothing less than God, he concludes: *But we, says he, who make nothing to be a part of God, affirm the Soul to be far inferior to the Deity, for this very Reason, because we own it to have been born, and upon this Account it has a lower, and qualified degree both of Divinity and felicity.*

The opinion of this *Father* concerning the Nature of the Soul is indeed very peculiar and extraordinary, and I think different from that of almost all the Fathers who lived either before or since him. And I believe it moreover pretty evident, that he did not derive this his notion from any tradition of the Church, or writings of the Fathers, but from that Sect of Philosophers more especially, of whom *Democritus* and *Epicurus* were the chief, whose fundamental Principle it was that all substance was corporeal, and that there was nothing really existent in the World, but what was Body, or some affection and property of it. And therefore these Men utterly denyed and rejected, as absurd and inconsistent with their Scheme of Philosophy, the Notion, even of an incorporeal Deity; as asserting Atomes and Space to have been the Principles of all Beings whatsoever. And least it should possibly be thought that space is either some real substance of it self distinct from Body,

^a Nos autem qui nihil Deo appendimus, hoc ipso animam longe infra Deum expendimus, quod natam eam agnoscimus, ac per hoc dilutioris Divinitatis, & exillioris felicitatis, *cap. 24.*

or else perhaps the affection or mode of some incorporeal Substance, the modern Patrons of this Atomic or Corpuscular Philosophy have departed a little from the Opinions of their Ancestors, and affirmed space of it self to be nothing but a mere Phantom and Creature of the Brain, and to have no reality without the Imagination. It is therefore not in the least to be wonder'd at that these Philosophers affirmed the Soul to be material, and that we find *Lucretius* throughout his third Book, with as weak and fallacious a thred of Argument as 'tis possible for a wise Man and Philosopher to make use of, but at the same time with all the Beauty and Elegance of Poetic Images and Expressions, that so great a Genius could be Master of, endeavouring to prove the Soul to be not onely^a Corporeal, but also purely a part of the Body, as much as the hand, the feet, or the Eyes. Notwithstanding which he asserts it to be diffused, and spread throughout the whole Body, ^b but yet to be Governed by the Mind and Understanding, whose chief seat and residence he affirms to be in the heart. Hence it is that he asserts, ^c and by a great

- a Primum Animum dico (mentem quem sæpe vocamus)
In quo consilium vitæ regimenque locatum 'st
Esse hominis partem nthilo minus ac Manus & Pes
Atque Oculi partes animantis totius extant.

lib. III. v. 94.

- b Nunc Animum atque Animam dico conjuncta teneri
Inter se, atque unam naturam consicere ex se.
Sed caput esse quasi, & dominari in corpore toto
Consilium, quod nos Animum Mentemque vocamus:
Idque situm media regione in Pectoris hæret.
Cætera pars Animæ per totum dissita corpus
Paret & ad Numen Mentis mōmenque movetur.

Ibid. v. 137.

- c This by a long train of no less than eight and twenty Arguments he endeavours to make out from v. 418 to v. 842. some of which proofs appear so weak, that it is

S

a wonder

Number, and Variety of Arguments endeavours to prove, that the Soul is both born, and dies together with the Body. Now tho' it be most certain and evident that *Tertullian* was not in all these points, as well as many others of the same Opinion with these Philosophers, yet it is highly probable that his Opinion concerning the Corporeal Nature and Constitution of the human Soul was deriv'd from them. Nay so clear and evident is it that in his Treatise concerning the Soul he makes use of several of those ways of arguing which we find in *Lucretius's* third Book, that one of the most considerable amongst the Critics has not stuck to recommend *that* treatise of *Tertullian*, as the best Commentary upon *this* Book of *Lucretius*. And as to the Notion of those Philosophers concerning one only Substance, that is to say, Body, and that therefore even God himself must be corporeal, we find *Tertullian* expressly asserting both the one and the other. Thus in his Treatise *de Carne Christi* going about to confute the Opinion of those Heretics, who affirmed our Lord not to have had a true and real, but only a Phantastic and Apparent Body, he lays it down as certain: *That what-*

a wonder they could be made use of by so great a Man. And as for those which have something of strength and probability in them, they are bottom'd upon that Principle, which he laid down in the first place, that the Soul is a part of the Body. From which position it does indeed unavoidably follow that it must die and perish with the Body: since I think it can hardly with reason be denyed, that the Life of every part of the Body consists in it's being vitally united to the whole, as we see that of the visible members to do, inasmuch that if any of them, as for instance, the foot, hand, &c. be separated from it, they become immediately dead and insensible. From hence we may see how weakly those Philosophers argued, who made the Soul to be corporeal, and a part of the Body, and withal affirmed that it continued to live some time, at least, after it's separation from it, but then died thro' it's own natural mortality. a Omne quod est corpus est sui generis. Nihil est incorporeale nisi quod non est cap. II.

soever

soever is any thing is Body of it's own kind. And that nothing is incorporeal, but that which has no Being. And again in his Treatise of the Soul, he affirms in general, and takes it for a Principle: *a* that what is not Body is nothing. And afterwards in his second Book, against Marcion, where he affirms the Substances of the divine and human Body to be different, he plainly supposes the Deity to be material. ^b For arguing against that Position of the Marcionites, that if God could be angry, jealous, rejoyce, or grieve, he would be liable to Death, and Corruption, he affirms it to be a very weak thing to judge of the Divine by the human nature, and to infer, that because Man, in whom these affections are found, is in a dying perishing Condition, that therefore we ought to suppose the same of God also. If, as he goes on, we carefully distinguish their substances, we shall find it necessary to attribute to each as different affections as the difference of their Substances requires, altho' they seem to be the same by their having the same Name. For altho' we read of the right hand, and eyes, and feet of God, we are not therefore to compare them to these parts of the human Body, be-

^a Nihil enim, si non corpus. ^b Inde venit ad Hæreticos quoque definitio ejusmodi: si Deus irascitur & æmulatur, & extollitur, & exacerbatur, ergo & corrumpetur, ergo & morietur. — Stultissimi qui de humanis divina præjudicant, ut quoniam in homine corruptoria conditionis habentur hujusmodi passiones, idcirco & in Deo ejusdem status existimentur. Discerne substantias, & suos iis distribue sensus tam diversos, quam substantiæ exigunt licet vocabulis communicare videantur. Nam & dexteram, & oculos & pedes Dei legimus, nec ideo tamen humanis comparabuntur quia de appellatione sociantur. Quanta erit diversitas divini corporis & humani, sub eisdem nominibus membrorum, tanta erit & animi divini & humani differentia, sub eisdem licet vocabulis sensuum, quos tam corruptorios efficit in homine corruptibilitas substantiæ humanæ quam incorruptorios in Deo efficit incorruptibilitas substantiæ divinæ cap. 16.

cause they agree with them in the Name. For as great a difference as there is between the divine and human Body, altho' the parts of both have the same Name, so great a difference likewise there is, &c. From which words I think it is undisputably clear, that this Father thought God to be material and to have a Body, and altho' in the following words he distinguishes between the substance of the Divinity, and the substance of Man, and also makes mention of the divine Mind, yet 'tis most evident from the course of his Argument in this place that he thought even this to be material. Which, not to mention other places that might be cited to this purpose, the following passage in his Treatise against *Praxeas* puts beyond all doubt or uncertainty. For interpreting and explaining that of the Apostle: *who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God*, concerning the eternal word of the Father. he speaks of the corporeity of God, as a thing he was most certain of: *Who, says he, will deny that God is a Body, altho' it must be confessed that God is a Spirit? For a Spirit is a Body of it's own kind, and in it's own shape.* Since therefore this was *Tertullian's* Notion concerning the Nature and Substance of all Beings in general, as well as of the Deity in particular, it is not to be wonder'd at that he thought the Soul to be corporeal. And accordingly in all places almost where he mentions the Soul, he either expressly affirms and solemnly proves, or else implies and supposes it's corporeity. If we take a view of that description he has given us of the hu-

a Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus Spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. cap. 7.

man Soul in his Treatise concerning it, we shall find him in the most exprefs and particular manner possible asserting it to be corporeal: *a We define, saies he, the Soul to have proceeded from the Breath of God, to be Immortal, Corporeal, Organical, to be of a simple uncompounded substance, to have Understanding in it's self, and several other faculties, to have Freedom of Choice, to be capable of improvement, to be different according to the temper and complexion of Men, to be the rational governing Power, to have a Principle of Divination, and to have proceeded from the first Soul that was created.* I think it is needless to insist upon all the several parts of which this Description of the Soul consists, but yet cannot but think my self obliged to observe what is indeed most obvious to remark, viz. that *Tertullian* very plainly and expressly here asserts the soul to be an organized Body: and this he solemnly and formally sets himself in Chapters the sixth, seventh, and eighth to prove, against the contrary opinion of *Plato*, not onely by alledging the Authority of very many of the Antient Philosophers to this purpose, but also by endeavouring to confirm and establish this Assertion both from Scripture, and Reason. I cannot think it needful to examin, and endeavour to confute those very fallacious and weak Arguments by which he would perswade us of this absurd Position that the Soul is corporeal; since my Business is onely, as far as I am able, to represent the true sense of this and the other Fathers

a Definimus Animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem, varie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem, ex una redundantem, cap. 22.

concerning the Nature of the Soul, and to shew, that whatever their opinions were concerning this matter, they were notwithstanding very far from believing it to be in it's own nature mortal. But yet I think it may not be amiss by adding a correspondent Passage or two, more fully and plainly to set before you his opinion as to the corporeity of the Soul. To this purpose therefore is what he says, after having given an Account of the Origin of the Soul from the Breath of God in these words: *'The Corporeity therefore, says he, of the Soul results from the parts being compacted together, and the shape of it from the formation of them. This is the interior Man, as the other is the exterior. This has it's proper eyes and ears, with which Men ought to hear and see the Lord; having also other parts and members, which it makes use of in thinking, and by which Dreams are represented to it.* Here we see plainly, that he not onely makes the Soul to be corporeal, but also describes it under a perfect human shape, assigning to it eyes, ears, and all the other parts that the Body, which he here calls the external Man, is known to have, and to which he ascribes the several functions and operations of the Soul. And in another place he is so nice and particular, as to the Members of the Soul, as to distinguish a difference of Sexes in them: where he says expressly, *^b That the Soul being formed in the*

a Inde igitur & corpulentia Animæ ex densatione solidata est, & effigies expressione formata. Hic erit homo interior, alius exterior, dupliciter unus: habens & ille oculos, & aures suas, quibus Populus Dominum audire, & videre debuerat; habens & cæteros artus, per quos & in cogitationibus utitur, & in somniis fungitur. cap. 9. b Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne, pariter cum ipsa sortitur & sexum, ita pariter ut in causa sexus neutra substantia teneatur. cap. 36

Womb together with the Body, with it likewise obtains a diversity of Sex, but yet so as that the operations of either sex do not agree to it.

This is, in short, the Account, which *Tertullian* gives us, of the Nature of the Soul. How far this Account may contribute to infer, or any way strengthen the conclusion you would deduce from hence concerning it's Natural Mortality, I shall then consider when I have laid before you his true Opinion concerning the Soul's Natural Immortality. Now whatever Conclusions the Antient or Modern Philosophers might be apt to draw from the Origin of the Soul *ex traduce*, or from the corporeity of it's Nature, concerning it's Natural Mortality, yet most certain it is that *Tertullian* himself either was not well apprized and aware of these Inferences, or at least did not think they could follow with any force of Argument from the Premises laid down by him; because we find him constantly to have held, and strenuously to have asserted the Natural Immortality of the Soul. And this seems to me sufficient of it self to overthrow all your Arguments drawn from this Father for the Natural Mortality of the Soul. For since we are here debating onely about the opinion *Tertullian* had concerning the Immortality of the Soul, whatever Conclusions may be deduced from the Accounts and Descriptions he gives us of the Origin and Nature of the Soul, which are inconsistent with his known, declared and avowed Opinion, concerning it's Immortality, are to be immediately rejected and laid aside, as not containing a true Account of his sense and judgment in the point before us. Now that *Tertullian* held the

Soul to be of self immortal, is I believe abundantly evident from a far greater number of Passages, which are to be found throughout his Writings than I can think it proper to trouble you withall at this time: and therefore I shall wholly confine my self to those that are to be found in his Treatise concerning the Soul. And here I cannot but observe in the first place, that in the description he has given us of the Nature of the Soul in that definition of it I have just now cited, he has mention'd it's Immortality in the very next place to the Account he has given us of it's Origin from the Breath of God, as thinking that this did as much, if not more intimately belong to the nature and essence of it, than any of those Properties and attributes he mentions afterwards. The same Immortality he ascribes to, and affirms of the Soul in a great number of other places in this Treatise. As in the very first Chapter he supposes the Soul to be Immortal, where he affirms that it's Immortality cannot be so well learned from *Socrates*, how finely soever he may have discoursed upon this Subject, as from the Principles of Christianity, which have given Mankind a clearer view, and more certain and full Account of this matter. *It is not, says he, to be wonder'd at, if Socrates, even in his Prison, being desirous to defeat and disappoint A-*

a Nihil mirandum si & in carcere lemniscatas *Anyti* & *Melii* Palmas gestiens infringere, ipsa morte coram Immortalitatem vindicat Animam, necessaria præsumptione ad injuriæ frustrationem. Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia *Socratis* de industria venerat consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis. Cui enim veritas comperta sine Deo? Cui Deus cognitus sine Christo? Cui Christus exploratus sine Spiritu Sancto? Cui Spiritus Sanctus accommodatus sine fidei Sacramento. cap. i.

nytus and Melitus of their Pompous Victory, in the very Article of Death defends the Soul's Immortality, which was but a necessary Foundation, in order to elude the injury they had done him. So that all that Wisdom of Socrates was onely made use of with design to support the æquanimity of his Soul under his affliction, and did not proceed from a full discovery and conviction of the Truth. Now altho' he condemns Socrates in this place for taking up this Opinion concerning the Immortality of the Soul onely out of a design to support and comfort himself under the immediate Prospect of approaching Death, and in some measure to defeat the cruel satisfaction his Enemies took in his Calamity, with the hope and assurance he had of a future Eternity; yet it is very plain, that his Argument in this place supposes that *natural Immortality* of the Soul, which, he says, nothing but an illumination from God himself, could give the Mind an undoubted assurance and infallible certainty of. And tho', in the following words he makes mention of *Christ* and the *Spirit*, as the onely means to guide us into all Truth, yet no one who reads and considers this passage can possibly imagin any thing more to be meant by it than that light and assistance of the *Spirit* of God, afforded through *Christ* to the Mind of Man, which is necessary to the perfect discovery of all divine Truths. Again, there is nothing can be said more full and exprefs for the Natural Immortality of the Soul, than where, answering the Argument to prove the Soul to be naturally Mortal, because if corporeal it might be thought as the Body does to stand in need of Food to support it, he affirms, that the Soul stands in need
of

of such supports onely upon the score of, and to continue it's union with, the Body, and that when this it's Tabernacle shall be dissolved the Soul will go safe from it, having no more occasion for these supports: since every thing necessary to uphold it's Being is contained, as he affirms, within it self, that is to say, *it's *IMMORTALITY*, *rationality*, *sense*, *reason*, and *freedom of choice*, all which, he expressly affirms, do *NATURALLY* belong to the Soul. Here we see the Immortality of the Soul is not onely put upon the same bottom with it's Reason, Understanding, and the freedom of it's choice, which without all doubt belong to and flow from the very Nature and Essence of it, but is also positively said to be *Nativitus Animæ Conlata*, by it's very production bestowed upon it. Than which there cannot, I think, be an assertion that more plainly avers the Natural Immortality of the Soul, or that more fully and flatly contradicts your *Hypothesis* of an adscititious extrinsecal Immortality. For if, as *Tertullian* here asserts, Immortality be thus *nativitus animæ conlata*, and belongs to it's Essence as much as Thought, Reason or a power of determining it's choice, there can be no more occasion for your human adscititious immortalizing

a Certe enim domus Animæ Caro est, & Inquilinus carnis Anima. Desiderabit itaque Inquilinus ex causa & necessitate hujus Nominis profutura domui, toto inquilinatus sui tempore; non ut ipse substruendus, nec ut ipse loricandus, nec ut ipse tibicinandus; sed tantummodo continendus; quia non aliter contineri possit quam domo fulta. Alioquin licebit Animæ, dilapsa domo ex destitutione propriorum subsidiorum, incolumi abire, habenti sua firmamenta, & propriæ conditionis alimenta, IMMORTALITATEM, rationalitatem, sensualitatem, intellectualitatem, arbitrii libertatem. Quæ OMNIA NATIVITUS Animæ conlata, cap. 38.

spirit or Principle, in order to perpetuate it's duration to eternity, than there is of any such Principle in order to it's Understanding, Reasoning, and Willing. Whenever he speaks of Death, he defines it to be nothing but the separation of Soul and Body, the natural consequence of which is only the dissolution of the Body; but never so much as intimates that it can at all reach, or have the remotest reference to the Soul, which he must have affirm'd if he had thought the Soul to have been naturally mortal. Thus he tells us, *a that the work of Death is manifestly nothing else but the separation of Soul and Body.* And again *b This*, says he, *is the work of Death the Separation of Body and Soul.* There is not the least mention made either here or any where else, that Death operates upon, or can any way concern the Soul. Nay in the very words immediately preceding the Passage I last cited he expressly denies that Death can have any reference to the Soul. For arguing against those who affirm'd, that in Death there was not a total Separation of Soul and Body, but that something of the Soul still remain'd, even after Death, he says, *c That if any thing of the Soul remains that must be Life, but Death can no more mix with Life, than Day with Night;* by which he plainly affirms it to be impossible the Soul should die, meaning no doubt an impossi-

a Opus autem mortis in medio est, discretio corporis animæque. cap. 51.

b Hoc igitur opus mortis separationem carnis animæque. cap. 52. c Si quid Animæ remanserit Vita est. Non magis vitæ miscetur Mors, quam diei nox. cap. 52. Several of the Philosophers were of this Opinion, and among others Tertullian in the preceding Chapter mentions Plato and Democritus. What lead them into this sentiment was not onely the return of some to life after in all appearance they had been a long while dead, but also that the growing of the Hair, and nails in Dead Bodies could hardly otherwise be accounted for.

lity with relation onely to second Causes, and in the ordinary course of Nature. For never any one yet has been so forsaken by his Reason as to deny, that God, by withholding the general concurrence of his Providence, as well as by exerting a positive and particular act of his Power, can destroy and annihilate any created thing. *And lastly where he gives some Account of the several ways and causes of Death he has so particular a Regard to the Immortality of the Soul, that he seems very sollicitously to guard and fence it against the insults of Death, plainly supposing it thereby to be of its own nature Immortal. From these, and a very great number of other places, which, were it needful, might be laid together to the same purpose, it is I suppose abundantly evident to all such, as are ever so little acquainted with the Writings of this *Father*, that whatever consequences may be deduced from the Account *Tertullian* gives of the origin and nature of the Soul, to prove it's natural Mortality, yet that he still believ'd it in it's own nature Immortal: which is all I am concern'd to contend for, whose Business in this place is onely to shew, what the Opinion of this *Fathers* is concerning the Immortality of the Soul.

Now to all this you will perhaps think fit to answer, That in the beginning of §. 14. you have granted that *Tertullian* owns the Actual Immortality of the Soul. In reply to which I desire it may be observed, *first*, that in one of those places I have cited he expressly ascribes something more than

a Plane ad Immortalitatem Animæ hic quoque protegendam in mentione mortis, aliquid de ejusmodi exitu interstruam &c. cap. 53.

an *Actual Immortality* to the Soul, by saying that Immortality is *nativitus animæ conlata*, and belongs as intimately and inseparably to it's Nature as Thought, Reasoning, or a freedom of choice. But, *secondly*, if by *actual Immortality* you mean a peculiar sort of Immortality, distinct from an Immortality by Nature, and which is owing either to a new and extraordinary Act of God's Power or Providence, besides and beyond what was granted to it at it's Creation, and different from the general concurrence of Providence, or else to some supernatural Grace and Indulgence of an adscititious and extrinsecal spirit or principle of Immortality I affirm that there is not the least footstep to be seen, or remotest intimation given of any such thing throughout all *Tertullian's* numerous Writings. Whenever he speaks of the Soul's dependence upon God he means nothing more by it, as might evidently be shewn by a great variety of places, than that general dependence, which all Creatures must necessarily have upon their Creator, which, as I have often already observed, is not inconsistent with, nor does in the least prejudice, the Soul's natural Immortality. That the Soul is a Creature, created from and by the Will and Breath of God, tho' one would think it should not stand in need of Proof, is notwithstanding a point he frequently sets himself to make out, in opposition to those Heretics who affirm'd the Soul to be a part of the substance of God. These in consequence of this Opinion must have affirmed the same sort of Immortality to belong to the Soul, that is in God: which to ascribe to any Creature I suppose would be something bordering very close upon Blasphemy.

my. This sort of Immortality therefore he denies of the Soul, where reckoning up the two extreme Opinions concerning the Soul's Immortality, namely, that of such as did not believe the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and the other of such as believ'd it to be a part of God, he plainly rejects both, expressing himself after this manner. ^a *Alii immortalem negant Animam, alii plusquam immortalem adfirmant: Some, says he, deny the Soul to be Immortal, others affirm it to be more than Immortal:* meaning no doubt by this later clause the absurd opinion of those, who representing the Soul to be a part of God, must, as I said, affirm the same Immortality to belong to it which is in God: but God having his Being and Essence from himself alone, and the continuance of his duration to Eternity being founded upon and implying necessity of existence, the same Immortality that is in him cannot be granted to any Creature, however in it's own nature Immortal. And as for any *New Indulgence*, besides the general Concurrence of Providence, I cannot find that he ever ascribes the Immortality of the Soul to it: all which is to me a clear indication that *Tertullian's* Sentiment concerning the Soul's Eternal Duration was no other than this; that it's Immortality is to be entirely ascribed to it's own nature, but yet so as not to make it independent upon God, upon whose Will all Creatures, as such, from the most contemptible Worm, to the most glorious Angel, must depend for the continuance of their duration to any assignable time, or to eternity.

^a De Anim. cap. 3.

As profound a silence altogether do we every where find concerning the Souls Immortality being derived from any adscititious extrinsecal Spirit or Principle. It would but tire the Reader and too much swell the bulk of this Treatise, if I should lay before him all those places, which might be collected out of *Tertullian*, wherein he makes mention of the *Spirit*, in order to shew that this Father never so much as once ascribes the Immortality of the Soul to it. I shall therefore confine my self onely to some few, and think it sufficient to observe no more but this at present, that *Tertullian* with reference to the point before us, never uses the word *Spirit* to signify any thing else, but either the *Soul* it self or the Holy *Spirit* of God, the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. In the former of these senses he makes the word *Spirit* sometimes to stand for the *Soul*, understanding it to signify the same as *flatus*, and to be derived à *spirando* as *flatus* is from *flare*. Thus arguing against those Philosophers or Heretics, who affirmed the *Anima* (*Soul*) to be one thing, and the *Spiritus* (*Spirit*) another, the former being, in their opinion, that by which we live, the latter that by which we breath, he affirms: *That there are much more solid grounds to believe them to be one and the same, since they cannot be separated, and to affirm that the Soul of Man is nothing else but the Spirit of Man; since it proceeds from the same subject we breath, as it does that we live.* And a little further distinguishing the Spirit of Man from the Spi-

a Quanto nunc firmitus est, ut unum credas, cum distantiam non das, ut ipsa Anima sit Spiritus, dum ipsius est spirare, cujus & vivere, cap. 10.

rit of God, or the Spirit of the Devil, he goes on : *When, says he, we speak concerning the Soul and Spirit, we must affirm the Soul to be the Spirit, as the day is the light And indeed the nature of the question in hand obliges me to call the Soul a Spirit, because breathing is ascribed to another substance. Since therefore I affirm that this belongs to the Soul, which is simple and uniform, I must necessarily call the Soul in some sense a Spirit, not as the name of it's nature, but act, nor as expressing it's substance, but operation. And lastly, not to burthen the Reader with too many citations in so evident a point, in another place he plainly takes Soul and Spirit promiscuously for the same thing :^b Therefore, says he, the Immortality of the Soul will not suffer us to believe that there can be any diminution, deficiency, or Separation of the Spirit. If the Soul could be capable of decaying, it would be liable to perish.* In this sense therefore, and, if I mistake not, in this sense onely, it is that he calls the Soul a Spirit, not meaning, as I think is pretty apparent, any adscititious Spirit or Principle, but expressly distinguishing it from the Spirit of God or the Spirit of the Devil. In what sense he affirms the Spirit of God to be communicated to, and to be in, Man, and that he never mentions it, as giving any Immortality to the Soul, as by Immortality

^a Erunt enim & aliæ Spiritus Species, ut ex Deo, ut ex Diabolo. Ita cum & de anima & spiritu agitur, ipsa erit Anima Spiritus, sicut ipsa dies lux . . . Sed ut Animam Spiritum dicam, præsentis Quæstionis ratio compellit, quia spirare alii substantiæ adscribitur: hoc dum Animæ vindicamus, quam uniformem & simplicem agnoscimus, spiritum necesse est certa conditione dicamus; non status nomine, sed actus, non substantiæ titulo sed operæ, cap. 11. ^b Proinde diminutionem animalis spiritus, aut indigentiam spiritus, aut segregationem conlati spiritus, Immortalitas Animæ non finit credi. Perit Anima si minoratur, cap. 43.

is meant simply and precisely, an eternal duration onely, and not an eternity of happiness, is what I come now to shew.

And as to this, I think it most certain and beyond all doubt clearly evident, that *Tertullian* never mentions the Communications of this Blessed Spirit to Man in any other way or sense, than either in the extraordinary Gifts and Illapses of it, improving and advancing the Powers and Faculties of Men, above their natural Pitch after a manner wholly supernatural and miraculous, or in its ordinary Graces and Vouchsafements to help our Infirmities and assist our endeavours in a course of Virtue and Piety, by which our corruptions are subdued and our natures renewed and sanctified. In the former of these senses he very frequently mentions the Holy Ghost, as sent upon the Apostles, and first Professors of Christianity to teach, instruct, and guide them in the Truths of the Christian Faith, as well as to give them extraordinary abilities and assistances to plant and propagate them in the World. I think I need not cite any great number of passages to make good so obvious a Truth, and therefore shall trouble you with such onely, as without any anxious search, most easily occur to my Memory. Thus, in his Prescriptions, speaking concerning the Preference, in point of time, which was given to the Jews above the Gentiles, as to having the Gospell preached to them, he says: *That it was towards the End of his Ministry, that Christ commanded his Disciples to go teach all nations, they being*

a Siquidem in fine præcepit, ut vaderent ad docendas & tinguendas nationes; consecuturi mox Spiritum Sanctum Paracletum, qui illos deducturus esset in omnem veritatem. De Præscrip. Hæret. cap. 8.

T

after

afterwards to receive the Holy Spirit the Comforter, which was to guide them into all Truth. And again in that Rule of Faith, and System of a Christian's Profession which in this same Treatise he gives us, he tells us: ^a *That Christ being taken up into Heaven, sent the Vicarious Power of the Holy Spirit, which should govern and direct the faithful.* It is doubtless no other Spirit, nor other Operations of this Spirit he here means, than those he must be understood of when, in the latter end of his Treatise against *Praxeas*, he tells us: ^b *That Christ poured out upon Men those Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which he had received from the Father, namely of that Holy Spirit, who is the third Person in the Blessed Trinity, and has the third degree of Majesty, who is the Preacher of the Unity of the Divine Nature, and the Interpreter of the Divine Oeconomy, to all such as believe the word of his new Doctrine, and receive him as a guide to all that Truth, which, according to the Christian Religion, is fully comprehended in the belief of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.* He mentions no other end but this, and those other I have mention'd, of the Holy Spirit's being given to Men: ^c *For this End, says he, Christ prayed the Father for the Comforter, and sent him into the World, that he might be a Teacher of Truth.* We find not here, or indeed

a Regula est fidei, illa scilicet qua creditur: Unum omnino Deum esse, &c. Christum in cælos ereptum sedisse ad dexteram patris misisse vicariam vim Spiritus Sancti qui credentes agat cap. 13. b Hic interim acceptum à Patre munus effudit Spiritum Sanctum, tertium nomen divinitatis, & tertium gradum Majestatis, unius prædicatorem Monarchiæ, sed & Oeconomyæ interpretatorem, siquis sermones novæ prophetiæ ejus admiserit, & deductorem omnis veritatis, qua est in Patre & Filio, & Spiritu Sancto, secundum Christianum Sacramentum. Advers. *Praxeam* cap. 30. c Spiritus Sanctus — ad hoc missus à Christo, ad hoc postulatus de patre, ut esset doctor veritatis. De Præscript. cap. 28.

any where else, throughout all the Writings of this Father, any mention made, or the least intimation given, of any adscititious human Spirit distinct from the Holy Spirit of God, or that it is any part of the Office of this Holy Spirit by an union with the human Soul to make it exist to eternity. In that other sense onely, of the ordinary communications of the influences and graces of this same Holy Spirit, are an innumerable company of passages to be understood, wherein mention is made of the Spirit. It is not I suppose needfull to represent them all, and therefore I shall onely cite one or two. Thus where he explains how *St. John Baptist* might be said to come in the Spirit and Power of *Elias* he says: *He did not come in the Person with the Soul and Body of Elias. For these make up the substance or Person of every particular Man. But Spirit and Power are extrinsically bestowed by and thro' the Grace of God, and so may be transferr'd from one to another, as Moses's Spirit descended upon the Prophets that succeeded him.* We see here he reckons up all the parts, which properly belong to, and are in Man; but makes not the least mention of your adscititious immortalizing Principle. He also affirms no other Spirit to be possible to be in Man, besides the Holy Spirit of God, nor any other gifts and graces of the Spirit, besides those extraordinary ones, which made the Prophet an inspired Man, or those ordinary ones, which made him a Holy Man, which likewise

a Et ipse, inquit, præcedet coram Populo in Virtute & Spiritu Heliae³ non in Anima ejus nec in carne. Hæ enim substantiæ sui cujusque sunt hominis. Spiritus vero & Virtus extrinsecus conferuntur ex Dei Gratia, ita & transferre in alterum possunt ex Dei voluntate, ut factum est retro de Moïse Spiritu. cap. 35.

he represents as capable of being taken from one Man, and given to another, and of being transferred down from one to another, which tho' perfectly consistent with the Spirit of God, and the Communication of it's Graces in the manner and sense I have explained, yet is most plainly incompatible with the Nature, and contrary to the Operations of your Immortalizing Principle. Again speaking concerning the Holy Spirit of God, which is communicated by Baptism to the Souls of Men, and the Blessed effects of it, he makes not the least mention of it's being an Immortalizing Principle, which, if he had thought of any such thing, he would not surely have failed to do, when the nature of the subject he was treating of required it, but onely that it takes away our Original Corruption, and helps us to overcome and forsake our actual sins: ^a *Therefore, says he, when the Soul comes to the Faith reformed by it's second Birth of Water and a Power from on high, that is to say, the Holy Ghost, the vail of it's former Corruption and Darkness being removed, it beholds it self in clear light. For the Holy Spirit seizes upon the Soul by this new birth, as by it's former birth it was seized upon by a profane Spirit. The Body follows the Soul thus as it were married to the Spirit, as a part of it's dowry, and is no longer a servant to the Soul, but to the Spirit. By the Body following the Soul, as a dotale mancipium, a slave given as a*

a Proinde cum ad fidem pervenit reformatæ per secundam nativitatem, ex aqua & superna virtute, detracto corruptionis pristinae aulæ, totam lucem suam conspicit. Excipitur etiam à Spiritu Sancto, sicut in pristina nativitate à Spiritu profano. Sequitur animam nubentem Spiritui Caro, ut dotale mancipium, & jam non Animæ famula sed Spiritus. cap. 41.

part of the Dowry, nothing else doubtless is intended to be meant but it's perfect and intire Obedience to the Holy Motions, Suggestions, and Impulses of the Blessed Spirit helping us forward and encouraging us in a Course of Piety and Virtue, of Holyness and Purity. A restitution lastly of the Image and Resemblance of God in Man, which has been most commonly thought to consist in nothing else but that Rectitude and Perfection of his Nature, which he lost by the fall is also by this Father in some places ascribed to the Operations of that Holy Spirit we receive in Baptism. And tho, I am well aware, that in one place of his Treatise concerning Baptism he may seem to contradict this Assertion, and to make the resemblance of God in Man to consist in an Eternity of Existence, yet even this when duely weighed, and consider'd will be found to make nothing for your Purpose. His words are: *Thus Man is restored to the resemblance of God, who was before framed after his Image. The Image consisting in the form, but the resemblance in Eternity. For he receives that Spirit of God, which at his Creation he received with the Breath of Life, but afterwards lost by his Fall.* There is no one I believe that considers these Words with Attention but must be sensible, that the Eternity, in which *Tertullian* in this place tells us, the Resemblance of God in man consisted, is not that of the Soul, but of the Man. For is not whatever he here speaks affirmed concerning the Man? Is it not the

a Ita restituitur homo Deo ad similitudinem ejus, qui retro ad imaginem Dei fuerat. Imago in effigie, similitudo in Aeternitate censetur. Recipit enim illum Dei Spiritum, quem tunc de adflatu ejus acceperat, sed post amiserat per delictum. De Baptismo cap. 5.

Man who by receiving the Holy Spirit of God at his Baptism is restored to that Eternity, which, as Man, he lost by his Fall, in as much as by it he was made obnoxious to Death, as that consists in a separation of Soul and Body, and a Dissolution of the Body, which if he had not fallen he had never been liable to? There is therefore no reason to interpret the Eternity here, which Man in *Tertullian's* Opinion receives by the Spirit, of the Soul, but of the *Man*, who alone strictly and precisely consider'd can be said to have lost that Spirit by the Fall, which he receives again by Baptism. In a word, and not to insist very long upon so manifest a point, altho' negative forms of speech are somewhat dangerous, especially when one so perfectly well acquainted with the Writings of the Fathers as you are known to be is to have the examining of them, yet I dare venture to affirm that there cannot one place be found, either in this his Treatise of Baptism, where, if he had any such notion, it might be expected he should have mention'd it, or in any of his other writings, wherein he ever ascribes the Immortality of the Soul to the Holy Spirit of God, or to any other Spirit or Principle whatsoever, besides its own nature and constitution upheld by the general support of God's Providence: which is a further evidence, and amounts to a certain conviction, that he believed it to be in it's own nature Immortal.

As to the Resurrection of our Bodies, and their Union with our Souls, together with that Blissfull state of the most pure and uninterrupted felicity, which the good will enjoy hereafter, and which is sometimes signified by Eternal Life, there

is no doubt to be made but both the one and the other may very properly be ascribed to the Holy Spirit of God, the third Person in the ever Blessed Trinity. And tho' I think it needless to trouble you with any of those passages, wherein *Tertullian* attributes both of them to the Holy Spirit, yet it may not be improper to observe, with reference to the former of these, that the Scriptures themselves as well as the constant Faith of the Church in all Ages has been a very sufficient Foundation for *Tertullian*, and the rest of the Fathers to build this Opinion upon. As to the Scriptures I have already observed that they ascribe the work of the Resurrection to all the three Persons of the ever Blessed Trinity. For this being a thing, which nothing less than an Omnipotent Power can perform, and since every one of the Blessed Three is truly and properly God, it is not to be wonder'd at, that the Scripture ascribes to each of these this most astonishing and miraculous Performance of infinite Wisdom and infinite Power. I have already cited some places out of the New Testament wherein the raising and changing our mortal Bodies is attributed to the *Spirit*. And there are many other places in the Old Testament, which pious Antiquity has always understood in this sense, and cited to this purpose. As *Psal. CIV. 30. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created, and thou renewest the face of the Earth.* And again, *Ezech. XXXVII. 14. And shall put my Spirit in you and ye shall live, &c.* with many others to the same purpose. And according to this notion, in the *Nicene*, or rather *Constantinopolitan* Creed, we profess to believe in the *Holy Ghost, the Lord, and Giver of Life*, who in this respect also

is the most proper object of our Faith, as he will raise and restore our Dead Dissolved Bodies, and reunite them more Beautifull, Glorious and Spiritual to our Souls at the last Day. But this can never have the least reference to the Soul, which as it is not subject to Death, by any way or means that we know of, so neither can it be the proper object of a Resurrection. And accordingly we find neither ^a *Tertullian*, nor any of the Fathers, excepting onely *Tatian*, if he may be called a Father, ever representing the Soul to be in the least concerned in that which is properly called the Resurrection. It is the Body onely to which they apply this very wonderfull *Catastrophe*, and make the Resurrection to consist in a Restitution of *that* alone, and it's being reunited to the Soul, which they never so much as intimate to be liable to Death and Dissolution.

Having thus, as I think, fully, and with as much

a *Tertullian*, in that most excellent Treatise de Resurrectione Carnis, confines himself intirely to the Body, as the onely Subject of the Resurrection. And accordingly we find him still endeavouring by a great variety of Arguments, to confirm and establish this point alone both against the absurd Opinions of the Heretics, and the subtil reasonings of the Philosophers. And accordingly 'tis the Resurrection of the Flesh or Body, which in the first Chapter he shews was not wholly unknown to the World, even before the coming of Christ, especially to the Platonists and Pythagoreans, It is concerning the same Flesh or Body onely that he speaks, when answering the Objection against the Resurrection of our Bodies, that they are so mean and despicable, as not to be worthy to be raised, he shews that they were made by God, and are the workmanship of his hands, that they were the subject of Baptism, that they are fed with the Body and Blood of Christ, that they are worthy to dye for the Name of Christ, that Christ took our Flesh upon him &c. In all which places, and indeed throughout this whole Treatise, as well as in all his other Writings he speaks of the Flesh and Body onely as the subject of the Resurrection. And therefore however the Spirit may be said to be the efficient Cause of the Resurrection, and to give Life and Immortality to our Bodies, yet from thence to infer that our Souls likewise have their Immortality from this same Spirit is so weak and Sophistical a Conclusion, that I cannot doubt but the Learned and Humble Mr. Dodwell will himself, upon more mature deliberation, retract and condemn it.

Brevity

Brevity, as the matter would permit, represented the true sense and Opinion of *Tertullian* concerning the Origin, Nature and Immortality of the Soul, I shall now consider and examine those citations and arguments you have drawn from him. How far that is true, which you say, that *Tertullian* was of the same Opinion with the Fathers of the Church, who lived before him is I suppose too evident to need to be any longer insisted upon. You further say, That *Tertullian* indeed owns the actual Immortality of the Soul, as the rest, excepting only *Tatian*, did. To this I have just now return'd an Answer, and shewn in what sense *Tertullian* owned an Actual Immortality, namely, no otherwise than as that is implied and comprehended in a natural Immortality. But if by an *actual Immortality* you mean, as I think you must mean, if you would make this notion subservient to your Hypothesis of the Souls *natural Mortality*, an Immortality quite different from one which arises from the nature of the Soul, supported and upheld by the general Concurrence of God's Providence, I must make so free with you as to affirm that this with reference both to *Tertullian*, and all the other Fathers of the Church, is indeed nothing but a mere groundless conjecture, which as by what has been already said in great measure appears, has neither Reason nor the Authority of Antiquity to support it. For if the *actual Immortality* of the Soul does not flow from it's own natural Constitution, it must proceed from something else which is extrinsic to it's nature. And this must be either some special Grace and Favour of God, besides and beyond the ordinary interposition of his Providence, or else some Spirit or Power

pre-

preternaturally and extraordinarily communicated and united to it, by virtue of which it becomes Immortal. But we find not the least mention any where in all *Tertullian's* Writings, nor indeed do you pretend there is any mention, of any such extraordinary interposition of God's Power, or communication of his Spirit, or any other Spirit, or Principle whatsoever for this purpose of Immortalizing the Soul. As to what you alledge §. 16. which may seem to make for this your Opinion, it shall be fully consider'd and answer'd when I come to it.

You add, *That Tertullian owns the actual Immortality of the Souls of all those who were, on that account, obliged to come over as Profelytes upon the publication of the Gospel.* Your sense here is to me somewhat perplext, or at least however plain and clear in it self, surrounded, as it often happens in other places, with so much obscurity darkness and ambiguity of Expression, that it is no easy matter to penetrate and fully understand it. You seem here to affirm, and I think your Words in their natural Construction will hardly admit of another Interpretation, that this *actual Immortality* of the Souls of Men, you here speak of, is antecedent to their hearing the Gospel published to them. For you say, that *Tertullian owns the actual Immortality of the Souls of all those, who were on that account,* that is to say, on account of this actual Immortality, *obliged to come over as Profelytes upon the publication, of the Gospel.* But this seems to me directly contrary to your whole *Hypothesis*, which supposes the Souls of such as hear the Gospel to be then actually Immortalized, when the Gospel is duely proposed to them, if to punishment by the extraordinary interposition of God's Pleasure

sure, but if to reward by the Baptifmal Spirit. But I fhall not take advantage of this unhappy inconfiftency, and therefore whatever way you have taken to exprefs your felf by, will fuppose you to mean thefe words in a fenfe confiftent with your *Hypothesis*, and then they muft amount to thus much : *That Tertullian owns the naturally mortal Souls of all fuch, as are obliged to come over as Profelytes upon the Publication of the Goffel, to be made actually Immortal.* One would be apt to think, by this fo positive an Affertion, from one who is fo perfectly well acquainted with all the Writings of the Fathers, that *Tertullian* had at leaft fomewhere or other made a diftinction between a natural and actual Immortality, if not exprefsly affirmed the latter to belong to thofe Souls, who by hearing the Goffel duely propofed, and efficaciously promulged, were thereby obliged to believe and embrace it. But as you have referred to no place where *Tertullian* makes any fuch diftinction, or affirms any fuch thing, fo to my great furprize after the utmoft recollection, and moft diligent fearch I have not been able to find any fuch paffage, and am verily perfwaded there is nothing in all his Writings that has the leaft Tendency to this Opinion. And fince I have already fhewn that *Tertullian* exprefsly afferts the Natural Immortality of the Soul, I muft therefore conclude that he no otherwife held the actual Immortality of the Soul, than as that is implied, and fupposed in it's natural Immortality, which, as fuch, muft belong to all human Souls, and therefore could not be thought by *Tertullian* to be more efpecially given, to the Souls of fuch as were obliged to come over as Profelytes upon the Publication of the Goffel.

You

You go on and say, That *Tertullian* had confuted the Opinion of *Hermogenes* in a Book now lost, who took the Soul to be framed *è suggestu materiæ*. ^a As to this Book against *Hermogenes*, which *Tertullian* himself several times mentions in his Treatise concerning the Soul, and tells us it was entituled *de Censu Animæ*, concerning the Origin of the Soul, it is plain indeed that the main design of it was to confute the Opinion of *Hermogenes* whereby he affirmed the Soul not to proceed from the Breath of God, but to be made out of some preexistent matter, as some Philosophers affirmed concerning the World, that it was not made out of nothing, but out of some subject matter, which was coexistent and coeternal together with the Deity. This Opinion he no doubt solidly overturn'd, and substituted in the Room of it his own concerning the Origin of the Soul from the Breath of God. But how can this be in the least to your purpose. And how does this help to prove that the Soul is either naturally Mortal, or actually Immortal, in your sense of actual Immortality, and as distinguished from a natural Immortality? But you proceed and say: *That the Cartesians may take this for an Argument of the Soul's Natural Immortality.* But, as you urge, *they can never prove, that nothing but modifications of*

^a It is a very odd Opinion which we are told in the *Historia Literaria* in *Tertulliano*, the Reverend Dr. Alix has entertained concerning this Treatise against *Hermogenes*, that it was nothing, but *Tertullian's* Book concerning the Soul: Whereas in the very beginning of his Book *de Anima*, he as plainly as words can express distinguishes his Book against *Hermogenes* from his Treatise concerning the Soul. *De solo censu Animæ congressus Hermogeni, quatenus & istum ex materiæ potius suggestu, quam ex Dei flatu constituisse præsumpsit, nunc ad reliquas converlus quæstiones &c. De Anima cap. 1.* And some other places likewise put it beyond all doubt that these two were distinct Treatises.

Matter can depend on Matter, as to their Being and preservation. The reasoning, you say, is far from self evident, nor was it ever, that you know of, granted by any before Des Cartes. Whether any Cartesians have made use of this Argument from the Souls not being made *è suggestu Materie* for it's natural Immortality, I know not, but yet I think it may very fitly and properly be used: since it very strongly proves and justly infers the Souls Immateriality, and consequently Immortality. For if the Soul be not made of matter or body, it must be Incorporeal and a pure Spirit; and therefore cannot be affected^a with any Bodily Impressions, so far as to destroy it's nature, and put an end to it's existence. For tho' the Soul may seem to be sometimes affected and disorder'd by the indispositions and decays of the Body, yet this can never proceed from it's natural Constitution, but onely from it's being in a state of union with the Body, by virtue of which it must make use of some parts of the Body in all it's motions and operations; and this is the true reason that when these happen to be disordered, and if I may so speak, to be but of *tune*, it cannot act with that freedom force and vigour, as when they are rightly disposed, and in a proper frame and temper; altho' it be still in it self the same, and by it's own nature intirely independent upon Matter. The skill of an Artificer, much less his nature and existence

a *Tangere enim & tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res.* This Maxim tho' made use of by Lucretius to a very ill purpose, is yet in it self most certainly true. For tho' Spirits may have a way proper and peculiar to themselves of acting upon Bodies, and being acted upon by them, yet it cannot be by contact and impulse, which their natures that are free from all manner of extension will not admit of. And this is one reason why they cannot receive any alteration in their nature and essence from any influence or agency of corporeal things.

cannot

cannot with any reason be therefore said to depend upon the Tools and Instruments he makes use of in his Work, because when they are not rightly disposed, he cannot perform his Work with so much freedom, as when they are. In like manner tho' the Soul may be very much weaken'd and disabled in it's Operations and Actions by the indisposition of the Body, yet it does by no means from thence follow, with any force of reason, that it depends upon the Body in it's nature and essence. As to what you say, that the *Cartesians* can never prove that nothing but modifications of matter depend upon matter, as to their Being and Preservation, I think this to be so self-evident, whatever you are pleased to say to the Contrary, that no body yet ever doubted of it. Nor is it the Position of the *Cartesians* alone, but all the Philosophers that ever were, have constantly asserted it. It is the known Doctrine of *Aristotle*, that Substances exist of themselves, without depending upon any thing but the first Cause for the support of their Beings, and that all Accidents or Modifications of Substances whatsoever depend intirely upon their proper and immediate subjects, without the support of which, or separated from them, they cannot exist. This Assertion therefore that onely Accidents or Modifications of Substances, and not Substances themselves whether Corporeal or Incorporeal, depend upon their proper subjects is a position, which is common to *Des Cartes* and his Followers, with all the Philosophers and Men of sense, that ever were in the World, and withall is so infallibly true, and clearly self evident, that I dare be confident it is impossible for you, or any Man else to produce

5

any

any one Argument or Authority to the contrary. So that if the human Soul be a substance as *Tertulian* every where supposes, and not meerly the harmony Concent or Modification of our Bodies, ^a as some of the old Philosophers affirmed, it can never depend upon any thing, after the same manner as Accidents or Modifications of Substances depend upon their proper subjects. I cannot think you can mean any other sort of dependence, because you expressly speak of that dependence onely, which the Modifications of Matter have upon Matter, and because all that the *Cartesians*, or any other Philosophers have ever asserted concerning this point is, that nothing but Accidents or Modifications of Matter have the same dependence of inherence upon Matter, as they have; which, as I think, never any one yet has denied, so I sup-

^a Some such as these Tully mentions in the first Book of his Tusculan Questions: Aristoxenus Mulicus, idemque Philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam velut in cantu & fidibus, quæ Harmonia dicitur. Sic ex corporis totius natura, & figura varios motus cieri, tanquam in cantu sonos *This Opinion* Lucretius ascribes to many Philosophers.

Quamvis multa quidem sapientum turba putarunt

Sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum.

Verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse

Harmoniam Graii quam dicunt, quod faciat nos

Vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte fiet mens:

Ut bona sæpe valitudo, cum dicitur esse

Corporis & non est tamen pars hæc ulla valentis

Sic animi sensum non certa parte reponunt. lib. III. v. 99

Tully likewise tells us that Dicæarchus mentions one Pherecrates to have been of the same Opinion. Dicæarchus — Pherecratem quendam Phthioram senem differentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum, & hoc esse nomen totum inane, frustra que animalia & animantes appellare: neque in homine inesse animum vel animam, nec in bestia: vixque omnem eam qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis æquabiliter esse fufam, nec separabilem à corpore esse, quippe quæ nulla sit, nec sit quidquam nisi corpus unum, & simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturæ vigeat & sentiat. Tusculan. Quæst. 1.

pose neither will you upon second thoughts continue and persist in the denial of.

But you proceed and say, *That Tertullian had such Opinions concerning the Soul as are inconsistent with it's independence upon purer Matter, tho' it might survive the grosser organical Body of our visible humanity.* And this you endeavour to prove and make good by alledging several notions of *Tertullian* concerning both the Origin and Nature of the Soul. As that it is, according to him, derived *ex traduce*, and begotten by the Soul of the Parent after the same manner as the Body is; that all Souls were derived from that one Soul of *Adam*, which God gave him, when he breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life; that the Soul is produced *ex Animæ semine*, and by him said to be *in utero seminata pariter cum Carne*: That he owns the Soul to be corporeal, or to have a Body. From all which you conclude: *That such a Soul as this is, tho' it might survive the Gross Organical Body, yet even Cartesians themselves could not believe independant on matter, in it's own nature. If therefore it be preserved from actual Mortality, it must be by the like interposition of an extraordinary Providence, as that by which our Bodies themselves are to be Immortalized after the Resurrection.* The passages you have alledged out of *Tertullian*, upon which you have founded these Assertions may be seen above, and therefore I think it needless to cite them again, as I am sure it would be improper to put them into English, least I should thereby offend Modest Ears. As to your first Assertion, that *Tertullian* had such Opinions &c. I am I must confess a little at a loss what to answer to it, because I cannot certainly tell what you can mean by it. If you here understand by your saying *Tertullian* held

held opinions concerning the Soul that are inconsistent with it's independance upon purer matter, that he thought it to depend upon this your purer matter, after the same manner as Accidents or Modifications of matter do depend upon their proper Subjects, I must affirm, that *Tertullian* neither supposes nor affirms any such thing, nor can it fairly be deduced from any of his Notions that you have mention'd, (as will presently more plainly appear) or that I can any where find in all his writings concerning the Soul. And indeed it is in it self impossible that it should. For since the Soul is acknowledged by almost every body, and especially by *Tertullian* to be a Substance, and not a mere modification of the Body, it must imply a Contradiction to say, that it depends upon matter after the same manner as Accidents do upon their Substances. Or if by the Soul's depending upon purer matter you may perhaps understand, that it requires some corporeal Vehicle, which it must inform after it's separation from the body, as it did the body here, in order to it's being and preservation, this I affirm to be a thing which we not onely can have no certain knowledge of, but which also seems inconsistent with the nature of the Soul, whether it be corporeal or incorporeal. For if the Soul be a substance of it self, it must certainly not require the assistance of any thing besides God to support it's being. But if indeed it be nothing but the Modification of a substance, if it be onely the particular frame, disposition and texture of the Visible body, or any other purer body, it must dissolve and perish with that body. But this not having been *Tertullian's* notion concerning the Soul,

we cannot be perswaded that he ever believed it could depend upon matter after this manner. But if, as I rather think, by the dependence of the Soul upon purer matter you mean that it consists of matter, or that it is of a purely corporeal nature, it must indeed be owned that *Tertullian* not only held opinions which suppose this, but also himself positively asserted it, as I have before sufficiently shewn. For, not to mention that he seems to suppose, that very breath of God, which constituted the Soul of *Adam*, and from which the Souls of all his Posterity are derived, to be corporeal, his very deriving the Soul *ex traduce* is an undeniable Argument, that he held it to be a body. For does not this plainly suppose it to be both extended, and divisible or discernible, which are the essential Properties, and most sure indications of body? But yet I cannot see that it will from hence follow that he thought it to be in it self and of its own nature mortal. For tho', according to the reasonings and late discoveries of our modern Philosophy, which may possibly be very well grounded, whatever is extended must consist of parts, and whatever has parts may be capable of being divided into those parts, and consequently is capable of being corrupted or dissolved, yet I cannot find, as I have before observed, that *Tertullian* was well apprized of this way of Reasoning, and therefore might notwithstanding, as I have shewn he certainly did, believe the Soul to be in its own nature Immortal. And this seems to be yet more plainly evident, in as much as we find him frequently affirming the Soul to be naturally immortal at the same time that he is asserting and proving

proving it to be deriv'd *ex traduce*. ^a Thus, as I have before observed, in the definition he gives us of the Soul, immediately after having declared it's Origin from the Breath of God, he adds that it is immortal, placing Immortality not onely among, but setting it before all those other attributes and properties, which are most essential to, and inseparable from it's nature. ^b And again referring to, and even citing, the very words of *Plato*, in that remarkable passage of his *Timæus*, I have before consider'd, where he affirms the Soul to be created by the supreme God, he never censures or blames him for making it in it's own nature immortal, but onely for asserting the Soul to come immediately from God, and not to be derived, *ex traduce*, from the Parent. ^c And lastly, arguing against that extravagant opinion, which he fixes upon *Plato*, of the

^a Definimus Animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem &c. *cap. 22.* ^b Item in *Timæo*, quod genimina Dei, delegata sibi mortalium genitura, accepto initio Animæ Immortali, mortale ei circumgelaverint Corpus. Tum quod mundus hic imago sit alterius alicujus. Quæ omnia ut fidei commendet, & animam retro in superioribus cum Deo egisse in commercio Idearum, & inde huc transvenire, &c. *We see here not the least censure intimated for his making the Soul in it's own nature immortal: nor does he any where else where he argues against Plato's other opinions ever condemn or censure him for this: which is a certain sign that in this he was of the same Opinion with Plato, and notwithstanding he affirm'd the Soul to be derived ex traduce, believed it in it's own nature Immortal.* ^c Nos autem qui nihil Deo appendimus, hoc ipso animam longe infra Deum expendimus, quod natam eam agnoscimus, ac per hoc dilutioris divinitatis, & exilioris felicitatis, ut statum, non ut Spiritum, & si immortalem, ut hoc sit divinitatis, tamen passibilem, ut hoc sit nativitas. *As to what Tertullian means here by dilutior divinitas, & exilior felicitas, I shall have occasion presently to give a more full and particular account of it. In the mean time I think it necessary onely to observe in general, what I have already mention'd, that as the Creatures have no perfection in the same way and degree that God has, so neither have any of them Immortality. If it be asked what it is that puts a difference betwixt the Immortality that is in God, and that which is in some of the Creatures. I answer, necessity of existence, and independence, which God has, but the Creatures have not.*

Soul's being equal to God, although he makes the Soul to be far inferior to God upon the score of it's being born, yet he affirms that it's being immortal proceeds from it's having something divine in it's nature, as it's being *passible* flowes from it's being born. From these passages I think it abundantly to appear, that what notion soever *Tertullian* might have of deriving the Soul *ex traduce* from the Parent, yet he never thought that this made it so dependent upon matter, as that it must therefore be in it's own nature mortal, and capable of corruption and dissolution. And as to that *Passibility*, which he here says belongs to the Soul, as derived and born from the Parent, the following words shew plainly enough, that he was very far from meaning by it any thing of a natural Mortality. He says onely that it is therefore *à primordio exorbitationis capax, & inde etiam oblivionis affinis*, which plainly denotes nothing but a failure in it's moral and intellectual Perfections, and not any defect in it's nature and essence, much less a possibility of dying and wholly ceasing to be.

As to that which *Tertullian* says, that the Soul is begotten by the Soul of the Parent, after the same manner as the Body is, and that it is produced *ex Anima semine*, we must certainly understand it with some restrictions and limitations, if we will onely allow him to speak consistently with himself, and understand him so, as to reconcile this with his declared and avowed Opinions concerning the Soul. It is evident that the chief design of *Tertullian* in those Chapters where he makes these Assertions was to confute the Opinion of the Stoicks and Platonists, and some of the Heretics, and others,

thers, who not onely derived the Soul immediately from Heaven, but also would have it to be a part of the Substance of God himself. In opposition to these, as I have before observed, and to obviate this Error, which seems to border very near upon Blasphemy, *Tertullian* affirmed the Soul, tho' remotely it came from God, yet to be immediately derived *ex traduce* from the Parent, and to be form'd and fashioned in the Womb with the Body. ^a And this last he affirmed more especially to obviate the Opinion of those, who said the Soul was then infused into the Body, when the Infant was perfectly form'd, and born into the World. More fully to confute which groundless opinion, ^b he mentions

^a Nulla interest professoribus veritatis de adversariis ejus, maxime tam audacibus quam sunt primo isti qui præsumunt non in utero concipi Animam, nec cum carnis figuratione compingi atque produci; sed effuso jam partu, nondum vivo infanti extrinsecus imprimi. Cæterum semen ex concubitu muliebribus locis sequestratum, motuque naturali vegetatum compinguescere in solam substantiam carnis: eam editam, & de uteri fornace fumantem, & calore solutam, ut ferrum ignitum, & ibidem frigidæ immersum, ita aeris rigore percussam, & vim animale[m] rapere, & vocalem sonum reddere. Hoc Stoici cum *Ænesidemo*, & ipse interdum *Plato*, quum dicit: Perinde Animam extraneam alias, & extorem uteri, prima adspiratione nascentis infantis adduci, sicut expiratione novissima educi. *De Anima*, cap. 25. ^b Exultat *Elizabeth*, *Joannes* intus impulerat: glorificat Dominum Maria, Christus intus instruxerat. Agnoscunt matres suos invicem foetus, agnitæ mutuo ab ipsis utique viventibus, qui non tantum animæ verum & Spiritus. *By the Spirit here is meant nothing but the communications of that Blessed Spirit of God, which sanctified these infants from their Mothers Womb. But he proceeds.* Quomodo igitur Animal conceptum? Simulne conflata utriusque substantia Corporis Animæque? an altera eam præcedente? Immo simul ambas, & concipi, & confici, & perfici dicimus, sicut & promi, nec ullum intervenire momentum in conceptu, quo locus ordinetur. Recogita enim de novissimis prima. Si mors non aliud determinatur, quam disjunctio corporis animæque, contrarium morti vita non aliud definietur, quam conjunctio corporis animæque. Si disjunctio simul utrique substantiæ accidit per mortem, hoc debet conjunctio[n]is forma mandasse pariter obvenientis per vitam utrique substantiæ. Porro vitam à conceptu agnoscimus, quia animam à conceptu vindicamus. Ex-

the Babe leaping in *Elizabeth's* Womb for joy, when the Mother of Christ came to salute her, which plainly proved it was then animated with a human Soul, and proceeds to give an Account, when the union of the Soul with the Body must be supposed to commence. And this he derives from the very moment of Conception, telling us that both Soul and Body are conceived, formed, perfected, and brought into the World together, and that as Death is nothing but the Separation, so neither is Life any thing but the Conjunction of Soul and Body. So that to me he seems by this account to make a difference however between the formation of the Soul and Body, and any one, that more fully considers, and maturely weighs this place, would I believe be apt to conclude, that nothing more is meant here by the formation of the Soul in the Womb, than that it is there more nicely fitted and adapted, as it were, to it's Tenement of Clay, the Body. But as to it's Being, Nature, and Essence we cannot suppose *Tertullian* could imagin it received them from the Parent; since his opinion of deriving all Souls from that one of *Adam*, must suppose all Souls to have been created with, and to have been contained in that one Soul of *Adam*, if not formally, yet at least virtually and eminently. From hence therefore, I think, we may fairly infer thus much, that *Tertullian* thought all human Souls to have been created by God, and that by their being formed in the Womb with the Body he can hardly be supposed to mean any thing more, than

inde enim vita, quo Anima. Pariter ergo in vitam compinguntur, quæ pariter in mortem separantur. *De Anima cap. 27.*

that

that they are then taking possession of, and as it were settling themselves in these their earthly Tabernacles. But be this as it will, yet I think it most certain and undeniable, that no inference can be from hence made, that *Tertullian* ever thought the Soul to be of it's own nature mortal, not onely because 'tis plain, he held it to be in it's own nature immortal, but also in as much as this very opinion do's not by any means imply the Soul to be so begotten by and formed in the Parent, but that it still allows God to be the Author of it, when he first created it in, and as it were with the Soul of the first Man.

Your next Argument to prove that *Tertullian* could not think the Soul so wholly independent upon matter in it's own nature, as to preserve it self from *Actual Mortality* by virtue of that, without any extraordinary interposition of God's Power and Providence, is taken from his notion of the Nature of the Soul, which this Father affirm'd as we have already seen to be perfectly corporeal. How far the Soul's being of a Corporeal Nature (which however no one that considers it's Powers and Faculties can think it is) does necessarily prove and infer it to be in it self Mortal, Corruptible, and Dissolveable, and whether it be impossible for God himself at first to frame and put together such a Mass and Systeme of matter, as may be in it self undissolveable, and continue for ever in one state, as to it's particular and specific nature and essence, provided onely the general and ordinary concurrence of God's Providence be afforded it, without any new and extraordinary interposition of his Power, are I think rather nice and curious, than necessary

or useful Questions, and such as in the present case I can by no means think it needful to insist upon. For since the debate, which is now between us, is not concerning what things are in themselves, but what the Father we have before us thought them to be, it will be sufficient for me to shew, that tho' *Tertullian* affirmed the Soul to be corporeal, yet he believ'd it, at the same time, to be in it's own nature Immortal: and therefore how just a consequence soever it may be in it self from the Corporeity of the Soul to infer it's natural Mortality, yet most plain and evident it is that *Tertullian* did not allow it to be such. Now to make out this, nothing more, one would think, should be needful than what I have before sufficiently shewn, namely, that this *Father* so often affirms the Soul to be in it's own nature immortal; that Immortality belongs as much to it's Essence, as thought, reason, and liberty of choice: all which, I think, amounts to little less than a Demonstration, that he was of opinion that the Corporeity of the Soul might easily consist with it's natural Immortality. But further to shew that *Tertullian* might think the Soul to be in it self Immortal, notwithstanding it was corporeal, it ought to be consider'd that he thought God himself to be corporeal, whom notwithstanding he and all the World owns to be most strictly in his own nature Immortal. If therefore he had imagin'd that Corporeity was inconsistent with Immortality, he would certainly never have ascrib'd that to God, which he thought plainly inconsistent with the most obvious and universally acknowledged attribute of the Divine Nature. Nor can it be said that he asserts the Soul to be corporeal

real after a different manner, and in a different sense from that, wherein he affirms God to be Corporeal: since the Notion of Body abstractedly consider'd, as an extended, solid, or impenetrable substance, in which sense onely we argue it to be discernible, and therefore corruptible agrees to all Bodies in general, and whatever other difference there may be between the several *Species* and *Textures* of them, yet in this they all agree. Besides I cannot, I must confess, find, that *Tertullian* distinguishes the Corporeity of God from the Corporeity of the Soul, but onely from that of the Human Body, as appears undeniably clear, as well from that passage I have above cited out of his Book against *Marcion*, as from several other places of his Treatise concerning the Soul, which I think it needless to trouble you withall. But to put it beyond all doubt that this *Father* did not allow any consequence to be drawn from the Corporeal Nature to the Natural Mortality of the Soul, we find him in some places expressly and formally obviating, Disowning, and Arguing against this Inference. Thus after he had asserted the Corporeity of the Soul, and it's extension, according to the three dimensions of a Body into length, breadth, and depth: *We also*, says he, *ascribe shape to the*

a Et tamen non inconstanter profitebimur, solenniora quæque, & omnimodo debita corpulentia, adesse animæ quoque; ut habitum, ut terminum, ut illud trifariam distantivum, longitudinem dico, & latitudinem, & sublimitatem, quibus metantur corpora Philosophi. Quid nunc quod & effigiem animæ damus? *Platone* nolente, quasi periclitetur de animæ immortalitate? Omne enim effigiatum compositum & structile affirmat. Dissolubile autem omne compositivum & structile: sed animam immortalem, igitur indissolubilem qua immortalem, & ineffigiatam qua indissolubilem. *De Anima* cap. 9. And a little after he says, sed nos corporales quoque illi inscribimus lineas, non tantum ex fiducia corporalitatis

Soul, contrary to the Opinion of Plato, who thinks the Immortality of the Soul would be endanger'd by it. For according to him every thing that has shape consists of parts and is compounded, but what has parts, and is compounded is capable of Dissolution: but in regard the Soul is immortal, it must therefore be undissolveable, in as much as it is immortal, and without parts, in as much as it is undissolveable. Notwithstanding which Reasoning of Plato he affirms the Natural Immortality of the Soul, tho' at the same time he makes it to be corporeal, and even organical, which is a most plain and conclusive Argument that in his Opinion at least no Argument could be drawn, or just inference made from the Corporeity of the Soul, to prove it's natural Mortality. And this appears still more certain and evident in that, in another place, he also positively avers that notwithstanding the Soul is corporeal and compounded, it is however in it self indivisible and incorruptible. And tho' it must indeed be confess'd that what he says in this place is in it self very hardly reconcileable with his notion concerning the Corporeity of the Soul, yet it abundantly declares and sufficiently demonstrates that he thought at least the Soul's being nothing but purer matter, did not destroy it's natural Immortality, which is all that I am concern'd in this place to prove: (^a *The Soul, says he, is one simple and intire thing of it self, and no more ca-*

poralitatē per estimationem, verum & ex constantia gratiæ per revelationem. *ibid.* a Singularis alioquin & simplex, & de suo tota est non magis instructilis aliunde quam divisibilis ex se, quia nec dissolubilis. Si enim structilis & dissolubilis, si dissolubilis jam non immortalis. Itaque quia non mortalis, neque dissolubilis, neque divisibilis. Nam & dividi dissolvi, & dissolvi mori est. *cap. 14.*

pable

pable of being made up of any extrinsecal matter, than it is of being divided in it self, because indeed it is not dissolveable. For if it were compounded it would be capable of dissolution, and if it were capable of dissolution it would not be immortal. Therefore because it is not mortal it is neither dissolveable nor divisible. For to be divided is to be dissolved, and to be dissolved is to die.) These words I think are too plain to need any comment, and nothing certainly can be more evident than that *Tertullian* in this place asserts the natural Immortality of the Soul at the same time that he owns it to be corporeal. And lastly not to multiply citations in so clear a point he repeats the same thing towards the latter end of this Treatise concerning the Soul. *The Soul*, says he, *is indivisible, in as much as it is Immortal.* From all which I think it is undoubtedly clear and certain that though *Tertullian* held the Soul to be a Body of it's own kind, yet he affirmed it at the same time to be of such a Nature as to be incapable of being divided or dissolved, and therefore that it was in it self, and of it's own nature Immortal.

But you still urge, That *Tertullian* believed the Soul to be so dependent upon matter, that if it were preserved from actual Mortality, it must be by the like interposition of an extraordinary Providence, as that by which our Bodies themselves are to be immortalized after

a Cæterum Anima indivisibilis & immortalis, etiam mortem indivisibilem exigit credi: non quasi immortalis, sed quasi indivisibili animæ indivisibilitate accidentem. Dividetur autem mors, si & anima. Superfluo scilicet animæ quandoque morituro. Ita portio mortis cum animæ portione remanebit. cap. 51. As to what he speaks here of death happening to the Soul, 'tis plain he means the Man: since he tells us no further off than the beginning of this Chapter, that death is onely the Separation of the Soul and Body.

the

the Resurrection. If indeed *Tertullian* had any where expressly asserted the natural Mortality of the Soul, or advanced such notions and opinions concerning it, as in their consequences did necessarily suppose it, without disowning and declaring against those consequences, or if he had not expressly and formally affirmed it to be in it's own nature Immortal, there might have been some ground for you to say, that if the Soul were preserved from Actual Mortality, it must be by the like interposition of an extraordinary Providence, as that by which our Bodies are immortalized after the Resurrection. But since *Tertullian* no where affirms the Soul to be in it self mortal, and positively disowns all those consequences, which might be raised from the account he has given of it's Origin and Nature to prove it Mortal, and has moreover, as I have shewn, expressly asserted it to be in it's own nature Immortal, I cannot see that *Tertullian* could think any thing more to be necessary to preserve it in being to all Eternity, than the general Concurrence of that Providence, without which no created Being can subsist for any, the least, assignable duration. So that we see here is no occasion for any Interposition of an extraordinary Providence to preserve the Soul to Eternity; and if *Tertullian* had ever thought that any such peculiar interposition, or extraordinary Grace and Favour were requisite to this purpose, he could not certainly have been guilty of so great an Omission, as not once to mention, or give the least Intimation of it. In his Treatise concerning the Soul, where he so often has occasion to assert and prove it's Immortality he no where ascribes it to any extraordinary interposition

sition of God's Power, but onely, as we have already seen, to the peculiar frame and constitution of it's Nature and Essence, supported by the general Concurrence of his Providence. And if he had ever dreamt of your Baptismal Spirit, as a Principle, which was necessary to immortalize the Soul, it is very strange we should every where meet with so profound a silence concerning it, especially in his Treatise concerning Baptism, where he so often speaks concerning the Communication of the Spirit in Baptism, and for what Ends and Purposes it is communicated to the Faithful. This Book we know was chiefly designed against *Quintilla* the Montanist, who denyed the Necessity of Water Baptism, and therefore it has this peculiar advantage above most of his other writings that it was in all likelihood drawn up before this *Father* had declared himself a follower of that absurd Sect. In this Treatise we find him more especially employ'd in representing and explaining the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Waters of Baptism, and upon the Persons to be baptized, and likewise in shewing for what Ends and Purposes it descends. ^a Hence he mentions the Spirit of God, at first moving upon the Face of the Waters, as a Type of it's descending upon, and moving in the Waters of Baptism. He tells us: ^b *That the Spirit comes down*

a Et Spiritus Dei super aquas ferebatur. Habes homo imprimis ætatem venerari aquarum, quod antiqua substantia, dehinc dignationem, quod divini Spiritus sedes. *De Baptismo cap. 3.* And a little further Chapter the Fourth more fully: Sed ea satis erit præcepisse, in quibus & ratio baptismi recognoscitur prima illa, quæ jam tunc etiam ipso habitu prænotabatur ad baptismi figuram, Dei spiritum, qui ab initio supervehebatur, super aquas intinctorum moraturum. b Supervenit enim statim Spiritus de cœlis, & aquis superest, sanctificans eas de semetipso, & ita sanctificatæ, vim sanctificandi combibunt. *cap. 4.*

from Heaven, and rests upon the Waters sanctifying them by it self, and they being so sanctified receive a Power of sanctifying. And again: Then, says he, that is after the Holy Spirit is invoked by Prayer, and the Person Baptized, the most Holy Spirit willingly descends from the Father upon those cleansed and blessed Bodies, and being acquainted with it's antient seat it rests upon the Waters of Baptism, having before descended upon our Lord in the figure of a Dove, that the Nature of the Holy Spirit might be declared, by that Creature, which is most remarkable for it's simplicity and innocence. We see here in these, and it would more plainly appear by a great Number of other places, which might be cited were it needful, no other Spirit mentioned by *Tertullian*, but the Holy Spirit, nor this for any other Ends and Purposes than the renewing and sanctifying of the Faithful, and for the raising of their bodies at the last day, not as any Principle, necessary to immortalize the Soul, or preserve it from actual Mortality.

You proceed in §. 15. to give some Account how long the Opinion of *Tertullian* concerning the Origin of the Soul continued in the Church, and when it was deserted, which I shall for the present wave the Examination of, till I have first consider'd what you have further drawn from this Father §. 16. to shew that he held the Natural Mortality of the Soul, and derived it's Actual Immortality from the Spirit. And here, you say, that

a Tunc ille sanctissimus Spiritus super emundata & benedicta corpora libens a Patre descendit, super Baptismi aquas, tanquam pristinam sedem recognoscens conquiescit, columbæ figura dilapsus in Dominum, ut natura Spiritus Sancti declararetur, per animal simplicitatis & innocentia. cap. 8.

Tertullian

Tertullian, as well as *Irenæus* and others derives the Human Soul from the *flatus vitæ* in *Genesis*, that he distinguishes this πνοή or *Flatus* from the πνεῦμα or *Spirit*, and from that very same passage of *Isai. XLII. 5.* by which it is proved by *Irenæus* and *Theophilus*: and that he makes this Spirit Adscititious, and not common to all Mankind as the *Flatus* was. As to the first of these, that *Tertullian* derives the *Human Soul*, from the *Flatus vitæ* in *Genesis* &c. it must indeed be confessed that he is very full and express in asserting this, not onely in those places I have already cited, but also in some others, where it must be owned, the Father speaks after the same manner, and almost in the same words as *Irenæus* does upon this Subject. As for example, where he opposes the opinion of those Heretics, which is not altogether unlike yours, who affirmed I know not what Spiritual Seed to be bestowed upon the Soul, he tells us: * *That the Scriptures acknowledging*

a Scriptura factoris magis Dei sui conscia, nihil amplius promulgaverit, quam Deum stantem in faciem hominis flatum vitæ, & hominem factum in animam vivam, per quam exinde & vivat & spiret: satis declarans differentias Spiritus & Animæ in sequentibus instrumentis, ipso Deo pronunciante: *Spiritus ex me prodixit, & flatum omnem ego feci*: & anima enim flatus factus ex Spiritu. Et rursus, qui dedit flatum populo super terram, & spiritum calcantibus eam. Primo enim anima, id est flatus, populo in terra incedenti, id est, in carne carnaliter agentis; postea Spiritus eis qui terram calcant, id est opera carnis subigunt: quia & Apostolus, non primum quod Spiritale est, sed quod Animale, postea Spiritale. Nam etsi Adam statim prophetavit magnum illud sacramentum in Christum & Ecclesiam: Hoc nunc Os ex Ossibus meis, & caro ex carne mea: propter hoc relinquit homo Patrem & Matrem, & adglutinabit se uxori suæ, & erunt duo in carnem unam, accidentiam Spiritus passus est. Cecidit enim Ecstasis super illum, Sancti Spiritus vis, operatrix Prophetiæ. Nam & malus Spiritus accidens res est. Denique Saulem tam Dei Spiritus postea vertit in alium virum, id est in Prophetam, cum dictum est: quid hoc filio Cis? An & Saul in Prophetis? Quam & malus Spiritus postea vertit in alium virum, in Apostatam scilicet. cap. 11. *That Text Isaiah LVII. 16. which according to the Hebrew*

no other maker of the Soul but God, declare nothing more concerning it, than that God breathed into Man's Face the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul, by which from thence forward he might live and breath, sufficiently declaring in the following Books, by the voice of God himself the difference between the Spirit and the Soul: A Spirit hath come from me and I have made every Breath: for the Soul was made a Breath from the Spirit. And again: He that giveth Breath unto the People upon it, and Spirit to them that walk therein. For first he gave a Soul, that is a Breath to the People that live upon the Earth, that is, to such as live a carnal life in the Body, and afterwards his Spirit to such as tread under foot the Earth, that is, subdue the Works of the Flesh, because the Apostle says: that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual. For in as much as Adam immediately Prophecy'd concerning that great Mystery between Christ and his Church: This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh. For this Cause shall a Man leave his Father and Mother, and cleave to his Wife, and they two shall be one flesh, he no doubt had an illapse of the Spirit. For an Extasy fell upon him, the Power of the Holy Spirit, which inspires with Prophecy. For even an evil Spirit operates by an internal Illapse. And lastly the Spirit of God, afterwards turned Soul into another Man, that is into a Prophet, as we find where it is said, what is this

Hebrew runs thus: The Spirit should fail before me, and the Souls, which I have made, seems to bear a different sense in the version of the LXXII. and more agreeable to that Tertullian cites it in here, πνῦμα γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἐκτελείται, καὶ πνῦν πᾶσιν ἐγὼ ἐποίησα. And the Vulgat reads it: Spiritus a facie mea egredietur, & flatum omnem ego feci.

that is come unto the Son of *Kish*? Is *Saul* also among the Prophets? *Whom also an evil Spirit afterwards turned into another Man, namely, into an Apostate.* This is the passage, which I have thus cited at length, that I suppose you must mean, when you say *Tertullian* derives the Human Soul, as *Irenaeus* likewise does, from the Breath of Life, *Gen. 11. 7.* Now tho' I readily grant this to be very true, yet must profess my self quite at a stand to find, how it can be in the least to your purpose, to prove the Natural Mortality of the Soul. For does *Tertullian* anywhere say, or ever so much as remotely intimate, that the Soul being derived from this *Flatus* makes it of a Mortal Perishing Nature? Nay does he not plainly suppose, and so far as the subject could lead him to it, assert, in one or two of those places I have above cited, as well as in some others, which might be cited, that the Soul is therefore in it's own nature Immortal, because it has it's Origin from the Breath of God? And indeed every one must confess that there is very great force in this Argument to prove the Soul to be in it self Immortal; in as much as this implys, that it more immediately proceeds and comes forth from God, and has therefore so full and intire a dependence upon the general Concurrency of his Will, and Providence, that nothing either from within or without it self, by any influence or agency whatsoever, can hurt and destroy it. Which is all that was ever meant by the Natural Immortality of the Soul. And therefore tho' it's being derived from this *Flatus*, or Breath of Life, be no doubt a plain argument of it's intire dependence upon the Will of God, yet it can suppose no other dependence, than that which all Crea-

tures, as such, have upon their Creator; which, as I have above observed, is not onely consistent with, but also supposes it's Natural Immortality. But as for any extraordinary, or miraculous interposition of God's Power, as this account of the Origin of the Soul does not suppose it, so neither could we have believ'd it, tho' *Tertullian* had positively asserted it, if it had not been particularly revealed. For I think it beyond all doubt, that we ought never to believe that God acts out of the known and ordinary Methods of his Power and Providence, unless he himself some way or other manifests it unto us.

As much am I in the dark to find out how *Tertullian's* distinguishing the *πνοή*, or Human Soul, from the *πνεῦμα*, or Holy Spirit of God proves that he derives the actual Immortality of the Soul, from the Spirit. I have already, and I think very sufficiently, shewn how little what *Irenæus* means by this distinction makes for your Purpose. And therefore may venture to acknowledge, what indeed is too evident to be deny'd, that *Tertullian* also makes the same distinction, and that he likewise founds this distinction upon the same Notion and Text of Scripture *Isai. XLII. 5*. But then I must at the same time affirm, that it is indisputably evident, that by the Spirit here he means nothing less than your adscititious immortalizing Principle, and indeed can onely be understood of the blessed influences and inspirations of the Holy Spirit of God, communicated to us for no other Ends and Purposes, than of illumination and sanctification. This is so clearly evident not onely from the reason of the thing it self, and the tenor of the *Father* both here

here and elsewhere, but also from what expressly follows this passage of *Isaiah*, as cited by *Tertullian*, that to me it is very wonderful, that you could induce into your mind a Persuasion that he could mean it in any other sense, or apply it to any other purpose. For does he not expressly and formally explain these words, *eis qui terram calcant*, which we indeed translate more agreeably to the Hebrew, *to those that walk in the Earth*, of such as, *Opera carnis subigunt*, subdue the Motions, Inclinations and Actions of the Flesh? Which it is impossible to understand of any thing, but either the extraordinary Gifts of the Holy Ghost, or it's ordinary Graces and Assistances which are given to our Endeavours to keep the Animal Inclinations under the Dominion and Guidance of Reason, and to help us forward, and give us still greater Vigour in our Advances towards Virtue and Holyness. And this certainly is all which this Father can be understood to mean by that of the Apostle, *1 Cor. XV. For that was not first, which is Spiritual, but that which is Natural, and afterwards that which is Spiritual*; namely, those Assistances and Communications of this Holy Spirit, which enabled *Adam* immediately after the Creation of *Eve* to foretell the future State of Wedlock. For does he not expressly say, *accidentiam Spiritus passus est*, he had an illapse of the Spirit, when that extasy or deep sleep fell upon him? And this, it's plain, was nothing but *Sancti Spiritus Vis*, the Power of the Holy Spirit of God, and to no other Purpose but of a Prophetic inspiration, viz. as that Holy Spirit is *Prophetiæ Operatrix*, a Power that inspires into the minds of Men Predictions of future Events. And therefore immediately after he compares the

manner of the Holy Spirit's inspiration to the il-lapses of an Evil Spirit, telling us, *nam & malus spiritus accidens res est*, the influence of an Evil Spirit is an accidental not natural thing, and he further pursues the same notion afterwards in the Instance of *Saul*, whom both a Good and Evil Spirit turned and transformed into another Man. It is I think beyond all Contradiction evident, that nothing of this your Adscititious Immortalizing Spirit or Principle can be meant by the distinction the Father here makes between the *πνεῦν* or human Soul, and the *πνεῦμα* or Spirit: since it is so plain that there is not the least intimation given of any Operation of this Spirit to any purpose of Immortalizing the Soul, but onely for enlightening the mind in an extraordinary manner, or for the ordinary assistances of Grace. It is indeed very true what you say, and for which you cite those words of *Tertullian*; ^a *That the Spirit neither of God nor of the Devil is naturally bestowed upon the Soul*, that he plainly makes this Spirit adscititious, and not common to all Mankind, as the *Flatus* was. But then I would fain know how this can be at all to the Purpose of proving the Soul to be naturally Mortal, or actually Immortalized by this Spirit. For does he any where affirm any such thing, or do his Assertions in this place any way imply it? No: all that he affirms or supposes in this place is onely

^a *Igitur si neque Dei, neque Diaboli Spiritus ex Nativitate conferitur Animæ, solam eam constat ante eventum Spiritus utriusque. &c. De Anim. cap. 11. By ex nativitate Animæ conferitur &c. Mr. D. owns to be meant that this Spirit does not naturally belong to the Soul, which will serve further to explain what Tertullian means when he tells us, as I have shewn above, that Immortality is nativus Animæ conlata.*

this, which indeed never any one denied, that the influences both of the Good and Evil Spirit are adventitious and extrinsecal, and not internal and natural. But what, in the name of wonder, is this, either to the natural Mortality, or actual Immortality of the Soul? Would you have it thought that it from hence appears to have been *Tertullian's* Opinion, that the Immortality of the Soul was derived from this Adscititious or Adventitious Spirit? This is not supposed in this place, and I dare venture to be positive is not any where asserted in all *Tertullian's* Writings. Or would you insinuate that because *Tertullian* affirms the Spirit to be adscititious and not natural, that therefore he thought the Soul to be in it self mortal? I answer that certainly this Consequence can never be thought just by any one who ever so little considers and weighs it. Nor can I discern any the least connexion to be between the Holy Spirit being Adventitious to the Soul, and the Soul's Natural Mortality. But you go on and say, *That he gives the Soul a Body, and a Shape as well as Irenæus, and that he does not doubt any more than he, that the Spirit is the onely solid ground for the Claim of Immortality.* As to the former of these it must indeed be confessed that *Tertullian* both gives the Soul a Body, and makes it perfectly material, as I have already shewn. As to *Irenæus* it does not, I confess, to me appear so certain what his Opinion as to this matter was. * For altho' he affirms that the

a Quando ipsæ Animæ corporis habeant figuram. lib. II. cap. 33. And again, Per hæc manifestissime declaratur — & habere hominis figuram cap. 63.

Soul when separated from the Body has a perfect human shape, which it is indeed hard to understand how it can have, without it be clothed with a Body, yet when we consider that whatever impresses the Idea of a shape upon us does it no otherwise than by acting upon the senses, and since Spirits may for ought we know to the contrary have in themselves a Power of acting upon the senses, it may from hence appear not altogether improbable, that they may seem to have a human shape, and yet not be invested with Bodies. As to your saying, *Tertullian did not doubt but that the Spirit is the only solid Ground for the claim of Immortality*, it is to me the greatest wonder in the World, next to that of your publishing this Dissertation, that you should make so positive an Assertion in a matter for which you have not produced any one Authority to make it good, and I dare positively aver can never produce any thing as a sufficient ground for it, either from the Writings of *Tertullian*, or any other of the Fathers. For if by Immortality here you mean nothing but simply the everlasting Duration of the Soul, and not, as is frequently understood by it, that eternal happiness, which with reference to some of Mankind, will accompany this Duration, I must take leave to be very confident, that there is not the least mention any where to be found in all *Tertullian's* Writings, that all our claim to it is derived from the Spirit. It would be altogether needless at this time, and contribute to the swelling this Treatise to a greater Bulk than I am willing it should rise to, if I should lay before you all those places, which might be cited, and arguments which might be drawn

drawn from them, to shew the falseness of this Assertion, and therefore I shall not now trouble you with them, but proceed to consider what follows, which is, what this Father's Notion was concerning Immortality.

And here you say, that *as for proper Immortality, Tertullian allows it onely to that which is innatum and infectum, ἀγέννητον & ἀμόνητον, in the Language of the Greek Philosophers, and therefore confines it to God alone.* And this you say is agreeable to the Language, Principles, and Reasoning of Plato in his Timæus. And from hence you infer, that *Tertullian could not allow to created Beings, that are made, and have a beginning, an Immortality which arises from their own natures, but which is to be imputed to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of God.* And upon this Ground, you say, *Tertullian professing himself of a different Opinion from Plato, who affirmed the Soul to be innata, argues thus against him: "Plato, says he, makes the Soul to be uncreated, which might easily be made use of as an argument to prove that he thought it to have a perfect Divine Nature. He adds that it is Immortal, Incorruptible, Incorporeal, because he believ'd God to be Incorporeal, Invisible, without Shape, Uniform, a Governing, Rational, and Intellectual Principle. What could*

a Innatam eam (Animam) facit, quod & solum armare potuissim ad Testimonium plenæ divinitatis: adjicit Immortalem, Incorruptibilem, Incorporealem, quia hoc & Deum credidit, invisibilem, ineffigabilem, uniformem, principalem, rationalem, intellectualem. Quid amplius proferberet Animam, si eam Deum nuncuparet? Nos autem qui nihil Deo appendimus, hoc ipso Animam longe infra Deum expendimus, quod natam eam agnoscimus, ac per hoc dilutionis Divinitatis & exilioris felicitatis; ut statum, non ut spiritum, & si immortalem, ut hoc sit Divinitatis, tamen passibilem, ut hoc sit Nativitatis. Ideoque & à primordio Exorbitationis capacem, & inde etiam oblivionis affinem. de Anima cap. 24.

he say more of the Soul, if he should call it God. But we who do not make the Soul to be a part of God, do therefore suppose the Soul to be far inferior to God, because we acknowledge it to be created. And for this Reason it has an inferior degree both of Divinity and Felicity; as the breath of God which proceeds from him, and not as the Spirit, which is a part of him. And altho' it be Immortal, and upon that account may seem to be Divine, yet is it Passible, and therefore created. And from hence it is capable of both Error and Forgetfulness.

From all which you observe that Immortality in this Reasoning is taken for an Attribute properly to God. And from hence you infer, that the Immortality, which agrees to a more dilute Divinity, or to a Being far inferior to God, such as is the human Soul, must be a more dilute Immortality, and far inferior both to that which properly agrees to God, and to what it might have had, if the Soul had been the same with the Divine Spirit. And this you affirm to be nothing but a precarious Immortality, which is perfectly dependent on the Divine Favour. Before I give a particular Answer to what is here urged, in order to set this whole matter in a clearer light, I think it necessary to premise and shew *first*, what sort of Immortality that is, which is proper and peculiar to the Divine Nature. And, *secondly*, I shall consider what kind of Immortality that is, which belongs to the Human Soul, and which tho' it be dependent upon the Will and Pleasure of God, may notwithstanding be truly and properly call'd a Natural Immortality.

And, *First*, as to that Immortality, which is proper and peculiar to the Divine Nature, it is indeed quite

quite different from that which belongs to any Created Being, and might perhaps more properly be stiled *Eternity*. For as God has all his other glorious Attributes and Perfections in such a manner, measure, and degree as is far superior to that wherein the most exalted Creatures have any of them; so also the manner of his Duration must be extremely different from that of any Created Being. Now Eternal Duration, as an Attribute of the Divine Nature, has some Properties and Conditions belonging to it, which more especially distinguish and separate it from the Duration of every thing else. And these are, Necessity of existence, it's having no beginning, as well as no end, and it's being without Parts and Succession. The first of these, Necessity of Existence, proceeds and flows from this, that all things have their Being and Existence from God, but he has his Existence from nothing else. This makes him entirely independent, and consequently necessarily existent. For that which gives and preserves Being, and Existence to every thing else is necessary in order to the beginning and continuance of their Existence, and that which has it's own Being from it self cannot be destroyed, or have a period put to it's Duration by any Agency or Influence whatsoever. And therefore all the kinds and degrees of necessity, absolute, relative or hypothetical, must agree and concenter in the duration of this Being, But because every thing besides God has it's Essence and Existence from something else, it must always, be dependent upon that Cause, which gave and continues to it it's Being, and consequently cannot be necessarily existent. And 'tis in this sense onely that *Justin Martyr*,
or

or whoever else was the Author of the Questions and Answers to the Orthodox, as well as some other of the Fathers, whom I think it needless to cite, makes God onely to have this sort of Immortality, ^a *Because he has it not from the Will of another, as all other things that are Immortal have, but from his own Essence.* Meaning no doubt that the Duration of the Deity is intirely from himself. Again, the eternal Duration of the Divinity is in this Respect also to be distinguished from the Immortality of any created Being, in that it is infinitely extended both ways, backwards as well as as forwards. For that which has it's Being from it self must be from Eternity, but that which has it from any thing else, must have had a beginning, and consequently there must be some part or point of the infinite *expansum*, if I may so call it, of Duration Assignable, wherein it was not. And therefore it is in this Respect, and with regard to this Extension of the Duration of the Divinity backward, that both Fathers and Philosophers ascribe Eternity onely to that which is *innatum* & *infectum*, ἀγέννητον, καὶ ἀπώτερον: since that which never was created or generated, could never have a Beginning, and therefore must have been from Eternity. And in this sense it is that *Tertullian* ascribes Eternity to the Divine Nature. ^b *So far*, says he, *as hu-*

^a Εἰ μόνος ἀθάνατος ὁ Θεός, καὶ τὸν ἀπείριστον, πῶς ἀληθὴς κατ' αὐτὸν τὸ, πᾶσι περὶ εἰς καὶ καμνησόμεθα; ΑΠΟΚ. Μόνος ἔχων τὴν ἀθανασίαν λέγεται ὁ Θεός, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν θελήματι αὐτοῦ ταύτην ἔχει, καὶ ὥστε οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀθάνατοι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ οἰκειότητι αὐτοῦ. p. 427. ^b Quantum humana conditio de Deo definire potest, id definitio, quod & omnium Conscientia agnosceret: Deum summum esse magnam, in æternitate constitutum, innatum, infectum, sine initio, sine fine. Hunc enim statum æternitati censendum, quæ summum magnum Deum efficiat, dum hoc est in Deo ipsa, atque ita & cetera; ut sit Deus summum magnum, & forma, & ratione & vi, & potestate. Contra *Mar. cap. 3.*

man Abilities are capable of determining concerning God, I think I may venture to affirm, what every one must own, that God is the greatest and chiefest of Beings, from Eternity, uncreated, unbegotten, without Beginning, without End: for this is necessary to that Eternity, which makes God the greatest and chiefest of Beings &c. In the same acceptation likewise Isidore Pelusiot. ascribes Eternity onely to God, excluding every Creature from this kind of Duration, to some of whom nevertheless he attributes Immortality. (^a *Eternity, says he, is no more than Everlasting Life, and therefore 'tis commonly used to signify that sort of Duration, which agrees to that Being, that is without Beginning, and is always the same. But Immortality may be affirmed of what has had a Beginning, but will have no End, as Angels and the Souls of Men.*) And Incorruptibility of those things that are made, but are incapable of being Dissolved.) But Eternity is eminently a Property of the divine Nature, and therefore can onely be affirmed of the Adorable, and most Powerfull Trinity, which does not admit of the Terms before and after, nor can have first, second, or third predicated of it. A third Property, which is peculiar to the eternal Duration of the divine Nature is that it is without parts and succession. In the Continuance or rather Permanency of God's Existence we must make no distinction between Past, Present,

α αἰδιότης οἷον αἰετώτης ἐστὶ. διό ἐπὶ μόνῃς τ' ἀνάρχῃ φύσει τ' αἰεὶ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐαύτως ἔχουσιν λαμβανὰς εἶδη. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡρώμεν μὲν, μὴ ἀπὸ θνητοῦτος ὅ, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀγγέλῳ, καὶ ψυχῇ κατηγερείδῃ δύναται. ἔ τὸ ἀφάρτον ἐπὶ τῷ παρρημίων μὲν, κρείττον ὅ φθαρῆς γιγνημῖνων. τὸ δὲ αἰδον κυρίως τῷ Θεῷ ὅς τις ἰδὼν ἐστὶ, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ καὶ δευτέρῳ, καὶ βασιλευσίν τριῶν; μόνῃ λαμβανὰς πύκνῃ, τῷ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἀνιχομένης, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον ἔ τρίτον καὶ τετάρτον. Ibid. Pelus. lib. III. Ep. 149. It is most probable, that by the τὰ κρείττονα φθαρῆς here he means nothing but the Heavens and Elements, which according to the Opinion of Aristotle are incorruptible.

and

and Future, but the whole infinity of his Duration consists in one point or moment. And tho' it be indeed very difficult to form an Idea of this in our Minds, and to put it together in our thoughts, or to conceive how any Being can in the Instant *Now* exist all to morrow, and at once possess more than the present Moment of Duration, yet the Immutability of the divine Nature, which must exclude all manner of Vicissitude obliges us to believe all this of God, how difficult soever, and almost Impossible, it may seem to be conceived by us. And indeed this is no more than what some of the best of the antient Philosophers, as well as Fathers have always believed and affirmed concerning God. Thus we find *Plato* in his *Timæus* ^a speaking concerning that Being which has no beginning, and is therefore eternal, *that it is always the same.* ^b Which *Proclus* interprets of it's being free from all vicissitude of Time. And in another place *Plato* explains himself more largely and fully upon the same thing, where he tells us: ^c *That Men mistake in applying those modes of speaking, it was, and it shall be, which denote the parts of time, to that eternal Substance, which is called God. For we commonly speak concerning him, that he was, he is, and shall be: whereas, he is, onely agrees truly and properly to him. But he was, and he shall be, ought onely to be applyed to such things whose beginning is in, and whose existence is according to, the fleeting Succession of*

^a Τὸ δὲ μὲν αἰεὶ ᾗσιν δὲ σὺν ἔχον &c. αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν. ὅτι δὲ τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ νοεῖν πᾶν τ' ἔχον μὴ μεταβολῆς. *Proc. in Tim.* ^c Ταῦτα δ' πάντα μίσηται, καὶ τὸ τ' ἔχον, καὶ τὸ τ' ἔστιν χρόνος γαργότος εἰδη φέροντες λαογόνου ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδίου φύσιν, σὺν ὁρῶν. λίγαν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς ἦν, ἐστὶ περὶ καὶ ἔστιν. τῇ δ' τὸ ἐστὶ μένον, κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀποσπᾶται. τὸ δὲ ἔχον, τὸ τ' ἔστιν περὶ τὴν αἰετὴν χρόνον ᾗσιν ἑῶνται πρέπει λίγαν. κινήσεις γὰρ ἔστιν. τὸ δ' αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον ἀκινήτως, οὐτὶ πρὸς οὐτὸν, ἔτι νῦν τὸν ἀποσπᾶται γαργότα ποτὶ, οὐδ' ἐγάρ τινος νῦν, οὐδ' ἐφ' αὐτῆς ἑστιάται. *Tim. p. 37.*

the parts of Time. For these are motions. But that which is always immoveably the same, we cannot say that it is ever Older or Younger, or that it has been, or shall be. Here we see plainly Plato denies that any Phrases denoting the Parts or succession of time, can properly be applied to the supreme Being: thereby no doubt very clearly intimating, that the Duration of God, has not the same fleeting perishing Succession of parts, as the Duration of Created Beings evidently has. The same Notion we also find in Plutarch: ^a God, says he, is, and, if I may so speak, exists in no time, but in one Immoveable and Invariable Eternity; in which nothing is before, nothing after, nothing future, nothing past. And He is the only independent, self-subsisting Being, concerning whom we cannot say, that he has either been, or shall be, that he either began to be, or will ever cease to be. And in the same sense, and to the same Purpose, and almost in the same Words does Tertullian speak concerning this matter, where he tells us: ^b Eternity has no time; since Eternity swallows up time. That which acts cannot be acted upon. That which has no beginning can have no distinctions of time applied to it. If God might be said to be old, that would suppose there may be a time when he will not be, if

^a Ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, εἰ χρεὶ φάσαι, καὶ ἐστὶ κατ' οὐδὲνα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν αἰωνίτην, καὶ ἄχρονον, καὶ ἀνέγκλιτον, καὶ ἑστέριον οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ὕστερον, οὐδὲ μέλλον, οὐδὲ παρεχμίνον, ἔ μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸ ὄντως ὄν, οὐδὲ χρονός, οὐδὲ ἰσμήνιος, οὐδὲ ἀρξάμενος, οὐδὲ παυσόμενος. Plutarch. De εἰ apud Delphos. ^b Non habet tempus Eternitas. Omne enim tempus ipsa est. Quod facit pati non potest. Caret ætate quod non licet nasci. Deus si est vetus non erit, si est novus non fuit. Novitas initium testificatur, Vetustas finem comminatur. Deus autem tam alienus ab initio & fine est quam à Tempore, arbitro & metatore initii & finis. Contra Marc. lib. I. cap. 8. This last peculiarity of the divine Eternity, seems indeed no other than what God has given us of himself Exod. III. 14. I AM THAT I AM. So Plato tells us, He is, may be properly said of God but not He was, or He shall be.

Young, that supposes a time when he was not. Youth denotes a beginning, as Age threatens an End. But God is as far from having any Beginning and End, as he is from existing in time, which determines and ascertains the beginning and end of things. From all this it may I suppose, sufficiently appear that the Immortality or rather Eternity of Duration which is proper to the divine Nature is one of those Attributes of it, which are commonly call'd incommunicable, and which are so inseparably united to the Essence of the Deity, as that it is impossible they should be given to any Creature.

Let us therefore consider in the second place what sort of Immortality that is, which may be communicated to a Creature, and belongs in particular to the human Soul. Now as Independence and necessity of existence are peculiar to, and inseparable from, the Duration of God, so a dependent Duration and Existence is proper to every thing else. For since nothing can give it self Being, or preserve it when given, every thing that has a beginning of Existence from another must be dependent upon that, which brought it into Being. And in this respect the human Soul, as a Creature, tho' it will exist for ever, as having within it self no Principles of Dissolution, not being liable to any external Influence, which can destroy it's Essence, or put an end to it's Being, yet it still depends upon the Will and Pleasure of God for the continuance of it's Existence. But then this Will and Pleasure can signify nothing more than the Ordinary Concurrence of his Providence, which the most exalted *Seraph* does equally depend upon for the perpetuity of his Existence, as do the Souls of of Men. Again the Immortality of all Creatures,
and

and of the human Soul in particular is an Eternity onely forwards, or a *parte post*, as it is sometimes expressed. For since every thing was created by God, or had a beginning from the first Cause, there must have been a time when it was not, and therefore it cannot have been from Everlasting. Whether God has created or can create any thing from all Eternity is a question more curious than profitable, and which I think we need not trouble our selves to discuss; since the Scriptures so plainly assure us that every thing had a beginning in time. This however we may lay down as certain, even from reason, that Creation, in the most common and obvious notion of it, implying the production of something out of nothing, this can hardly be conceived without supposing some assignable point of duration, when it was not. If it be said that these things might result and flow from the first Cause by a natural and necessary emanation, as light streams forth from the Sun, this, it is to be feared, will take away that Freedom of acting, which we must suppose to belong in an eminent degree to the first Cause of all things. So that this must stand as a certain and infallible note of Distinction between the Eternity of God, and the Immortality of any Creature, that the former is extended thro', and intirely fills up all the immense *expansum* of infinite Duration, whereas the latter stretches onely thro' a certain part, which tho' it be unbounded and infinite towards one side of it, is certainly bounded and limited at the other. Lastly the everlasting Duration of all created Beings is still deduced and carried on thro' a successive chain of parts and periods, not all existing together at once, as in the eternity of

God,

God, but perpetually succeeding one another. For since the Power and Knowledge of created Beings is finite and limited, they cannot be supposed to comprehend and be possess'd of any part of duration, but what is present and before them. That which is past, is not in their Power, and much less that which is future, so that, as they cannot recall the one, and make it to exist again, so they must wait till time bring up to them the other. Thus therefore their Duration must be carried on, and continued to Eternity thro' an endless Train or series of points or parts of time, some of which are still perishing, whilst others succeed and come into their places. This then is that sort of Immortality, which properly belongs to the Souls of Men, as they are created Beings, which altho' it evidently appears to be quite different from and of another kind than the eternal Duration of God, is notwithstanding what may very properly be stiled a Natural Immortality. For this implies nothing more, than that the Souls of Men are so made, as not to contain within themselves any Principles or seeds of Dissolution, as Bodies do, and also that they cannot be destroyed by the Agency and Influence of any second Cause: since the Continuance of their Being and Existence depends intirely upon the first Cause, the general Concurrence of which, together with the particular frame and constitution of their own natures, without any thing else, is sufficient to prolong their Duration to Eternity. And I think it may not be improper in this place to remind you, of what I have indeed before observed, that by owning thus much in your *Premotion* you have fairly given up the Cause, and over-

overthrown the whole Scheme and Design of your Dissertation, to prove the Soul to be a Principle naturally Mortal. For in this *Premon.* §. 4. You represent the dependence of human Souls upon the Pleasure of God to imply, that they are hereby so fully discharged from all dependence upon any other created Being, that they may still continue in their Duration, whatsoever other created influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their continuance, who can no more continue than give their own Being. Than which, I think, there cannot be a fuller and plainer assertion of the Soul's Natural Immortality. And altho' you afterwards retract this concession, by denying the Souls of Men to be in themselves Immortal, but onely as they are capable of laying hold on the divine Spirit, which will Immortalize them, yet every one that considers it, will, I believe, be convinced that it can be nothing but a plain assertion of the Soul's Natural Immortality: especially when he reflects, that neither in Scripture nor primitive Antiquity is the Immortality of the Soul ever ascribed to the Holy Spirit, or to any any o-Spirit or Principle whatsoever. I may now I suppose proceed to apply what I have here said concerning the Immortality or rather Eternity, which is proper to God, and that Immortality which is proper to the human Soul, by way of answer to that which you have urged to make good your point concerning the Soul's Natural Mortality.

As to what you assert in the first place, That *Tertullian* allows proper Immortality onely to that which is *innatum & infectum* &c. and therefore confines it to God alone, if by *proper Immortality* you

Y

mean

mean that eternal Duration, which is peculiar to the divine Nature, I readily grant what you say to be most true in it self, and likewise perfectly agreeable to *Tertullian's* sentiment, as to this matter. If we consult our Reason, and onely consider what sort of duration is proper to God, we shall quickly and easily be sensible, that his Eternity is as incompatible with any finite limited Being, as his Immensity, Omnipotence, and Omnipresence. Nor was there ever any one, as I know of, so absurd, who acknowledged the Soul to be a Creature, as to affirm, that this, or any other attribute of the Deity, could agree to it, in the same manner and measure as it is in God. Those Philosophers and Heretics indeed, and there were some such even in *Tertullian's* Time, who made the Soul to be a part of the Substance of God, must, in consequence of this Opinion, have believed the same sort of duration to agree to it, which belongs to the Divine Nature. But these we not onely often find *Tertullian* expressly and formally opposing, but also frequently in the Course of his arguments guarding against, and with a great deal of foresight and caution endeavouring to prevent their Arguments. They are these Heretics, which without all doubt he must be supposed to mean, when he says, in a Passage of his Treatise concerning the Soul, which I have cited before: *Alii immortalem negant animam, alii plusquam immortalem adfirmant. Some deny the Soul to be Immortal, others affirm it to be more than Immortal*, that is, to have a duration equal to that of God, as being a part of the Divinity it self. This Opinion the Heretics derived, as they did very many of their
other

other Opinions, from some of the Antient Philosophers, especially from *Zeno*, and the Sect of the Stoicks, who affirmed the Sun, Moon, and Stars, as well as the Soul's of Men to be parts of the Substance of God. This Opinion *Tertullian* likewise mentions in other places. As in his *Apologetic*, where observing the different Opinions of Philosophers concerning the Origin, and Consummation of the World, he mentions also their disagreeing concerning the Nature and Eternity of the Soul. ^a Some says he, *make it divine and eternal, others contend that it is corruptible*. Meaning no doubt by eternity here that duration, which is peculiar to God. And again, there is no doubt but he means the same Philosophers and Heretics, when in his Book concerning the Testimony of the Soul, he calls upon it to give in it's evidence to the Unity of the Divine Nature, addressing himself to it after this manner: ^b *Whether thou art a divine and eternal Being, as very many of the Philosophers imagined, or whether thou hast nothing divine in thee, because thou art mortal, as was the Opinion of onely Epicurus*. It is therefore in opposition to this Opinion that he not onely frequently affirms the Soul to be a

^a Sic & de Animæ statu, quam alii divinam & æternam, alii dissolvibilem contendunt, ut quis sentit, ita & intulit aut reformavit. *Apologetic*. cap. 47. ^b Consiste in medio Anima, seu divina & æterna res es, secundum plures Philosophos, eo magis non mentiens: seu minime divina; quoniam quidem mortalis, ut *Epicurus* soli videtur, eo magis mentiri non debens, seu de cœlo exciperis, seu de terra conciperis &c. *De Test. Animæ*, cap. 1. If it be thought that by *Tertullian's* expressing himself concerning the Soul thus: minime divina quoniam mortalis, he must be supposed to believe that such Souls, as were actually Immortal had some divine Principle communicated to them, we ought to observe that he here speaks of *Epicurus's* Opinion, who thought the Soul to be onely a part of the Body. It is also remarkable that in this place he ascribes this Opinion concerning the Soul's Mortality onely to *Epicurus*. Which tho' perhaps not true in it self, is yet a pretty clear Evidence that himself was not of that Opinion.

Creature, but also sometimes denies it to have that sort of Immortality, which belongs to, and is inseparable from, God. But no one, I suppose, will allow, that it can with any force of Reason from hence be concluded, that he either believed the Soul to be naturally Mortal, or that it's actual Immortality was owing to any New and Extraordinary Indulgence of an adscititious Spirit or Principle, or indeed to any thing besides the particular frame and make, if I may so speak, of it's nature and constitution, supported and upheld, by the general concurrence of God's Providence. Nor will it appear at first sight to any considering Man to have any foundation in Reason to infer, that because the Soul has not the same sort or mode of Duration to Eternity that God has, that therefore it is not in it self, or by it's own nature Immortal. If any one should ask what that is which puts a distinction betwixt the Eternity of God, and the Immortality of the human Soul, which *Tertullian* here says has a more dilute Divinity, I answer; it's having a beginning, and being therefore dependent, and not necessarily existent as the Deity is. But this must be allowed to be very far from being inconsistent with the Soul's Natural Immortality: since, as I have before observed this dependence is no other than all created Beings, as such, must necessarily have upon their Creator. And therefore it may be as well argued from hence, that *Angels*,^a who have, I think, ever been allowed

^a It is true indeed that some of the Fathers affirm that the *Angels* are Immortal not by Nature, but Grace. This is the manner that several of the Fathers express themselves in concerning this matter. But then by Grace 'tis plain they mean nothing of an extraordinary Favour, but only the general concurrence of Providence towards the continuance and preservation of *Angels*.

to be in their own Natures Immortal, have a precarious Immortality, as that human Souls have it.

You proceed and say, that this Notion of proper Immortality belonging onely to God, is agreeable to the Language, Principles, and Notions of *Plato* in his *Timeus*. This indeed I readily yield to be true and clearly evident : it being not only most agreeable to *Plato's* Scheme of Philosophy, but also to the strictest reason, that nothing but God should have that Immortality, or rather Eternity, which is peculiar to him. Which Eternity *Plato*, and all the *Fathers* ground upon his having no beginning, and therefore no dependence upon any thing for his Existence. Whereas all Created Beings having had a Beginning from the one uncreated Being, must always be dependent upon that for the Continuance of their Duration. Which however does by no means imply such a precarious Immortality, as that they must necessarily of themselves tend to Corruption and Dissolution, unless there be some new and extraordinary Interposition and Indulgence of Providence, besides and above this ordinary Concurrence to support and preserve them. And altho' it be most certain, and every day visible that some Beings, notwithstanding this ordinary concurrence tend to decay and dissolution, and cannot be preserved from the Effects of their Natural Mortality, but by a miraculous interposition of God's Power, yet this evidently proceeds from the particular frame and constitution of their Nature, which being proper to them, and not common to all Created Beings, we may justly infer that such Creatures as have not this particular frame of Nature are not obnoxious to the same Mortality;

lity ; and therefore can never have an end any otherwise than by God's restraining and withholding the general and ordinary influences of his Providence, which we must suppose he will for ever continue to afford them, unless it could some way or other be made to appear either from Reason or Revelation, that he will not. And this general Concurrence by virtue of which Angels, and the Souls of Men, are continued in their Being and Existence to eternity is all that *Plato* or any of the Fathers mean, when they say they are Immortal by Grace; as being so framed and originally constituted, as to exist to eternity, provided onely this grace or general influence of Providence concur to their Preservation. A great many passages might be alledged out of several of the Fathers, which would set this position out of all doubt and uncertainty. But I shall content my self with onely one or two out of *John Damascen* and *Maximus*, who have with a great deal of fidelity collected and truly represented the sense of the Fathers upon almost all the common Places in Divinity. The first is a passage of the former of these, where he tells us, *That the Angels are not immortal by nature, but by Grace. For whatsoever has a beginning must be naturally capable of having an end. But onely God exists for ever, or rather more than for ever. For the Creator of time cannot exist in time, as being above all time.* Here we see that *Damascen* plainly opposes the immortality of Angels onely to that

α αἰώνιος ἔ φησι, ἀλλὰ χάριτι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀρχαίον, καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν φύσιν.
 μόνος δὲ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ ὢν, μὴδὲν δὲ ἔ ὑπὲρ τὸ αἰεὶ. ἔχ' ὡς χρόνον γάρ. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ χρόνον,
 οὗ τῶν χρόνων ποιητὴς. Orthodox. Fid. lib. II. cap. 3.

of the Deity: and therefore when he says that Angels are immortal & φύσει ἀλλὰ χάριτι, not by nature but Grace, he can mean no more than that they are not immortal or eternal, independently and necessarily as God is, but derivatively and dependently upon his Will, and the general concurrence of his Providence. The same notion he also more fully explains in another place, but with reference onely to the Duration of the Deity compared with that of Angels, and ascribes the difference between them to this, that the Duration of the Divinity is without Beginning as well as End. ^a That, says he, which is without Beginning must be without End, but that which is without End by Grace, is not altogether without beginning, as for instance, the Angels. Here we see again he evidently opposes an Immortality by Grace to the Eternity of the Supreme Being, which is without Beginning as well as End, whereas that other Immortality, tho' he allows it to be ἀπτελεύτητος, without End, yet does he distinguish it from that of God, in this respect alone. that it is not ἀναρχος, without Beginning too. *Maximus* lastly, carries this Notion yet further, and upon the ground shews, that tho' the Soul had a Beginning and be dependent, yet that it is in it's own nature Incorruptible and Immortal, and likewise tells us, upon what Account it comes to be so. ^b (Immortality, says he, is a necessary consequence

a Το γὰρ ἀνερχον ἀπτελεύτητον, τὸ δὲ χάριτι ἀπτελεύτητον, ἢ πάντως ἀναρχον ὡς αὐτὸς οἱ ἄγγελοι. Ibid. lib. I. cap. 8. b Ἀκολουθεῖν οἶμαι δεῖν τῷ ἀπλῷ τὸ ἀθάνατον ὥπως ἄκωρον ἐδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ φθαρτικῶν ἐστίν. ἵππει οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνέση. καὶ γὰρ φθειρόμενα ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρίων φθαρταί. διὰ πᾶν φθειρόμενον διαλυτὸν ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ διαλυτὸν, σὺνίστηται. τὸ δὲ σὺνίστηται πολυμερές. τὸ δὲ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενον, ἐλλογιότι ἐκ διαφορῶν συγκείται μερῶν. τὸ δὲ διαφορὸν ἐστὶν ὁμοίον. καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπλῶς ὥστε, καὶ μὴ ἐκ διαφορῶν συγκείμενη μερῶν, ἐσύνιστος, καὶ ἀθάνατος ὥστε, διὰ τοῦτο ἀφθαρτος, καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐστίν.

of Simplicity, and if you will attend I will shew you how. There is nothing which can destroy it's own Essence; for if it could it would never have existed at first, but every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted by something that is contrary to it. Therefore whatever is corruptible is dissolvable, and whatever is dissolvable must be compounded of several parts, and that which consists of parts, must consist of different parts, but that which consists of different parts can never be the same simple thing. But since the Soul is simple and does not consist of parts, it is therefore un compounded, and consequently indissolvable, incorruptible, and Immortal.) From these passages taken together we may easily discern what the Fathers thought concerning the Immortality of the Soul. They thought it indeed dependent upon the Will and Pleasure of God, for the Concurrence of his Providence in order to the Preservation of it's Being and Existence. But at the same time they were sensible that it was secured from all danger of dissolution either from it self, or the influence and energy of any second Cause, by the Spirituality and Simplicity of it's nature and constitution.

The last thing, which in this Section you urge to make good the Design of your Dissertation is: *That Tertullian ascribes all the Right the Body has to the Resurrection to the Spiritual Body, with which the Animal Body is then to be invested, which also is called Spiritual, from the Spirit then to be received by it.*

A *Author* I have above-cited that place of Tertullian, wherein he alludes to the famous passage of Plato's Timæus, yet I think it may not be amiss again to lay it before the Reader. Item in Timæo, quod Genimina, Delegata sibi mortalium genitura, accepto initio Animæ IMMORTALI, mortale ei circumgelaverint Corpus. De Anima cap. 23.

And

And for this you refer us to the fifty third Chapter of his Treatise concerning the Resurrection of the Body. The chief design of *Tertullian* in this excellent Discourse concerning the Resurrection is to answer the Objections, which Heretics or others made against it, to establish the Certainty, and to give some Account of the manner of it. And accordingly in reference to the last of these, we find him undertaking to prove, in one of the Chapters, not far preceding that you have referr'd us to, that the same Body will *rise* which fell or died. And this he endeavours to make out in Chapter the 48th by shewing that our Saviour's Body, which rose was the same with that which was crucified, and in Chapter the 49th, by proving that the Apostle *1 Cor. xv.* is without all doubt to be understood to have taught the same Doctrine. In Chapter the 50th he endeavours to fence and guard against an Objection to the Identity of the Rising Body from what the Apostle affirms *1 Cor. xv. that Flesh and Bloud cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*, telling us, ^a that by the Kingdom of God is not meant the Resurrection, as if the sense were that Flesh and Bloud could not be capable of a Resurrection, but a State of Eternal Happiness, to which Flesh and Bloud as understood not of the Substance but Qualities cannot attain, affirming still that Flesh and Bloud even in this sense, as under-

^a Non enim Resurrectio carni & sanguini directe negatur, sed Dei Regnum, quod obvenit Resurrectioni (est autem & in Judicium Resurrectio) immo & confirmatur carnis Resurrectio Generalis, quum specialis excipitur. Dum enim in quem statum non resurgat, edicitur, in quem resurgat subauditur, &c. — Carnem & Sanguinem nomine culpæ non substantiæ arceri a Dei Regno.

stood of the Corruptions and Sins of the Flesh, will arise to Judgment and Condemnation. Which I take to be a positive assertion of the Universality of the Resurrection, and consequently a direct Contradiction to this your Hypothesis, which, as has been already proved, cannot consist with such a Universality as is here asserted. In the next Chapter he proves the same, by shewing that our Lord's Flesh and Bloud did inherit the Kingdom of God, and was seated at the right hand of the Father, and that therefore our sinful Flesh and Bloud is however capable of being translated to the same place. After this he proceeds to the Chapter whither you have referr'd us, the main and principal design of which is so far from serving, that it indeed directly contradicts, and totally overthrows the whole drift and tendency of your Argument in this place. For here the *Father* is chiefly employed in endeavouring to prove, that the Body only, and not the Soul will be the subject of the Resurrection. In pursuance of which we find him at the beginning of this Chapter proposing it, as the Opinion of some, ^a that the Animal or Natural Body was to be interpreted to extend to the Soul, and affirmed that this also was to be raised with the Body. In Opposition to these he uses great Variety of Arguments to shew that the Body onely, and not the Soul is to be concern'd in the Resurrection. ^b He urges; *that*

^a Sed Corpus Animale Animam quidam argumentantur, ut illam a carne avocent recidivatam. ^b Porro cum constet fixumque sit, illud resurrecturum corpus, quod fuerit seminatum, ad ipsius rei exhibitionem provocabuntur. Aut ostendant Animam seminatam post mortem, id est mortuam, id est humi elisam, disjectam, dissolutam, quod in illam a Deo decretum

since it is fixt and certain that no other Body is to rise, but that which fell and was sowed, these Men ought to be called upon to produce no other than that same. Or else they ought to prove, that the Soul was that thing, which was sown after death, that is, that the Soul dies, is laid in the Ground, and dissolved; which indeed God never determin'd concerning it; they ought however to shew it's corruption, it's dishonour, it's infirmity, in order to prove that it shall be raised in incorruption, in glory, and in power. And then he goes on to shew in the instance of ^a Lazarus, that great example, as he calls it, of a Resurrection, that his Body onely was laid in the Sepulchre, and almost stunk, and rose again with his Soul indeed, but with it Incorruptible and Immortal, which no one had wrapt about with Grave-Cloaths, no one had laid in the Sepulchre, no one thought did stink, no one saw buried four days. The Bodies of all Men undergo the same Fate and are to have the same event as Lazarus's; but the Soul of no one can, as neither did Lazarus's. And again afterwards shewing that the Animal Body will rise, and when made Spiritual, live for ever, he expressly excludes the Soul from any share in the Resurrection, and confines it onely to the Natural or Animal Body. ^bFor, says he, the Body is made Ani-

cretum non est; proponant corruptelam ejus, & dedecorationem infirmitatem, ut ipsius sit etiam in incorruptelam, & in gloriam, & in virtutem. a Sed enim in Lazaro, præcipuo Resurrectionis Exemplo caro jacuit &c.

— Cum Anima quidem, sed incorrupta; quam nemo vinculis lineis strinxerat, nemo in sepulchro collocarat, nemo jam foetere senserat, nemo quatruiduo viderat seminatam. Totum habitum, totum exitum Lazari, omnium quoque caro hodie experitur, Anima vero nullius. b Recepta enim Anima, rursus Animale corpus efficitur, ut fiat Spiritale. Non enim resurgit nisi quod fuit. Ita unde carni competit corpus Animale dici, inde Animæ nullo modo competit. Caro enim ante corpus, quam animale corpus. Animata enim postea facta est corpus animale. Anima vero effi-
corpus;

mal or Natural by receiving again the Soul, that it may afterwards be made Spiritual [no doubt by receiving that Spirit, by virtue of which it shall be raised, and made Immortal.] For nothing rises but that which was fallen. But now the reason why the Body is called an Animal Body can by no means agree to the Soul. For the Flesh was a Body before it became an Animal Body. For when it was Animated, it was then made an Animal Body. But the Soul, tho' it be a Body, yet because it is not an Animated, but rather an Animating Body, cannot be called an Animal Body, nor be the subject of the Resurrection as that is. --- As therefore the Flesh was made an Animal Body by receiving the Soul, so will it be made Spiritual, by putting on the Spirit. The Father indeed, as we see, mentions the Spirit in this place, but then 'tis beyond dispute evident that he means no other Spirit than the Holy Spirit of God, which the Body and not the Soul is to put on, and by virtue of which that alone and not the Soul is to be raised and immortalized. And therefore in the following words he evidently restrains the effects that both the first and second Adam have upon Mankind to the Body onely. ^a Therefore, says he, since the order and succession in both the Adams, by which the first is said to be made a living Soul, but the last a quickening Spirit, agrees to the Body, and not to the Soul, it must denote onely a distinction in the Body:

corpus; tamen quia ipsa est corpus non animatum, sed animans potius, animale corpus non potest dici, nec fieri quod facit. — Sicut ergo ante animale corpus caro, recipiens animam, ita & postea spiritale induens Spiritum. ^a Itaque cum carni conveniat ordo in utroque Adam, non anima, ut primus homo in animam vivam, novissimus in Spiritum vivificantem, distincti sint, æque distinctio eorum carni distinctionem præjudicavit; ut de carne sit dictum, non primum quod Spiritale, sed quod Animale, postea quod Spiritale.

and

and therefore what the Apostle says, that was not first which was Spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterwards that which was Spiritual, *must be understood of nothing but the Body.* And afterwards as well as all along in this Chapter, he with a great deal of caution and very expressly applies whatsoever he speaks concerning the Resurrections onely to the Body. And altho' towards the end of it he does indeed mention the communication of the Holy Spirit of God which we now enjoy; yet 'tis certain that he represents them onely as a Pledge of those fuller and more powerful communications of it, by virtue of which our Bodies will be raised, not onely not comprehending, but also expressly and positively excluding the Soul from any effect or influence from it, as it is the efficient Cause of the Resurrection, and a Principle of Immortality.

I thought it not improper to be thus minute and particular in giving an account both of the subject and design of those Chapters, which introduce this you have refer'd us to, as well as in representing what is contain'd in this fifty third Chapter, that it might the more plainly and undeniably appear that the Father here intended what he has said about the Resurrection onely concerning the Body, exclusively of the Soul. Now since this is so clear and evident, that no one, I am sure, who considers it can have the least doubt about it, I must confess my self to be quite at a loss to find out to what End or Purpose you should mention this Doctrine of *Tertullian*, concerning the Resurrection of our Bodies: which tho' it be certainly most true in it self, and perfectly agreeable to

to the Analogy of Faith, and Doctrine of the Scripture, yet can never have the least influence or tendency to countenance and support your Notion concerning the Natural Mortality, or Actual Immortality of the Soul. For what tho' *Tertullian* ascribes the Right the Body has to the Resurrection to the Spiritual Body (which however is not true as you thus express it) will it from hence follow with the least force of reason, that the Soul is naturally mortal? And tho' it be most certainly true that the Animal Body will, after the Resurrection, be invested with, or rather, as it may more properly be expressed, be made a Spiritual Body, which indeed I readily grant to be called Spiritual, from the Spirit that dwells in it; yet no one can be so absurd as from hence to infer, that because our Bodies are made Spiritual and Immortal by the Spirit, that this same Spirit has the same effect and influence upon the Soul. If indeed *Tertullian* had affirmed the Soul to be the same with the Body, or if he had not affirmed it to be of a quite different nature from the visible Mortal Body, (notwithstanding that he made it a Body of it's own kind) and to be so framed as of it self to endure to eternity, there might indeed have been some probability in this inference. But since he does nothing of all this, and withal establishes Principles which directly contradict your whole Notion, it appears to me, and I suppose will to every one else, the most precarious and groundless inference that could fall from the Pen of so judicious a Man to conclude that because the Resurrection and Immortality of the Body is by *Tertullian* ascribed to the Spirit, that

therefore the Immortalizing of the Soul must by him be ascribed to the same Spirit.

Thus have I fairly represented, and I think fully Answer'd, whatever you have thought fit to urge out of *Tertullian* in §. 16. of your Dissertation, to make good your *Hypothesis*. I must now return to §. 15. where you profess your design to be to shew, that *Tertullian's* Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul *ex traduce* was universally received and embraced in the Church, until about the fourth Century. And to this purpose you affirm, that it was not till about this time, that the present Doctrine concerning the Creation of the Soul, in the sense Creation is understood by the modern Schoolmen, did begin, and that from this time the Western Churches more especially have been pleased with that turn of St. *Augustin*, that the Soul *creando infunditur & infundendo creatur*. But that even St. *Augustin* himself, who takes notice of this Doctrine of *Tertullian*, dares not however condemn it for a Heresy, but confines the Heresy of *Tertullian* to his siding with the *Montanists*. And that even at this time it was not condemn'd: the Church having neither declared against this Doctrine of *Tertullian*, which, you say, supposed the Soul's Natural Mortality, nor declared for the contrary Doctrine of it's Natural Immortality, and it's immediate creation; which has since prevail'd. Now in Answer to this I think it necessary to observe in the first place, as to what you are pleased to affirm, That *Tertullian's* Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul did suppose it's Natural Mortality, that this Assertion will by no means be admitted by any one who knows ever so little of the Opinions of the Fathers

Fathers concerning the Nature and Duration of the Human Soul: since it so plainly appears from what has been already said, that both *Tertullian*, and all the rest of the Fathers of this time, however they might believe the Soul to be derived *ex traduce*, were notwithstanding always of opinion that it was created by God and in it's own nature Immortal. And therefore I cannot think my self in the least concerned to debate this point with you concerning the Opinions of the Fathers and Judgment of the Church about the Origin of the Soul. For tho' it should be found that in these Ages of Christianity the Soul was thought to be derived from and thro' the Parent, yet since it was at the same time believed and determined to be created by God, and in it's own nature Immortal, I think I may very fairly and without any prejudice to my Cause grant your position, and utterly deny the consequence you would deduce from it, for the natural Mortality of the Soul. And indeed as these Fathers who held this Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul did not believe this consequence could be deduced from it, so neither will it be found in the Nature of the thing it self, to have any manner of Connexion with it. For this Opinion supposes, what was constantly held in the Church, that the Soul was created by God, and more particularly that the Soul of every Descendant of *Adam* was created with and in that one Soul which was given to *Adam*, and derived from it thro' all the several Branches of Mankind, that have ever descended from him. So that the Difference betwixt the Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul, which has been received ever since the time of
of

of St. *Augustin*, and that of *Tertullian*, and others of his time is indeed as small and inconsiderable as is possible: since both suppose every human Soul to be created by God; but *Tertullian*, and those who were of his Opinion, affirm this was done when the Soul of the first Man was created; but St. *Augustin*, and such as embraced his Opinion, will not have this to be performed, but at that very moment when it is infused into the Body, it is to inform. Now I cannot imagin that any considering Man will think the difference betwixt these Opinions so great, as to afford a sufficient ground to infer two conclusions so widely distant from one another, as the Natural Mortality and Natural Immortality of the Soul are. For, not to mention again that both these Opinions suppose the Soul to have been more immediately created by and from God, and upon this Account to have some more than ordinary impress of Divinity and Immortality upon it, what can there be in the Notion of the Soul's being derived *ex traduce* which does imply, or can be thought to infer it to be naturally Mortal? If it be said that this supposes the Soul to be discernible and therefore corruptible and dissolveable. I reply, (besides that *Tertullian* and the rest of the Fathers did not apprehend this Consequence, nor argue after this manner, this being the reasoning of much later times,) that if we suppose all human Souls to have been created with and in that of *Adam*, we may affirm them to have been derived first from his, and so in a perpetual series, without granting *Adam's* Soul to have been discernible. For since this Opinion implies that every particular human Soul was formal-

ly contained in that of the first Man, it will from hence unavoidably follow that this derivation cannot be by a Division of the parts of the Soul from whence it is derived, but by a peculiar way of propagation, without any Division, or Separation of it's Substance. And altho' it must indeed be confess'd that this Notion may not be altogether agreeable to the Opinion of *Tertullian*, yet if we consider the Nature of the thing simply and abstractedly, it will appear at least as probable as any other. And if it be admitted will give a very good Account how tho' the Soul be derived *ex traduce*, yet it may still be indiscerpible, and in it's own nature Immortal: which latter however we are sure those Fathers believ'd, who affirmed it to be so derived. And this I take to be an undeniable Argument, that they did not think any Consequence could reasonably be drawn from the Account they gave of the Origin, to the Natural Mortality of the Soul.

It is indeed certainly true and very just what you have observed, that the Church had not, at this time of *Tertullian*, nor a good while after, determin'd any thing concerning the Origin and Nature of the Soul. For since according to the Opinion of those Ages the Notions that were then disputed or prevail'd concerning these points were far from implying the Natural Mortality, or in the least inconsistent with the Natural Immortality of the Soul, they did not then think themselves at all concern'd to intermeddle judicially or decisively in these disputes, or to determine any thing concerning them. This is most clearly evident as from many other passages of the writings of the Fathers,

Fathers, which might be alledged, so more especially from that very passage in *Rufinus's* Apology to *Anastasius*, which you have cited onely a part of, and which follows entire in these words. *I hear also that there be Questions started concerning the Soul. You are the best judges whether you ought to receive or reject the Complaints that are brought upon this head. But if my Opinion be desired in this matter, I must confess that I have read the several Opinions that have been vented upon this subject. Some I have read who affirm, that the Soul is derived together with the Body from some seminal Principles. And they endeavour to confirm this by what Arguments they can. Of this Opinion I suppose Tertullian and Lactantius among the Latin Fathers to have been, together with some others. Others affirm that God still creates and infuses Souls into Bodies when they are formed in the Womb. Others say that God framed them at first when he created all things, and now assigns them to Bodies according to his pleasure. And this was the Opinion of Origen and some others*

a Audio & de Anima quaestiones esse commotas. De qua re utrum recipi debeat querimonia, aut abjici, vos probate. Si autem & de me quid sentiam quaeratur: fateor me de hac quaestione apud quamplurimos tractatorum diversa legisse. Legi quosdam dicentes, quod pariter cum corpore per humani seminis traducem etiam anima diffundatur: & hi quibus id poterant assertionibus confirmabant. Quod puto inter Latinos *Tertullianum* sensisse vel *Lactantium* fortassis, & alios nonnullos. Alii asserunt quod formati in utero corporibus, Deus quotidie faciat Animas & infundat. Alii quod factas jam olim, id est, tunc cum omnia Deus creavit ex nihilo, nunc eas judicio suo dispenfet in corpora. Hoc sensit & *Origenes* & nonnulli alii Graecorum. Ego vero cum hac singula legerim, Deo teste dico; quia usque ad praesens certi vel definiti aliquid de hac quaestione non teneo, sed Deo relinquo scire quid sit in vero, & si cui ipse revelare dignabitur. Ego tamen haec singula, & legisse me non nego, & adhuc ignorare confiteor, praeter hoc solum, quod & manifeste tradit Ecclesia, Deum esse & Animarum & Corporum conditorem. *Rufin. Apolog. ad Anastas. inter Opera Hieronymi.*

of the Greeks. As for my self I protest before God, that after having read all these Opinions, I have not yet framed any certain and determinate Notion concerning this Question, but leave it to God to know what truth there is in any of them, or to whom he shall please to reveal it. But yet I do not deny that I have read these several Opinions, and must confess my self ignorant which is the right, onely one thing I am sure of, which the Church also plainly delivers, that God is the Creator both of our Souls and Bodies.) From this passage I think it is very clearly evident, if we will be concluded by the Testimony of *Rufinus*, that the Church had not yet declared it self concerning any of these Opinions, and without all doubt the Reason was, because none of them were then thought to be any way inconsistent with the Natural Immortality of the Soul. For if they had, we may rest satisfied they would immediately have been Synodically condemn'd and anathematized; * as we find those Heretics in *Arabia*, commonly called *Psychopannuchites* to have been, who held the Soul was of such a Nature, that it died with the Body, and was at the last day to be raised with it again. So jealous were the Fathers of these early Ages of any Opinion, which supposed or implied the Soul not to be in it's own nature Immortal. But as for any other Notions, which were then thought to be well enough consistent, and easily reconcileable with

* Ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτοὺς πάλιν ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ, κατὰ τὸν δηλαδὲν ἐπιφύοντα χρόνον, δογματίζονται ἄλλοις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσθηταί· οἱ εἰλεον τὴν ἀνθρωπείνῃ ψυχῇ τὴν ὥρην κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνῃ καιρὸν, ἀλλὰ τῇ πλείντῃ συναποδίδωσκει τοῖς σῶμασι, καὶ σωθῆναι φέρεται, αὐτὸς δὲ ποτὶ κατὰ τὸν τῇ ἀναστάσεως καιρὸν σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀναστῆναι. καὶ διὰ καὶ τότε σωτηροῦσθαι εἰς μικρὰς σωθῆναι, πάλιν ὀριζάντες παρακληθεῖς, καὶ ἐκείνῃ, κινήσας τι λόγῳ ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνῃ, ὥστε πρὸς, ὡς μετὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἐκείνῃ, ὡς μετὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἐκείνῃ. Euseb. H. E. lib. VI. cap. 37.

this certain and universally acknowledged property of the Soul, it's Immortality, they let every one abound in his own sense, and follow his own judgment.

As to what you say, that even St. *Augustin* himself, who takes notice of this Doctrine of *Tertullian*, dares not however condemn it for a Heresy; if by *this Doctrine of Tertullian*, you mean his Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul *ex traduce*, and you can mean nothing else, if you would be thought to write pertinently and coherently, I must deny that St. *Augustin* in that place of his Book *de Hæresibus*, which you have reference to, mentions any thing concerning *Tertullian's* Opinion about the Origin of the Soul, amongst those Opinions, upon the Account of his holding of which, he affirms him not to have been reputed an Heretic. And that this may the more undeniably appear, I think it necessary here to present the Reader with that short Chapter in which St. *Augustin* gives an Account of the Heresy of the *Tertullianists*. *The last remains of*

a *Tertullianistæ à Tertulliano* cujus multa leguntur Opuscula eloquentissime scripta, usque ad nostrum tempus paulatim deficientes, in extremis reliquis durare potuerunt in urbe Carthagenensi. Me autem ibi posito ante aliquot annos, quod etiam te meminisse arbitror, omni ex parte consumpti sunt. Paucissimi etiam qui remanserunt in Catholicam transierunt, suamque Basilicam, quæ nunc etiam notissima est, Catholicæ tradiderunt. *Tertullianus* ergo, sicut scripta ejus indicant, animam dicit Immortalem quidem, sed eam effigiatum corpus esse contendit. Neque hanc tantum, sed ipsum etiam Deum corporeum esse dicit, licet non effigiatum, nec tamen hinc Hæreticus creditur factus. Posset enim quoquo modo putari ipsam naturam substantiamque divinam corpus vocare: non tale corpus cujus partes aliæ majores aliæ minores valeant vel debeant cogitari, qualia sunt omnia quæ proprie dicimus corpora: quamvis de Anima tale aliquid sentiat: sed potuit, ut dixi, putari corpus Deum dicere, quia non est nihil, non est inanitas, non est corporis vel animæ qualitas, sed ubique totus; & per locorum spatia nulla partitus, in sua tamen natura, atque substantia immutabiliter permanet. Non ergo ideo est *Tertullianus* factus Hæreticus, sed quia transiens ad Cataphryges, quos ante destruxerat, coepit etiam secun-

the Tertullianists, says he, so called from Tertullian, many of whose writings we have, and who decreased by little and little quite down to these times, continued in the City of Carthage. But when I was there some years since, which I suppose you remember, they entirely failed. For those few which remained came over to the Catholick Church, and surrender'd up their meeting House to them. Tertullian therefore, as appears from his Writings, affirmed indeed the Soul to be Immortal, but then would have it to be nothing but an Organized Body. And not onely so, but he also affirms God to be corporeal, tho' not an Organized Body. But yet he was not looked upon as an Heretic for all this. For he might call God a Body, but yet not think him such a Body whose parts are to be supposed some greater, some less, such as all Bodies are which are properly so called (although his Opinion concerning the Soul is somewhat like this) but he might, as I said, affirm God to be a Body in opposition to his being mere nothing, or onely a quality of the Body or Mind, being intirely every where, and yet not circumscribed by any place, continuing immutably in his own nature and substance. It was not therefore for this that Tertullian was looked upon as an Heretic, but because he pass'd over to the Montanists, whom he had before opposed and weakened and, contrary to the Doctrine of the Apostle, began to condemn second marriages as no better than Fornications, and afterwards separating even from these Montanists, he set up Conventicles of his own. He affirmed moreover, that the Souls of the worst Men after

das nuptias, contra Apostolicam Doctrinam, tanquam stupra damnare: & post modum etiam ab ipsis divisus, sua conventicula propagavit. Dicit sane ipse animas hominum pessimas post mortem in Dæmones verti. And then in the last place he mentions his Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul. Statum autem Animæ credit per traducem propagari. De Heres. in Tertullianistis.

Death

Death are turned into Devils. But he believed the Soul to be derived and propagated by tradition from the Parent. From hence it is very plain, that the Words *nec tamen hinc Hereticus creditur factus*, which alone you could have reference to, when you say *St. Augustin dares not* condemn his Opinion for Heresy, has no manner of respect to his sentiment concerning the Origin of the Soul, but onely to his Notion about the Corporeity of God: it being this Opinion onely that he endeavours to mollify by an Interpretation, and by affirming that *Tertullian* by Body might mean onely substance in opposition to a mere non entity, or modification and Accident of some substance. We find also here not the least mention after what manner the remaining *Tertullianists* were reconciled to the Church, any other-wise, than that they deliver'd their meeting House into the hands of the Catholicks. So that what follows, that in the reconciliation of them, no other Recantation was exacted or expected than that of their Communion and the *Characteristical Doctrines* of the *Montanists* is more than you know, or have any ground from this Chapter of *St. Augustin* to assert.

As groundless and unreasonable altogether is your applying to this particular Opinion concerning the Origin of the Soul, what *Rufinus*, in the words immediately following those I have above cited, alleges for himself in general against those who calumniated him for translating the Books of *Origen* *πρὸ ἀρχῶν*. There were, we know, opinion's in those Books, which were generally disapproved and condemned as soon as known, but it is certain withall that they were not the Opinions he entertained concerning the Origin and Nature of the Soul, which by your

own way of reasoning he could not at this time be condemned for, but some others, which are too well known to need any mention in this place. This and some other instances of your taking so much pains, and using so much force to fetch in Witnesses to speak for your *Hypothesis*, and when you have brought them, your not being able to make them give in an Evidence, which is to your Purpose, makes me ready to suspect, that you entertained your *Hypothesis* first, and afterwards set your self to find out Reasons to support it.

What the Opinion of St. *Hierome* was concerning the Origin of the Soul for brevities sake I omit largely to shew. Onely I think it may not be amiss to give the Reader at length the Passage out of his Epistle to *Marcellinus* and *Anampsychia*, of which you have cited onely so much as would serve your purpose. It is known, that the chief business of this Epistle was to answer a Question, which had been put to him by *Marcellinus* and *Anampsychia*, concerning the Origin and Nature of the Soul. And in order to this he gives an Account in this passage of the several Opinions that were then entertained either by Christians or Philosophers concerning this matter, but for his own refers us to his Answer to *Rufinus* and to St. *Augustin*. "I remember, says he, your Question, or rather that Ecclesia-

a Super Animæ statu memini vestræ quæstionculæ, imo maxime Ecclesiasticæ quæstionis: utrum lapsa de cœlo sit, ut Pythagoras Philosophus, omnesque Platonici & Origenes putant; an à propria Dei substantia, ut Stoici, Manichæus, & Hispaniæ Priscilliani Hæreses suspicantur; an in Thesauro habeantur Dei olim conditæ, ut quidam Ecclesiastici stulta persuasione confidunt; an quotidie à Deo fiant & mittantur in corpora, secundum illud quod in Evangelio scriptum est: *Pater meus usque modo operatur & ego operor*: an certe ex traduce, ut *Tertullianus*, *Apollinaris*, & maxima

Stiatal Question, concerning the Origin of the Soul, whether it comes from Heaven, as the Philosopher Pythagoras, the Platonists, and Origen thought, or whether it be of the substance of God, as the Stoics, Manichæans, and Priscillianists of Spain imagin'd; or whether they were at first created, and are laid up as it were in a Treasury, as some Ecclesiastics foolishly believe; or whether they are still created by God, and sent into Bodies, according to that of the Gospel, my Father worketh hitherto and I work; or whether they be deriv'd ex traduce from the Parent, as Tertullian, Apollinarius, and the greatest part of the western Christians think; so that as the Body begets the Body, so likewise the Soul does the Soul, which subsists after the same manner as the Souls of Brutes: concerning this I say I have given my Opinion in my Answer to Rufinus's Apology to Anastasius: in which whilst by a fallacious and deceitful, not to say foolish confession of his Faith he endeavours to impose upon the simplicity of his Readers, he exposes his own Faith, or rather Infidelity. These Books I presume your good Father Oceanus has. For they were formerly published by way of Answer to the several Calumnies of Rufinus. But however you have with you your holy and learned Bishop St. Augustin, who can teach and explain to you not onely his own, but my Opinion too. In this passage are several things which might very properly

pars Occidentalium autumant; ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic Anima nascatur ex Anima, & simili cum brutis Animantibus conditione subsistat. Super quo quid mihi videatur in opusculis contra *Rufinum* scripsisse me novi, adversus eum libellum, quem sanctæ memoriæ Anastasio, Episcopo Romanæ Ecclesiæ edidit: in quo lubrica & subdola, imo stulta confessione dum auditorum simplicitati illudere nititur, suæ fidei, ino perfidiæ illulit. Quos libros reor sanctum parentem vestrum habere Oceanum. Olim enim editi sunt multis Rufini libris adversus calumnias respondentes. Certe habes ibi virum sanctum & eruditum Augustinum Episcopum, qui viva, ut aiunt voce, docere te poterit, & suam, imo per se nostram explicare sententiam. *Hieronym. Epist. 82.*

be observed, and insisted upon. As *first*, the great diversity of Opinions that were concerning the Origin of the Soul: which as it is indeed a very good Argument that the Church had not yet declared it self upon this point, so it is a plain proof that all were not of *Tertullian's* Opinion, as to this matter. And indeed his restraining the Opinion of the Soul's being derived *ex traduce* to *Tertullian*, *Apollinarius*, and the majority of the Western Christians, certainly implys that the Eastern Christians were of another Opinion, as to this point, which also I shall immediately further make appear. In the next place we here find St. *Hierom* professing himself of the same Opinion with St. *Augustin*, as to the Origin and Nature of the Soul. Now whatever St. *Augustin's* Opinions were, as to this matter, which I shall not stay to shew, yet we are sure, and I think I have sufficiently proved before, that he firmly believed the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and therefore we may fairly infer from hence that St. *Hierome* did so too, and consequently that he could hold and maintain no opinion concerning the Soul which was inconsistent with this known and avowed Opinion of all Christians concerning it.

As I can readily grant that the Church had not at this time formally declared it self in behalf of any of these several disagreeing Opinions, that were then commonly maintain'd concerning the Origin and Nature of the Soul, so I must at the same time affirm that the Notion of deriving the Soul *ex traduce*, tho' it was asserted by *Tertullian*, and indeed generally embraced by the Western Christians, yet was condemned by very many of the Fathers, who lived in this Century. I shall mention onely one or two. A-

thenagoras

thenagoras positively declares against this Opinion in his Treatise of the Resurrection, where he expressly denies: *That Souls are begotten by Souls, and affirms that the Man begets the Man.* And the *Apostolical Constitutions*, those venerable remains of Ecclesiastical Faith, and Discipline, which if not some of them at least drawn up by the Apostles themselves, yet certainly contain the Apostolical Doctrine, mention indeed the Body as produced *ex traduce* from some seminal Principle, but affirm the Soul to be created out of nothing. ^b *He*, saith this Constitution, *that makes the Man out of a little Seed, and then formes the Soul out of Nothing.* And, again ^c *We confess the Soul in us to be Incorporeal, and Immortal, not Corruptible as our Bodies are, but Immortal.* By it's being said here that the Soul is *Incorporeal*, it is implied at least that it is not derived *ex traduce*; since such as held this Original of the Soul did not believe it to be a spirit but a Body. And not to mention any more, *Gregory Nyssen*, tho' a Father not of this Age we are speaking, frequently rejects this Opinion, and more especially in his Book *de Anima*. From hence it may appear, that tho' this Opinion of deriving the Soul *ex traduce* were generally received amongst the Western Churches, yet the Fathers and Churches of the East, were of another sentiment, which will yet further appear by a brief representation of the Opinion of *Origen*, concerning the production, nature, and Immortality of the Soul.

α Οὐ ψυχὰι ψυχὰς γινώσκει, ὡς τὴν ἑ πατρὸς, ἢ τὴν μητρός οἰκεῖνται ὡς ἐσθλαίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνδρώπυς ἀνδρώπυι. β Ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῇ κυρίᾳ τὸ ἀνδρώπυον ἐν μικρῷ ἀτίμευτο-
μεφον, καὶ ψυχὴν αὐτῷ ἐκ ὕπου ἐσθλαίαν γινώσκει. Constitut. Apostol. lib. V. cap. 6.
c Ψυχὴν ἀσώματον ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀθάνατον ὁμολογούμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ φθαρτὴν ὡς τὰ σώμα-
τα, ἀθάνατον. lib. VI. cap. II.

The Opinion of this Learned and Pious Man concerning the Origin of the Soul is agreed by all, and positively affirmed by *St. Hierome* in the passage just now cited, to be very much the same with that of *Pythagoras* and the *Platonists*. Now the former of these, we are sure, ^a believed the Soul of Man to be delibated from the divine Mind, and to be thrust down into these terrene Bodies, that it might be in a state of trial and probation. Now altho' it be certain that *Origen* was not altogether of this Opinion, which plainly imply's, that the Soul is a part of the Substance of God, yet it is evident that he believed the Soul to preexist and to descend from Heaven into these Body's. ^b That he did not believe the Soul to be a part of the divine Substance is evident, not onely from his representing it as onely bearing some affinity to God, but also because he formally condemns *Heracleon* of Impiety for maintaining this Notion: ^c *Believe it, says he, it is very impious to affirm that those who worship God in Spirit are of the same Substance with the Uncreated and ever Blessed God, as Heracleon has lately affirmed.* That he thought the Soul to be præexistent, and to descend from Heaven into these Bodies is evident from an innumerable company of passages, which might be laid together out of his Writings. In his Treatise, *περὶ ἀρχῶν* he affirms, that those rational Beings, which were at first crea-

^a Audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque incolas pene nostros, qui essent Italici Philosophi quondam nominati, nunquam dubitasse, quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus. *Cicer.* ^b Ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλαργίᾳ ἀνδραγαθῷ, πείσμεναι λαδὼν περὶ ὑποκρίσεως λογικῆς, ὡς ἔχουσιν τὴν συγγένειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ. *De Martyrio.* ^c Ἐπιστήσωμεν εἰ μὴ σφιδρα εἰναι αὐτοῖς ὁμοιοῦς τῇ ἀβανίτῃ φύσει καὶ πνεύματι, ὅτι καὶ λέγουσιν τὸν Θεὸν καὶ τὸν πνεύματι τὸν Θεοῦ, ὡς τὸ βραχίονα τοῦ Θεοῦ. *Comment. in Johan.* p. 217.

ted by and from God, before they had done any Good or Evil were pure Minds, but afterwards were degraded into Souls, for their Wickedness, His words are :
^a *From all which it seems plain, that the Mind sinking from it's Original state and dignity, is made and called a Soul; which when it is repaired and improved into it's pristin State becomes again a Mind. And if this be so, it seems to me, that we ought not to think this deviation and degeneracy of the Mind from it's Original Purity to be alike in all, but in some more, in some less, and that some retain very much of their antient vigour, but others little or none at all. And from hence it comes to pass that some are born with brighter parts, and a more flaming Genius, others with abilities more slow and dull, and some are perfectly stupid and unfit for any thing.* But still more express is what he says in another place for the Soul's præexistence, and to prove that it is not uncreated, and yet not made with the Body : ^b *All Souls, says he, and every intellectual Being is made, because God made all things by Christ.* And again taking it as it were for granted and reasoning from it : ^c *If, says he, the Soul of Man, which, while it is the Soul*

^a Ex quibus omnibus illud videtur ostendi, quod Mens de statu suo ac dignitate declinans, effecta vel nuncupata est Anima : quæ si reparata fuerit & correctæ, redit in hoc ut sit Mens. Quod si ita est, decessus ipse mentis ac devolutio videtur mihi, quod non æqualis omnium sentiendus sit, sed vel plus vel minus in Animam verti, & aliquas quidem mentes, servare aliquid etiam prioris vigoris, aliquas vero aut nihil, aut exiguum aliquid. Unde inveniuntur quidam statim ab ineunte ætate ardentioris acuminis, alii vero tardioris; nonnulli autem obtusissimi, & penitus indociles nasci. De Principiis lib. II. cap. 8. ^b Omnes Animæ atque omnes rationabiles naturæ factæ sunt, quoniam quidem omnia à Deo per Christum facta sunt. ^c Si hominis Anima, quæ utique inferior est, dum hominis Anima est, non cum corporibus facta, sed extrinsecus proprie probatur inserta. — Nam quantum ad homines spectat, quomodo cum corpore simul facta Anima videbitur ejus, qui in ventre suum fratrem supplantavit lib. I. cap. 7.

of Man, is certainly inferior [meaning to the Souls of the Cælestial Bodies] *be not framed with the Body, but properly infused from without, then --- Now as to Men, how could the Soul be said to be framed with his Body, who supplanted his Brother even in his Mother's Womb. &c.* And so goes on, by several Instances and Arguments endeavouring to shew, that this Opinion of *Tertullian*, by which he derives the Soul *ex traduce*, cannot be thought to be true.

From hence it may in some measure appear how far *Origen* and the Eastern Churches were from the Opinion of *Tertullian* and the Western Churches concerning the Origin of the Soul being derived from the Soul of the Parent, and formed together with the Body. As to the Nature of human Souls tho' it must indeed be confessed that *Origen* did suppose and assign to them certain thin and Airy Vehicles, yet he certainly held them to be in their own nature Incorporeal and purely Spiritual. This in his Books against *Celsus* as well as throughout his other writings, he so often takes for granted, and makes Use of as an undoubted Principle of Argumentation, that it is perfectly needless to trouble you with any citations to this Purpose. The same may be said concerning the Souls Immortality, which in all his Writings he either supposes, or expressly affirms. Nor can he be understood any where to mean a precarious Immortality, which is owing either to an extraordinary interposition of God's Power and Providence, or flows from any extrinsecal Cause or Principle whatsoever, but which arises from the internal frame and constitution, if I may so speak, of the Soul's purely Spiritual and Incorporeal Nature.

To

To this I suppose you will be ready to answer, that you own §. 17. *Origen's* Opinion to have been for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. But then you call it his *private* Opinion, by this Epithet, I suppose being willing to have it thought, that his *publick* Opinion, and what he commonly taught was contrary to this. What Authority you have to distinguish thus I can't imagin. ^a And tho' a certain infamous Prelate once would have taught a most pious Prince to distinguish between his Publick and private Conscience, yet I suppose *Origen* was too honest a Man to be so good a Casuist. I am sure there is nothing to be found in all his Writings, which could give you the least ground to make this Distinction. Let the place of *Origen* be produced, wherein he so much as once denies, or but speaks doubtfully concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul. But this you know cannot be done. And as to that passage, which you have alledged out of the Preface of his Book *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, it will by no means be allowed to come up to it. ^b *As to the Soul*, says he, *whether it be derived ex traduce, from some seminal Principle, so as that the Nature or Substance of it is contained in those seminal Bodies; or whether it have some other Origin, and whether according to this it be generated or not generated, or whether it comes extrinsically into the Body or not, is what we have no certain Tradition for.* Here indeed *Origen* Affirms that the Church had not

^a *Arch-Bishop Williams* to K. Charles I. see my *Lord Clarendon's History*.
^b De Anima vero utrum ex semine traducis ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius, vel substantia inserta iplis seminibus corporalis habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium: & hoc ipsum initium, si genitum est, annon genitum; vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne, non satis manifesta prædicatione distinguitur. *Proœm. lib. περὶ ἀρχῶν.*

determin'd any thing concerning the Original of the Soul. And the reason was plainly this, because in the Opinions of those times, none of the Notions that were commonly maintained among Christians, were inconsistent with, or could be thought any way to prejudice, the Soul's Natural Immortality. But as for this Truth, it was not onely believed and embraced in the Church, but also the Governours of it were evermore so careful to preserve this belief, that they would no doubt soon have censured and condemned any Opinion concerning the Original, or Nature of it, which had been inconsistent with it's Natural Immortality, as we find they did in the case of those Heretics in *Arabia*, who taught that it died with the Body.

CHAP. IX. *ad* §. 18, 19, 20.

St. Cyprian believed the Soul to be in it's own Nature Immortal. He never ascribes it's Immortality to the Holy Spirit. The first Passage Mr. D. has cited from him consider'd. By the Spirit nothing is meant but the gracious assistances of the Holy Spirit. St. Cyprian's Notion of the first and second Birth not to Mr. D's purpose. Arnobius's Opinion concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul. What Dependence Arnobius thought the Human Soul had. He never takes the Spirit for a Principle of Immortality, with reference to the Duration of the Soul. Lactantius's Opinion concerning the Origin, and Nature of the Soul. He held it to be in it's own nature Immortal. The first passage Mr. D. has cited shewen not to be to his Purpose. The second Passage which Mr. D. has cited to prove the Soul naturally Mortal, proves it to be in it's own nature Immortal. By Immortality when made the effect of the influences of God's Holy Spirit, and the Reward of Virtue is meant a State of Happiness, and not the Eternal Duration of the Soul. The Passage cited out of this Father to prove that he held the distinction betwixt Soul and Spirit does not prove that he believed any such distinction.

THE last Fathers of the Latin Church, which, which you think fit to make use of to serve your opinion are *St. Cyprian, Arnobius, and Lactantius*. And altho' there be a pretty great distance betwixt the times of the first and two last of these, yet I shall take leave to join them together in the same Chapter. *St. Cyprian* flourish'd about the middle of the third Century, that is, about the Year 250, but *Arnobius* and *Lactantius* not till about the beginning of the fourth, that is about the Year 303. *Lactantius* being somewhat younger than *Arnobius*, as having been taught and instructed by him in the

Elements of Oratory at *Sicca* in *Africa*. As to the first of these, *St. Cyprian*, we can find indeed but little in his Writings concerning the Origin or Nature of the Soul, but yet there is enough to shew that he believed it to be in it's own nature Immortal. As to the Origin of the Soul we find him, in his Epistle to *Pompeius*, deriving it, at least that of *Adam*, or supposing it to be derived, from the Divine Breathing. Thus in the passage you have cited out of this Epistle he tells us. *Moreover, says he, a Man is not born, when by the Imposition of hands he receives the Spirit, but in Baptism he is; that being already born he might receive the Spirit, as it was in the first Man Adam. For God first formed him, and then breathed into him the Breath of Life. For the Spirit cannot be received unless there be something to receive it.* The design of *St. Cyprian* in these Words is to shew, that the first or natural Birth must precede the Reception of the Holy Spirit in Baptism, which is the second Birth. And this he represents by the order of Creation in *Adam*, by virtue of which God first formed his Body capable of receiving a Soul, and then Breathed into him this Breath of Life. As to the Nature of the Human Soul, tho' there be little or nothing to be found in his genuine Writings positively and formally asserted upon this Subject, yet I think it may be made undeniably to appear from several passages of them, that he thought it both Spiritual, and in it's own nature Immortal. His Book concerning Mortality seems to be built upon, and throughout supposes the Natural Immortality of the Soul. The design of this most admirable Treatise was to support and comfort the Faithful, under a destructive

Pestilence

Pestilence that then raged with the greatest fury in many Provinces of the Christian World. And in order to fortify them against the fear of Death he frequently puts them in mind of, and represents to them, that state of Immortality, which upon the Soul's leaving the Body it was immediately to enter upon. ^a To this purpose he exhorts them *to depend upon God for that Immortality and Eternity, which he had promised they should enjoy, upon their going out of this World, &c.* And tho' without all doubt the Immortality and Eternity here mention'd has reference onely to that State of Bliss and Happiness, which good Souls are to enjoy upon their departure from their Bodies, yet since this is built upon and evidently supposes the Eternal Duration of the Soul, and since this endless duration is ascribed by this Father, as I shall presently further shew, to no external Principle or Cause besides the general Concurrence of God's Providence, we must suppose all these Passages, which represent to us that blissful state, which is immediately to commence at our Death, to contain, if not a formal and exprefs, yet at least a virtual and implicite assertion of the Soul's Natural Immortality. And in this sense, and according to this Notion we must understand this following passage: ^b *He indeed ought to fear Death, who not being born*

^a Deus de hoc mundo recedenti tibi immortalitatem atque eternitatem pollicetur, & tu dubitas? Hoc est, Deum omnino non nosse: hoc est Christum credentium Dominum & Magistrum peccato incredulitatis offendere: hoc est in Ecclesia constitutum fidem in domo fidei non habere. Quantum profit &c. de Mortalitate. ^b Mori plane timeat, sed qui ex aqua & spiritu non renatus, Gehennæ ignibus mancipatur. Mori timeat, qui non Christi Cruce & Passione censetur. Mori timeat, qui ad secundam mortem de hac morte transibit. Mori timeat, quem de sæculo recedentem

again of Water and the Spirit, is obnoxious to Hell Fire. Let him fear Death, who will receive no benefit from the Cross and Passion of Christ. Let him fear Death, to whom the first Death is onely a passage to the second Death. Let him fear Death, who, when he leaves this World will be tormented in everlasting burnings. Let him fear to die, who by his longer continuance in this World has onely the torment and wailing of the next delayed. Many of our Brethren die in this Pestilential season, that is, many of them are freed from the miseries of this World. This Mortality as it is a Judgment to Jews and Gentiles and the Enemies of Christ, so to the Servants of God it is onely an entrance upon a state of perfect Health and Security. We see here both the Universality and Eternity of future Rewards and Punishments plainly supposed and positively asserted; which can be grounded and bottom'd upon nothing but the Natural Immortality of the Soul. And if St. Cyprian had believed that the Souls of Jews and Gentiles, especially such as never heard of the Gospel, had been naturally Mortal, and would at one time or other have ceased to be, he could not with any Reason have threaten'd them, as in this place he plainly does, with everlasting Punishment. Again, what can be more exprefs than where he affirms: *That our Death is onely a passage to Immortality, and that Eternal Life*

dentem perennibus poenis æterna flamma torquebit. Mori timeat, cui hoc mora longiore confertur, ut cruciatus ejus & gemitus interim differatur. Multi ex nostris in hac mortalitate moriuntur, hoc est, multi ex nostris de sæculo liberantur. Mortalitas ista ut Judæis & Gentilibus & Christi hostibus Pestis est, ita Dei servis salutaris exceptus est. a Quod interim morimur, ad immortalitatem morte transgredimur, nec potest vita æterna succedere nisi hinc contigerit exire: non est exitus iste sed transitus, & temporalitèr itinere decurso ad æterna transgressus.

cannot succeed unless we go out of the World: and that this is not so much our exit out of this World, as our Passage into the next, by which after having finish'd our course here we enter upon Eternity.) And altho' what he here speaks is undoubtedly to be understood primarily and principally of Christians, yet is it by no means to be restrain'd and applied onely to them. For it is beyond Contradiction evident that tho' the Immortality here spoken of, as it signifies an Eternity of Happiness, belongs onely to a certain number of Men, namely, such as are good and virtuous, yet Immortality, as it signifies simply and absolutely an Eternal Duration regards us as Men; which must suppose us to be framed with such Souls, as by their Natural Constitution, together with the general concurrence of Providence, are capable of enduring to Eternity. And this will yet more plainly appear when we consider that St. Cyprian assigns no other Principle or Cause of the Eternal Duration of the Soul, besides it's natural constitution, never so much as once mentioning the Communication of any Spirit, besides the Holy Spirit, nor of this for any other purposes besides those of Regeneration, Sanctification &c. not at all speaking of it as a Principle by which Immortality is given to the Soul.

There is no one, who has ever so little skill and knowledge in the Writings of this Father, but will presently be sensible, that there is hardly any one point he is more full and frequent in than in declaring and explaining the Operations and Effects of the Holy Spirit of God, still ascribing the beginning and rise, as well as the Growth, Progress and Perfection of a Christian's Life to the Divine

Communications and Blessed Assistances of it. To this purpose is what he largely insists upon in his Epistle to *Donatus*, where it is evidently his principal Design, to give a compleat Catalogue of all those Blessed Effects and Fruits of that Holy Spirit, which is communicated to the Faithful by Baptism. And here after he has represented the wretched state he was in before he was converted and baptized into the Christian Faith, he proceeds to give an Account of the Advantages he received from Baptism, and the influence of the Holy Spirit thereby convey'd, in these Words: *But after the*

a Sed postquam undæ genitalis auxilio superioris ævi labe deterfa, in expiatum pectus ac purum desuper se lumen infudit; postquam cœlitus spiritu hausto, in novum me hominem nativitas secunda reparavit: mirum in modum protinus confirmare se dubia, patere clausa, lucere tenebrofa; facultatem dare quod prius difficile videbatur; geri posse quod impossibile putabatur ut esset, agnoscere terrenum fuisse, quod prius carnaliter natum delictis obnoxium viveret: Dei esse cœpisse quod jam Spiritus Sanctus animaret. Scis ipse profecto & mecum pariter recognoscis quid detraxerit nobis quidve contulerit mors ista criminum, vita virtutum. Scis ipse, nec prædico, in proprias laudes odiosa jactatio est: quamvis non jactatum possit esse, sed gratum quicquid non virtuti hominis adscribitur, sed de Dei munere prædicatur, ut jam non peccare esse cœperit fidei, quod ante peccatum est fuerit erroris humani. Dei est inquam, Dei omne quod possumus: inde vivimus, inde pollemus, inde sumpto & concepto vigore, hic adhuc positi futurorum indicia prænosces. Sit tantum timor innocentiae custos, ut qui in mentes nostras indulgentiae cœlestis allapsu clementer Dominus infulsit, in animi oblectantis Hopitio justa operatione teneatur: ne accepta securitas indiligentiam pariat, & vetus denuo hostis obrepit. Cæterum si tu innocentiae, si justitiae viam teneas, si illapsa firmitate vestigii tui incedas, si in Deum viribus totis & toto corde suspensus: hoc sis tantum quod esse cœpisti, tantum tibi ad licentiam datur, quantum gratiae spiritualis augetur. Non enim, qui beneficiorum terrestrium mos est, in capessendo munere cœlesti mensura ulla vel modus est: profluens largiter spiritus nullis finibus premitur, nec coercentibus claustris intra certa metarum spatia frænatur. Manat jugiter, exuberat affluenter. Nostrum tantum sicut pectus & pateat quantum illuc fidei capax afferrimus, tantum gratiae inundantis haurimus. Inde jam facultas datur, castitate sobria, mente integra, voce pura, virtute sincera; in medelam dolentium, posse venenorum virus extinguere; animorum desipientium lapsus reddita sanitate purgare, infestis jubere pacem, violentis quietem, ferocientibus

light from above had infused it self into my Breast cleansed and purified by the Waters of Baptism from the spots and blemishes of my former Life ; after by receiving the Holy Spirit from Heaven the second Birth had framed and moulded me into a new Man, whatever was before doubtful in me immediately commenced certain, whatever seemed shut up from my understanding from thence forward became open and clear, whatever was dark and obscure was bright and shining, that which was difficult, and out of my Power was made possible and easy, and I was forced to acknowledge that what was before earthy, and being born carnal was liable to Sin, now became devoted to God, as being animated by the Holy Spirit. You know very well, and must acknowledge as well as I, what a Death of Sin, and a Life of Virtue freed us from and advanced us to. You I say know, and therefore I need not enlarge upon it, and besides nothing is more disgusting than to boast of our own attainments ; altho' that cannot be called boasting but gratitude, which ascribes every thing not to the Power of Man but to the Gift of God ; by which we attribute our present freedom from Sin to the benefit of Faith, and our former Sins to our own Error and Infirmary. It is from God and from him alone that we can do any thing, from him we live, from him we increase in strength, and from him

rocientibus lenitatem, immundos & erraticos spiritus qui se expugnandis hominibus immerferint, ad confessionem minis increpantibus cogere ; ut recedant duris verberibus urgere, confluentes, ejulantes, gementes, incremento poenae propagantis extendere, flagris cadere, igne torrere. Res illic geritur, nec videtur occulta plaga, & poena manifesta. Ita quod esse jam coepimus, acceptus Spiritus licentia sua potitur : quod necdum corpus ac membra mutavimus, adhuc carnalis aspectus saeculi nube caecatur. Quantus hic animi potentatus, quanta vis est ? Non tantum ipsum esse subtractum perniciosi contactibus mundi, ut qui expiatus & purus, nulla incurantis Inimici labe capiatur ? sed adhuc majorem & fortio rem viribus fieri ; ut in omnem adversarii grassantis exercitum imperioso jure dominetur :

being inspired with a lively Hope, while we are in this World we have the foretast and assurance of our future happiness. Onely let fear and watchfulness be the guard of our Innocence; that so that Holy Spirit, which by the favour of Heaven has enter'd into our Souls, may by our rejoycing in his Company, and carefully endeavouring to keep him, be induced to dwell with us: that our security may not produce sloth and inactivity, and so our old Enemy subtilly slide in upon us again. But if you proceed in the paths of Innocence and Justice, without slipping or falling, if you depend and relie upon God with your whole strength and Soul, and onely continue to be what you have begun to be, your Power will still increase in proportion to the increase of those Graces of the Holy Spirit, which you will receive. For the Gifts of Heaven are not stinted and bounded like those of Men, but the Spirit largely diffusing it self upon us, can have no bounds to limit, nor any thing to stop and restrain it, but it still flows and abundantly encreases upon us. Onely let our Souls desire it, and our breasts be open to receive it, and we may be sure that this Grace will increase as much as our Faith is enlarged. It is from this Spirit that we have a Power by Sobriety, Chastity, sincere Virtue and a Sound Mind to cure such as labour under the distemper of Sin, by expelling the poison of their Vices, by this we render weak minds healthful and strong, by this we make those who are of an angry, fierce, implacable indisposition, mild, gentle, and peaceable, by this same Spirit we dispossess those impure and wandering spirits, that seize upon, and take an intire possession of Men's Minds, and oblige them to confess what they are, and compelling them to leave these their habitations, we increase their punishment, and prolong their groans and lamentations in the tormenting flames of Hell. This work

is performed without being seen, and tho' the blow be private and invisible, yet the punishment is publick and manifest. This is but the beginning of what we shall be, and the Spirit we have received will enlarge our Powers. But having not yet put off this visible Mortality, we are in some degree blinded with the mists of the World. But notwithstanding how great even now is the Power and Force of the Mind? In as much as it is in great measure freed from the pestilential influence of the World, as being sanctified and purged, it cannot be again liable to the incursions of it's Enemy, but gaining still greater strength and force, it has an absolute uncontrouleable Dominion over all the Forces of it's Adversary. In this long passage, which I have thus represented at large, because it contains the fullest account this Father any where gives of all the blessed effects and influences of the Holy Spirit, we see there is not the least mention made of it's being a Principle of Immortality to the Soul. We find him indeed reckoning up in this place both the extraordinary and ordinary Gifts and Graces of it, as it's enabling Christians with a Power to cast out Devils, which at this time was so frequent and common in the Church, that it was appealed to with the greatest Confidence, as a Confirmation of the Truth of the Christian Doctrine, it's enlightning and directing the Understanding, sanctifying and strengthening the Will, subduing and governing the Affections, and lastly it's being an earnest of our future happiness, together with whatever else is most usually ascribed to the Holy Assistances of this Blessed Spirit; but we find here, as well as every where else, the profoundest silence concerning what you ascribe to the Holy Spirit of God,

or

or to any other spirit or principle, that it is the Cause and Ground, by virtue of which the Duration of the Soul is prolong'd to eternity.

Nor where he speaks of Baptism, as he frequently does and gives the most particular Account what the Effects and Advantages of it are, does he ever make the least mention, or give the remotest insinuation that any Principle or Foundation of Immortality, as apply'd onely to the Soul, and signifying the eternal Duration of that, is conveyed by it. ^a He tells us indeed, that it gives us a new Life, that we put off that which was before, and altho' the same constitution and compages of the Body remains, yet that we are changed in Soul and Mind. And again ^b he calls the second Birth a spiritual Birth, by which we are born in Christ by the Laver of Regeneration. But nothing is or indeed can be understood in these places by the new Life and second Birth, but a moral and religious change of the Heart and Life from a state of Vice and Sin, to one of Holyness and Virtue; the same as *St. Paul* calls putting off the old, and putting on the New Man, and our Saviour being born again of Water and the Spirit, which I think was never yet understood of any thing besides the Gracious Assistances of God's Spirit in the Reformation and Change of our Lives from a Habit of Sin to one of Purity and Virtue. And that no-

^a Difficile prorsus ac dubium pro illis tunc moribus opinabar, quod in salutem mihi divina indulgentia pollicebatur, ut quis renasci denuo posset, utque in novam vitam lavacro aquæ salutaris animatus, quod prius fuerat deponeret, corporis licet manente compage, hominem Animo ac Mente mutaret. *Epist. ad Donatum.* ^b Nativitas secunda spiritalis fit qua in Christo per lavacrum regenerationis nascimur. *Epist. ad Pompeium*

thing else can be understood in the former of these places is most evident from that which follows, where St. Cyprian tells us, that before his Conversion he thus argued with himself: *How is so great a change possible, that what is become hard, and turned as it were into a perfect callous substance by long standing, and by an inveterate Custom is grown into a second nature, should so easily and quickly be laid aside? Since by this it must needs have taken the deepest root. How can that Man learn parcimony, who has been accustomed to high fare, and luxurious Dainties?* And so he goes on representing the difficulty of passing from a habit of Vice to one of Virtue, and then in that long passage I have above cited, setting forth the Advantages we receive by Baptism, this is mention'd as the principal, that what is thus difficult, and may seem almost impossible by Nature, Grace or the Assistances of the Holy Spirit convey'd by this Ordinance makes possible and easy. But this gives not the least reason or ground to suppose I know not what adscititious Immortalizing Principle, either distinct from, or the same with, the Holy Spirit of God, which is to give Immortality to the Soul, as being a Principle in it's own nature mortal. And as for his calling the second Birth, a spiritual Birth nothing more can be meant by it than that it gives beginning to a new and spiritual Life, which is carried on and encreases to perfection, by the ordinary Aids and Succors of the Holy

a Quæ possibilis, aiebam, est tanta conversio, ut repente ac perneciter exuatur, quod vel genuinum situ materiæ naturalis obduruit, vel usurpatum diu senio vetustatis inolevit? alta hæc & profunda penitus radice sederunt. Quando parcimoniam discit, qui epularibus cœnis, & largis dapibus assuevit? &c.

Ghost.

Ghoſt. Which the Words following make ſo clear and evident as to ſet it beyond all doubt or contradiction. ^a *For Water, ſays he, of it ſelf, unleſs it have the Holy Spirit, cannot purge away our Sins, and ſanctify us.* We ſee here the cleaning us from our Sins, and the Sanctification of our Nature is the onely work, which is aſcribed to that Spirit we receive by our Spiritual Birth. Again he mentions it frequently as one of the Bleſſed Effects of Baptiſm, that by it our ſins are forgiven. And this, that I may not lay together a great number of places in ſo plain and uncontroverted a point, is moſt clearly evident from his Epiſtle to the Presbyters and Deacons of *Rome* concerning *Lucian* the Confefſor. ^b *Our Lord, ſays he, commanded to baptize all Nations, and has told us that by Baptiſm our paſt ſins are forgiven.* But as here is no mention made or intimation given of your Immortalizing Principle, ſo neither can the aſſertion in this place be any way thought to imply or ſuppoſe it. Laſtly Baptiſm is mention'd by this Father, as the means by which we become the Sons of God, and are made capable of avoiding Eternal Punishment. As to the former of theſe he tells us in his diſcourſe upon the Lord's Prayer : ^c *That the New Man, who is born again, and by Grace reſtored and reconciled to his God, calls him Father, in the firſt place, becauſe now he begins to be his Son.* And as to the latter in his ſhort Apology for the Chri-

^a Peccata enim purgare & hominem ſanctificare aqua ſola non poteſt, niſi habeat & Spiritum Sanctum. *Epiſt. ad Pompeium.* ^b Nam cum Dominus dixerit in nomine Patris ac Filii & Spiritus Sancti gentes tingui, & in Baptiſmo præterrita peccata dimitti, hic &c. *Epiſt. ad Clerum Roman.* ^c Homo renatus, & Deo ſuo per ejus gratiam reſtitutus, Pater primo in loco dicit, quia filius eſſe jam cœpit. *De Orat. Domin.*

stian Religion to *Demetrianus*, after having cited that of the Prophet *Malachi* iv. 1. *For behold the Day of the Lord cometh &c.* he adds that the Prophet here foretells, ^a *that all foreigners, that is such as are profane and strangers to the Holy Family, as having not been born again, nor made the Sons of God, shall be burnt up and consumed.* By which Passage, as it is plainly to be seen that the Father can mean nothing else but that by Baptism Men avoid Eternal Punishment, so is it also worth remarking that it contains an assertion that directly contradicts and overthrows your Hypothesis, in as much as it makes such as are strangers to and never heard of the Gospel liable to the Eternal Fire of Hell. Now as in none of these places which I have cited, and many more which might have been cited, we find the least mention or intimation of any adscititious immortalizing Principle convey'd by Baptism and giving actual Immortality to the *Soul*, so I dare positively aver, that there is no such thing to be found in all his Writings. As for those places you have alledged out of this Father, and the Arguments you have drawn from them, I come now to discuss them, and consider whether they can be at all pertinent to the purpose you have produced them for.

And here the first passage you think fit to make use of is that I have above cited out of the Epistle to *Pompeius*. ^b *Moreover*, says *St. Cyprian* in this

a *Succendi & cremari alienigenas præcinit Dominus, id est alienos à divino genere, & profanos, spiritaliter non renatos, nec Dei filios factos. ad Demetrianum.* b Porro autem non per manus impositionem quis nascitur quando accipit Spiritum Sanctum, sed in Baptismo; ut Spiritum jam natus accipiat, sicut in primo homine *Adam* factum est. Ante enim

Deus

place, a Man is not born when by the Imposition of hands he receives the Spirit, but in Baptism he is; that being already born he might receive the Spirit, as it was in the first Man Adam. For God first formed him, and then breathed into his Face the Breath of Life. For the Spirit cannot be received, unless there be something first to receive it. To which you are pleased to add another known Passage out of the Epistle to *Fidus* concerning the Baptism of Infants, which I must ask the Reader's Pardon for citing at somewhat a greater length than you have done; you having begun it so very abruptly in the middle of a sentence. ^a Moreover if remission of Sins be given to the greatest Offenders, and such as as have sinned long before, by virtue of their believing afterwards, and if no body be to be kept from Baptism, and the Grace conveyed by it, much less ought an Infant to be hinder'd from it, which being but just born, can have been guilty of no sin, excepting only, that being descended from Adam by the Flesh, it must have contracted the Original Guilt and Punishment of Death even from it's Birth. Which therefore has a better title to receive Remission of sins: because not it's own, but others sins are remitted to it. The substance of the Argument you have raised from these two passages is, if I understand it rightly, as follows. *St. Cyprian* you say here mentions two Na-

Deus eum plasmavit, & tunc insufflavit in faciem ejus flatum vitæ. Nec enim potest accipi Spiritus, nisi prius fuerit qui accipiat, *Ep. 74.*
 a Porro autem si etiam gravissimis delictoribus, & in Deum multum ante peccantibus, cum postea crediderint, remissa peccatorum datur, & baptismo atque à Gratia nemo prohibetur, quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans; qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum *Adam* carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquæ prima nativitate contraxit. Qui ad remissionem peccatorum accipiendam, hoc ipso facilius accedit, quod illi remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata.

tivities, one natural, as Man is descended from Adam, the other spiritual, as he receives the Spirit communicated in Baptism. By the former of these we receive from Adam the *flatus vitæ*, or πνοὴ ζωῆς, the *Breath of Life*, by virtue of which Adam was made a ψυχὴ ζῶσα, a *living Soul*, and by receiving it we are reckon'd by this Father to be *Carnaliter nati secundum Adam*, as descending from the flesh of Adam, and by this also we are said *contagium mortis antiquæ contrahere*, because this *flatus vitæ*, *Breath of Life*, is not alone sufficient to secure us from that actual Mortality, to which he was condemn'd immediately upon his fall. But by the later, the second Birth, we receive a second Life, which is ascribed by this Father to the Spirit that is given us in Baptism, which as stopping the contagion of the old Death, must needs be taken for a Principle of Immortality. In order to set this matter in a true and clear light I shall *first*, further shew what St. Cyprian's true sense is in those passages you have cited from him; and *then* return some answer to those deductions you have made from them.

As to the former of these two Passages I have already shewed in part what the *Father* must mean by it, in reference to the Subject, before us, namely nothing but this, that as Adam's Body was first formed, and that then he received into it the Breath of Life, so the Soul must be first given to Man, that there may be a fit Subject to receive the kind influence and immanations of that Spirit, which is communicated by Baptism. Which sense is I think the furthest that can be from making any thing for the purpose of your Immortalizing Principle. For what tho' the Father compares the Breath of Life

that animated *Adam* after he was formed out of Clay, with the inspirations of the Blessed Spirit into the Minds of Men, it cannot certainly with any Reason be thence inferr'd, that the Soul has Life given it by the Spirit, as *Adam's* Body had by the Breath of Life: since this way of arguing if taken strictly, as it ought to be, would suppose that the Soul could not be animated before it receives the Spirit, as *Adam's* Body was not before it received the Breath of Life, which is contrary to sense. But neither is the Spirit here or any where else, as I have before shewn, mention'd as giving any Principle of Life or Immortality to the Soul in a Physical or Natural sense. And therefore it is impossible any such inference could be intended by the *Father* in the Comparison he here makes. The following passage is so far from being in the least to your Purpose, that I must confess I cannot but much wonder how it was possible for you to apply it to this point. And I cannot forbear thinking that you were extremely much to seek for Arguments and Authorities to establish your Opinion upon, when you are forced to make use of such, as any body upon a single and slight view must needs discern do not at all serve the end of your Dissertation. The design of *St. Cyprian* in this Epistle was to confute and overturn the Opinion and Arguments of *Fidus*, that Infants are not to be admitted to Baptism before they be eight days Old. This he does by many Arguments. As first, by shewing that the Grace of God, communicated by Baptism, is to be denied to none, and therefore not to Infants. Next, by shewing that God is no acceptor of Persons, and therefore the admitting Infants into the Church

Church is as well Pleasing to him, as the admitting of adult Persons. And lastly, by proving *à fortiori*, in the words which I have cited, that if adult Persons, who are grievous Offenders, are not unworthy of Baptism, much less ought Children to be deemed so, who have nothing but Original Sin, as they are descended from *Adam*, to be cleansed from. And tho' the Father here mentions the *Contagium Mortis antiquæ*, which by being descended from *Adam* we contract, and by Baptism and the Spirit received in it we are freed from, yet nothing certainly can be meant by it, but the Natural Mortality and Death of the Body, together with the loss of happiness, and the being liable to eternal punishment, as we are by nature the Children of Wrath. But this is so far from supposing the natural Mortality, that it strongly implies the Natural Immortality of the Soul, in as much as an Eternal Punishment, must suppose an eternal Duration. But this we know cannot be if the Soul should be made of such a Nature, as at one time or other actually to die and cease to be. If you should urge and say that it may be preserved from it's actual Mortality by the Pleasure of God, this I have above observed if understood onely of the general Concurrence of his Providence, is easily consistent with, and indeed supposes it's Natural Immortality; but if it be understood of any extraordinary indulgence or interposition of God's Power or Providence, that is a perfectly groundless and precarious supposition, which neither Scripture, Reason, nor Antiquity do give the least Countenance to.

And now as to the matter of Argument, which you have raised from these passages, the Answer

to them may be the shorter, because by this time it appears how little these passages themselves, in their true and genuine sense, can be to the purpose of your Dissertation. I readily yield that *St. Cyprian* in the former of these passages, as well as in divers other places, distinguishes between the first and second Birth, and that he supposes us by the first Birth to receive from *Adam* the Breath of Life, by virtue of which *Adam* became a living Soul, and it may likewise be granted you, that by receiving this Breath of Life, together with a Body, much alter'd no doubt from that Perfection which *Adam's* Body had, while he was Innocent, he may be said to be carnally descended from *Adam*, and in the language of this Father to contract the infection of *the Old Death*. But then I utterly deny, nor do you offer any Arguments to prove, that by this Death is meant the Mortality or Death of the Soul, or indeed any thing else besides the Mortality and Death of the Body, and that Eternal Punishment, which is due to us for our Original, as well as actual sins, as I have just explained it. And as for your saying that the the *flatus vitæ, the Breath of Life*, is not sufficient to secure us from that actual Mortality, to which *Adam* was condemned upon his Fall, I readily grant it, if understood of the Death of the Body onely, and the punishment of the Soul, but then I must profess my self quite at a loss to find how this proves the Soul to be naturally Mortal, and cannot but observe, that there never was any one yet who thought that the Soul could secure the Body from Death. I must likewise grant that the the Spirit we receive by Baptism stops the Contagion of this Old Death. But then I affirm

firm that this is no otherwise done, than as by it's Holy Assistances we are enabled to live so that we may be rewarded Soul and Body with Eternal Happiness, when at the last day this same Spirit by his Power shall raise and reunite our fallen, dissolved, scatter'd Dust to our Immortal Souls, never to be again separated from them.

And it is no doubt with reference to this Life, that those passages, which in the process of this Argument you mention, and which I have fairly cited above with what goes before and follows them, are secondarily and remotely to be understood, where he tells us, *a That we are animated into a new Life, by the laver of this healing Water.*, And again where he says, *b That what was earthy, because liable to sin, by reason of it's fleshly Original, began now to belong to God, as being animated by the Holy Spirit.* For tho' it be most certain that St. Cyprian in the former of these places speaks primarily and chiefly concerning a moral Change of the Heart and Life from Sin to Virtue, and therefore that the new Life here is to be understood principally of a Life of Religion, [as appears beyond dispute not onely from the Scope and Design of this Epistle, but also from the Words immediately following, *quod prius fuerat deponeret, corporis licet manente compage, hominem animo ac mente mutaret*, yet I cannot but think that the future Life of Happiness and Glory, to which the present new Life of Virtue and Holiness is a necessary preparation, may also be understood by it. But no one certainly can ever think, that by the

a In novam vitam lavacro aquæ salutaris animatus. b Terrenum fuisse, quod prius carnaliter natum delictis obnoxium viveret; Dei esse cepisse quod jam Spiritus Sanctus animaret.

new Life can be meant any thing of a Supernatural and extraordinary Principle of Immortality, super-added by Baptism to the Soul; since here is not the least intimation given of any such Principle, but the contrary is most plainly evident. The same is likewise most clearly manifest concerning the other passage here mention'd, which every one that reads, as I have cited it before at large, will immediately be convinced cannot be understood of any thing but a moral Change. For is not this the onely effect here mention'd of our fleshly Original, that we are liable to Sin? And therefore can our belonging to God mean any thing besides a Reformation of our Lives from worse to better? And as for his using the word *Animaret* to express this by, that is plainly for no other reason than in pursuance of the Metaphor of a new Life of Holyness the very Essence and Soul of which is owing to those gracious Assistances of God's Spirit, by which we are enabled to perform good Actions. Nor is any thing else meant by another passage you have cited immediately after in these words: *After by receiving the Holy Spirit from Heaven, the second Birth had framed a moulded me into a new Man:* where by the *New Man* no doubt is understood a New Life of Virtue, in opposition to the old Man, or a Life of impurity and unholyness. And this, not to mention abundance of other Arguments, is evident from the words immediately following where 'tis plain he speaks onely of the Ordinary Communications of the Holy Spirit, by virtue of which

a Postquam celitus Spiritu hausto, in novum me hominem nativitas secunda reparavit.

this new made Life is formed in us. It is therefore altogether without Ground, or shadow of Reason, that you affirm this New Man to be the Man from Heaven, in the Language, as you say, of the *Apostle* and *Plato*: which New Man however neither the *Apostle* nor *Plato* ever dreamt of, in the sense you speak of, as has already been abundantly shewn.

St. *Cyprian* is followed by *Arnobius*, tho at the Distance of near 60 years. This *Father*, if he may be called a Father, tho' singular, not to say Heretical, in many of his Opinions, yet had almost the same Sentiment with many of the rest, concerning the Origin of the Soul. And tho' he is peculiar in his Notions concerning the Nature of the Soul, yet he owned it to be of it self Immortal, with those limitations I have before put to this Notion, namely so, as to make it dependent upon God. As to the Origin of the Soul he thought with *Tertullian*, that it was derived *ex traduce* from the Parent, with this difference however that *Arnobius* seems to suppose it to have come solely and intirely from the Parent; whereas *Tertullian's* Opinion, if attentively consider'd, will appear to amount to no more than this, that all Souls were created with and in that first of *Adam*, and are derived from that thro' all the Successive generations of Men. And tho' it be most certain, that when he speaks concerning the Origin of the human Soul, he says, in one place *uno ex fonte omnium nostrum defluunt Animæ*, all our Souls flow from one Fountain, which may seem to denote that his Notions as to this point were the same with *Tertullian's*, yet in other places, where he more fully and largely insists upon this matter, he sufficiently declares himself to

be of a different sentiment. And accordingly we find him not onely positively and fully asserting and declaring this to be his Opinion, but also frequently arguing against, and endeavouring to confute an Opinion of the Platonists and others, who by deriving the Soul immediately from God, and making it a part of the divine substance, seemed to contradict and overturn this Notion of his. To this purpose is what he answers to a Question, which he supposes a Heathen might ask: *a What is the Origin of Man, and what are, and from whence came their Souls?* To which he gives no other Answer indeed, than that they are derived *ex traduce*, and propagated after the same Manner as the Souls of Brute Animals. And we find him frequently mentioning with scorn, and largely and fully confuting that Opinion according to which the human Soul is immediately derived from God. To this purpose he mentions some *b* who were puffed up with a vain and immoderate Opinion of themselves, who affirmed that Souls were not onely next to God in Dignity, and Degree, but also *genitore illo ac patre prolatas*, proceeding as it were from the maker and framer of all things, and therefore that they are *Divine, Wise, Learned, &c.* Which Opinion he condemns, and after he had proved the very foundation, upon which this Notion is built, that is to say,

a Unde inquitis homines, & ipsorum hominum quid aut unde sunt Animæ? Unde sunt Elephanti, Tauri, Cervi, Muli, Asini? Unde Leones, Equi, Canes, Lupi, Pantheræ? Eorumque quæ vivunt, quid aut unde sunt Animæ. *p.* 79. *b* Quare nihil est quod nos fallat, nihil quod nobis polliceatur spes cassas, id quod nobis à quibuldam dicitur viris, immoderata sui opinione sublati animas immortales esse, Deo, rerum ac principi gradu proximas dignitatis, genitore illo ac patre prolatas, divinas, sapientes, doctas, neque ulla corporis attræctione contiguas. *p.* 53.

that all knowledge is Remembrance, to be in it self impossible, he concludes that we can derive nothing from Heaven, and that as the Knowledge of the Soul is owing to it's own Acquisition, so the substance of it also is intirely derived from, and born of, the Parent.

As to the Nature of the Human Soul it seems to me that *Arnobius* thought it be neither purely material, or corporeal, nor purely immaterial and incorporeal but as it were of a middle nature between both. For I cannot but think this his middle Nature must be understood with reference onely to God, and Body, of a nature and essence between which two alone he will have the Soul to be. And in this sense he makes even the Blessed Angels themselves to be of such a middle Nature as to be equally different and distant from the Nature of God, and of Body. So that in truth he seems to determine no otherwise concerning the Nature of the Human Soul, than he does concerning the Nature and Essence of the Angels, and whatever other Creatures there may be of a more exalted and glorious nature and order: *All which*, he tells us, *whether they be Gods, Angels, or Demons, or by what other name soever they may be called, are themselves of a middle Nature, and in a mutable condition.* And according to this Notion we find him frequently mentioning the *Medietas Animarum*, and their *anceps ambiguaque natura*. By all which he no doubt understands nothing but what upon a due considera-

a Omnes omnino Dii, Angeli, Dæmones, aut nomine quocunque sunt alio, qualitatis & ipsi sunt mediæ, & ambigæ fortis conditione mutabiles. p. 67.

tion will be found not altogether disagreeable with the common Opinion, but yet which is directly opposite to, and fundamentally overturns that Notion of the *Platonists* and others, which he frequently sets himself to confute, namely, that the Soul is of the same Nature with God: which he wholly destroys by shewing that it is of a middle Nature between the purely spiritual Nature of God, and the gross Compages of corporeal Concretions. True indeed it is that he seems in some places to make the Soul to be in some sense corporeal, but what it is he means by this corporeity is not so easy to determine: whether he will have the Soul to be a Body of it's own kind, or whether by Body he means no more than substance, as *St. Augustin* represents *Tertullian's* sense in this case to be, is altogether uncertain.

But notwithstanding this, how uncertain soever it may be, what this Father's Opinion was concerning the Nature of the Soul, we are pretty sure that he held it to be in it's self Immortal. For speaking concerning such Opinions as were common to Christians with the Philosophers he mentions the Immortality of the Soul as one. Which because he affirms to have been the same among Christians, as among the Philosophers, must therefore be understood of a Natural Immortality. ^a *Most of those things, says he, which we believe your Philosophers also thought fit to be believed. For Plato thought as we do, that all our hope is to be placed in God alone: that there will be a Re-*

a Pleraque quæ credimus etiam Philosophi vestri credenda duxerunt. Sentit enim nobiscum *Plato* Deo uni spes nostras committendas: resurrecturos mortuos: animas esse Immortales.

urrection of the Dead: and that our Souls are Immortal. And altho' it be most certain, that he frequently sets himself in this second Book, to prove that the Soul is not Immortal, in the sense and signification of *Plato*, yet it is withal too evident to be denied, that this is onely with reference to that opinion, which he and some other Fathers have ascribed to *Plato*, that the Soul is a part of the substance of God, and consequently must have the same Immortality that belongs to the Divine Nature, which, because it implies necessity of Existence, is what he very justly denies can agree to the Human Soul, without denying or disallowing it's Natural Immortality. It must indeed be confess'd that he always affirms this Immortality to be principally owing to the favour of God, as he is the giver of it. By which I cannot find that he means any thing more than that our Souls, as all created Beings do, depend upon the general Concurrence of God's Providence, for the continuance of that Being, Existence, and all the Powers of them, which were given them by virtue of their Creation. And in no other sense but this is what he says in the following words to be understood.

^a Since therefore these things are so, it is not vain or absurd to believe, that Human Souls are of a middle condition, as being not created by the first Being, but liable to the Laws of Mortality, of small and perishing strength, who have perpetuity bestowed upon them from, and

^a Ergo cum hæc ita sint, non absone neque inaniter credimus, mediæ qualitatis esse animas hominum, utpote ab rebus non principalibus editas, juri subjectas mortis, parvarum & labilium virium, perpetuitate donari, si spem muneris tanti Deum ad Principem conferunt, cui soli potestas est talia corruptione exclusa largiri.

ought to ascribe so great a Gift to, the Bounty onely of the supreme God, who alone has a Power to bestow an Eternity, which will know no corruption. The last words of which passage, tho' they expressly ascribe the perpetual duration of the Soul onely to God, yet can be understood of nothing but his giving it to them by virtue of that nature he has endowed them with, and continuing the same to them, by the general Concurrence of his Providence. And in this sense it is most undeniably true, what he here says, that it is God alone, who could give Immortality to the Soul, by giving and enduing it at first with such a nature, as by the continuance of this general concurrence, will make it exist for ever, but which however without such concurrence cannot preserve it self, and may upon this Account be truly said to depend wholly upon the Divine Grace and Favour. And this is all, which, as to the point before us, is desired to be granted; since it not onely does not contradict, but supposes the Soul to be in it self Immortal. This I think is a true and just, tho' short, representation of *Arnobius's* Opinion concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul: which will appear more clearly evident, and be confirmed more fully, by a particular Examination of, and a full Answer to all those passages and arguments, which you have cited and drawn in §. 19. from his Writings.

And here I cannot but observe in the first place, that tho' *Arnobius* should be found to have been of your Opinion, which however I hope fully to prove he was not, yet since he was onely a *Catechumen*, when he wrote these seven Books against Heathenism

Heathenism in defence of Christianity, and consequently not fully instructed in the Doctrines of his Religion, and the Tradition of the Church, and since, as you own and all observe he abounds with Paradoxes upon this, as well as almost all the other points in Divinity, insomuch as some have thought his Opinions favourable even to *Arianism* it self, I think his Authority can be reputed of no great weight one way or the other, nor himself be looked upon by any means as a proper and competent Witness to the Faith and Doctrines of the Church and Age wherein he lived. How far what he says is conformable to the Opinions of the other Catholick Doctors of these early times does, I suppose, already in some measure, and will presently more fully appear: when I shall have made it evident that whatever singular or Heretical Opinions he had entertain'd in other matters, yet as to the Immortality of the Human Soul, he was of the same sentiment, which the Catholick Church holds now, and has in all Ages held as to this point.

As to what you say that *Arnobius*, as well as *Tertullian*, and some other of the Fathers confute *Plato* for making the human Soul to proceed immediately from God, and to be a part of the Divine Nature, and therefore to have that sort of Immortality which peculiarly belongs to the Divinity, it must indeed be confessed, that both this Father, and some of the rest are much employed upon this Argument. But then it was not so much in opposition to *Plato*, (who, whatever these Fathers might think, was not indeed of this Opinion, but onely gave occasion to it, as might fully be made to appear were it worth the while) as to some Heretics

retics of these times, such as were the *Manichees* and *Priscillianists*. These affirmed the Soul to have some nearer Relation to the Divine Nature than what *Aratus* dreamt of, when he affirmed Men to be the Offspring of God, as they were made by him. In opposition therefore to these alone it is that the Fathers affirm the Soul to be derived *ex tra-*
duce from the Parent, to be corporeal, and lastly to be mortal, as that is opposed to, and contradistinguished from the absolute, independent, necessarily existent Immortality of the Divine Nature, which is inseparable from it, and cannot be communicated to any Creature whatsoever. To make this beyond contradiction evident, as to *Ar-*
nobius, I might here lay together a very great Number of Places out of his second Book, but I shall onely trouble you with a few passages. It is no doubt in this sense onely, that what he says in the words following, where he applies himself more especially to such as were of the Opinions I but now mention'd, is to be understood: *“ Lastly, says he, why is the Soul it self, which by you is said to be Immortal and a God, sick when the Body is so, why is it weak in Infancy, worn out, delirous, foolish, and past sense in Old Age? In which place his design is evidently nothing but to shew, that the Soul is not a part of the Divinity, nor Immortal in the same sense and manner as God is, by affirming it to be passible and affected in and with the Body, which if it were a part of the Deity it could not be. In pursuance of the same argument it is that he says:*

a Ipse denique Animus, qui Immortalis à vobis & Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus, delirus & fatuus, & insana. p. 47.

That

^a That if Men either understood themselves thoroughly, or knew ever so little of the Divine Nature, they would never have pretended that their Souls were Divine and Immortal, nor would they have vainly thought themselves to be so great and extraordinary Beings, because they are able to procure for themselves the several little Conveniences and Advantages of Life, &c. Which we see clearly is levelled onely against the Opinion of those, who would have the Soul to be of the same nature with God, and consequently to have the same Immortality, which is the peculiar attribute of the Divine Nature. It is plainly with reference to these Men onely, that he pursues the same way of Reasoning in the words following a little after those I last cited: ^b If, says he, they had duely consider'd these things, they would never have been so puffed up with Pride and Arrogance, as to think themselves some kind of Deities and equal to the Majesty of the supreme God, because they were the Inventors of Grammar, Music, and Oratory, and found out Geometrical Theories. In all these places, and wherever else he insists upon this Argument, we find *Arnobius's* onely design was to oppose and confute that extravagant Opinion of some, who thought themselves with reference to their Souls equal even to God himself, and affirmed in consequence hereof the same sort of Immortality to belong to them, which is proper onely to God. So that when in these and other places he affirms

a Quod si homines penitus aut ipsos se noscent, aut intellectum Dei suspicionis alicujus acciperent aura, nunquam sibi adsciscerent divinam immortalemque naturam: nec existimarent quiddam magnificum se esse, quia sibi craticulas, trulleos, craterasque fecerunt, &c. p.56. b Nunquam, inquam, crederent, *Typho* & Arrogantia sublevati prima se esse numina, & æqualia principis summitati, quia Grammaticam, Musicam, Oratoriam pepererunt & Geometricas formulas. *Ibid.*

the

the human Soul not to be Immortal, and to depend upon the Will and Pleasure of God, we are not so to understand him, as if he thought it in it's own nature Mortal, but onely as removing from it that same sort of Immortality, which inseparably belongs to the Divine Nature, and which as implying independence and necessary existence must be incompatible with the dependent precarious state of all Created Beings.

And this too will appear to be the most proper key to open the true and genuine sense of that first passage, you have cited from this Father, where he says that the perpetuity of Souls *is the Gift and Favour of the supreme God*. Which a little after he purposely sets himself more fully and largely to explain not onely concerning human Souls, but also concerning the Angels and Dæmons, the Eternity of whose duration he likewise expressly ascribes to the Grace and Favour of God, but then he plainly and positively restrains it to that Grace and Favour, which was given to them at their Creation, and which therefore can be understood of nothing, but that same almighty Will and *Fiat*, by virtue of which they were at first made, and still continue in Being to Eternity, and which, as has already been often observed, is consistent with their natural Immortality. His words immediately follow those, wherein he affirms the Nature of the Heathen Deities, Angels, and Dæmons to be in the same middle quality and condition with that of the Human Soul. ^b *For since, says he, we all grant, that there is one Father of all things, who onely has Immor-*

a Summi principis munus ac beneficium. b Nam si omnes concedimus unum esse rerum patrem, immortalem atque ingenum solum, nihilque omnino

ality and is uncreated, and that there could be nothing before him, which could come under any Denomination, it follows, that all they, which in the vulgar opinion are looked upon as Gods, were either begotten by him, or made by by his word. If they be produced and created by him, they must be after him in order and time: and if they be after him in order and time, they must have had a beginning of their Being and Life. But whatever has a beginning and entrance into Life, must also be capable of having an End. But the Gods are said to be Immortal. They are not therefore so by nature, but by the Will and Gift of God the Father. After the same manner therefore as Immortality is the Gift of God to all created Beings it is so also to the Souls of Men, however we may imagin that Death may put an end to their Life, and that at last they may be utterly annihilated. The Divine Plato, in that Treatise, which is intituled Timæus, wherein he speaks many things most worthy of the Divine Nature, and far removed from the vulgar Opinion, affirms the inferior Deities, and the World to be in their own nature corruptible, and that they are not utterly incapable of Dissolution, but yet by, the Will and general Concurrence of the supreme God, are

omnino ante illum, quod alicujus vocaminis fuerit invenitur: sequitur ut hi omnes quos opinatio credidit Deos esse mortalium, aut ab eo sint geniti, aut eo jubente prolati. Si sunt prolati & geniti & ordinis sunt posterioris & temporis: si ordinis posterioris & temporis, ortus necesse est habeant, & exordia nativitatis & vitæ. Quod autem habet introitum, & vitæ incipientis exordium, necessario sequitur ut habere debeat & Occasum. Sed Immortales perhibentur Dii esse. Non ergo natura, sed voluntate Dei Patris ac Munere. Quo igitur pacto Immortalitas largitoris est Donum Dei circa prolatos, & Animas hoc pacto dignabitur Immortalitate donare. quamvis eas mors sæva posse videatur extinguere, & ad nihilum redactas irremediabili abolitione delere. Plato ille divinus multa de Deo digna, nec communia sentiens multitudini, in eo sermone ac libro, cui nomen Timæus inscribitur, Deos dicit & mundum corruptibiles esse natura, neque esse omnino dissolutionis expertes: sed voluntate Dei Regis ac Principis vinctione in perpetua

preserved to Eternity. For that which is once framed with wisdom, and has all it's due perfections, is preserved by the Goodness of God, and cannot be dissolved and annihilated, by any thing but that which first gave it Being. Since therefore things are thus, and we can have no other Notions of them, you ought not to wonder that we affirm the Soul to be of a middle condition and quality, (when Plato has affirmed the same concerning the Gods themselves) and that it is preserved to Eternity by the Will and Favour of the supreme God. It is, I think, beyond all doubt and dispute, evident, that Arnobius speaks here of no other Grace and Favour than the general Will and Concurrence of God's Power and Providence; by which all things are supported in those Beings, which were given them by their Creation, by virtue of which he affirms not onely the Souls of Men, but even the blessed Angels themselves, and if there be any other Creatures of a more exalted and Divine Nature, continue to Eternity. So that we see here all new Indulgences, or extraordinary Interpositions of Divine Power to be fairly excluded, and nothing requisite to preserve the human Soul to Immortality, but what is necessary to continue the existence even of the brightest and most glorious Seraph; which certainly cannot be by the communication of any extrinsecal favour, or the imparting to it any Principle of Spirit of Immortality, but onely

p. rpetua contineri. Quod enim recte sit vinctum, & nodis perfectissimis colligatum, Dei bonitate servari ? neque ullo ab alio, nisi ab eo qui vinxit, & dissolvi si res poscat, & salutari vinctione donari. Ergo si res est ita, nec aliud convenit vel existimare vel credere, quid animas admiramini media dici qualitatis à nobis, cum numinibus ipsis dicat Plato medias esse naturas, sed ad continuam & inocciduum vitam principali benevolentia subrogari. p. 67, 68.

by

by the continuance of that same Will and Power to preserve it, by which it was at first made, and brought into Being. It is likewise as clearly evident, that the Father, neither in this nor any other place throughout his Writings, denies any other Immortality to belong to the human Soul, than he denies to agree to the Angels themselves, which can be no other than that which is proper and peculiar to the divine Nature, and which never any body yet affirm'd could ever agree to any Being but God. And it is in this sense onely that he denies the Heathen Gods, and in consequence human Souls (whom he alwaies affirms to have the same Immortality with these inferior Deities) to be in their own Natures Immortal, namely, as such a Natural Immortality implies necessity of Existence, which can belong to that Being onely that is from everlasting, and has his Essence, Existence, and whatever properties belong to these from himself alone. And this will appear beyond contradiction evident from the manner of his reasoning in this Passage. For does he not here expressly and positively ascribe *Immortality* onely to that Being, which is *ingenitum*, uncreated, and has no beginning? Meaning no doubt that sort of Immortality, which is proper and peculiar to the Divine Nature and Essence. Again, does he not ascribe *Mortality* to all those Beings, which are created and have a beginning, and that upon no other account than because they are created, and have a beginning? But it is evident that this is a sort of *Mortality*, which is easily consistent with natural Immortality: since it implies nothing more than this, That all Created Beings must have an End, if that Will

and Power should be restrained and withdrawn, by which they are upheld and preserved to Eternity. And he makes this to be the Case, not onely of the human Soul, but even of those Creatures too, which are of a nature and constitution far superior to that of the Soul.

And this, which is undoubtedly the true and genuine sense of *Arnobius* throughout these seven Books, so far as he is consistent with himself and his avow'd Principles, gives a plain and true Account, not onely of that part of the forecited Passage, which you have quoted, but also of all the other passages you have made use of to this same purpose. As where he says: *You, meaning the Heathens, and more especially the Philosophers, place all the hope you have of the Salvation of your Souls within your selves, and imagin you can be made Gods by your own endeavours, but the sense we Christians have of our own Infirmary, makes us promise nothing for our selves, whilst we consider the weakness of our own natures, and that upon all occasions we are easily overcome by our Passions.* Now it is plain to any one that thinks, that the sense of these words, supposing they had been at all applicable to your Purpose, can be no other than this; That our Souls cannot be supported by the virtue and strength of themselves alone, without the Concurrence of God Almighty's Providence: which is not more evidently true, than it is consistent with the Soul's being notwithstanding in it's own nature Immortal. But after all I

a Vos vestrarum animarum salutem in ipsis vobis reponitis, fierique vos Deos vestro fidei et instestinoque conatu: at vero nos nobis nihil de nostra infirmitate promittimus, naturam intuentes nostram virium esse nullarum, & ab suis affectibus in omni rerum contentione superari. p. 66.

believe it will clearly appear upon a more attentive survey of these words, with a special Reference to what goes before and follows them, that they are rather to be understood of such a moral Perseverance in Virtue and Holiness, as will in the end advance Men to Eternal Happiness, than of any physical or natural continuance and permanency in Being. And in this latter sense no one can think they can be in the least to your Purpose. Again when he saies a little further: *a You, speaking to the same Philosophers, imagin that as soon as you shall be separated from the Body, you shall have wings, by which you will be able to mount up to Heaven, and ascend even to the Stars. But we dare not be so bold, as not thinking it in our own Power to go up to the superior Regions: since it is uncertain whether we shall deserve to have Life bestowed upon us, and to be exempted from Death [Punishment.] But you think you shall presently, &c.* I cannot think he means any thing more, than that it is not in our own Power, nor can be ascribed to our own strength, that we are enabled to live such a Life, as may make us capable of enjoying the Happiness of the other World. For what else can he mean by saying, *it is uncertain whether we may deserve to have Life bestowed upon us*, but that we cannot tell whether our Good Works and Pious Services will be so far accepted by God at the last day, as that he

a Vos cum primum soluti membrorum abieritis è nodis, alas vobis affuturas putatis, quibus ad coelum pergere, atque ad sidera volare possitis. Nos tantam reformidamus audaciam, nec in nostra ducimus esse positum potestate sedes superas petere; cum & hoc ipsum habeamus incertum, an vitam accipere mereamur, & ab lege mortalitatis abduci. Vos in aulam Domini-

will bestow eternal Rewards upon us for them? And what can be meant by it's being uncertain, *whether we shall be exempted from the Law of Mortality*, but this, that it is dubious whether we shall escape Eternal Punishment, which according to his erroneous Opinion was at last to put an end to the Being both of Soul and Body? It is further evident that he here, as in the preceding passage, sets himself to oppose the Opinion of the *Platonists* concerning the flight of the Soul up to Heaven immediately after Death. Now what *Plato* thought the *πνεύμας* to consist in I have already observed, namely, in Good, Virtuous, and Wise Actions. It must therefore be the sense of *Arnobius* in this place also, that it is not by our own strength, that we are capable of Performing such Actions as will deserve, and be rewarded with, Happiness. This, which any considering Man will easily perceive to be the true sense of these Words, is plainly so very far from serving any purpose of yours, either in the Dissertation in general, or in that particular Section before us, that it evidently makes against you, in as much as it supposes it to be in the Power of every Man with God's Assistance by a Virtuous Life to obtain that *πνεύμας*, which will wing his way and carry his Soul up to Heaven.

It must here be observed that *Arnobius* among his other singular and heretical Opinions held also this strange and absurd Paradox, that the Souls of the wicked would not exist to eternity, but after a long Punishment and Torment in Hell be consumed. To this purpose is what he mentions concerning the Opinion of *Plato* in these words: '*Altho'*, says he,

a Quamvis enim vir lenis, & benevolæ voluntatis inhumanum esse crediderit

Plato being a Man of a mild temper, and kind Disposition, thought it inhuman to condemn Souls to utter extinction, yet it was not without reason that he thought that they were thrown into Turbid and Scalding Rivers, which flowed with terrible Balls of Fire. For they are cast into such a place, and being reduced to nothing, undergo a perpetual annihilation. For they are of a middle condition, as we are assured by Christ himself, and capable of perishing, if they are ignorant of God, but will be freed from Destruction, by endeavouring to avoid his Punishments and obtain his Rewards. And again where he says: *Your Affairs are in a doubtful Condition, I mean the salvation of your Souls, and unless you apply your selves to know the supreme God, a most dreadful Death awaits you, when you shall be separated from the Body, which will not presently put an End to your Being, but will consume you by a long, and most tormenting Punishment.* And a great deal more he has to the same purpose in other places. Now tho' it cannot be denyed that this is a most erroneous Opinion, and contrary not onely to the Analogy of Faith, and the exprefs Testimony of Scripture, but also to the Faith of the Church, and the Profession of all the Orthodox Christians that ever were in the World, and which ought therefore to

diderit, capitali animas sententia condemnare, non est tamen absone suspicatus jaci eas in flumina torrentia flammarum globis, & canosis voraginibus tetra. Jaciuntur enim & ad nihilum redactæ, interitionis perpetuæ frustratione vanescunt. Sunt enim mediæ qualitatis, sicut Christo auctore compertum est, & interire quæ possint Deum si ignoraverint, vitæ & ab exitio liberari, si ad ejus se minas atque indulgentias applicaverint. p. 52. b Res vestra in ancipiti sita est, salus dico Animarum vestrarum, & nisi vos applicatis Dei principis notioni, à corporalibus vinculis exolutos expectat Mors sæva, non repentinam afferens extinctionem, Sed per tractum temporis cruciabilis pænæ acerbitate consumens. p. 86.

be immediately rejected, and condemned, yet it at the same time gives us the best light and information what *Arnobius* meant by what he mentions so often of God's Bounty and Indulgence in saving Men from Destruction, namely, not his communicating to them any Spirit or Principle of Immortality with reference to their Souls, but his enabling them by the divine Assurances of his Holy Spirit, so to order their Lives that they may escape that Punishment, which according to his Notion would End in their Destruction and Annihilation. And this is the true and genuine sense of all those places, which you have cited, wherein he ascribes the Salvation of Men and their Eternal Life to the Spirit of God, or the Holy Ghost. As of that where he says: ^a *No one besides Almighty God can save the Soul, nor is there any one besides him that can make it Eternal, by giving to it the Spirit of Immortality, who himself alone is Immortal, and cannot be comprehended within the limits of time.* And again where he affirms it to belong to the ^b Priestly office of Christ to give everlasting happiness to the Soul. The Salvation *Arnobius* here speaks of is not the Soul's deliverance from any effects of a supposed Natural Mortality, which it plainly appears he no where mentions, or gives the least Intimation of, but onely from Punishment, and that Death, which according to his mistaken Opinion, is consequent thereupon. Nor can the *spiritus Perpetuitatis* in these places signify

^a Servare animas alius nisi Deus Omnipotens non potest: nec præterea quisquam est qui longævas facere, & spiritum perpetuitatis subrogare, nisi qui immortalis & perpetuus solus est, & nullius temporis circumscriptione finitus. p. 87. ^b Unius Pontificium Christi est, dare Animis salutem, & spiritum Perpetuitatis apponere. p. 89.

any thing else, but that Holy Spirit of God, by virtue of whose divine Assistances, they are enabled to do such good Actions, as will be rewarded with Eternal Life, as that signifies Eternal Happiness.

As to what you say, in your Argument upon the former of these places, that *Arnobius* owns this divine Spirit so Immortal in it self, as withall to be a Principle of Immortality to those human Souls to whom God is pleased to grant it, as it is very far from being a just reflection upon this Subject, or from containing a true account of *Arnobius's* sense, as every one by this time must needs see, so is it in it self most unreasonable and absurd. For if this divine Spirit, you speak of, be indeed no other than the Holy Spirit of God, how ridiculous is it to say that *Arnobius* owns it to be so Immortal in it self, as to be also a Principle &c? For who, I pray ever denyed the Holy Ghost to be in it self Immortal, who allowed him to be God. And as for his being a Principle of Immortality to human Souls how far *Arnobius* has given you the least ground to fasten this Opinion upon him, I must leave to the World to Judge, from what has been already said.

As to *Lactantius*, who is the last of the Latin Fathers, you think fit to make use of, he is so express and full against your *Hypothesis*, that nothing but a fondness for your own Opinion, which comes nothing short of a perfect Infatuation, could so blind your Eyes, as not to let you see it. For whether we consider the Account he gives us of the Origin, and Nature of the Soul, or those positive and clear Arguments, which he purposely alledges to prove that it's Existence must be to Eternity, we

cannot but be sensible that he firmly believed it to be in it's own nature and Essence Immortal. As to the *Origin* of the Soul, it is so evident from an Innumerable company of Places, which might be alledged that he thought it to proceed from God, and to be as, it were, an Irradiation of the divine Mind it self, that I think I need not attempt a very laborious Proof of that, which never any one yet was so hardy as to deny. He tells us, as to the Soul of *Adam*, ^a *That after God had framed his Body, he Breath'd a Soul into him from the living Fountain of his own Spirit, which is everlasting.* And, not to trouble you with more Citations, in so clear a Matter, in another place he expressly and formally rejects that Opinion, which derives the Soul *ex traduce* from the Parent. ^b *(It is also, says he, commonly made a Question, whether the Soul be from the Father, or from the Mother, or proceed from both. But this matter I can easily put out of all doubt. For I affirm that neither of these three things is true, because Souls come into Bodies neither from both the Parents, nor from either of them. For tho' the Body may come from the Bodies of Parents, because something is contributed towards the production of them from both; yet the Soul cannot proceed from the Souls of the Parents; because nothing can be separated from so little and incomprehensible a thing. There-*

a Ficto enim corpore spiravit ei animam de vitali fonte spiritus sui qui est Perennis. *Lactant. de Origin. Erroris lib. II. §. 12. Ed. Oxon.* b Illud quoque venire in Questionem potest, utrum ne Anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Sed ego id meo jure ab ancipiti vendico. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est; quia neque ex utroque, neque ex alterutro feruntur Animæ corporibus. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest; quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque: de animis anima non potest; quia ex re tenui & incomprehensibili, nihil potest decedere. Itaque serendaram animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subjacet.

fore the Business of producing Souls belongs solely and entirely to God; according to that of Lucretius,

*Lastly we all from Seed Celestial rise
Which Heaven our common Parent still supplies.*

For Mortals can produce nothing but what is mortal. Nor ought he to be thought the Father of the Soul, who is by no means sensible of his infusing or inspiring it; nor if he were sensible of it could tell how and when it is done. From hence it appears that our Souls are not given to us from our Parents, but from one and the same God and Father of all: who alone has established and knows the Laws of the production of all things. From these two passages, but more especially from the latter, it is undoubtedly clear, that *Lactantius* acknowledges no other Origin of the Human Soul, than that of it's being immediately derived from God himself.

As to the Nature of the Soul, this Father varies a little in his Notions about it, one while affirming it to be *Fire*, but after, as it were retracting this Opinion, he makes it to be perfectly Incorporeal, and nothing but a pure Spirit. The former of these Opinions it's plain he took up purely from his own reasoning without the least Authority from Tradition or Revelation to support it. For thus we find him introducing his Argument.

Denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi,
Omnibus ille idem pater est.

ut ait *Lucretius*. Nam de mortalibus nec potest quicquam nisi mortale generari. Nec putari pater debet, qui transfudisse aut inspirasse animam de suo nullo modo sentit: nec si sentiat, quando tamen, aut quomodo id fiat, habet animo incomprehensum. Ex quo apparet, non a Parentibus dari Animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo Patre; qui legem rationemque nascendi tenet solus; siquidem solus; efficit. *De Opificio Dei* §. 19.

Since

^a Since every Animal consists of Soul and Body, the matter of the Body is Moisture, but that of the Soul is Heat. And this appears from the formation of Birds out of an Egg, which being full of a thick fluid, unless Heat cherishes and enlivens it, neither this fluid can be turned into the Body of the Animal, nor this body be animated. Such likewise as were banished were forbid the use of Water and Fire. For as yet it was thought unlawfull to inflict a capital Punishment even upon Malefactors, because they were Men, therefore by forbidding them the use of those things, which are necessary to support Life, it was the same as if the Person under such a sentence, had formally been punished with Death. These two Elements were thought to be so primary and necessary that Man could not be produced, nor enliven'd without them. One of these is common to Man with other Animals, the other proper onely to Man. For since Man is a Celestial and Immortal Creature, he must consist of Fire: which is an Argument of his Immortality. For Fire came from Heaven, the nature of which consisting in Motion, and making it to have a tendency upwards, it must be the Life and Soul of Man. We see here this whole weak and childish Reasoning of Lactantius in this

a Cum enim constat omne Animal ex Anima & Corpore: materia corporis in humore est, Anima in calore. Quod ex avium foetibus datur scire, quos crassi humoris plenos, nisi opifex calor soverit; nec humor potest corporare, nec corpus animari. Exulibus quoque ignis & aqua interdicti solebat. Adhuc enim videbatur nefas, quamvis malos, tamen homines supplicio capitis afficere. Interdicto igitur usu sclarum rerum, quibus vita constat hominum, perinde habebatur ac si esset, qui eam sententiam exceperat, morte multatus. Adeo ista duo elementa prima sunt habita, ut nec ortum hominis, nec sine his vitam crediderint posse constare. Horum alterum nobis commune est cum cæteris Animantibus, alterum soli homini datum. Nos enim quoniam cæleste atque immortale animal sumus, igne utimur: qui nobis in argumentum immortalitatis datus est: quoniam ignis è cælo est hujus natura, qui mobilis est, & sursum nititur, vitæ continet rationem. *De Origin Erroris lib. II. §. 9.*

place is intirely founded upon a Philosophical Hypothesis, which has neither Revelation nor any Authority of more Antient Fathers to support it; and therefore as we have reason to believe that it is proposed by him rather as a Problematical Speculative Theory, than that he thought it to have any thing of Certainty in it, so it may be fairly rejected as not agreeable to his more deliberate and mature Judgment upon this point, to be sure as not consistent with Catholick Tradition and Holy Scripture. However I think my self obliged to take notice that even upon this Hypothesis he supposes the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal: since 'tis plain he affirms and endeavours to prove it to be Celestial and Immortal for this Reason onely because it is Fire. But it is evident he did not continue long in this Opinion. For we find in another place that he departs a little from this Notion, and makes this Fire to be the Vital Heat onely; which as he seems to represent to be a part of the Body, so we may reasonably enough suppose, that he thereby intended to distinguish it at least from the Rational Soul. *For, says he, the Nature of Earth is in the Flesh, of Water in the Bloud, of Air in the Breath, and of Fire in the Vital Heat. But neither can the Bloud be separated from the Body, as Water may be separated from Earth, nor the Vital Heat from the Breath, as Fire may be separated from Air. Therefore there are onely two Principles of all things: the nature of which is contained in our Bodies.* The Principles he here speaks

a Nam terræ ratio in carne est, humoris in sanguine, aeris in spiritu, ignis in calore vitali. Sed neque sanguis à corpore secerni potest, sicut humor à terra, neque calor vitalis à spiritu, sicut ignis ab aere. Adeo rerum omnium duo sola reperiuntur elementa; quorum omnis ratio in nostri corporis fictione conclusa est. *De Origin. lib. II. §. 12.*

of are Moisture and Dryness, or Water and Fire, both which he confines to the Body. And as it is plain from this Passage, that he was not intirely satisfied that the Soul was Fire, so is it beyond all doubt certain from other places that he afterwards changed his Opinion as to this point, and upon more mature consideration believed the Soul to be perfectly Immaterial and a pure Spirit, and tho' he derived it from God, yet he was always carefull to avoid the Notion of some Heretics, who made it part of the Substance of God, affirming it to be a created and withall an Immortal Spirit. This is so evident from a very great Number of Passages which might be alledged to this Purpose, that I think it perfectly needless to insist long upon it; and therefore shall onely trouble the Reader with one Passage, wherein tho' he seems to be somewhat dubious and uncertain concerning the Nature of the Soul, yet it sufficiently appears what his Notion was concerning it. *It remains, says he, that I should say somewhat concerning the Soul. Altho it's Nature and Essence cannot be perceived by us. But yet we cannot but understand that the Soul is Immortal. For whatsoever is moved and lives of it self and can neither be seen or touched; that must be Eternal. But Philosophers have not yet agreed what the Soul is, nor perhaps ever will agree. For some affirm it is the Bloud, others that it is Fire, other Air, from whence it has the name of Anima*

a Superest de Anima dicere; quanquam percipi ratio ejus & natura non possit. Nec ideo tamen immortalem esse animam non intelligimus: quoniam quicquid vivet, moveturque per se semper, nec videri aut tangi potest; æternum sit necesse est. Quid autem sit Anima, nondum inter Philosophos convenit, nec unquam fortasse conveniet. Etenim alii sanguinem esse dixerunt, alii ignem, alii ventum, unde Anima vel Animus nomen accepit; quod Græce ventus dicitur, nec illorum tam n quisquam dixisse aliquid videtur.

or Animus: because in Greek Wind is called *ἀνεμος*: but none of these seem to have said any thing to the Purpose. For it does not follow that because when the Blood is let out of the Body by a Wound, or consumed with the Heat of a Feavour the Soul seems to die, that therefore the Essence of the Soul is in the matter of the Blood. For this would be the same as if any one should answer to the Question what the light of a Lamp is, that it is the Oile, because when the Oile is consumed the Lamp goes out; since they are different, tho' one be the Food which Nourishes the other. The Soul therefore seems to be like light, in as much as it is not the Blood, but is nourished by the Blood, as the Light of a Lamp is by Oile. Those who supposed the Soul to be Fire, were induced to think so chiefly upon this Ground, that while the Soul is in the Body it is warm, but when it is separated from it, it presently grows cold. But Fire cannot be the Soul, because it can have no sense, is visible, and burns to the touch: but we know the Soul to be sensible, invisible and that it does not burn. From the whole it appears that the Soul is something very like to God. And as for those who thought it to be Air, they were deceived by this, that we seem to live by drawing the Air into our Lungs. Hence it is that Varro has defined

detur. Non enim si Anima sanguine aut per vulnus effuso, aut febrium calore consumpto, videtur extingui: continuo in materia sanguinis animæ ratio ponenda est; veluti si veniat in quæstionem, lumen, quo utimur, quid sit; & respondeatur oleum esse, quoniam consumto illo lumen extinguitur; cum sint utique diversa; sed alterum sit alterius alimentum. Videtur ergo Anima similis esse lumini, quæ non ipsa sit sanguis, sed humore sanguinis alitur, ut lumen oleo. Qui autem ignem putaverunt, hoc nisi sunt argumento, quod presente anima corpus caleat, recedente frigescat. Sed ignis & sensu indiget, & videtur, & tactu comburit. Anima vero & sensu aucta est, & videri non potest, & non adurit. Unde apparet, animam nescio quid esse Deo similem. At illi qui ventum putant esse, hoc falluntur, quod ex aere spiritum ducentes, vivere videamur. Varro itaque definit, Anima

the Soul to be Air, received into the Mouth, warmed in the Lungs, made more hot in the Heart, and diffused thro' the whole Body. But this Notion is evidently false. Nor is the Nature of these things so obscure but that we may easily perceive what is not true. If any one should tell me that the Heavens are made of Brass, or Glass, or that they are nothing but frozen Air as Empedocles thought, shall I presently assent to him, because I don't certainly know out of what matter the Heavens are made? For tho I don't know what they are, yet I can be sure what they are not. The Soul cannot be the Air received in at the Mouth, because the Soul is framed long before it can be received in there. For the Soul is not infused into the Body immediately after the Infant is born, as some Philosophers thought, but immediately after Conception, when the divine Power forms the Child in the Womb. For we find that the Fetus lives in the Belly of it's Mother, that it grows, and moves there. Lastly all Births would be abortions, if the Animal were not alive before it comes into the World. The other definitions of the Soul, suppose us to be Dead for those nine Months we are in the Womb. Therefore none of these three Opinions can be true, yet we must not think them so

Anima est Aer conceptus ore, tepefactus in pulmone, servectus in corde, diffusus in corpus. Hæc apertissime falsa sunt. Neque enim tam obscuram nobis hujusmodi rerum dico esse rationem, ut ne hoc quidem intelligamus, quid verum esse non possit. An si mihi quis dixerit æneum esse cælum, aut virreum, aut ut Empedocles ait; aerem glaciatum, statim assentiar, quia cælum ex qua materia sit ignorem? Sicut enim hoc nescio; ita illud scio Anima ergo non est Aer ore conceptus; quia multo prius gignitur Anima, quam concipi Aer ore possit. Non enim post partum innatur in corpus, ut quibusdam Philosophis videtur, sed post conceptum protinus, cum fœtum in utero necessitas divina formavit: quia adeo vivit intra viscera genetricis; ut & incremento augeatur, & crebris pulsibus gestiat emicare. Denique abortum fieri necesse est, si fuerit Animal cujus extinctum. Cæteræ definitionis partes eo spectant, ut illis novem mensibus, quibus in utero fuimus, mortui fuisse videamur. Nulla ergo ex his tri-

bus

altogether mistaken, as to assert nothing true in all that they have said. For we live by our Blood, by our vital Heat, and by our Breath. Now since the Soul is tied to the Body, by all these joined together, they could not properly define what the Soul is, and indeed it is easier to be Conceived than explained. From this long Passage, tho' it must be confessed that *Lactantius* here speaks with a certain modest hesitancy, and as it were problematically onely, we may notwithstanding plainly perceive that he believed the Nature of the Soul to be Spiritual, like the Nature of God, who is a Spirit. And whatever obscurity he might fancy to be in our Knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, yet we find him here speaking positively and clearly for it's Natural Immortality. For does he not thus argue, that whatever has Life and Motion of it self, and is invisible and intangible must be Eternal? He makes not the least mention, here or indeed any where else of any adscititious Immortalizing Principle; but onely reasons and argues for the Soul's Immortality from it's known Nature and allowed Properties, which it is impossible to imagin he would have done, had he known or thought of any Baptifmal Spirit by virtue of which it was to be Immortalized. Again, we find the Father in this passage expressly and positively retracting and condemning that Opinion, which he had before advanced, that the Soul is Fire. For does he not expressly say that the Soul cannot be

bus vera sententia est. Nec tamen in tantum falsos esse dicendum est; qui hæc serunt ut omnino nihil dixerint. Nam & sanguine simul, & calore, & spiritu vivimus. Sed cum constat Anima in corpore his omnibus adunatis; non expresse runt proprie quid esset; quia tam non potest exprimi, quam videri. *De Opificio Dei* §. 17.

what

what is called *Fire*, because Fire is insensible, visible, and will burn, whereas the Soul is sensible, invisible, and does not burn. So that it appears very evident that *Lactantius* believed the Soul to be a created, and in it self Immortal Spirit, and in it's own nature like to the Nature and Essence of the Deity, and wholly free from all, even the purest and most refined, bodily concretions.

As to the Soul's Immortality, besides those places already alledged, from whence it sufficiently appears that he thought it to be in it's own nature Eternal, he has so frequently taken occasion to express his sentiments of this matter, as well as bestowed a good part of one intire Book to prove it to be in it self Immortal, that I cannot but confess that it is to me, one of the most Astonishing things in the World, next to that of your writing this Unfortunate Book, that you could find in your heart so much as once to mention his Authority for the Soul's Natural Mortality. All the Ways by which it is possible to make it most plainly appear that the Soul is in it's own nature Immortal, he has made use of to declare this Truth to us. He affirms this to be the ultimate End, and supreme Good of Man, ^a that he is *formatus à principio, & natus ad Immortalitatem capiendam*, from the beginning framed, and as it were by Nature contrived for Immortality: which certainly cannot be true if Immortality does not belong to his Nature, and if a great Number of Men die so, as at last utterly to perish and be annihilated. And tho' I readily

^a Vnum igitur & summum Bonum Immortalitas; ad quam capiendam & formati à Principio & nati sumus. Ad hanc tendimus, hanc spectat humana natura; ad hanc nos provehit Virtus. *lib. vii. §. 8.*

allow that this perhaps may primarily and principally be meant of that Immortality we are to be made partakers of by virtue of the Resurrection, yet has it likewise a very manifest reference to, and clearly enough supposes the Natural Immortality of the Soul. * He represents in short, and fully approves of *Plato's* reasoning in his *Phædo* for the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and alledges the Authority of *Pythagoras* and *Pherocydes*, who are no inconsiderable Names in the History of Philosophy, and the last of whom *Tully* assures us first affirmed the Soul to be Immortal. And tho', as he tells us, *Dicæarchus* first, and then *Democritus*, and last of all *Epicurus*, by their Authority had somewhat shaken and weaken'd the Belief of this Truth, and caused the credibility of it to be doubted by some, inso-much as *Tully* himself, after having enumerated the several Opinions of the Philosophers concerning it, professes that he was doubtful, which was in the right, yet he tells us that Christians had no reason to be pendulous or uncertain, as to the Immortality of the Soul, to whom Revelation had most fully and clearly manifested the Truth of it. And then he proceeds to mention those additional Arguments, which neither *Plato*, nor any one else had made use of, to prove the natural Eternity of the Soul. These are taken from it's invisible and

a Plato autem sic argumentatus est, Immortale esse &c. Hæc fere Platonis collecta breviter &c. In eadem sententia fuit etiam Pythagoras antea, ejusque Præceptor Pherocydes, quem Cicero tradit primum de Eternitate Animarum disputavisse. Qui omnes licet Eloquentia excellere; tamen in hac duntaxat contentione, non minus auctoritatis habuerunt, qui contra hanc sententiam differebant: Dicæarchus primo, deinde Democritus, postremo Epicurus. &c. Verum nobis divinatione non opus est, quibus veritatem Divinitas ipsa patefacit, lib. vii. §. 8.

spiritual nature, by which it becomes like to God; and tho' it be neither part of the Substance of God, nor has that sort of Immortality, which is the peculiar Prerogative and inseparable Attribute of the Divinity, and which therefore no Creature can have, yet has it an Immortality proper and natural to it, which does not indeed imply necessary Existence, but yet by virtue of which it does of it self, without assistance from, or dependence upon any created Being, endure to Eternity. By virtue of this similitude the Soul of Man ^a has to the Divine Nature, it is that Man alone of all the visible Creation is endued with a sense of Religion, and enabled to know and worship God: which, since it is peculiar to Man, is an Argument, that there is some affinity and congruity between us and that everlasting Being, which is most justly the great and ultimate end of all our desire, love, and endeavour. ^b And from this Wisdom in Man, which is indeed nothing else but the Knowledge of God, he very truly infers, that the Soul of Man can never perish or be dissolved, but must endure to Eternity, in as much as by the Instinct of it's Nature, and thro' the sense it has, whence it came, and whither at last it must return, it is so strongly inclined to know, to love, and to endeavour after the enjoyment of God, who is from everlasting, and will

^a Ex eo Æternitatem animæ posse dignosci, quia nullum sit aliud animal, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei, religioque sit pæne sola, quæ hominem discernat à Mutis. Quæ cum in hominem solum cadat profecto testatur, id affectare nos, id desiderare, id colere, quod nobis familiare, quod proximum sit futurum, *lib. vii. §. 9.* ^b Cum autem sapientia, quæ soli homini data est, nihil aliud sit, quam notitia Dei; apparet animam non interire, neque dissolvi, sed manere in sempiternum, quia Deum, qui sempiternus est, & quærit, & diligit, ipsa cogente natura, sentiens vel unde orta sit, vel quo reversura. *Ibid.*

continue to everlasting. ^a Again because Man alone is capable of Virtue he argues that his Soul must be Immortal. For since the Reward of Virtue is Everlasting, the subject of it, which is the Soul must likewise be everlasting. ^b And, since Virtue, if there were no reward after this Life, would rather hurt than advantage human Affairs, it must from hence follow that Virtue will certainly meet with it's due Reward after Death, which cannot be unless the Soul be in it's own nature Immortal. And hence he takes occasion to represent the Opinion of the Roman Orator, that the chief Happiness of Man was to be expected after this life is ended, introducing him saying, that we ought with a great deal of boldness and intrepidity to undergo Death, the consequence of which we know will be attended with the greatest advantage; at least it will not be followed by any evil. Death therefore does not put an end to our Being, but onely admits us to the everlasting Rewards of Virtue. And that nothing might be wanting most clearly and fully to demonstrate that he thought the Soul to be in it's own nature Immortal, he sets himself

^a Quoniam igitur contraria sunt vitia virtuti, omnis ratio diversa & contraria sit, necesse est: quia vitia commotiones & perturbationes Animi sunt, virtus è contrario lenitudo & tranquillitas animi est: quia vitia temporalia & brevia sunt, virtus perpetua & constans & par sibi semper; quia vitiorum fructus, id est, voluptates, æque ut ipsa breves temporalesque sunt, virtutis ergo fructus ac præmium sempiternum est, quia vitiorum commodum in præsentia est, virtutis igitur in futuro. *lib. VII. §. 10.* ^b Virtus autem nunquam nisi morte finitur, quoniam & in morte suscipienda summum ejus Officium est. Ergo præmium Virtutis post mortem est. Denique Cicero in Tusculanis, quamvis dubitanter tamen sensit, summum homini Bonum non nisi post mortem contingere. Fidenti animo inquit, si ita res feret, gradietur ad mortem, in qua aut summum bonum, aut nullum malum esse cognovimus. Mors igitur non extinguit hominem, sed ad præmium virtutis admittit. *ibid.*

in Book VII. §. 12. formally to propose, and confute those Arguments *Lucretius* has alledged in his third Book to prove it naturally mortal. From all which, and many other Arguments he very frequently concludes in the most expresse and positive terms, that the Soul must be in it's own nature Immortal. As where he says: *"Altho' Soul and Body are in conjunction, and come into the world together, and the one, being made and framed of an earthy concretion, is, as it were the Vessel which contains the other, which is derived from a celestial Origin, yet when any force separates them from each other, which separation is called Death, then both return to their proper Origin: that which was taken from the Earth, is dissolved into Dust, but that which is derived from the Breath of God, endures and lives for ever, because this Breath of God is everlasting.* The force of the Father's Argument in this place is plainly as follows: That as the Body, which in it's own nature is mortal and corruptible, because it was framed out of the Earth, which is a mortal and corruptible Principle, must die and return to that frail corruptible Dust, out of which it was taken, so the Soul, which is in it's own nature Immortal, and Incorruptible, because derived from the Divine Breathing, which is an Incorruptible Immortal Principle, when it is separated from the Body can never die or cease to be, because the Original from whence it came is

a Ergo quamvis inter se conjuncta & sociata nascentur, & alterum quod est de terrena concretionem formatum, quasi vasculum sit alterius, quod est à coelesti subtilitate deductum: cum vis aliqua utrumque discreverit, quæ discretio mors vocatur, tum utrumque in naturam suam redit; quod ex terra fuit in terram resolvitur: quod ex coelesti spiritu, id constat ac viget semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus sempiternus est. *lib. VII. §. 12.*

everlasting.

everlasting. And a little after he argues again after the same manner: ^a *For if, says he, the earthly corruptible Body, after the recess of the Soul, does immediately drop to pieces, and crumble into dust, from whence it had it's Original; therefore the Soul, which is not corruptible, will continue to Eternity, in as much as it's Origin is Eternal.* And, not to trouble you with a multitude of other places, which might easily be laid together to this same purpose, he positively avers: ^b *That it is impossible the Soul should perish; because it has it's Original from the Breath of God, which is Eternal.* We cannot but observe that in all these places, he ascribes Immortality to the Soul upon no other Account than it's having it's Origin from the Breath of God: which I think directly contradicts, and fairly overturns your Opinion, who will have this Breath of Life, or the Soul (tho' in this you speak inconsistently and contradict your self, as I have elsewhere shewn) which is thus received from the Breath of God, to be in it self mortal, and that it is actually immortalized by the πνεῦμα, or Spirit. And to put it clearly beyond all doubt, that he was fully perswaded that no sort of death, could reach or affect the Soul, so as to make it cease to exist or live, he particularly tells us that Death signifies nothing, but either the separation of Soul and Body, or else the Eternal Punishment of the Soul. To this purpose he tells us: ^c *That Man is made up of different and repugnant Principles, as the World is of*

a Nam si terrenum & fragile corpus post secessum animæ non statim diffluit, in terramque tabescit ex qua illi origo est: ergo anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum manet, quoniam origo ejus æterna est. *Ib.* b Nam interire prorsus anima non potest, quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui æternus est originem cœpit. *Ibid.* c Ex rebus igitur diversis ac repugnantibus homo factus est, sicut ipse mundus ex luce ac tenebris, ex vita & morte. Quæ

light and darkness, of life and death. Between which Principles he has ordained, that there should be a perpetual state of Hostility: that if the Soul, which has it's Origin from God, gains the Superiority, it might be blessed with a happy Immortality, and live in perpetual Light. But if the Body overcomes the Soul, and subjects it to it's Dominion, it might be in everlasting darkness and death. The Power of which Death does not consist in this, that it will extinguish or annihilate wicked Souls, but punish them for ever. And this punishment we call the second Death, which is it self as perpetual and everlasting, as the eternal happiness is. We define the first Death, that it is the Dissolution of the Nature of the Animal. Or thus: Death is the Separation of Soul and Body. But the second Death we define thus: that it is the suffering eternal Torment, or Death is the Condemnation of the Soul to everlasting Punishment, according to it's deserts. The Argument in this place evidently proceeds upon and concludes concerning all wicked Souls, as well those which have, as those which have never heard of the Gospel, and implies nothing of any extraordinary interposition of God's Pleasure or Power to immortalize them, but clearly supposes them to be in their own natures Immortal: which plainly enough contradicts, and effectually destroys your whole Hypothesis. He affirms the same thing af-

duo inter se pugnare in homine præcepit; ut si anima superaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur, sit immortalis, & in perpetua luce versetur: si autem corpus vicerit animam, ditionique subjecerit: sit in tenebris sempiternis & in morte. Cujus non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam secundam mortem nominamus: quæ est & ipsa perpetua, sicut & immortalitas. Primam sic definimus: Mors est naturæ Animantium Dissolutio: vel ita: Mors est corporis animæque seductio. Secunda vero sic: Mors est æterni doloris perpassio. Vel ita: Mors est animarum pro meritis ad æterna supplicia damnatio. lib. II. c. 12.

terwards

terwards as positively and expressly, tho' in fewer words. As where he says: * *Death, as I have shewn, does not destroy or annihilate the Soul, but makes it liable to eternal torments.* From all which I suppose I may venture to conclude that *Lactantius* held the Soul to be in it's own Nature Immortal.

Now whether the Reasons and Arguments, which *Lactantius* has brought in those places I have cited, or any others, to prove the Natural Immortality of the Soul be well grounded and proper, is what I cannot think my self in the least obliged to determin: it being all one as to the purpose for which I alledge them, whether they be strong and conclusive, or weak and inconclusive. It is enough in the present case for me that *Lactantius* thought them cogent and conclusive, and endeavour'd by them to prove the Soul to be in it's own Nature Immortal. And that he could not mean onely what you call an *actual Immortality*, as not imply'd in, but distinguished from a *natural Immortality*, is evident, not onely from his Arguments being wholly drawn from the Origin, Nature, and known Properties of the Soul, but also because he never makes the least mention of the Holy Spirit of God, or of any other Spirit or Principle; as giving Immortality to the Soul. Thus far I have represented the Opinion of this Father concerning the Origin, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul. I come now to return an Answer to all that you have thought fit to alledge and cite from him §. 20 to prove the Soul mortal in it's own nature, and immortal by the Spirit.

^a Mors autem sicut ostendi, non funditus perimit ac delet; sed æternis afficit cruciatibus. lib. vii. §. 12.

And here you argue in the first place: That he also takes Man to be of a middle Nature, capable of Immortality, as a Reward of his good Behaviour, otherwise mortal, if he did not answer expectation. And for this you alledge the following passage: which because you have not onely cited partially, but also begun it most abruptly, in the very middle of a sentence, I shall take leave here to quote fairly and at large. *Altho' God might still have procreated an innumerable Number of Souls from his own Immortal Breathings, as he made the Angels, who have an Immortality of Happiness, without Fear or Danger of any evil: yet he pitched upon another ineffable work, and created an infinite Multitude of Souls, which being united to weak, frail Bodies he placed in the middle between Good and Evil, that he might propose Virtue to them whilst they thus consisted of the corporeal and spiritual nature; that so they might attain Eternal Happiness, and the unspeakable Rewards of Everlasting Life, not by living in Ease and Delicacy, but through much labour, and many difficulties.* You have indeed afterwards cited this very passage, more at large, and as I have here quoted it, in another part of this section, and to another purpose, than that to which you have alledged it here; but I am now to consider it with reference onely to what you cite it for here; which is to prove that *Lactantius* sup-

a Cum posset semper spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare, sicut angelos genuit, quibus Immortalitas sine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat: excogitavit tamen inenarrabile opus, quemadmodum infinitam multitudinem crearet animarum, quas primo fragilibus & imbecillis corporibus illigatas, constitueret inter bonum malumque medias, ut constantibus ex utroque naturam virtutem proponeret, ne immortalitatem delicate assequerentur ac molliter; sed ad illud æternæ vitæ inelodabile præmium summa cum difficultate ac magnis laboribus pervenirent.
lib. vii. s. 5.

posed

posed Man to be of a middle nature, capable of *Immortality*, as a Reward of his good Behaviour; otherwise *Mortal* &c. Before I proceed to shew the true sense of the Father in this place, I must a little examin and endeavour to ascertain, what your meaning is, in the assertion you here make. You say *Lactantius* here takes Man to be of a middle Nature, capable of *Immortality*, if he lived well &c. By *Immortality* here you must mean, if you would be consistent with your self, not the Everlasting happiness of Heaven only, but simply and abstractedly from that, the eternal Duration or Existence of the Soul. For these two ought to be carefully distinguished. The Happiness of the next World, which, tho' indeed we find frequently called *Immortality*, and *Eternal Life*, is notwithstanding as widely different from the Everlasting Duration and Existence of the Soul, as the happiness, and enjoyments of this Life are from our existing and living to enjoy them. Now in the latter of these senses, what you assert, that Man (meaning, as I suppose you do, by Man the Soul of Man, otherwise what you say will be still not in the least to your Purpose) is onely *capable* of *Immortality* on condition he lives well, does indeed imply what you here drive at, that he is not by nature *Immortal*. So again when you say, Man *otherwise* was *Mortal*, namely, if he did not, as you express it, *answer expectation*, by his being *Mortal*, you cannot certainly mean, that he was liable to *Eternal Punishment*, which we know is frequently called *Death*, and the second *Death*: because this Sense will not be at all to your purpose, whose design, I take to be, not to prove that Man, if he acts contrary to the

the Dictates and Precepts of Reason and Religion does thereby stand obnoxious to everlasting Wrath and Punishment, which never any Christian has yet denied, but that his Soul is placed by Nature in such a mortal perishable state, that it is capable of dying and ceasing to be, unless preserved by an extraordinary Interposition of divine Grace or Power from falling into Nothing. Supposing that how loosely or obscurely soever, you may have express'd your self, yet that your sense and meaning is consistent with your Hypothesis, and pertinent to your Design, and that by Man here you mean the nobler part of Man his Soul, and by its being capable of Immortality, its being *capable* of an everlasting duration, and by its being mortal, its being created so, as that it would naturally have an End of its Being and Life, unless supported by an extraordinary act of God's Grace and Power, let us see whether what *Lactantius* here says can be in the least applicable to this sense. Now it is plain that *Lactantius* here speaks of Immortality not in this latter, but in the former sense, as it signifies an Eternity of Happiness. For does he not say that it is not otherwise attained, than by the laborious and difficult Practice of Virtue? Nay does he not expressly call it the unspeakable Reward of Eternal Life? which every one must be convinced can be meant of nothing else but Eternal Happiness. So that the true sense of *Lactantius* in this place is, that when God created Man he placed Good and Evil before him, that by choosing one, and refusing the other he might obtain eternal happiness, but if he acted otherwise he should incur eternal Misery. Here is not the least mention or supposition made of any middle

middle Nature of the Soul, as you groundlessly assert. And if Immortality be understood, as to be sure it ought to be in this place, to signify eternal happiness, this sense hath not the least tendency to serve your Purpose. Since likewise the *Mortality* here supposed implies no possibility of ceasing to be, but only the being liable to eternal Misery, it is so far from making any thing against, that it indeed very fairly and fully supposes and proves, as has been before observ'd, the Natural Immortality of the Soul. For how can the Soul of Man suffer everlasting Punishment, unless it be created so, as that by virtue of its own Nature, supported by the general and ordinary Concurrence of God's Power and Providence, it may endure for ever? If it be said that God by a New Indulgence of his Power, besides and beyond what was granted to it at its Creation, or by any extraordinary Interposition of his Grace, preserves it to Eternity, this is a merely precarious Assertion, and for which there is not the least Ground, neither from Scripture, Reason, or the Authority of this, or any other Father, to believe.

The following Passage, which you cited also to this same Purpose is so far from serving your design, that it contains a very full Assertion of the Soul's Natural Immortality. *'Because,* says he, *Man consists of two things a Body and a Soul, one of which*

a Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constar, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum cœleste; duæ vitæ homini attributæ sunt: una temporalis quæ corpori assignatur, altera sempiterna, quæ animæ subjacet. Illam nascendo accepimus, hanc assequimur laborando; ne Immortalitas, ut ante diximus, sine ulla difficultate constaret. Illa terrena est, sicut corpus; & ideo finitur: hæc vero cœlestis, sicut anima & ideo terminum non habet. *Ibid.* These last words which contain a very full and positive assertion of the Soul's Natural Immortality Mr D. did not think it to his Purpose to cite.

is terrestrial, and the other celestial, he has therefore two Lives given him, one temporal, which is assigned and belongs to the Body, and the other Eternal, which belongs to the Soul. We receive that by our Birth, but we obtain this by Labour, God taking care by this means, as I said before, that Everlasting Happiness should not be so easily acquired, that it should cost us nothing. That former Life is terrestrial, like the Body, and therefore must have an End, but the other is Heavenly, like the Soul, and therefore can have no End. We see here he expressly affirms, that the Duration and Life which is given to the Soul is Eternal, as that which is given to the Body is temporary. Now as he here represents the Body to have it's temporary short Life and Duration no otherwise than from the frame of its Constitution, and the Condition of its Nature, so must he likewise suppose the Soul to have the Eternity of its Life and Duration from no other Cause than the peculiar frame and Constitution of its Being. And indeed this is very plain from the words, which immediately follow those you have cited, in which he, as it were, gives the reason of what he had before asserted; and which amount to thus much, viz. That this Temporal Life has an End, because together with the Body, to which it belongs, it is of earthly Extraction, but the other Life, that properly belongs to the Soul, which is derived from Heaven can have no End, because the Soul, upon Account of its celestial Origin is Eternal. It is from hence most clearly evident, that the Father Ascribes the Eternal Duration of the Soul, not to any extrinsic adscititious Power or Principle, but to its Original and Natural Descent from Heaven; which as he affirms to be-

long

long to all Human Souls, so must he likewise have believed, that all Human Souls were therefore in their own nature Immortal, as having all the same extraction, and being derived from the same Origin. It is indeed true that he speaks here of an Immortality, which we are to acquire by the most laborious and difficult attainments of Virtue, and which we may deprive our selves of by our Vices; but then this is plainly to be understood, not simply and absolutely of the everlasting existence and life of the Soul, but of an Eternal Duration and Life of Happiness and Bliss. And this is what he means in the words following: *^a This first Life we receive without our being sensible of it, but we know when we receive the Second. For it is given to our Virtue, and not to our Nature, because God designed we should in the present Life acquire to our selves a Title to the future. Therefore he gave us the present Life that we might either deserve that true and eternal Life of Happiness, by our Virtue, or forfeit it by our Vices. The chiefest good we are capable of cannot be in this corporal Life: because as the divine Providence gave it us, so the same Providence takes it from us again. And that cannot be the chief Good of Man, which will have an End. But in that Spiritual Eternal Life of Happiness, which we acquire for our selves, is certainly contained the chiefest Good; because that can have no mixture of Evil, nor ever come to an*

^a Illam primam nescientes accepimus, hanc secundam scientes. Virtuti enim non naturæ datur, quia voluit nos Deus vitam nobis in vita comparare. Idcirco hanc præsentem, ut illam veram & perpetuam, aut vitis amittamus, aut virtute mereamur. In hac corporali non est summum bonum: quoniam sicut necessitate divina nobis data est; ita rursus divina necessitate solvitur. Ita quod finem habet, summum bonum non habet. In illa vero spiritali, quam per nos ipsi acquirimus, summum bonum continetur: quia nec malum potest habere nec finem. *Ibid.*

End. The Life here spoken of is evidently nothing but an Eternal Life of Happiness, which tho' it supposes the Eternal Existence and Duration of the Soul, yet we cannot think this latter to have been principally intended by the Father, nor that he thought it was to be ascribed to the same Cause as the Former. For if Eternal Life, in this latter sense, were supposed by this Father to be acquired by Virtue, then he must suppose, according to this sense, that it is lost by Vice; and so a vitious Man instead of an Eternal need to fear onely a temporary Punishment, which after a determinate period of time will put an End to his Being. But this latter is an Opinion, which ought immediately to be rejected, as most contrary to the Known and Declared Sentiments of *Lactantius*, as well as the certain Analogy of Faith, and Doctrine of the Scriptures, and therefore the former cannot be the Father's sense in this place. It is then beyond all doubt evident, that the Immortality, here spoken of, is to be meant of an Eternity of Happiness onely; which it is most certain that Nature alone without the Assistances of Grace, can never enable us to acquire: because those known and necessary conditions of attaining it, namely, Virtue, and Holyness of Life, cannot otherwise be acquired by us, than by those divine Aids and Succors, which are afforded to us, by the Holy Spirit of God. So that when, as you observe, *Lactantius* denies Immortality to be the effect of Nature, he speaks no doubt very truly and justly; since he means nothing by Immortality, but the everlasting Rewards and Happiness of the other World, without considering, or putting into the Account, that Eternal Life and Duration of the Soul, which indeed

deed I readily yield to be the necessary Foundation of this Happiness, but which is to be ascribed not to our Virtue, but to the Natural Frame and Constitution of the Essence of the Soul, by virtue of which, supported by the general Concurrence of God's Providence, it will exist for ever. And this is so plainly confirmed, by the words following a little after, and which you have likewise cited onely in part, that I cannot but wonder how you could read them, and not immediately be convinced of your Mistake. ^a *There would be no difference, says he, between the Just and Unjust, if every one that is born were made Immortal. Therefore Immortality is not the necessary Consequence of our Nature, but the Recompence and Reward of our Virtue. Lastly Man does not immediately as soon as he is born go upright, but at first as it were upon four Legs, because the Nature of the human Body, and the condition of the present Life is common to us with Brute Animals. But afterwards as his strength increases he goes upright, he begins to speak, and ceases to be a dumb Creature. Which condition of Man teaches us, that he is born Mortal, but afterwards becomes capable of Immortality, when he begins to live from God, that is to be a follower*

a Nam nihil interesset inter justum & injustum; siquidem omnis homo natus Immortalis fieret. Ergo Immortalitas non sequela naturæ, sed merces præmiumque virtutis est. So far Mr D. citation goes, but then follow these Words. Denique homo non statim quam natus est rectus ingreditur; sed quadrupes primo; quia ratio corporis & hujus præsentis vitæ communis est nobis cum mutis animalibus; post deinde confirmatis viribus erigitur, & lingua ejus in eloquium solvitur, & mutum animal esse desinit. Quæ ratio docet mortalem nasci hominem: postea vero immortalem fieri cum ceperit ex Deo vivere, id est, Justitiam sequi; quæ continetur in Dei cultu, cum excitaverit hominem Deus ad aspectum cœli ac sui. Quod tum fit cum homo cœlesti lavacro purificatus, exponit infantiam cum omni labe vitæ prioris, & incremento divini vigoris accepto, fit homo perfectus ac plenus. *Ibid.*

of

of Righteousness, which consists in the Worship of God, when God has excited him to the Contemplation of Heaven and himself. Which is then done, when Man is purified in the Heavenly Laver, and having laid aside his former State of Infancy, together with the Spots and Blemishes of his former Life, and received an increase of divine Grace and Vigour, he is made a Perfect and Compleat Man. There is no one certainly, who with due attention considers these Words, that can have the least reason to doubt, that any thing is meant here by *Immortality*, besides that Eternal State of Happiness and Bliss in Heaven, which is to be the glorious Reward of the Good and Pious. The very first words of this passage, where he says, *that if every one that is born were made Immortal, there would be no difference between the Good and the Bad, the Just, and the Unjust*, cannot I think bear any sense but this: that it is that everlasting State of Happiness, which alone can, and most certainly will put a most remarkable distinction between the Virtuous and the Wicked. Again, where he says that *Immortality* is not the Necessary Consequence of our Nature, but the Reward of our Virtue, it is impossible with all the Art or Force that can be used to these Words to make *Immortality* confess any other sense, than that of Eternal Bliss. And as for these words: *Quæ ratio docet* &c. it is evident that nothing more can be meant by them than this, that Man is born a Child of Wrath, and by the Original Corruption and Sin of his Nature, stands obnoxious to Eternal Punishment, but by Baptism, and living according to the Precepts and Rules of his Holy Profession, he becomes a Child of God, an heir to the Kingdom of Heaven, and has thereby a Title to the

Everlasting

Everlasting Rewards of another World. And therefore when you say that *Lactantius* owns our Title to Immortality, as derived from our Baptism, and the Baptifmal Spirit, we then receive, if by Immortality you mean, what I must confess is very often meant by that word, the never ceasing Glories, and endless Happinefs of Heaven, I must acknowledge your Representation of *Lactantius's* sense to be very true and just: but then I affirm that this is a sense, which can never be in the least subservient to your Purpose, who are to prove, if you would write pertinently to your Design, that this Father ascribes not the Eternal Happinefs, but the Eternal Duration of the Soul to Baptism and the Spirit received by it: which it is very evident he never does, either in the places we have already consider'd, or any where else, as will presently more fully and plainly appear.

You say, that when *Lactantius* affirms, that Man having received an increase of divine Grace and Vigor becomes Perfect and Compleat, he means such a Man, as, in the Stile of the Apostle, and *Irenæus*, has the divine Baptifmal Spirit, which you conclude is the Principle of Immortality here mentioned. What *Irenæus* meant by his Perfect Man, and what Spirit it was he thought necessary to produce this Perfection, has already been sufficiently shewn. And it would be more easy and obvious to know, even tho' we had nothing but the place I last cited to direct us, what *Lactantius* understands by his *Homo Perfectus* & *Plemus*, namely nothing else but a moral and Religious Perfection. A Perfection which consists and appears in the Habits and Acts of the most consummate Piety and Virtue.

Which Habits and Acts, because they cannot be acquired and exerted, without the Gracious Influences and Assistances of that Holy Spirit of God, which is conveyed in Baptism, are therefore very truly and fitly represented by *Lactantius*, as derived from this Spirit, which therefore in this moral and religious sense may very properly be said to render a Man Perfect and Compleat. So that your Mistake, as to this Point, seems plainly to be your fancying I know not what Immortalizing Principle, which is conveyed by Baptism, necessary to make up the Perfect Man; which as *Lactantius* never dreamt of, so neither had he any Idea in this place of any other Perfection, than such as is acquired by living according to the Will of God, and in all things conforming our Actions to his Commands. For the Man is here expressly said by *Lactantius* to be *Perfectus & Plenus*, when having received the gracious Assistances of God's Spirit, he begins *ex Deo vivere*, what that is he explains by *Iustitiam sequi*, and this by the Worship of God, all which Phrases imply indeed that Sort of Moral or Religious Perfection I am now speaking of, but give us not the least intimation of any Perfection by the Accession of any Adscititious Immortalizing Spirit or Principle.

You proceed and say, that this is that Spirit, which *Lactantius* says God puts into a terrene Body, and which he calls *sempiternus*, and *æternus*. lib. vii. 2. and affirms to proceed *à calo*, & *à Deo*. lib. ii. 11, 12. vii. 4, 5. and to be said to be *ex Deo*, and *à Deo Inspiratus*, where he calls it by the Name of *Anima*, telling us: ^a *That After having framed the Body of*

^a Fictio enim corpore, spiravit ei animam de vitali fonte spiritus sui, qui est Perennis. lib. ii. §. 12.

Man, he breathed into him a Soul, taken from the living fountain of his Spirit, which is everlasting. And this, you say, he makes Immortal, if it be Victorious. For speaking concerning the Contest that is between the Body and the Soul, the Flesh and the Spirit, he affirms that it was so ordered for this very purpose; ^a *That if the Soul, which has its Origin from God, Conquers, it might be Immortal, and, live in Perpetual Light.* And lastly you confess that he affirms the same concerning the Soul, lib. III. §. 12, When you here say that this is the Spirit, which *Lactantius* affirms God puts into a terrene Body, and which he says is *sempiternus, æternus, è cælo, & à Deo*, it is plain from the coherence and connexion of this with what goes before, that you mean no other Spirit, than that which Man receives at, and by his Baptism, which indeed is truly and properly nothing else, but the Blessed Influences and Emanations of the Holy Spirit of God. But in this Assertion is contained so very great and grievous a Mistake, and Misrepresentation of this Father, that if any Man besides Mr *Dodwell* had been guilty of it, I could not have accounted for it, without laying some imputation upon the Honesty and Integrity of its Author: since in those sections you refer us to *Lactantius* does not speak concerning that Spirit, which is communicated by Baptism, but onely concerning the Soul it self, which he there supposes to be a Spirit. Thus VII. 12. ^b *That which came from the Earth is resolved into Earth, but that*

^a Ut si anima superaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur, sit Immortalis, & in perpetua luce versetur. *Ibid.* ^b Quod ex terra fuit in terram resolvitur; quod ex coelesti spiritu id constat ac viget semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus sempiternus est. lib. VII. §. 12.

which proceeds from the divine Breathing exists and lives for ever, because this divine Breathing is everlasting. And again: ^a *Therefore the Soul, which is not capable of Dissolution, in æternum manet, exists to Eternity, because that from whence it had its Origin is Eternal.* And lastly in another place of this same Section, which I have before cited: ^b *The Soul, says he, cannot perish, because it has its Origin from the Breath of God, which is Eternal.* We see plainly that in all these places he not onely speaks expressly concerning the Soul alone, but also argues for it's Natural Immortality from it's being Derived from the Divine Breathing. And tho' it be indeed most certainly true, that the Holy Ghost, whose divine Influences we receive by our Baptism, is from Everlasting to Everlasting, as being God, coequal with the other two Persons in the Blessed Trinity, yet *Lactantius* is so far from affirming this in this place, that in this whole Section he does not once mention him, nor ever ascribe the Immortality of the Soul to any Conjunction with, or Influence from this, or any other Spirit. Thus where he says: ^c *That when the Soul shall be separated from the Body it will live of it self, and can never be liable to any Laws of Corruptibility, because it is divested of its frail corruptible Tabernacle of Clay;* we see he expressly ascribes it's Immortality to it self, and not to any adscititious Spirit. And in that other Section of Book the second, which you refer us to, he speaks of nothing,

^a Ergo Anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum manet; quoniam origo ejus æterna est. *Ibid.* ^b Nam interire profus anima non potest, quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui æternus est, originem caput. lib. vii. §. 12. ^c Cum autem dissociata fuerit à corpore; vigeat ipsa per se; nec ulla jam fragilitatis conditione tentabitur, quia indumentum fragile projecit. *Ibid.*

but the Human Soul, which he derives from Heaven and from God. ^a Thus, he says, *Man consists of a Soul and Body, that is, of Heaven and Earth. For as much as the Soul, by which we live, comes from Heaven, and from God, but the Body from the Earth, out of the mud of which, as we said, Man was formed.* And again: ^b *If the Soul overcomes, which proceeds, ex Deo, out of God.* In all these places, which are those you refer us to, there is not the least mention made, notwithstanding you are pleased positively to affirm there is, of any Baptismal or other Spirit whatsoever, but onely of the Soul, the Immortality of which he ascribes to it's self, and it's Origin from the Breath of God, and not to any extrinsecal adscitious Cause or Principle. And thus much you seem to allow, by your owning that *Lactantius* lib. III. 12. expressly affirms the Soul to be Immortal, tho' you afterwards retract it by saying that he means not a Natural, but Conditional Immortality. What *Lactantius* means, by what you call a Conditional Immortality, is I think, sufficiently clear from what has been already said, it being, I suppose, beyond dispute evident, that when he speaks of an Immortality to be obtained by Virtue and Piety, he never designed by it to understand ^c the Everlasting Duration of the Soul, but it's being and existing in

^a Constat enim ex Anima & Corpore, id est, quasi è cœlo & terra. Quandoquidem Anima, qua vivimus, velut è Cœlo oritur à Deo; corpus è terra, cujus è limò diximus esse formatum. lib. II. §. 12. ^b Si anima superaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur. Ibid. ^c Thus in the beginning of this Section, lib. III. 12. where he speaks concerning the Rewards of that Conquest, the Soul gains over it's Enemies, and affirms it to be Immortality, and again when he says so often that Immortality, and Eternal Life is the Reward of Virtue, we can understand these words of nothing but everlasting Happiness, and must not apply them to the everlasting Duration of the Soul, which is distinct from, and in the order of nature before, and indeed the foundation of this Happiness.

Happiness and Bliss. But *Lactantius*, even in this Section too, expressly affirms the Natural Immortality of the Soul; where he says: *'The reason why Man alone is capable of Religion is, that we may thereby be taught that his Soul is not Mortal: since he is capable of knowing and loving God, who is Immortal.* By the Human Spirit here is evidently meant nothing but the Human Soul; which he argues to be Immortal, not from any adventitious Spirit, which is by Baptism, or otherwise communicated to it, but from it's known Powers and Capacities, which because they are natural, and agree to all human Souls, not adventitious, and agree onely to some, must be supposed to prove not an extrinsecal adventitious, but an internal and natural Immortality, which belongs to all Human Souls as such.

You go on, and say, that *Lactantius* has a clear Notion of Soul, as distinct from the Spirit, so distinctly and independently subsistent, as that being actually separated, one will be a Principle of Mortality, the other of Immortality, to him that has them. And to make out this you cite a Passage, part of which you had quoted before, and which tho' I have above given at it's full length, yet I think it necessary here again to represent to your view, that it may the more plainly appear how little it makes to the purpose, for which you here alledge it. *Altho' God might still have created an innumerable company of Souls from his own Immortal Breathings, as he made the Angels, who have an Immortality*

a Ideo Religionem soli capimus, ut ex hoc sciamus humanum Spiritum non esse mortalem, quod Deum, qui est Immortalis, & desiderat, & agnoscit. lib. III. §. 12.

of Happiness without Fear or Danger of any Evil; yet he pitched upon another ineffable Work, and created an infinite multitude of Souls, which being united to Weak Frail Bodies, he placed as it were in the middle between Good and Evil; that he might propose Virtue to them, whilst they thus consisted of the Corporeal, and Spiritual Nature; that so they might choose Eternal Happiness, and the Unspeakable Rewards of Everlasting Life, not by living in Ease and Delicacy, but thro' much labour and many difficulties. What the true sense of this place is, and that it does not in the least contribute to establish the Notion you produce it for, will be so plain to any one that will take the pains only to read and consider it, that I think I need not bestow any time in endeavouring to explain it. He is so far from distinguishing the Soul from the Spirit here, that he makes not the least mention of any Spirit distinct from the Soul. He says indeed, alluding to *Gen. 11. 7.* that God from, or by Innumerable Breathings (for that I take to be the meaning of *Innumerabilibus sui spiritibus*) might have produced an Innumerable Company of Souls, which he might have made like to the Angels, and given them immediately an Immortality of Happiness, without any Danger or Fear of Evil, but that he chose another way, by creating a great Number of Souls, and infusing and uniting them to Bodies, and placing Good and Evil before them, to make this Eternal Happiness the Consequence of their Election, and the Reward of their Virtue. So that here is not the least intimation given of Soul, and Spirit being so distinct, as that one is a Principle of Mortality, and the other of Immortality to those who have them. Your Reasoning upon this Passage,
by

by which you endeavour to confirm this Notion in what follows to the End of this Section, is indeed so very weak and obscure, and contains so many manifest and palpable absurdities, as well as inconsistencies, and self-contradictions, that out of meer Compassion of, and Respect to your Person and Character, for which I have still the greatest veneration, I shall choose rather, as far as lies in me, to cast a veil over it, than expose it to that Scorn and Ridicule of the World, which, if it were open'd, and set in it's proper light, it must needs Occasion.

CHAP. X. ad §. 21.

*St. Athanasius's Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul. He believed the Soul in it's own nature Immortal. He never ascribes it's Immortality to the Spirit; which shews he did not believe it actually immortal, any otherwise than as that is implied in a natural Immortality. What St Athanasius means by saying that Man by his Creation was not capable of existing for ever. The Opinions of the Fathers, and of St Athanasius, concerning the Image of God in Man. Adam's being barely placed in Paradise did not give him a Title to Heaven. Immortality understood by St Athanasius, as the consequence of our choice, in a Compounded sense, for Eternal Happiness, and not in a Divided, for the Existence or Duration of the Soul. By the Death which was threatned for the transgression of God's Command to Adam, we are not to understand the Death of the whole Man, as to both the parts of his Composition, but onely the Separation of Soul and Body and Consequent Corruption and Dissolution of the Body. This is all St Athanasius means, where he gives an Account how Death came into the World. This proved from his comparing the Death of Mankind to that of our Lord, and from his assigning the Resurrection, as a means by which we are redeemed from it. Our Redemption from Death by the *abyos*, to be Understood onely of the Death of the Body. The Close.*

I Have now traced your Citations and Authorities almost to a Period, there being but one Father remaining, of those you have formally alledged, whose Writings have not been examined and discussed, and I think plainly shewn to be so far from favouring, that they directly contradict and overturn your whole Hypothesis. I come therefore in the last place to examin what you

you have endeavour'd to draw to your Purpose out of the great *Athanasius*, whom you mention not without that peculiar Respect, which he so highly deserves: He having been the most faithfull Asserter, and the most couragious Defender of, as well as greatest Sufferer for, the genuin Truths and Doctrines of the Christian Religion of all the Doctors and Fathers of the Church, that lived in these times. And I doubt not to make it undeniably appear that he believed as firmly, and embraced as heartily the Soul's Natural Immortality, as he did any other Truth of Natural or Revealed Religion.

If his Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul in general be inquired into, we shall presently see, that he believed it to be altogether free from all Material Concretion, perfectly Incorporeal, and a pure Spirit. This he so frequently positively affirms, or else plainly supposes throughout his Writings, that I cannot think it needfull to insist long upon the Proof of it. In his Oration against Paganism, where he purposely speaks most expressly and fully concerning the Nature and Immortality of the Soul, we find him affirming: *That there is no one, who is a friend to Truth, but must acknowledge, that the Mind of Man is altogether different from the Corporeal Senses. And for this Reason it is, that being of a Nature different from them, it recollects and judges of the Reports they make of their proper Sensations, and directs them to what is best.* And then he proceeds further to

α Καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἑκάστος, εἰ τ' ἀληθείας γίνοιτο φίλος, ὅτι ἄλλος παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νῦς. διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἄλλος ἐν, αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίνεται κερτὴς, & οὐ σκάνει ἀνπλασμακόντων, ἵνα αὐτὸς διακρίνῃ, καὶ ἀναμνησκεί, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐταῖς τὸ κρεῖττον. ὁφθαλμοὶ γάρ ἐστι μόνον τὸ ὁρᾶν &c. ἀλλ' ἡ δὲ ὁρᾶν &c. σκεπὶ τ' αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴς καὶ τῇ ταύτης νῦ διακρίνει. Orat. Cont. Gentes. §. 3 i.

explain

explain and demonstrate this by Arguments and Instances drawn from all the Senses: and concludes, that tho' it be the work and business of the Senses to apprehend sensible objects, yet it is the Business of the Soul, and more especially of the Understanding to judge and determin what ought to be seen &c. I must indeed confess, that the Comparison here runs upon the Acts and Operations of the Soul, consider'd with reference to those of the Senses; but it may be fairly concluded that since he affirms there is so great a difference betwixt the Operations of one and the other, he supposes as great a difference between those Substances, from whence these Operations proceed. And again a little after he concludes, that the Soul is altogether different from the frame and texture of the Body, from those Acts and Operations of Understanding and Reason, which it is found to exert. ** This, says he, is that we call the Rational Faculty of the Soul, which alone is peculiar to Man, by the Use of which he is distinguished from the Brutes, and which plainly shews that he has a Principle in him wholly different from the Body, or any thing that belongs to it.* The same point he pursues, and still further proves and illustrates a little after, taking his Argument from the Natural Desire Man has of Immortality, from which he infers that he must have something in his Composition of a Nature wholly distinct from the Body, and which is

α Τὸ το δὲ μόνον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸτό ἐστι τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὃ χωρὶς αἰσθητικῆς τῶν αἰσθησίων, καὶ δέικνυσιν, ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἄλλη παρὰ φαινόμενον ἐστὶ ἐν σώματι. Ibid. The MS. Copies vary somewhat in their Readings of this place. Some instead of ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἄλλη παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐστὶ ἐν σώματι, read παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐστὶ, which makes the Sense to be that the Rational Soul is wholly different from any thing that appears and can be the Object of Sense, i. e. that it is altogether Immaterial and Spiritual.

Spiritual and Immortal. ^a *How comes it to pass, says he, that the Body being of Short duration, Man should employ his Thoughts upon Eternal things to that degree, as to despise the present temporary enjoyments, and earnestly to desire those which are everlasting? It is not therefore the Body which frames these Notions, or minds any thing without it self: for that is temporary and mortal. It must therefore be some thing, which is wholly distinct from the Body, that frames a Conception of things wholly distinct from Body. And this can be nothing but the rational and immortal Soul.* We cannot but be sensible that this whole Argument supposes the Spiritual Nature, and infers the Immortality of the Soul. He affirms expressly, that as the objects of thought are of a quite different Nature from Body, so must the Soul which is employed about those objects be so too. And what can this mean but that he thought it to be a Spirit. I shall only trouble you with one short passage more out of an Answer to one of the Questions to *Antiochus*; which Treatise tho' it be most evident it was not writ by St *Athanasius*, yet seems to have been collected chiefly out of his Writings. ^b *The Soul of Man, says this Author, whoever he were, is an Intellectual, Incorporeal, Impassible, Immortal Substance.* Than which a

^a Πῶς ὁρῶσκαίρις τῷ σώματι ὁντος, τὰ αἰώνια φανταίνεται ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι τὸν μὴ ἰμπεδῶν καταφρονεῖν, εἰς ἐκείνα ὃ τὸν πόθον ἔχει; τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα σὰν αὐτὸ ὡς αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα λογίσσεται, καὶ σὰν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἑαυτοῦ λογίζετο. Διηγοῦντο καὶ ὁρῶσκαίριον ἔστιν ἀνάγκη δὲ εἶπεν εἶναι τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ, καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τῷ σώματι λογίζεσθαι. π. αὐτῷ εἰν τῷ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ ψυχῇ λογικῇ, καὶ ἀθάνατον; Ibid. §. 32. ^b Ἡ μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ψυχὴ ἔστιν εὐδοκία νοερά, ἀσώματος, ἀπαθής, ἀθάνατος, &c. Resp. ad Quæst. XVI. It is most evident that Athanasius was not the Author of this Treatise, not only because he is cited for something said here, but also because we find the false Dionysius here quoted, and several Names of a much later date than the times of Athanasius.

more exprefs assertion cannot be made, nor clearer Definition given of the perfectly Incorporeal and purely Spiritual Nature of the Soul.

As to the Immortality of the Soul we find him so frequently asserting, and purposely proving it, and this not as a matter of mere speculation and probability onely, but as a most necessary and concerning Truth, and which was not more indubitably established upon the sure Foundation of Reason, than upon the strong and never to be shaken pillar of Divine Revelation, and Constant Tradition, that you cannot find in your heart to deny it, but have however endeavoured, as much as you can, to weaken and invalidate the Force, Evidence, and Authority of what he has said in Defence of this Truth. I shall examin and shew the weakness of the Distinction, by which you endeavour to evade of this Fathers Assertions of, and Arguments for the Natural Immortality of the Soul in it's proper place, and in the mean time proceed to lay before you those undeniable Testimonies, by which it most plainly appears, that *Athanasius* stedfastly believed and earnestly contended for the Natural Immortality of the Soul. Now this is evident from abundance of places, but more especially from what he purposely says in Section the 32^d of his Oration *Contra Gentes* upon this Subject, which immediately follows that, wherein he gives so full an Account of the Spiritual Nature of the Soul. ^a *That the Soul, says he, was made Immortal, no one can be igno-*

a Οτι δε η ἀθάνατος κρίνεται η ψυχή, ἐν τούτῳ ἀναγκαῖον εἶδέναι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησιαστικῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας. Orat. contra Gentes. s. 33.

rant, who knows the Tradition of the Church, by which plainly appears the falsehood of the Heathen Worship. He affirms here the Soul to have been made or created Immortal, which can be understood of nothing but a Natural Immortality, and proceeds to prove it in the first place from the Nature and Essence of it, being altogether different from that of the Body. ^a This, says he, (meaning the Natural Immortality of the Soul) may be more easily known, by considering the Body and it's wide difference from the Soul. For if, as I have before shewn in this Oration, it be of a nature altogether different from that of the Body, since the Body is naturally mortal, the Soul must be naturally Immortal, as being altogether unlike to the Body. And again he argues for, and endeavours to prove the same thing from it's giving motion to the Body, but having a Principle of Motion within it's self. ^b Again, says he, if, as has been already shewn, the Soul moves the Body, but is it self moved by nothing else, it follows that it must have a Principle of motion within it self, and therefore that it will continue to live and to move of it self after the Death and Corruption of the Body. For the Soul cannot die, but it is the Body that dies by reason of the Soul's departure from it. But if the Soul were moved by the Body, it would follow, that when the Body which moves it is separated from it, it must die. But

α Γινώσκω δ' αὖ ἐν ἡ ἀρετὴ τέλει γινώσκω μὲλλον ἐκ τῆ ἀρετῆ τῶ σώματος γινώσκω, καὶ ἐκ τῆ ἀρετῆ τῶ σώματος ἀλλοιωμένη αὐτῶ. εἰ γὰρ ἀλλοιω αὐτῶ ὁ λογισμὸς ἀπιδύκει παρὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ τὸ σῶμα φύσει θνητὸν ἀνάγκη τῶ ψυχῶ ἀπιδύκει, τῶ μὴ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. Ibid. β Πάλιν εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖ ὡς δίδειται, ἔστι ὑπ' ἄλλου αὐτὴ κινεῖται, ἀνέλεον ἐστὶν ὑπ' ἑαυτῆς κινεῖσθαι τῶ ψυχῶ καὶ μετὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν ἀπιδύσει τῶ σώματος κινεῖσθαι πάλιν αὐτὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπιδύσασα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶ ζωῆς ἀναχέουσι ἀπιδύσασα τὸ σῶμα. εἰ μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐκινεῖτο, ἀνέλεον ἦν αὐτῆς αὐτῆς κινεῖσθαι

if the Soul moves the Body, it must much more move it self: and if it have a Principle of motion within it self, it must necessarily live after the Death of the Body: for the motion of the Soul is nothing but the Life of the Soul. &c.) After this he proceeds to argue for, and formally infers it's Immortality from it's several Actions and Operations, which are not onely wholly different from those of the Body, but which it exerts sometimes independently of it. * This, says he, meaning still the Immortality of the Soul, is more clearly evident from the Operations of the Soul, whilst in conjunction with the Body. For if whilst it is united, and so closely link'd to the Body, it will not be confined and restrained within the narrow bounds of it, but often when the Body lies upon a Bed without motion and as it were in a dead sleep, the Soul by it's own power keeps it self awake, transcends the Nature of the Body, and tho' it continues in it, yet being as it were separated from it, it forms in it self Ideas and Reasonings not onely concerning the things of this World, but also of Angels and departed Souls, and by the purity of it's mind takes it's flight into the other World, how much clearer fuller and livelier a sense will it have of it's own Immortality, when God, who has united it to the Body, shall

ἀποθνήσκων αὐτῷ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον αὐτῷ κινεῖν. αὐτῇ δὲ κινῶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ μεταὶ τὸν τῷ σώματι ζῆναι. ἢ γὰρ κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲν ἑτέρον ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτῆς, &c. Ibid. α Τὸ τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν συμπαί καθ'ἑαυτῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς φανερὰ περὶ αὐτὴν τις ἰδέσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοπεῖται ἐν συνδεδεμένῳ τῷ σώματι, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῷ σώματος σμικρότητα συστήσεται, καὶ συμμετρεῖται, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς ἐπὶ κλίνας τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ μὴ κινῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ζωντῷ κινῶν, αὐτὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς δυνάμιν ζῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὐκ αὐτῇ τῷ σώματι φύσις. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀποθνήσκουσι τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, τὰ ὑπὲρ γὰρ φανταζέται καὶ διαρρεῖ, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν γένων σωματικῶν ἀγρίοις καὶ ἀγγέλοις συναντῶν, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀφικνίεται, τῇ τῇ νῦν ζῶντι καθαροῦ, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πολλὰ πλεον, ἀπλῶς τῷ σώματι, ἐπὶ οὐ συνδεδεμένῳ αὐτῷ θεῷ, φανερωτέραι ἐξεί τι καὶ ἀθανασίας γνώσῃ; εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνδεδεμένῳ σά-

please

please to separate it from it? For if whilst it is joined to the Body it lives a Life without the Body, much more will it live after the Death of the Body, and it will never die, because God, by his Eternal Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, made it Immortal. And lastly, that I may not trouble you with a great many more places, which might here be laid together to the same Purpose, he concludes the Soul to be in it self Immortal, from that innate Knowledge, and those natural and earnest Desires it has of Immortality. ^a Because, says he, the Soul is Immortal, it is naturally capable of understanding and reasoning about those things which are Eternal and Immortal. For as the Body because it is mortal, has it's senses fitted to perceive fading mortal things, so the Soul which contemplates and reasons about Immortal things, must necessarily be it self Immortal and Live for ever. For those Notions and speculations it has concerning Immortality never forsake it, but still continuing in it, are as it were an Earnest and Foretast of it's future Eternity, And from hence it comes to pass, that it has naturally and from it self an Apprehension and Knowledge of God, without receiving it by the Information and Instruction of any one else.) It is easy to observe, that the medium or Argument the Father makes use of in all these places, is taken from the

ethan self

ματι τὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ σώματι ζῶν ἔστι, πολλὴ πλέον ἢ μετὰ θάνατον τῷ σώματι, ζῶνται, ὅτι οὐ παύονται ὁ ζῶν διὰ τὸ ἔσθαι αὐτὴν ποιῶντα διὸ διὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, ὁ πνεῦμα ἡμῶν ἰσοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ibid. a Διὰ τὸτο γὰρ ὁ ἀθάνατος καὶ αἰώνιος λογίζεται ὁ φρονεῖ ἰπικὴν ὁ ἀθάνατος ἔστι. καὶ ὡς περὶ τῷ σώματι ὁ θνητὸν πνεῦμα τῷ, θνητὸν καὶ αἱ τέττα θεωροῦσιν αἰσθήσεις, ἔσθαι ἀθάνατον θεωροῦσιν, καὶ λογίζονται τὴν ψυχὴν αἰώνιον καὶ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, καὶ αἰεὶ ζῶν. αἱ γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ ἀθανάσιος ἵπικα καὶ θεωροῦσιν οὐδέποτε αὐτὴν ἀφίσταται. μένουσιν ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς περὶ ἐκκαμῶς ἐν αὐτῇ γινώσκονται ὡς ἀσφάλεια τὸ ἀθανάσιος. Ἀλλὰ τὸτο γινώσκει καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ διὸ θεωροῦσιν ἔχει τὴν ἵπικα, καὶ αὐτῇ ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ, ὅτι ἐξ ὧν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λαμβάνουσι τὴν ὁ θεὸς λόγῳ γινώσκει ὁ κατέληψεν. Ibid.

known

known nature, and allowed properties of the Soul; which plainly shews that he thought it in it's own nature Immortal. For otherwise he would certainly never have argued from it's nature and properties to prove it Immortal. His representing it to be of a nature and essence altogether different from the nature and essence of the Body clearly demonstrates, that he thought it to be perfectly Immaterial and a pure Spirit; from the simplicity of the nature, and constitution of which it may justly be inferred, that it neither contains within it self any Principles or Seeds of Corruption, nor can possibly be destroyed by the influence, or activity of any second Cause. His affirming it likewise to be *ἀν-κίνητον*, or to have within it self a Principle of Motion, proves plainly that it cannot possibly be material: since it is one of the most obvious and first properties of matter that it cannot move, unless it be moved. But the *Father* affirms the very Life of the Soul to consist in it's motion: since therefore it has this motion, according to *Athanasius's* Opinion, from it self, and it's own nature, it can never cease to live, and to move; unless we should suppose, what is most contrary to nature and reason, that any thing should deprive and divest it self of any Perfection that it has. His representing the Actions and Operations of the Soul to be wholly different from those of the Body, plainly shews, that he thought their Natures and Essences likewise to be altogether different. True indeed it is, that we know but very little concerning the Nature and Essences of things: but this however I suppose is a sure ground to go upon, that such Substances have Natures and Essences quite distinct from, and even

opposite to each other, which support properties and qualities that are totally different and opposite. And since the Soul, as this Father affirms, sometimes exerts these it's Powers and Faculties independently of the Body, this plainly proves it to be of a nature distinct from, and in it's operations not necessarily to depend upon, the Body. And from hence we may fairly conclude, as he does, that it is of it self, and in it's own nature, Immortal; because the great God, when, by his Eternal Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also he made the World, he created it, gave it such a Nature and Essence, by virtue of which, upheld by the general support of his Providence, it will exist to Eternity. His arguing likewise, almost after the same manner, as ^a *Cicero* does in his first *Tusculan*: that the Soul cannot die and perish with the Body, because of the natural tendency of the thoughts of Men to what is future, and will exist after the Death of the Body, and because they have such earnest desires, and eager expectations of an Immortality after this Life is ended, plainly shews that he thought the same sort of Immortality to appertain to it,

a Maximum vero argumentum naturam ipsam de Immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ sunt, & maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sint. Serit arbores quæ alteri sæculo profint, ut ait statius in *Synephebis*: quid spectans nisi etiam postera sæcula ad se pertinere? And after this pursuing the same Argument with that force of Reason, elevation of thought, and perspicuity of expression, which is so peculiar to this Inimitable Man, he concludes: Quod si omnium consensus naturæ vox est: omnesque qui ubique sunt consentiunt esse aliquid quod ad eos pertineat, qui vita cesserint: nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur, quia natura optima sunt, cernere naturæ vim maxime: verisimile est cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus. *Cicero Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. §. 31, 35. Ed. Gron.*

which

which the *Roman* Orator there endeavoured to shew belongs to the Soul; which was no other than a natural Immortality. For to what purpose should God have planted these desires in the Souls of all Mankind, but with design to give them an Intimation of, and by gentle steps to lead them to, the Knowledge of their having something in their Composition wholly different from the visible, mortal Body, and which therefore is invisible, immortal, and incorporeal.

In answer to all this you will perhaps say, That you don't deny that *Athanasius* held it as his own Opinion, and represents it as the Doctrine of the Church, that the Soul is *actually* Immortal, but that you deny that he affirms it as his own Opinion, or as that of the Church, that it was *naturally* Immortal: by this I suppose being willing to persuade us, that it's *actual* Immortality is to be ascribed, according to the sentiment of this Father, to the influence of the Spirit of God. In order therefore to drive you from this place of Retreat, and to set this whole matter in the clearest light, and if possible, beyond all contradiction, I shall bestow some few reflections upon what *Athanasius* says concerning the Holy Spirit of God, and endeavour to shew, that he never ascribes the Immortality of the Soul to any Influences from it. Whenever he speaks concerning the Holy Spirit of God, his chief Business is to guard against, or to confute and overturn the Heresies of *Arius*, *Macedonius*, and others, who not believing the Doctrine of the Trinity, denied the Divinity of the Son, and Holy Ghost. There were it seems a party of *Arians*, who pretended to believe the Divinity of the Son, and thereupon made

a kind of separation from the Rest, but then could not be brought to confess that of the Holy Ghost, but obstinately persisted in affirming him to be a mere creature, a ministring Spirit, that differed βάθμῳ μόνον, onely in degree, and not in nature from the Angels. And in order to make good this Position, they gave a metaphorical Turn and Interpretation to all those Texts of Scripture, which are usually cited for the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, and from hence had the Name of *Tropici* given to them. Against these, and some other Heretics, who were in the same sentiment, *Athanasius* levels three of his four Epistles to *Serapion*, viz. the first, third, and fourth: wherein he most undeniably demonstrates the Holy Ghost to be very God, and to this purpose frequently takes Occasion to mention the Blessed Effects and Influences of this Eternal Spirit. He affirms that both the first and second Creation, or the giving Being and Existence to all things, and the Renovation of Men in their hearts and lives, is to be ascribed to the Operations and Influences of this Holy Spirit; from whence he very reasonably and justly infers that he is God. Thus in the third Epistle to *Serapion*, we find him endeavouring to prove the Holy Ghost to be God, because he created all things. *This*, says he, *being plainly Scripture, it is evident from hence, that the Spirit is not a Creature, but is concerned in the Creation. For the Father created all things by the Word in the Spirit. Since wheresoever the Word is, there is also the*

α Τὸ τε ὅ ἕως γεγραμμένον δῆλον ἐστίν, ὡς ὅσα ἐστὶ κτίσμα τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ κτίζον ἐστίν. ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ λόγου οὗ τοῦ πνεύματος κτίζει τὰ πάντα, ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα. καὶ τὰ διὰ τοῦ λόγου κτισθέντα ἔχει, ἐκ τῶ πνεύματος.

*Spirit. And whatsoever is created by the Word has it's existence from the Holy Ghost thro' the Son. For so it is written in the thirty second Psalm. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and all the host of them with the Breath of his mouth. Psal. xxxii. 6. The same he also observes and urges in many other places both of this, and his other Epistles, which concern the Holy Spirit. As where he says in the first of these Epistles to Serapion: ^a That all created things receive Life from the Spirit. In all which places nothing more doubtless is meant, than that all the Acts and Operations of the Deity, so far as they suppose Attributes, which are common to all the three Persons, as each is God, are here represented to proceed from them all together. But this will by no means serve your turn, in as much as this does not suppose any peculiar or extraordinary Act of the Spirit, but onely the general Concurrence of that same Power of his to preserve, which first gave them their Beings, and which may well consist, as has been already observed, with the Soul's Natural Immortality. Again Regeneration, Illumination, and Sanctification are by St *Athanasius*, as indeed they are by every one else, frequently ascribed to the Holy Communications and Influences of this Blessed Spirit of God. Hence he frequently calls the Holy Ghost, the Unction, the Seal, and the Spirit of Wisdom and Truth. ^b He tells us, *that we are sealed, and anointed, and taught all things by the**

ματῷ πατρὶ ὃ λόγος τὴν ὃ εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν. ἔτα γὰρ γέγραπται ἐν τῷ πνεύματι δό-
τις ψαλμῷ. τὸ λόγος κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερώθησαν, καὶ τῷ πνεύματι ὃ σῶματῷ
αὐτοῦ πάντα ἡ διώκρισις αὐτῶν. Epist. iii. ad Serap. §. 5. a Τα δὲ κτίσματα, ὡς
εἴρηται, ζωοποιεῖσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ. Epist. I. ad Serap. §. 23. b Τα δὲ κτίσματα
ταῦτα σφραγίζονται καὶ χρίονται, ὡς πᾶσι πάντων διδασκίται. Ep. I. ad Serap. §. 23.

Spirit of God. And a little after : ^a *That it is by being thus seal'd, that we are made partakers of what St Peter calls the divine Nature, and that all Creatures receive the Word in the Spirit.* He likewise frequently gives that common Epithet of ζωοποιόν, the giver of Life, to the Spirit, not onely because he gives Being and Life to every thing, but also because the great work of the Resurrection will be brought about, and performed by his mighty Power. Hence he expressly tells us, ^b *That for this very reason the Spirit is called the giver of Life.* For he that raised up Jesus from the Dead, shall also quicken our mortal Bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in us. *Rom. viii. 18.* But now, as there is not any mention made either here, or any where else, of the Communications of the Blessed Spirit of God, or of any other Spirit or Principle, for the purpose of Immortalizing the Soul, so neither can it with reason be supposed to be implied in any thing that he says concerning this matter. The Holy Spirit being concerned in the Creation of the World may indeed suppose the concurrence of the same Spirit requisite for it's preservation : but then this can be onely an ordinary concurrence, which is communicated to all Beings, and therefore not peculiar to those Men onely, who are Baptized, and consequently cannot be in the least serviceable to your Purpose. And tho' the Gifts of the Spirit be communicated by Baptism, for the Purposes of Regeneration, Illumination, and Sanctification, yet these are far from implying any

^a Οὕτω δὲ σφραγίζονται, εἰσάγεται καὶ κοινοὶ θείας φύσεως κοινωνοὶ, ὡς εἶπεν ὁ πατὴρ, καὶ μετέχει πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι. *Ibid.* ^b Πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν λήγεται. ὁ ἐργάτης γὰρ, φησιν, Ἰησοῦν &c. *5. 23.*

Power of Immortality the Soul; so far as that signifies simply and abutely onely the continuance of it's duration to Ety. And tho' it be certain that most agreeably the Doctrine of Scripture, and the Analogy of it, he ascribes the great work of the Resurrexion to the Spirit, yet this implies nothing thainconsistent with the *Natural Immortality* of Soul: since it is not the Soul but the Body it is the Subject of the Resurrexion, nor is th any perpetuity given by it to the Soul, but on to the Body, which by the Power of the Spirit raised from the Dust, and will continue for evin an indissoluble union with the Soul. Since thfore it is most evident, and even confessed by ur self, that *Athanasius* held the Soul to be Immortal, but does not, as we have seen, assign this Inortality to any Cause, but that Constitution, a Frame of it's Nature, which it received at it's Cation, we may reasonably from hence infer, that hbelieved it to be in it's own *nature* Immortal, al to be no otherwise *actually* Immortal, than as hat is a necessary Consequence of it's *Natural* Immortality.

But notwithstanding this you will urge, that *Athanasius* held the *natural Mortality* of the Soul. And to prove this ou think no other Testimony requisite to be alledged, and to be sure, were the passages you have cted in the least to your Purpose, that alone wold be sufficient, than what his own plain Words, you say, afford you, where, you would have us believ, he fully and clearly appears to have been of thi Opinion. To support this Assertion, and make t, as you think, most clearly evident, you have hid together several Passages
out

out of his Book concerning the Incarnation of Christ, not one of which as I shall make undeniably to appear, is in least to your Purpose. You have indeed made use of some little Art, I am loth to say of what kind is, to make them seem of the Colour, and to mix with something of the Air of your *Hypothesis* that the paint is either so unskillfully laid on, or the Passages are so stanch as not to receive a tincture from them, that even as they lie in your Dissertation, they appear plainly enough of a quite different Strain and Complexion from that of the whole thread of your Argument. The first Passage you cite to this Purpose is that where he says *That Man by virtue of that Nature alone, which wove him by his Creation, was not capable of existing forever.* It is evidently the Principal Design of the author in this Treatise to give a full Account of the Reasons why our Saviour was made Flesh and dwelt amongst us. And in order to this he first shews in opposition both to the Philosophers and Herets, that the World was framed by God the Father out of nothing, by his most powerfull Word *Cum Christus*, that he may the more fitly and properly introduce the second thing, which is the Subject of this Treatise, namely the Renovation or New Creation of it, by the same *Christus Jesus* by whom it was at first made. And accordingly having mentioned and confuted the Opinions of the *Epicurans*, who affirmed the World to be made by chance, or, which comes to the same, that it made itself, without any impulse,

^a Οὐκ ἰκανὸν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἰδίας γνώσεως λόγον ἀγαθὴν αἰεὶ. De Incarnat.
Verb. § 3.

direction, and superintendence from an Allwise Agent, which is plainly what he more especially expresses by the word *αὐτομάτως*; of the *Platonists*, and others, who affirmed indeed that God made the World, but then said it was out of uncreated matter, which was preexistent from Eternity; and, lastly, of the *Marcionites*, *Manichees*, and other Heretics, who asserted another Deity, besides the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, to have been the Maker of the World, he proceeds to tell us: *That divine Revelation and Faith in Christ will oblige us to reject these Fooleries, as no better than downright Atheism. For that teaches us, that the frame of the World was not made by chance, because it is not govern'd by chance, and also that it was not made from self-subsistent eternal matter, in as much as there can be no defect of Power in God: but it assures us that God by his Word made all things, which before could have no manner of Existence, out of nothing. For thus it tells us by Moses: In the beginning God created the Heaven, and the Earth. And in that most usefull Book called the Pastor: First of all believe, that there is one God, who created, and framed all things out of nothing. Which St Paul also signifies to us where he says: Thro' Faith we understand that the Worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things, which were seen, were not made of things, which do appear.*

α Η ὁ ἱεὺς διδασκαλία, καὶ ἡ κτ' Χριστὸν πιστὴν τῷ μὲν τέτῳ ματαολογίαν εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἀφαιρᾷ. οὐτε γὰρ αὐτομάτως, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀσθενεῖν εἶναι, οὐτε ἐκ περὶ παλαιότητος ὕλης, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀδυνάμει εἶναι τὸ Θεόν· ἀλλ' ἐκ ὧν ὄντων καὶ μηδαμῶς ὑπαρχόντων τὰ ὅλα εἰς τὸ εἶναι πειστικῶς τὸν Θεὸν ἀφ' οὗ τὰ λόγῳ εἶδεν, ἢ φησὶ ἀφ' οὗ μὲν Μαυρίας ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ οὐρανὸν, καὶ τὴν γῆν. διὰ δ' τ' ἀφαιρωτάτης βίβλου τ' ποιημένης πείθει πάντας πιστεύσαντας ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ κατηρτίσας, καὶ ποιῶν ἐκ τῆς μηδενότητος εἰς τὸ εἶναι. ὅπερ καὶ ὁ Παῦλος σημαίνει φησὶ. πιστεῖ νοοῦμεν κατηρτίσας τὴν αἰῶνα ῥήματι Θεοῦ, εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φανομένων τὰ

For

For God is Good, or rather the very fountain of Goodness: but that which is good can envy nothing what it enjoys. And therefore envying Being and Existence to nothing, he created all things out of nothing by his own Word, our Lord Jesus Christ. Among all his Creatures having a more mercifull regard to Mankind, than to any of the rest, and seeing that he was not sufficient upon the account of that Nature given him at his Creation to continue for ever, [these are the Words you have cited] he was pleased to give something more to him. For he did not simply create Man, as he did all the Brute Animals, but created him after his own Image, and made him &c. We see plainly that the Father in this place, with reference to the first point he proposed, is asserting and proving, that God by his Eternal Word created all things, and particularly he mentions Man, out of Nothing. And then speaking of that more especial mercifull Regard, which he had to Man, whom he knew barely by his having been created or produced into Being, not to be capable of existing to Eternity, (for if he were, it would follow that every thing that has a Being would continue in that Being to Eternity, which we see evidently false as to several Beings of the visible Creation) he was graciously pleased to add something further to him, not simply and absolutely creating him, as he did

βλεπόμενα μετέπειτα. ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ πηρὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ὑπάρχων· ἀγαθὸν δὲ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐν γένει τοῦ φθίνου, ὅτι οὐδενὶ ἔστι τι φθιόντως, ἐξ οὗ ὅτι πάντα πεποιήμεν διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου λόγου τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. ἐν οἷς οἱ πάντων τῶ ἐπὶ γῆς τῶ ἀνθρώπων γένος ἰδιώτες, καὶ παρώτρως ὡς, then follow the Words you have cited, ἔχοντες ἡμεῖς, the following word you left out, εἰς καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἡμεῖς λόγῳ ἀφαιμένῳ αἰεὶ, πλὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ἀπλῶς ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλογα ζῶν, ἔκπαι τῶς ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι ἰσχυρὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, μεταδόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν λόγῳ διωκίμους &c. which are the words you cite in the second place.

the rest of the Creatures, but creating him after his own Image. This, as is most clearly evident to any considering Man, is all he can mean by the *παρεν π* &c. which he adds immediately after the Words you have cited, and which, if you would have been so just, as to have quoted the words that lie between your first and second Citation, would evidently have appeared to the Reader to be the sense of this place: so that it is plain from hence, that *Man*, according to this Father's Opinion, had Immortality bestowed upon him, by his being created *κατ' εἰκόνα*, after the Image of God. And upon this single View, this Passage appears as little to your purpose, as any other you have cited in all your Dissertation. For (not to mention that what he speaks here has evidently a Relation not to the *Soul*, but to the *Man*, which being so distinct as they are, it is most illogical to argue from the one to the other) is not whatever is given to Man by his being thus created, given to Man in general? And therefore tho' we should suppose, what the Father before us, as well as many other of the Fathers, affirm, and which seems not altogether unreasonable, that Immortality was given to Man, by his being created after the Image of God, yet will not this serve the purpose of your adscititious Spirit, not onely in as much as it ascribes Immortality to something distinct from it, but also because whatever was thus given to Man, must be supposed to be derived to all his Posterity, if not in the same degree and quality, yet at least in the same kind. It is true indeed, that the Image of God in Man was certainly very much obscured and defaced, in all the parts and branches of it, by the Fall, but yet not wholly taken

taken away in any. And therefore we may reasonably suppose, that tho' *Adam* by his Fall, and incurring Corporal Death thereby, did obscure the Image of God in Man, with regard to this part of it, his Immortality, yet the *Soul's* surviving this stroke of Death, and by virtue of it's natural Incorruptibility continuing to Eternity, was certainly a very valuable remain of this part of the Divine Image, which Man was not deprived of by the Fall, and which therefore must be derived to all his Posterity. Unless you will affirm, that the Punishment of Death inflicted for the Sin of our first Parents reached the *Soul* as well as Body: which is so uncatholick, and absurd an Opinion, that I am perswaded you will be ashamed to take refuge in it.

As to that famous Question in what this Image of God consisted, I cannot stay at this time largely to insist upon it; and therefore shall onely just mention, the various Opinions, more especially of the Fathers, when they discourse about this Nice, and, I think I may add, needless Speculation. Some therefore will have this Image of God in Man to have reference onely to the Body, others to the Soul, and some to both Body and Soul. Those who will have the Image of God to have reference onely to the Body were generally such as thought God to be corporeal, such as *Audius*, the founder of the *Audiani* in *Epiphanius*, the *Anthropomorphites*, and even *Tertullian*, as I have before shewn. *Tertullian* indeed has this peculiar fancy as to this matter, that he supposes the Image of God to consist in that resemblance, which the Body of the first Man had with the visible Humanity of our Saviour, when on Earth.

For thus we find he explains himself concerning this matter in his Book de Resur. Carn. ^a *What the Father spoke to the Son before he created Man was: Let us make Man after our own Image and Likeness. And God made Man that which he framed him, after the Image of God made he him, that is after the Image of Christ. For as the Word of God, who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; so that Clay taking the Image of Christ, who was to come in the Flesh, was not onely the Workmanship, but also the Earnest of God.* Those who place this Image of God in the Soul or Mind of Man, make it to consist in the Knowledge of the Understanding, the Freedom of the Will, or in the Practice of Virtue. And lastly such as will have this Image to have reference both to Body and Mind, make it to consist in the Dominion Man has over the Creatures, or else in that Immortality which results from an indissoluble Union of Soul and Body, which Union would have been continued to him for ever, without that sad interruption, which is now seen in it, by the dismal Interposal of Death, by virtue of his being created after the Image of God, if he had persisted in that State of Innocence and Perfection, in which he was at first created. And of this last Opinion *Athanasius* seems to have been in the Passage before us. For he says that God seeing that Man by Virtue of his Creation was

^a Sic enim præfatio Patris ad Filium: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram. Et fecit hominem Deus id utique quod finxit, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, scilicet Christi. Et sermo enim Deus, qui in effigie Dei constitutus non rapinam existimavit parari Deo. Ita limus ille jam tunc Imaginem induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus erat sed etiam pignus. De Resur. Carn. Cap. 6.

not sufficient to exist to Eternity, gave him Immortality by creating him after his own Image. But this is an Immortality, which will not in the least serve the Purpose of your Dissertation: because in the first place it is an Immortality not of the Soul, but of the Man, and then it is derived not from any adscititious Spirit or Principle, but from his Being created after God's Image, and lastly because it signifies primarily and principally that Happy State *Adam* might for ever have enjoyed in Paradise, and onely secondarily and remotely that inseparable eternal Union of Soul and Body, which is the Foundation of this Happiness. And therefore tho' it be most certainly true, what you argue upon this passage, that *Athanasius* ascribes the Immortality, which was given to *Man*, rather than to any other Animal, to his having been framed after the Image of God, yet is not this in the least to the purpose of the *Soul's* Immortality. And as to what you say, that what the Scriptures call *the Image of God*, after which Man was made, *Philo* and the Fathers call the ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρώπου, I must for the sake of Truth, make so free with you, as to tell you, that it is altogether a Mistake. The ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρώπου in *Philo* is, as I have elsewhere observed, nothing but that *Idea* in the Divine Mind, according to the Pattern of which Man was framed. But this, as every one must see, is widely different from that Image and Resemblance of his own Perfections, which God was pleased to imprint upon Man, and thereby to dignify and distinguish him from all the rest of the Creatures. I cannot therefore imagin what it should be, that should make you confound these two things, which in themselves are so clearly
and

and fully distinct, unless it were that you found the words κατ' εἰκόνα, both in the first Chapter of *Genesis*, and in the Writings of *Philo*.

St *Athanasius* goes on, and further explains, what was meant by God's creating Man after his own Image, in the words you have cited in the second place, where, after he had said that God did not onely create Man, but created him also after his own Image, he immediately subjoins: *a and made him partaker of the Power of his own Word, that having some shadows of the λόγος, and being made rational, he might continue for ever in happiness, living in Paradise the true and real Life of Saints.* It is I suppose too clear and evident to need a Commentary what is meant by these Words, namely, that our first Parents having been created after the Image of God, were thereby put into a capacity, by having the Union betwixt their Souls and Bodies hereby made indissolveable, of continuing for ever, in the Blissfull State and Life of Paradise and Heaven. But by falling from this Original Rectitude of their Nature, and so forfeiting, or at least much obscuring, that Image of his own Immortality and Perfections, which God had stamp't upon them, they became liable to Corporal Death, and lost that State of Happiness they had, by their being created after God's Image, been put into. But this, which it is undeniably clear and certain is the true and genuine Sense of these Words, I am sure is very far from serving your Purpose. For here is not the least Intimation

a Μεταδὲς αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τὸ ἴδιον λόγον διδόναι, ἵνα ὡςπερ σκιάς τινος ἔχοντες τὸν λόγον, καὶ θρόνοι τοῦ λόγου, ἀμείνουν ἐν μακαριότητι διωγηθῶσι, ζῶντες τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ἐν παροδείσῳ βίον. De Incarnat. Verb. §. 3.

given of Man's being secured from *actual Mortality*, as you love to call it, with reference to his Soul, but with regard to his Body onely, and the Union of that with his Soul. It was no doubt by receiving this Image, and the Succours and Powers of the Divine λόγος, that he was render'd capable, if himself had pleased, of living for ever in the happiness of Paradise and Heaven: but what I pray has this to do with the Immortalizing of the *Soul*, which evidently onely regards the Immortality, as that signifies the Everlasting Happiness, of the *Man*.

You say, that *this happy Life in Paradise had given Adam, if he had persisted in it, a further Title to an Eternal State of Happiness in Heaven, of which Paradise was a Covenanting Symbol, but revocable by his misbehaviour, which depended on his own Free Will*. It is I think, to say the least of it, somewhat a precarious Assertion, which you here make, that the Life in Paradise gave *Adam* a title to a state of Happiness in Heaven. Since it seems to me, that it was not simply his living in Paradise, but his obeying the Commands of God, that gave him all the Title he had to Heaven: which Obedience, together with Repentance for the past transgression, gave him without all doubt a Title to Heaven, even after he had been cast out of Paradise. So that if by this Argument, drawn thus from the Life in Paradise giving the first Man a Title to Heaven, you would conclude, as you seem to intend, that therefore by being cast out of Paradise, he lost all his Title to future happiness, I affirm both your antecedent and consequent to be utterly false and groundless. For did not God immediately provide a way, by which on certain, new, and less difficult, Conditions than
were

were contained in the first Covenant of unfinning Obedience, he might obtain an Eternity of Happiness hereafter? So that tho' he lost Paradise, and the Power of ever returning thither again, yet he did not thereby irrecoverably lose his *Title* to Heaven. But should we grant all that you can desire to prove by this Argument, yet neither will this be found to make any thing for your Purpose. For what if *Adam* by losing Paradise forfeited his Title to Heaven, does it from hence follow, that he must therefore cease to be Body and Soul, or that his Soul is *naturally Mortal*? I am sure there is another Opinion more Orthodox and Catholick, which gives a very good Account of the one, without any necessity of supposing the other. For are we not taught by the sure Analogy of Faith, grounded upon the infallible Word of God, that tho' *Adam* by transgressing the Command of God lost Paradise, brought corporal Mortality into the World, and made himself and all his Posterity liable to Eternal Wrath and Punishment, yet by Repentance of what is past, and Obedience for the future, thro' the Merits of Christ, both he and they might escape this Punishment, and make themselves capable of Eternal Happiness. And this, which might easily be made appear, were that needfull, to have been St *Athanasius's* Belief concerning these matters, plainly supposes, that the Soul was not to be included in the Sentence of Death for the transgression of our First Parents. For if the Soul had been designed to be comprehended within the sense and meaning of that Dreadfull Threat, *In the Day thou eatest &c.* how was it possible for *Adam*, and those of his Posterity to be liable to that Eternal Punishment, which has

always been thought to be denounced, and chiefly intended in this Threat ?

He proceeds, in the Words immediately following those you have cited in the second place, to shew what way and method, God in his Mercy took to secure Man in this State of Happiness in Paradise, which by an ill Use of his Free Will he might so easily Forfeit. And for this he tells us: *That God seeing Man had freedom of Choice, which might determin him indifferently to Good or Evil, he took care to secure to him the favour he had bestowed upon him by the place he fix'd him in, and the Law that he gave him. For he brought him into his own Paradise, and gave him a Law* [then follow the words you have cited in the third place] *that so if he did not abuse this favour, but continued good and obedient, he might enjoy a Life in Paradise not liable to pain, care, or mortality, and besides had a State of Immortality promised to him in Heaven. But if he transgressed God's Command, and became disobedient and wicked, he was assured that he must undergo the Curse of a natural Mortality, be cast out of Paradise, undergo Death in another place, and continue under Corruption.* From this Passage you argue thus: "that the Father supposes us only enabled to be "Immortal if we please, but still supposes Death "and Corruption most agreeable to our own na-

α Εἰδὼς δὲ πάλιν ὅτι ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀμφοτέρω ἰδίῳ δυνάμειν ἐκείνην, ἀπολαύειν ἡσυχασίας νόμον καὶ τόπον πάλιν δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς χάριν. εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ παράδεισον αὐτὸς εἰσενεγκὼν, ἐδωκεν αὐτοῖς νόμον. And then follow the words you have cited in the third place, ἵνα εἰ μὴ φυλάξαι πάλιν χάριν, & μίνοι καλοὶ, ἔχουσιν τὴν ἐν παραδείσῳ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἀνιδμενοι, & ἀμείνονες ζῶντες, ὥστε τὴν καὶ τῆς ἐν οὐρανοῖς ἀφ' αἰσίων αὐτὸς πάλιν ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχειν. εἰ ὅτι παραδοῖεν & ἐραφίντες γίνονται φάυλοι, γένεσθαι αὐτὸς πάλιν ἐν θανάτῳ κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν ὑπομένειν, καὶ μετὰ τὴν μὴ ἐν παραδείσῳ ζῆν, ἐξ ὧν δὲ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀποδείκνυται μίνοι ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ & ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ. Ibid.

"ture

“ture, if deserted by the Divine Favour, notwithstanding the Divine Breathing, which is the Image of God. The Immortality the Father here speaks of is evidently no other, than that our first Parents were to have enjoyed in Paradise and Heaven, if they had continued obedient to God’s Command, and so preserved that Rectitude and Perfection of their Nature, wherein the Image of God, after which they were created, consisted. For does he not expressly say, that if they continued obedient, they were to enjoy a Life in Paradise, which was to be *ἀλυστος, ἀώδυνος, ἀμέτερος*, without pain, care, and not liable to Dissolution, and besides, that they had the promise of an Immortality in the Heavens? Where by *ἀλυστος ζωῆς*, an undissolveable Life, there is no doubt to be made, but that he understands a Life not liable to those Laws of Separation between Soul and Body, and Dissolution of the Body, which our first Parents by their Fall, and their Posterity ever since, have been subject to. But this has not the least reference, as will presently more fully appear, to the *Soul*, which notwithstanding it’s separation from, and the dissolution of it’s Companion of Clay, the *Body*, may, and most certainly will, continue for ever, by virtue of it’s own natural Immortality. So that the Immortality here spoken of, which the Father says was in the Power of our first Parents to have acquired, was not the Everlasting Duration of their *Souls*, simply and abstractedly consider’d, which is the proper Subject of our Debate, but the Immortality, as I said before, of the *Man*, which was to consist in an uninterrupted State of the purest felicity of Paradise, and in the never ceasing, and most refin’d Joys of Heaven, to which,

after a certain Period of time, he supposes, they were to have been translated. If therefore when you say, *Athanasius* supposes us, or rather our first Parents, for it is concerning them alone that he here speaks, *only enabled to be immortal if we please*, you mean Immortality in this latter sense, I readily grant this to be a true Representation of the Father's sense and meaning, who without all doubt understands Immortality here *in sensu composito*. But then I affirm, that this Testimony is not in the least to the purpose of this Debate, which does not proceed concerning Immortality in this sense, but concerning Immortality, as understood *in sensu diviso*, barely of the everlasting duration and existence of the *Soul* only.

But you still urge this matter, and would have us believe, that by Death here the Father supposes, nothing else can be meant, but that of the whole Man, as that implys an utter extinction, and ceasing to be for ever. And accordingly you say, he expounds the divine Threat of *Θανάτω ἀποθανείσθε*, *ye shall die the Death*, by *μὴ μόνον ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῷ Θανάτῳ Φθορᾷ διαμένειν*, that they should not only die, but remain under the corruption of Death. The Place upon which you ground this Assertion, immediately follows that I last cited, and runs in these Words: *And this the Holy Scripture signifies, when it says in the Person of God: Of every tree in the Garden, thou mayst freely eat: But of the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest there-*

α Τὸτο ὃ ἐν τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ἀποσημαίνει λέγεσθαι καὶ περὶ τῷ Θεῷ. ἀπὸ παν-
τός ἐστιν τὸ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὴν βρώσιν φωνῇ. ἀπὸ δὲ τῷ ἔλεει τῷ γινώσκον καλὸν καὶ
of,

of, thou shalt surely die, *or dying thou shalt die, as it is in the Hebrew Idiom.* As to the Scriptures saying, thou shalt surely die, *what else can be signified by it, but that he should not onely die, but also continue under the Corruption of Death.* Amongst all those several senses, that have been given of this Text, *In the Day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,* by either Antient or Modern Expositors of any Note, I don't remember that I have met with any, that has extended the Death here threaten'd so, as to make it reach to the Soul; so as to mean an utter extinction of Being, or ceasing to exist. Some have indeed interpreted this place so, as to make it have reference to the Soul, but then this is in a moral and metaphorical sense, as understood of a Death of Sin, in opposition to a Life of Holyness and Virtue, and that corruption and depravation of our Nature deserted by God, which was a necessary consequence thereof. And in this sense St *Augustin* in his Commentary upon *Psal. lxx.* speaks of two sorts of Life, and likewise of two sorts of Death. *There are,* says he, *two sorts of Life, one of the Body, the other of the Soul. As the Life of the Body is the Soul, so the Life of the Soul is God. And as when the Soul leaves the Body it dies, so when God deserts the Soul that dies also.* Of the same Opinion also *Gregory Nyssen* seems to have been, where endeavouring to give an Account, how the Veracity of God could be made to consist with the Letter of

ποιησὶν οὐ φάσκει αὐτ' αὐτῷ ἢ δ' ἂν ἡμεῖς φάσκει θανάτῳ ἀποθνήσκει. τὸ δὲ θανάτῳ ἀποθνήσκει, πᾶν ἄλλο εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ φθαρὲ ἀφαιρῆναι. Ibid. a Duæ sunt vitæ, una corporis, altera animæ. Sicut vita corporis Anima, sic vita animæ Deus. Quomodo si anima deserat, moritur corpus: sic anima moritur, si deserat Deus. August. in *Psal. lxx.*

the Threat, *In the Day*, when the Punishment was not inflicted, if understood of the Death of the Body, till nine hundred years after, he says: *Upon that very account, because he was, by his Sin, alienated from the true Life of God, he might be said upon the very Day of his Fall, to have the sentence of Death inflicted upon him; tho' it was not till sometime after, that the Death of the Body overtook him.* Which implies, that the former Death, which he is said to suffer upon the very Day of his transgression, was that of the Soul, in this Metaphorical or Religious sense, by its being alienated from that, which he calls the true Life of the Soul, viz. a Life of Virtue and Holiness. But this is a sort of Death, which will not serve your Purpose; since in this sense the Soul may every Day die, and yet never cease to live, and to be. The more common Opinion therefore, and that which has been most generally received, as most agreeable to Reason, and the Doctrines of Christianity, is, that by Death here is to be understood immediately and principally the Death of the Body, by its separation from the Soul, and being thereby dissolved into Rottenness and Corruption, and at last crumbled into Dust. And according to this Sense are the words to be understood in that severe Expostulation of God with Adam after the Fall, Chap. III. 19. *In the sweat of thy face, thou shalt eat Bread, till thou return unto the Ground: for out of it wast thou taken: Dust thou art, and to Dust thou shalt return.* Which it is evident can be un-

a Διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀδικασίαν αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄντως ζῆναι, ἀνθρώπου ἐκπαύση κατ' αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ δόξουσιν. καὶ πῶτα δὲ ζήσονται ὕστερον, ἐν ὁμοιωμένῳ τῷ Ἀδάμ ἐν καλῶναι ψυχῆς. Greg. Nyssen. l. contra Eunom. Instead of θανάτῳ δόξουσιν, St Hierome seems to say, that Symmachus read θνήσκει ἵστη, or at least interpreted these words in this sense.

derstood onely of the Body, and can never agree to the Soul, with reference to which *Adam* could not be said to be taken out of the Ground; since the Text positively tells us, he received that from the Spirit, or Breath of God. And no doubt it was with reference to this Death of the Body, that the Apostle, *Rom. viii. 10.* allusively tells us: *That the Body is dead, because of Sin.* And there is a great deal of Reason, as well as Authority of Scripture and Tradition, why it should be understood in this sense, if not onely, yet at least primarily and principally. For as the Everlasting Life, which our first Parents, if they had not fallen, might have enjoyed, would have consisted in an indissoluble union of Soul and Body, and what was a Consequence hereof in an Incorruptible, and Immortal State of the Body, without danger of decay or dissolution, so the Death, which was threatn'd and inflicted for his Sin, cannot certainly be understood to extend any further, than the Rules of it's Opposition to this Life will carry it, and so can't mean any thing more, under this Consideration, than a State, wherein *Man* should be liable to such a Separation of these two parts of his Composition, as would be attended with the Death and Dissolution of his Body. And this seems perfectly agreeable to the sense of St *Athanasius* in this place: who by his interpreting the Text of *Gen. In the Day &c.* to signify, that they should not onely die, but also remain under the *Φρεσ*, the Corruption of Death, seems to have reference only to the Death of the Body. The word *Φρεσ* being hardly to be taken for any thing else, but that Rottenness and Putrefaction, which is so visible in, and peculiar to, the Body, when by Death

it is separated from the Soul. It must indeed be confessed, that, besides this temporary Death of the Body, there is another sort of Death, which has reference to the Soul, and which was the Consequence of the Fall, and that is the enduring the Wrath of God in an Eternity of Punishment. And tho' I do not think St *Athanasius*, in the Passage before us, had any respect to this Death, any otherwise, than as it is fitly Typified, and Represented by the former, yet there is no doubt to be made, but this also is to be understood, as secondarily, and remotely comprehended in that Threat, *In the Day, &c.* And this, as it is thought by some, was designed to be intimated by that peculiar way of Expression, by a reduplication, *Dying thou shalt die*, which may be taken to signify, not onely the certainty of the Punishment, as we have render'd it by *thou shalt surely die*, but also the extent of it to a Temporary Death of the Body, and an Eternal Punishment of both Soul and Body.

But you still press this same Argument, and say, that St *Athanasius* makes the Death of the Soul, as implying a Ceasing to be for ever, the event, when our first Parents had broken the Command, that was given them. And to make this appear, you cite the following Passage: *'Their transgressing the Command brought them back to the Condition of their Nature, that as when they were not, they were brought into Being, so in time they might deservedly undergo a Dissolution of their Being.* You go on and say, that the Father gives this Account of the Agreeableness of

α Η γδ παρώσας τ' ἰστολῆς, εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸς ἐπέσφιν, ἵνα ἄσπερ ἐκ ὄντις μαρτυροῦν, οὕτως καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ εἶναι φθόρον ὑπομείνουσι τῷ χρόνῳ εἰκότως.
De Incarnat. §. 4.

the Punishment to the Crime committed in the Fall. And then you cite the words immediately following: *For if by the present Power, and Kindness of the Eternal Word, they were called into Being, when as yet they were nothing, it was most reasonable, that when Men were deprived of the Knowledge of God, and turned to things, that are not (for wicked things may be called things that are not, as good things may be called things that are, because they proceed from God who is) they should lose the advantage of Existing for ever, that is, that the Union between Soul and Body being dissolved, they should remain under the Power of Death and Corruption. For Man is of his own nature Mortal, as being made out of Nothing: but by his likeness to the Self-existent Being, if he had preserved this likeness, by a constant sense of God upon his Mind, he would have blunted the Edge of this his Natural Corruption, and remained incorruptible; as it is said in the Book of Wisdom: the giving heed unto her Laws, is the Assurance of Incorruption. Being therefore made incorruptible, he would have lived from henceforth, as God: which also the Holy Scripture somewhere signifies in these Words: I have said ye are Gods, and all of you Children of the most high: But ye shall die like Men, and*

α Εἰ γὰρ φύσιν ἔχοντες τὸ μὴ εἶναι ποτε, τῇ ᾧ λόγῳ πνεύματι, καὶ φιλαδελφίᾳ
εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐκλήθησαν· ἀκούσαντες ἢ κινωθέντας τὰς ἀνθρώπους τὸ πρὸς θεῷ ἐνοίας,
καὶ εἰς τὰ σὰκ ὄντα ἀποσφαινόμενοι· the following words Mr Dodwell thought, as I
suppose, not to his purpose, and so left them out in his citation of this place. σὰκ
ὄντα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ κακὰ, οὐτὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι θεῷ μαρτυροῦνται
then follow the words as Mr D. has cited them. κινωθέντες καὶ τὸ εἶναι αἰεὶ. τὸτο
δὲ ἐστὶ ἀβυσθίνης ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπου
θνήσκοντες, ἀπὸ δὲ ἐκ σὰκ ὄντων μαρτυροῦντες· διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄντα ὁμοιοτητα, ὡς εἰ
ἐφύλαττε διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν κατανόησιν, ἡμῶν ἂν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν, καὶ
ἡμεῖς ἀφάρτοι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ σοφία πρὸς πρᾶξιν νόμων βεβαιώσεως ἀφάρτοις.
ἀφάρτοι δὲ ἂν ἐξ ἡ λοιπὴν ὡς θεοί, ὡς πατὴρ, καὶ ἡ θεία γραφή τὸτο σημαίνει λέ-
γεται· ἐγὼ εἶπα θεοὶ ἐστέ, ὅτι οὐκ ὑψίστη πάντες, ὑμεῖς δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἀποθνήσκετε,
καὶ ὡς εἰς τὰ ἀρχόντων πίπτετε. Ibid.

fall like one of the Princes. St *Athanasius* begins in this Paragraph with the second thing, which he propos'd, and which is the main Subject of this Treatise, namely, to give an Account of the Reasons of our Lord's coming into the World, and taking the Humane Nature upon him. * Now this he affirms, most agreeably to the Analogy of Faith, founded upon Scripture, and deliver'd in the Antient Creeds, to have been merely upon our Account, and for our Salvation. For God having at first created Man pure and spotless, having fram'd him after his own Image, and stamp'd some resemblance of his own Perfections upon him, Man notwithstanding found out many wicked devices, and neglecting and even rejecting, as he tells us in the words preceding those you have cited, the Knowledge and Contemplation of God, by this means unhappily fell under the Condemnation of Death, which was denounced against him: and growing still worse and worse was at last intirely brought under the Power, and Dominion of it. And then follows the first of the two last cited Passages. *For the Transgression of the Command &c.* There is no one I believe, who will take the pains to consider this whole Paragraph with attention and care, who will not easily be convinced, that nothing more can possibly be primarily and principally meant by the

a Τῆς γὰρ ἐκείνης ἐσωματώσεως ἡμῶς γενομένης ὑπόθεσις, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμῶν σπουδὴν ἐφελκυσθησάτω, καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ χρίσθαι καὶ φανῶναι σῶματι. ἕτως μὲν οὐκ ὁ Θεὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ πεποιήκει, ὅ μιν ἐδέλθῃ ἐν ἀφῃμασίᾳ. ἀνθρώποι δὲ καὶ τελευτήσαντες καὶ ἀποσφραγίστες τῷ αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ κατανοήσαν, λογιστὰρ οὖν δὲ καὶ ἰπποκρίσαντες ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κακίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἔχον τὴν ἀπειληθεῖσαν ὁ θάνατος κατακτείναν, καὶ λοιπὸν σὺν ἡμῖν, ὡς γενομένης διέμμεν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλογίζοντο, διεφθείροντο, καὶ ὁ θῆναι αὐτῶν ἐκδοτεὶ βασιλεύσαν. De Incarnat. §. 4.

Death he here speaks of, but the Death, and Dissolution of the Body. It is most evident, that the Death he here mentions is opposed to that Eternal Life, which was bestowed upon Man *in* and *by* his having been created after God's Image. But this Life would have consisted in nothing, but the perpetual, and indissoluble Union of Soul and Body, and the everlasting Happiness of Paradise and Heaven; and therefore the Death here spoken of, as the Consequence of the Fall, and of the loss of that Image of God, after which he was created, can be nothing but the breaking, and dissolving this Union, and the Condemnation of what survives to an Eternity of Punishment. This is the *κατάκρισις ἑ παντός*, the condemnation of Death, which the Father mentions in the words preceding those you have cited; and which he represents as not prevailing at first, after so dreadful a manner, over the Race of Mankind, whilst the Longevity of the *Antediluvians* continued, as it did afterwards, when Man's Life was contracted to a much narrower compass, by the intire Dominion, and overruling Tyranny of Death. And as this reasoning has evidently no other reference, but to the Death and Dissolution of the Body, so neither can the *φθορά καὶ φύσιν*, as he calls it, the natural corruption, which he so often mentions in both these places I have last cited, have any further respect, than to the Death of the Body, and the everlasting misery of the Soul. This, as to the former part of it, is that condition of their nature, to which, if they had never received the Impress of the divine Image, they would from the first have been liable, and to which, after they had lost this Image, and Resemblance by the Fall, they and their Posterity

ever

ever since have stood obnoxious. And this is perfectly agreeable with the Reason that is here given, why this punishment was inflicted upon them: which is that, as by the Bounty of the Divine λόγος, they had received this Image, and Resemblance of the Divine Nature, which gave them an Immortal Life without danger of Death; so when by their Disobedience and Wickedness they had lost this Image, they then returned back to that State of Dissolution and Separation of Soul and Body, from which this Image of God alone could have secured them. But this Sense cannot be thought to make in the least for the Purpose of your Dissertation, which is not concerning this sort of Immortality, but onely concerning the Eternal Existence, and Duration of the *Soul*: about which the Father in this place makes not the least mention. But you say, that what he affirms here, must be understood of the whole Man. For that otherwise it could be no great unhappiness to him, if his *Body* perished alone, and his *Soul* had still continued to Eternity. I readily grant, that what *Athanasius* says in these places, is to be understood concerning the *whole Man*, but then this is not in a *Divided*, but *Compounded* Sense, with reference not to the Parts, out of which Man results, but with regard to the Being, or Creature made up of these parts, and this with respect onely to the Union and Conjunction of them. But I can't by any means assent to what you are pleased to say, that it would have been no great unhappiness &c. For was it not a great Unhappiness to *Adam*, and is it not the same to all his Posterity, to lose that Immortality without fear of Death, which if he had continued Innocent, they would have enjoyed, and

to be made obnoxious to the Laws of Mortality. Death is deservedly thought, and stiled the King of Terrors, and to be the greatest Evil we can suffer in this Life. And was it then no unhappiness to be made liable to Death? To which, if we add, as a Consequence of this Sentence, the Weakness, Infirmities, and constant decays of the Body, and at last that great disorder, which occasions Death, by making it no longer a fit habitation for the Soul, and which is sometimes attended with the most extreme pains and bitter Agonies, we shall easily be sensible, that it was unhappiness enough in all Conscience to be thus made subject to Mortality, tho' it be only with reference to the Body. But if to this Consideration, we join likewise the everlasting punishment of the Soul, under the Wrath of God, so justly incensed by this transgression of our first Parents, there will be, if I may be allowed with Reverence so to speak, enough and overmuch of Unhappiness in this Punishment, without supposing the extinction of the Soul necessary, which in this Case would have been so far from increasing, that it would have lessened the Unhappiness. So that, which way soever we consider this matter, we find as yet not the least ground in St *Athanasius* for this your unreasonable Paradox, and so far are the passages last cited from being to your Purpose, that I can ascribe you thinking them so to nothing, but such a strong Possession of, and fondness for, an Opinion, you had unaccountably taken up, as falls but little short of a downright Infatuation: which indeed is the best thing I can say for it.

But you go on to the fifth Section of this Treatise of St *Athanasius*, and cite the following passage
to

to the same purpose. ^a For God not onely created us out of nothing, but also by the Grace of the Diviue λόγος enabled us to live according to his Will. But Man leaving these durable everlasting things, and by the contrivance of the Devil, being turned to such things as were liable to Corruption, were themselves the Cause of their own Death, and Corruption; being, as I said before naturally Mortal, which Mortality however they had avoided thro' the Grace of the λόγος, if they had continued Good. For by reason of the Word accompanying them, this natural Corruption had never approached them, as it is said in the Book of Wisdom: For God created Man to be Immortal, and made him an Image of his own Eternity. Nevertheless thro' envy of the Devil, came Death into the World. And so after this, Men were subject to Death, and Corruption even triumph'd over them, which acquired much more Power, than it had by Nature, over the whole human Race, in as much as Man was now obnoxious to the Divine Threat for transgressing the Commandment. For now Men set no bounds to their Wickedness, but going on still further and further, at last pass'd all bounds. For at first they were onely the Be-

α Ο μὲν γὰρ Θεὸς οὐ μόνον ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἡμᾶς πεποιήκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ Θεὸν ζῆν ἡμῖν ἐπέσχετο τῇ ἑλπίδι λόγῳ χάριτι. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι, δόξασαντες περὶ αἰῶνα, ἐσυμφορέσαντο τῷ Διαισθητῇ εἰς τὰ τῷ Φθούρῳ ὑποτασσόμενοι, ἑαυτοῖς αἰῶνος τὴν τιμὴν φθορᾶς περιέσχον, ὅτις μὲν ὡς ἀπὸ φύσιν φθαρείται, χάριτι δὲ τῆς τοῦ λόγου μεταβολῆς τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἐσφυζόμεναι, ἐμειδνύμενοι καλοῖ. διὰ γὰρ τὴν συνέχου τέτοις λόγῳ, καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰ τούτων οὐκ ἤρχετο, καθὼς ἔη σοφία φησι. ὁ Θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ἀφθαρσίας, ἔσχηκεν τὴν ἰδίαν αἰδιότητα. φθῶν δὲ Διαισθητῇ γινώσκοντες εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν κτῆσιν. ταῦτα δὲ ἡγομένους οἱ μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἀπιδύναστον, ἢ τὴν φθορὰν λοιπὴν κατ' αὐτῶν ἠέχοντο, ἔπειθεν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχυρὰ κατ' ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, ὅσα καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλῶ τὸν Θεὸν Διαισθητῇ παραστὰς τὴν ἐπιτολὴν κατ' αὐτῶν ἀπετέλεσεν. So far you thought it to your Purpose to cite this Father, but the following words, even to the end of this Section, are so remarkable, and contribute so much to discover the true Sense of St Athanasius in the place before cited, as well as in that passage you have cited immediately after this, that I think, they ought not to be omitted. Ε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλημμελεσιμένοις οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὐκ ἔχοντες

vnters

ginner of Evil; and by that brought Death and Corruption upon themselves: but afterwards falling into Injustice, and all manner of transcendent Impiety, and not stopping at one Wickedness, but still adding new Impieties to their former Wickedness, they seemed to have an insatiable thirst after Wickedness. For Adulteries and Thefts were every where practised, and the whole Earth was full of Rapin and Murther. And there was no Law to restrain their Wickedness and Injustice, but all manner of Wickedness was committed by every one both in public and private. One City made war against another, and Nation rose up against Nation, and the whole World was divided by Seditions and Quarrels, every one striving to out-do another in Wickedness. They were not Strangers even to unnatural lusts, for as one of the Apostles of Christ testifies: their Women &c. It is evidently the design of St Athanasius in this place to give an Account, how by the Fall, Death came at first into the World, and how by the subsequent Wickedness of Man, it came afterwards strongly to prevail, and, as it were, triumph over the human Race, so much more, than it did at first. Accordingly he tells us, that God not onely gave Man a Being, when as yet he was nothing, but also afforded him his Grace, which would have enabled him to live according

ὅταν ὀρεσσιμένων εἰσέκησαν· ἀλλὰ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπεκτινόντο, λοιπὸν καὶ εἰς αἵματον ἐληλυθῶσι ἐκ ἀρχῆς μὲν ὕστερον δὲ κακίας χυδόντο, καὶ κατ' ἑαυτῶν τ' ἴδικται προκαλεσάμενοι καὶ τὴν φθοράν· ὕστερον δὲ εἰς ἀδικίαν ἐκτραπίετες, καὶ παρανομίαν πάντων ὑπερβαλόντες, καὶ μὴ ἐν κακῷ ἱστέμενοι, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ καινοῖς ἐπιπύπτε, ἀκροῦσι δὲ τὸ ἀμάρτανον χειροῖσι. μοιχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν ὁ κλοπῇ πανταχοῦ, φόνον δὲ καὶ ἀρπαγῶν πλήρη ἦν ἡ σύμπασα γῆ. ὁ νόμος μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἐν φροντίδι περὶ φθορᾶς καὶ ἀδικίας πάντα διὰ τὰ κακὰ κατ' ἑνα ὁ χρηστὴν παρὰ πάντων ἐπισταίτο. πόλεις κατὰ πόλιν ἐπολέμουν· καὶ ἰδίᾳ κατὰ ἰδίαν ἐγχείροτο. διέκριτο δὲ πᾶσι ἡ οἰκονομία τῶσι καὶ μόχλοις, ἵνα φιλονεικούντων ἐν τῇ παρανομίᾳ. οὐκ ἦν δὲ τῶν μακρῶν ἐδὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἶπεν ὁ ὁ Χεῖρος μάρτυς ἀποδείξω· αἱ τι γὰρ ἡλικίαι αὐτῶν &c. De Incarnat. §. 5.

to his Will. But that Man seduced by the Craft of the Devil, deserted God, transgressed his Command, and so became liable to Mortality and Corruption. There is no one I believe, who is not perfectly blinded by Prejudice, but will easily discern, that nothing is meant here, but the Mortality of the *Man*, and the Corruptibility of the *Body*, and not any Mortality or ceasing to be of the *Soul*. It is no doubt with reference to the Union of Soul and Body, that Man is here said by this Father to have been naturally corruptible, which corruptibility notwithstanding he might have avoided by continuing obedient, namely, as the avoiding this corruptibility is understood of a perpetual Union, without any dissolution, of Soul and Body, which we know would have been the Reward of his Obedience. And it is in this sense onely, that the Passage the Father here cites out of the Book of Wisdom, is to be understood, where it is said: *that God created Man to be Immortal, and made him an Image of his own Eternity*: plainly in this last Clause alluding to that Immortality of the *whole Man* in a compounded sense, in which, this Father represents part of this Image of God in Man to have consisted. *Nevertheless, thro' envy of the Devil came Death into the World.* That is to say, corporal Mortality and Death, which consists, as I have said before, in a Separation of Soul and Body, a dissolution of the Body, and a state of Punishment for the Soul. That this Death has no further respect, than to the putting an End to this Life, or at most to the punishment of the Soul (which however I think not to be literally, and immediately here signified) is plain from what follows this Citation, the Father here

makes out of the Book of Wisdom, even to the End of this Paragraph. For agreeably to the Scripture History, he represents this Death and Mortality, as growing and still increasing upon Mankind, as their Wickedness and Impieties grew and increased; evidently alluding to that gradual shortening of the Life of Man, which is represented in Scripture. But this plainly relates onely to this Life, and cannot with any Reason be applyed, nor indeed was ever understood to have any manner of Reference, to the Duration and Existence of the Soul, simply and absolutely consider'd. So that we see this Passage also is every whit as remote from the Purpose of your Dissertation, as any of the rest, and cannot possibly be thought, to give the least ground or remotest intimation, either that the Soul is naturally Mortal, or owes it's Immortality to any extraordinary interposition, or extrinsecal communication of any Spirit, or Principle of Immortality.

From the foregoing Passage, you argue thus: *This Disadvantage to our State of Mortality, that followed from our violation of the Law, against the forbidden fruit, seems to be the same that is insisted upon, Rom. VII. both, as by curbing our Appetites, the Law that curbed them made them more outrageous; and as the divine Sentence of Death, threatned in that same Law, added to our own natural Constitution, brought us under a double necessity of dying actually, which to some was necessary onely on one Account, of our frail and mortal Nature.* Your Sense in this place is so ambiguous and obscure, that I find it much more difficult to understand, and ascertain your meaning, than to answer the matter of Argument, which is herein contained. You say first, that the Disadvantage to our State of

H h

Mortality,

Mortality, which the Father represents to have followed the violation of the Law against the forbidden fruit, seems to be the same, that is insisted upon by the Apostle, *Rom. vii.* It is evident, that what you affirm here has reference to what St *Athanasius* says in the forecited passage, that our first Parents were naturally Mortal, but might have avoided this natural Mortality, if they had continued obedient. I have already shewn, that the natural Mortality the Father here speaks of, was onely that of the *Man*, and not of the *Soul*; and therefore cannot be thought in the least to your Purpose. And as to the Disadvantage, as you call it, to our State of Mortality, all that the Father means by it is, that by the violation of the Law against the forbidden fruit, Man lost that Image of God, after which he was created, and which would have made him Immortal, and became Mortal in the Sense I have before explained it, with respect to the *Man*, and not to the *Soul*. So that when you say the divine Sentence of Death, threatn'd in that same Law, added to our own natural Constitution, brought us under a *double necessity of dying*, you seem to me, to say the least of it, not to have well understood what you asserted. For most certain it is, that Man was under no necessity of *actually dying*, by virtue of the natural Mortality the Father here mentions, being secured from it, as he tells us, by being created after God's Image. It is plainly therefore evident, that Man was under no other necessity of *actually dying*, than what he brought upon himself, by transgressing God's Command, which was no other, than the Mortality and Corruption of the Body. And as to what the Apostle says, *Rom. vii.*

it

it is plainly altogether forreign to the Purpose of that Mortality, which was the Punishment of Man's Disobedience. St Paul, from the sixteenth Verse to the end of this Chapter, is giving an Account of that strong Inclination, and Propensity Man has to transgress the Commands of God, tho' at the same time, he cannot but allow, that those Restraints he is under are highly Reasonable, Just, and Good. And lamenting his own wretched Condition, labouring under this common infirmity of Mankind, he concludes, v. 24. with this Exclamation: *O wretched Man that I am, who shall deliver me from the Body of this Death?* ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆ θανάτου τούτου: *from this Body of Death*, as it may perhaps be more fitly render'd. Meaning doubtless thole Inclinations to Sin, which arise from the Body, and which subject us to Death, as that signifies not onely the Death of the Body, but also the Eternal Punishment of both Soul and Body hereafter.

And it was upon Account of the Prevalence of these Inclinations, prompting Men to Sin, that they fell into such grievous Vices, as this Father tells us, the Apostle enumerates Rom. I. 26. and which were the Occasion that Death grew, and prevailed so much upon the Antediluvian World. For as the Father tells us in another place you have quoted, and which I shall here cite more at length, than you thought proper to do, *Upon the Account of these Enormities, Death and Corruption still prevailing more and more against Man, the Race of Men died, and that rational Creature, who was made after the Image of God,*

^a Διὰ δὲ βιωτὰ πλείον τῆ θανάτου κρατήσαντες, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν παραμεινόντες καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν τῶ ἀνθρώπων ἔφθασεν· ὃ δὲ λογικὸς, καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ.

and was the Workmanship of his hands was destroyed and perished. For Death, as I said before, gain'd strength upon us, by reason of the Law, and it was impossible for us to avoid this Law of Death; because it was imposed upon Men for the transgression of our first Parent. And this was at once absurd, and indecorous. For it would have been absurd to suppose, God should affirm a falsehood, which yet must have been supposed, if when he had threatned Death for the transgression of the Command, Man had not died after he had transgressed it, and so his denunciation had been in vain. For God would not have been true, if Man had not died, after he had affirmed, that he should surely Die. Again it was unfitting, that a rational Creature, when it is once brought into Being, and made partaker of the Divine λόγος, should Perish, and by it's Corruption return to nothing. For it was not suitable to the Goodness of God &c. As it is most evident, that by Death here nothing more can be meant, than the Death of the Body, so the Law of Death here mention'd, is quite another thing from that Law in our Members, or that other Law which the Apostle mentions, and insists upon, Rom. vii. from the sixteenth Verse to the end of the Chapter. The Law, which the Father speaks of, in this place, was the Sentence of Death, denounced as the Sanction

ἄνθρωπος ἡφανίζετο. καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισθὲν ἔργον παρεπλάτυτο. καὶ διὰ τὸ θνήσκειν, ὡς περ εἶπον, νόμον λοιπὸν ἴσχυι κατὰ ἡμῶν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τι ἢ τὸ νόμον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεθειμένον τὸ παράδοξόν ἐστιν. καὶ ἡ ἀποστολὴ οὐ μόνον ἀπειλεί τὸ κτισθὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποδοκίμαζεν. ἀποδοκίμαζεν γὰρ ἡ εἰπόντις τὸ Θεὸν ψεύσασθαι, ὡς τοιοῦτην αὐτὴ θνήσκειν ἀποδοκίμαζεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἰ παρεπλάτυνον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, μὴ τὴν παρανομίαν μὴ ἀποδοκίμαζεν, ἀλλὰ λυέσθαι τὸν νόμον λέγει. οὐκ ἀληθὲς γὰρ ἡ οὐσία, εἰ εἰπόντις αὐτὴ ἀποδοκίμαζεν ἡμᾶς, μὴ ἀποδοκίμαζεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἀπειλὴς δὲ ἡ πάλιν πάλιν ἀπειλὴ κτισθὲν λογικῶς, καὶ τὸ λόγον αὐτὴ μεταβάλλει παρεπλάτυνον, Ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι διὰ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἐπιστρέφει. οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ ἀνασθῆναι τὸ Θεοῦ &c. De Incar. §. 6.

of the Command, not to eat the forbidden fruit. But the Law, which the Apostle mentions, is either that of the Mind, and then it must be understood of the whole Scheme and Compass, at least, of moral Duty: or else the Law of his Members, which he also calls the Law of Sin and Death, which can be understood of nothing, but those Sensual, and Sinfull Inclinations and Appetites, that are still tempting, and soliciting Men to transgress those Bounds, which Reason or Religion prescribe to them. So that I cannot see the least Reason for your paralleling, and asserting what St *Athanasius* here says has reference to what the Apostle insists upon, *Rom. vii.* And as to what you argue in the Words following this Citation, about the ἀφανισμὸς, and ἀφαιεσιμὸς, the obscuring, and disappearing of the Divine Image, I must be so free, as to tell you, it is not in the least to the Purpose of the Father in this place: who, as will be plain to any one, that casts his Eye upon this place, does not here speak concerning any obscuring or withdrawing, and disappearing of the Divine Image. He says indeed, that by Death, this Reasonable Creature Man, who was made after the Image of God, and was the Workmanship of his hands, ἡφανίσεν ἃ ὡσαύτως, disappeared and was destroyed, in the same sense, as a Man may be said, and is said by the Psalmist, upon his Death and Departure out of this World, *to be no more seen*, not as signifying an utter Extinction, and Ceasing to be, but onely his not appearing any more upon the Stage of this Life. Of the same import doubtless is that Phrase of εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι Ἀλλ' ἔφθεγγεν Ἰνερπέφειν, which you interpret of an utter extinction and ceasing to be, but which, I suppose, may

well enough be thought to answer to that of the Psalmist, in the place before mention'd, as it is in the Translation of the LXXII. *ὄυκέτι μὴ ὑπαίξω*, and be no more, that is, appear no more in this World: which is easily consistent with the natural Immortality, and actual Existence of the Soul, in a State of Separation from the Body.

His urging afterwards, that it was ἀπρεπὲς (indecorous) *πῶς τὰ θεῶν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀφανίζεσθαι*, that the Art and Workmanship of God in Men should perish and disappear, not onely plainly shews, that he speaks here with reference onely to the Body, but was also designed by the Father to introduce what he afterwards largely insists upon, and which is the chief point he drives at in this Treatise, namely, the Necessity of the λόγος being incarnate in order to repair the Ruins Death had caused in the Humane Nature. To this Purpose he tells us: *That it would have been better Man had never been created, than that after he was created, he should be neglected and perish. For if God, after he had made Man, had permitted this his work to perish, such a neglect would have been a greater Argument of Weakness, and want of Goodness in the Deity, than if he had never at first made Man at all. For if he had not made Man, there would have been no one, who could have accused him of Weakness: but after he had made him, and brought him into Being, it was most absurd,*

α Ἐδεῖ γὰρ μὴ γνέσθαι, ἢ γινώμενα παρεμνησθῆναι καὶ ἀπλῆσθαι. ἀδύναται γὰρ μάλλον καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθότης ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας γινώσκονται. Ὁ θεὸς, εἰ ποιοῦντας παρορᾷ φθάνειν τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, ἢ περὶ εἰ μὴ ποιήσει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ ἀνθρώπον. μὴ ποιήσαντος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀδύνατον ποιήσαντος δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι κτιστοῦ, ἀντιπαρατίθεται τὸ ἀπῆλθεν τὰ ἔργα καὶ μάλιστα ἐπ' ὅσῳ τὸ ποιητικόν. οὐκ ἐν ἰδέῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ ἀφίνασθαι φησὶ τῇ φθαρτῇ, διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπὲς ἐ ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὰς τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθότητος. Ibid.

that

that his Work should be destroyed even in the very sight of the Maker of it. It was not therefore fit, that God should suffer Men to continue always under Dissolution and Corruption; because it was unbecoming, and unworthy the Divine Goodness. It is too evident to need any Proof, that by such kind of Expressions, as φθαρῆναι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, and ἀπολλύειν τὰ ἔργα, and φέρεσθαι τῇ φθορᾷ, by which the Father here expresses the Consequences of the Sin of our first Parents, nothing can be intended, but the Death, Dissolution, and Corruption of the Body. It is to this onely, that the περὶ τῆ θανάτου νόμος θεοῦ, the just denunciation of Death, which he mentions in the following words, immediately extends; and therefore it was the Redemption of this, and of the Soul from eternal Punishment, (which supposes it's everlasting Existence) that the Holy Father represents God by the Incarnation of Christ to have procured for us. And agreeably to this Notion, he pursues the same Argument in the next Section, and shews, that there was no other way, by which Men's Bodies could be redeemed from the Power of the Grave: *What therefore was to be done in this Case, or how ought God to act here? Should he have required Repentance of Man for his Transgression. This some one may say, was worthy of God: that as by the Transgression, he was liable to Corruption, so by Repentance he might be restored again to Immortality. But Repentance would not have secured the Honour of God. For his veracity might have been called in Question, if*

α Τὶ οὖν εἶεν καὶ περὶ τούτου λόγος, ἢ ποιῶναι τὸ Θεόν; μετανοίας ἐπὶ τῇ παραστάσει τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἀπατήσεως; τούτου γὰρ ἂν πῶς ἄξιον φησὶν Θεοῦ, λίγαν. οἱ ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν παρανομία εἰς φθορὰν μετανοίας, ὥτως οὐκ ἐστὶν μετανοίας, γίνονται πάλιν ὡς εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν. [ἀλλ' ἡ μετανοία ἔτι ὅτι εὐλογεῖ τὸ θεὸν τὸ Θεὸν ἐφύλαττεν. ἔμφαν γὰρ πάλιν ἐκ ἀληθείας, μὴ κρατερούμεν ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ τῶ ἀνθρώπου. This passage you see,

Men

Men by this means could have avoided Death. Nor was it possible by Repentance to avoid the Condition of our Nature; since that restrains us onely from Sin. If therefore, there had been onely the Transgression, and Death and Corruption had not followed upon it, Repentance might have done well enough. But since by the Antecedent Transgression, Men were made liable to their Natural Corruption, and were deprived of the Divine Image, what could be done, or who was so fit, as the Eternal Word of God, who made all things at first, to restore them to that Grace and Perfection, which they had lost. For it was his Business to render that again Incorruptible, which was Corruptible, and to do that for all, which it might become the Father to perform. For being the Word of the Father, and above all things, by consequence he alone was able, and sufficient to create all things, to suffer for all Men, and to intercede for them with the Father. From this Passage, which I have thus cited fairly, and at it's full length, and without any transposition of the Sentences of which it consists, that the true sense of it might the more clearly appear, it is I think indisputably evident, that the Father's Principal Design here is to shew, that there was no other way to redeem Mankind from the Corporal Death incurred by the Fall, than by the sending of the

who somewhat oddly, setting it after another, which in the Text immediately follows it. οὐτε δὲ ἡ μετανοία διὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀνακαλεῖται, ἀλλὰ μόνον παρὰ τὴν ἀμαρτηματον. εἰ μὲν οὖν μόνον ἢ πλημμέλημα, καὶ μὴ φθαρὰς ἐπακολούθησις, καλὰς αὖ ἢ ἡ μετανοία. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπολαύσεως τῆς παρὰ φύσιν φθορᾶς ἐκρῆντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τὴν τῆς κατ' εἰκόνα χάριν ἀφαιρέθιντες ἦσαν, ἢ ἄλλο ἴδιον γινώσκαι; ἢ πνῶν ἢ χρεῖα πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην χάριν καὶ ἀνάκλησιν, ἢ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τῆς μὴ οὐτὶς πειποιητὸς τὰ ὅλα τὸ Θεοῦ λόγος; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἢ πάλιν καὶ τὸ φημεν εἰς ἀφαιρέσειν ἐνέχον, καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ πάντων εὐλογεῖν δόξασαι ὡς τοῦ πατρὸς. λόγος γὰρ ὢν τὸ πατρὸς, καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντας ὢν, ἀποκαλεῖται καὶ ἀνακαλεῖται τὰ ὅλα μὲν ἢ διευκρίναι, καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων παθεῖν, καὶ ἀποκαλεῖται καὶ πάλιν ὡς τοῦ πατρὸς. De Incarnat. §. 7.

Divine

Divine λόγος to take human Nature upon him. Repentance, he says, could not have done it. Not for that Reason, which by a strange transposition and misinterpretation of those parts of this Passage, which you have cited, you most absurdly assign, and which out of a tenderness of your Character, I forbear further to shew the Unreasonableness of, but as he says, because Repentance would not have secured the Honour and Veracity of God, which might have been called in Question, if by it Men might have avoided the Effects of their Original Corruptibility, which was corporal Death. But since it was necessary in order to salve the Veracity, of God, that the Sentence of Death should actually take place, it was therefore necessary, that the means of Redemption should be such, as might be applied, and have their Effects after Man had undergone the Punishment denounced in that Sentence, *In the Day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.* This therefore he positively and expressly tells us, no further off, than the latter end of the next Paragraph, was to be by the Resurrection from the Dead, which by virtue of his Death Christ has Procured for us. ^a *For Christ, says he, being the Powerful framer of all things, built himself a Temple, that is a Body, in the Womb of the Virgin, making it his own proper habitation, in which he dwelt and manifested himself. And thus taking a Body like unto ours, because he saw us all liable to the Corruption of Death, delivering that Body to Death for all, he offered it unto the Father,*

^a Αὐτὸς γὰρ δυνατὸς ὢν, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῆ ὅλης, ἐν τῇ παρῇν καὶ καταθέσει ἑαυτοῦ τὸν τὸ σῶμα, ἐξ ἰδίου κτίσας τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὄργανα, ἐν αὐτῷ γνωρίζοντα, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα ἀπὸ τῆ ἡμετέρας τῶ ὁμοίου λαοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάντες ἐκείνους εἶναι τῇ ᾧ θανάτῳ φθαρτῇ, αὐτὴν πάντων αὐτὸ θανάτῳ παραδίδους πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, καὶ

mercifully intending by this, that all as it were dying in him, the Sentence of Death might be abrogated, and disannulled, as having exerted all it's Power upon our Lord's Body, and having no longer any Power against Men. So that tho' they are turned to Corruption, yet they might be brought to Life, and made Incorruptible, by Christ's assuming our Flesh, and so Death by Virtue of the Resurrection might vanish and disappear, as stubble is consumed by the Fire. It is plain, he here compares the Corruption and Death, which Mankind undergo, to that which our Lord underwent for Mankind. Now as neither *Athanasius*, nor any Body else ever affirmed, or thought this Death of our Lord to extend any further, than to his Body, so neither ought we to suppose, that the Mortality and Death of Mankind, from which our Lord by his Death hath redeemed us, can have any further Reference. Especially since he here affirms, that we are redeemed from this Death, τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι, by virtue of the Resurrection, which no one can with Reason suppose to relate to any thing but the Body. The same also he further insists upon in the next Paragraph, where he tells us, ὅτι πάντων ἡ φθορὰ παύσεται τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι, that all may escape Death by virtue of the Resurrection. And again, τὰς πάντας ἐνέδυσεν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐν τῇ ποιεῖ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐπαγγελίᾳ, he has render'd all Incorruptible by the Promise of a Resurrection. We see plainly the Resurrection

Ἰούτο φιλανθρώπως ποιών, ἵνα ὡς μὲν πάντων λυθάνοντων ἐν αὐτῷ, λυθῇ ὁ κατὰ τὸ φθαρῆς τὸ ἀνθρώπων νόμος, οὗτις δὲ πληρωθείσης τῆ ἐξουσίας ἐν τῷ κυριακῷ σώματι, καὶ μηκέτι χώρου ἔχοντος κατὰ τὸ ὁμοίαν ἀνθρώπων; ὡς ὅτις φθορὰν ἀναστρέφοντας τὰς ἀνθρώπων πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐπιστρέφει, καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὰς τῶν ὅλων τῶν ὁσίων τῇ ἐσχατίᾳ, καὶ τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι τὸ ἴδιον εἰς αὐτῶν, ὡς καλεῖται ὅτι πρὸς ἐξαφαιζον. De Incarnat. §. 8.

onely was thought by St *Athanasius*, to be the sure ground of Incorruptibility, and Immortality. Here is not the least mention or intimation, nor indeed any where else in all his Writings, of your adscitious Spirit or Principle, which is to give Immortality to the Soul, of it's own Nature, as you would make us believe, Mortal. Which silence is to me a very cogent Argument, that this Father never dreamt of any such thing. Especially since he does not mention it in these Paragraphs, where treating of the way, and means by which we are freed from the Mortality, which was the Punishment of *Adam's* transgression, the very nature of the thing, and tendency of his Argument must have led him to the mention of it, if he had indeed any Notion concerning it.

But in answer to this you say, *That this Father's Reasonings about Repentance &c. suppose actual Mortality to have been the State in which Mankind was reduced by the Fall, and that Repentance alone would not suffice for the Reinstating Mankind in the designed Immortality, without restoring him to the Spirit, the Divine Principle which was Preternatural, and had been lost by the Fall.* If by the actual Mortality, which you say these Reasonings suppose, or rather St *Athanasius* affirms, Mankind to have been reduced to by the Fall, you mean the Mortality of the *Man* (which consists in a Separation of the two parts of his Composition, and the consequent Dissolution, and Corruption of the Body) and not of the *Soul*, I readily grant St *Athanasius* in the places you have cited to suppose, and in many other places, as well as these to affirm this. But then I cannot see, that this is in the least to the Purpose, and Design of your Dissertation,

fertation, in which you pretend to make out, not the Natural Mortality of *Mankind*, which every days experience convinces us of, but of the *Souls* of Men. These two appear, at first sight, to be very widely different; and therefore it will never be thought, by any considerate Man, with any force of Reason, to follow, that because St *Athanasius* supposes, and affirms the actual Mortality of the *Man*, or of *Mankind*, to have been the fatal Consequence of the Fall, that therefore by the same Fall his *Soul* became Mortal. It is indeed true, that he frequently affirms, that by losing the Divine Image by his transgression, he lost at the same time that Immortality, which his being created after the Divine Image gave him. But then I must desire it may be observed, that this is not the Immortality now under debate; since we are disputing, not concerning the Immortality of the *Man*, but of the *Soul*, which latter Immortality, I dare venture to be positive, you cannot produce one Passage out of all St *Athanasius's* Writings, wherein he affirms, or supposes the *Soul* to have lost by the Fall. And as for his saying, Repentance was not sufficient for the reinstating *Mankind* in Immortality, he gives this plain Reason for it, because Repentance must be antecedent to that Death of the Body, which was the Punishment of the Fall; and therefore if that could have done the Business, it would have prevented the Death, which was threatn'd, and so would have left an Imputation upon the Honour, and Veracity of God. You add that Repentance alone was not sufficient &c. without restoring him to the Spirit, the Divine Principle, which was preternatural &c. I am very sorry, that I must be

forced

forced here for the sake of Truth, to take notice of the most perverse, and unaccountable management of a Debate, and I must add, the most notorious falsification of an Authority I ever met with, and which I thought it would have been impossible for Mr *Dodwell* to have been guilty of, in palming here upon the World an Assertion, as made by St *Athanasius*, which he no where makes. For where, in the name of Goodness, does this Father say or suppose, that Repentance, without the Divine Spirit, was not sufficient to reinstate Mankind in Immortality? He says indeed, that Repentance was not a proper means for this Purpose, and gives his Reason for it. He likewise affirms, that the Incarnation of the λόγος, the second Person in the ever Blessed Trinity, his Life, Death, and Resurrection were the most proper means to effect this great Work, in as much as by these he has purchased a most sure title to a Resurrection for all Mankind, by which the Law of Mortality, as this Father calls it, is as it were cancelled, Death disarmed of it's Power and Sting, and the Grave despoiled of it's Victory. But he no where mentions the communication of the Holy Spirit of God, or of any other Spirit as necessary for this Purpose. So that this Assertion, I must take leave to say, is altogether false and groundless, there being nothing like it, supposed or affirmed, either in these places of St *Athanasius*, which you have cited, or any where else. Of the same Stamp and Character is what you are pleased to say, *That whosoever had not the Spirit restored to him by the λόγος, must by this Reasoning be confirmed in his Natural Mortality, by the threatening of Death upon the Fall, that God might approve himself veracious,*

acious. For not to mention, that the Mortality spoken of by the Father is onely that of the *Man*, and not of the *Soul*, where I pray is there any mention of the Spirit being restored at all, by the λόγος, or any other way? He says indeed, αὐτὸ (λόγος) ὡς πάλιν τὸ Φθαρτὸν εἰς ἀΦθαρσίαν ἐνεγκεῖν, it was the Work of the λόγος to restore that which was Corruptible, and to make it Immortal, which it is evident can be understood of nothing but the Body, because, as I have before observed, he expressly affirms, this is to be done no otherwise, than by the Resurrection, and not by the Communication of any Spirit, or Principle whatsoever. The Restitution of that Image of God, which was lost by the Fall, is likewise represented by this Father, as the Work of the λόγος, but never ascribed here, or any where else, to the Spirit. From all which, I cannot but with sorrow reflect upon your unhappy Fate, in undertaking to maintain an Opinion, which has driven you into such a method of Arguing, as is as difficult to make consistent with common honesty, as to reconcile with the Principles of sound Reason.

You proceed and say: *That he would Immortalize the Refusers of the Gospel to Punishment could not be known till the λόγος had declared his pleasure concerning it, who had it in his own Power alone to give life to whom, or as far as he pleased, or to leave them to their Natural Mortality.* Here you seem to destroy your own Hypothesis. For if the λόγος had it in his own Power alone, to give Life to whom, or as far as he pleased, (meaning I suppose to their *Souls*; for otherwise it will not be to your Purpose) or to leave them, as you say, to their Natural Mortality, then I would gladly know what Occasion there is for your adscititious

titious Immortalizing Spirit to be communicated for this purpose? If you say, that the λόγος immortalizes them, either by an extraordinary act of his Power, or by communicating this Spirit to them, then I affirm your Assertion to be directly contrary to the Doctrine of this Father, who affirms, that it is not by any arbitrary Power of the λόγος, nor by this your adscititious Spirit, but by the Resurrection that Men are made Immortal. And as to what you say, *that it could not be known, that he would immortalize the Refusers of the Gospel to Punishment &c.* If by Immortalizing the Refusers of the Gospel to Punishment, you mean with reference to their Souls, I cannot but profess my self heartily ashamed for you, that so precarious and false an Assertion should fall from the Pen of one, for whom all Good Men have hitherto had so sincere a Respect. For where or how has the λόγος, as you love to speak, declared any such Pleasure? The Gospel, I am sure, declares no such thing. It says indeed, that all wicked Men, and particularly Unbelievers, such as through Prejudice, Obstinacy, or any other wicked and sinister motive reject the Gospel, when duely proposed to them, shall be everlastingly punished, but it no where affirms, that their Souls, by any extraordinary Pleasure or Interposition of God's Power, are to be immortalized to this Purpose. And this I think amounts to a very good Argument, as I have before observed, for the Soul's Natural Immortality. For if all Men in general, and the Refusers of the Gospel in particular, stand obnoxious to an everlasting Punishment, but it be no where said, that God or Christ exerts any extraordinary Act of his Power or Grace, with reference to their Souls, in order to preserve them

them to an Eternity of Existence, which is the foundation of an Eternity of Punishment, this makes it at least highly probable, that they can have this Eternity of Duration no otherwise, than from the frame of their own Nature and Constitution. Our Saviour indeed is said to have *brought Life, and Immortality to light by the Gospel*. But then the words immediately preceeding, *who has abolished Death*, oblige us to understand this of the Immortality procured for us by the Resurrection, which is the Life, and Immortality of the *Body* and the *Man*, or of the Man with reference to his Body, and it's perpetual Union with the Soul, and not of the *Soul* simply and abstractedly consider'd. This latter could not have been truly said to be brought to light by the Gospel, which was known, and acknowledged by all the wiser part of Mankind so long before the Gospel was preached. Again, when you say the λόγος had it in his Power to leave, as many as he pleased, to their Natural Mortality, what is this but a mere begging of the Question, and instead of producing Arguments to prove (which I believe it indeed impossible to do) onely to make a wretched precarious supposition, that the Soul is in it's own Nature Mortal. And as to what you say, that this Father alledges *Heb. II. 10.* to prove this same Point, which you here lay down, I must beg you to take a second survey of the place, where the Father cites this Text, and there you will find, that the Death and Corruption from which our Lord by his sufferings has redeemed Mankind, is no other than that of the Body. For had he not said but a little before, that Men are freed from Death and Corruption by the Resurrection? And can any thing else be meant by those

those words, which introduce this, and some other Texts, which he here cites upon this Occasion. ^a *Did it not*, says he, *much more become God the Word, the Son of the infinitely Good Father, not to neglect Men, that were made by him, after they had render'd themselves liable to Death, but to abolish the Death, which they had incur'd, by the offering up of his own Body, to reform their Errors by his Doctrine, and to rectify whatever belongs to Man by his Power. These things &c.* And then he cites one or two places of Scripture, and afterwards the Text you mention. It is certain that no other abolition of Death is here intended by the Father, than that of the *Man* or *Body*, by Virtue of a Resurrection. And it is indeed too plain to need any Proof, that no other Restitution of Mankind, or else perhaps a moral Reformation, and Renovation of the Life and Actions, can be meant by the words, ἀνανεώσας ἀνακαινίσας, ἀνακτίσας, and by the Phrases, νέα and καινή κτίσις, and the ἀναγεννωμένη and ἀνακτιζομένη ψυχή, which the Father makes use of in other places.

And most certain it is, that in this Sense alone the last Passage you have cited out of this *Father*, is to be understood, where indeed he expressly and plainly ascribes this Immortality of the *Man*, which is to be brought about by the Resurrection, to Christ. I shall cite it more largely and fully, than you have done, that the true Sense of it may more clearly appear. ^b *What*, says he, *the Cause was of our Saviours appearing in the Flesh, we have already in*

^a Πολλὰ πλείον ὃ ἔπαυσατο Θεὸς λόγος πατὴρ εἰς φθαρτὴν κατερχόμενος, πρὶν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων γῆρας καὶ παρῆναι· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ συμβέβηκεν γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος, τῶν ἡ ἀμείλιτος αὐτῶν διαρκῶσαι τῇ ἐαυτοῦ διδασκαλίᾳ πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰαυτῷ δυνάμει κατεργασίας. Ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὸ αὐτῷ ἔσται τοῦ θεοῦ &c. De Incarnat. §. 10. ^b Τῷ μὲν οὖν αὐτίκῃ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐπιφανείαν αὐτοῦ, ὡς οἷον τι ἦν, ἐκ μέρους, καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς

part, and as far as the Subject will permit, and we are capable of Understanding, given an Account, namely, because no one but our Saviour, who at first created all things out of nothing, could change our Corruptible Bodies so, as to make them incorruptible: and because no one but he, who was the Image of the Father, could restore that Image after which Man was formed; and because none, but our Lord Jesus Christ, who is Life it self, could make that which was Mortal, become Immortal. Onely the divine Word, who framed all things, and is the true, and onely begotten Son of the Father, could teach Men to know the Father, and overthrow the Worship of Idols in the World. And for as much as there was a debt to be paid for all (for as I said before, all Men were liable to Death, and this was the chief Cause of his coming into the World) for this reason after he had sufficiently by his Miracles declared his Divinity, he then offer'd up a Sacrifice for all, delivering up the Temple of his Body to Death for all, that he might free all from the Punishment of the Old Transgression, and that he might demonstrate that he was more powerfull than Death, by rendring his own BODY Immortal, as the first fruites of the Resurrection of all Men. We see here the Father begins a Recapitula-

κατανοήσας ἡμῶν, ὡς εἰπομεν, ὅτι σὺν ἄλλῃ ἢ τῇ φθαρτῇ εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν μετα-
βαλεῖν, εἰ μὴ αὐτῷ Ἐσωτῆρος ἢ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐξ οὗ ὄντων πιποικητός τε ὅλα.
καὶ σὺν ἄλλῃ ἢ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα πάλιν ἀνακτίσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ μὴ ἡ εἰκόνη ἢ
πατέρος καὶ σὺν ἄλλῃ ἢ τὰ θνητὰ ἀθάνατοι παραστήσῃ, εἰ μὴ ἡ αὐτοζωὴ αὐτοῦ
τῇ Κυρίᾳ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα ἢ αὐτὴ πατέρος δόξα, καὶ τὴν εἰδὼσαν
καὶ ταῦτα ἑρμηνεύσας, εἰ μὴ τῷ πᾶσι πάντας ἀλασσομενῶτος λόγῳ, καὶ μὲν τοῦ
πατέρος ὅτος ἡμεῖς μετὰ Χριστοῦ, ἀληθινῶς. ἵνα δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον παρὰ πάντων
ἰδοὺ λοιπὸν ἀποδοῦναι (ὡφείλοτο γὰρ πάντας, ὡς εἰπομεν, ἀπαλλάξαι, δι' ὃ μέ-
λει καὶ ἡ ἰσχυρία) τίς ἐκείνῳ μὴ τὰς αὐτῇ ἢ θιοῦτος αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον ἀπ-
δοῦναι, ἡδὲ λοιπὸν ἔτι πᾶσι πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀφέρειν, ἀπὸ πάντων ἢ αὐτῷ καὶ εἰς
θνήσκον παραδίδας, ἵνα τὰς μὲν πάντας ἀνταλλάξῃς, καὶ ἐλαττωθῇς ἢ ἀρχαίας πα-
ραστάσεως ποιήσῃ. δείξῃ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ θανάτῳ κρείττενον, ἀπαρχὴν τῆς ἢ ὅλων ἀνα-
στάσεως, τὰ ἰδοὺ ΣΩΜΑ ἀφθαρτὸς ἱπιδεικνύμενος. De Incarnat. s. 20.

tion

tion in Brief of what he had before more largely insisted upon, to prove the *Necessity of the Incarnation, and Appearance of the Son of God in the World.* This he had shewn to be necessary in the first place, because onely he, who was the Son of God, and at first created all things out of Nothing, could change our mortal, corruptible, and actually dead and corrupted Bodies so, as to make them live, and become incorruptible and immortal. And again, because no one, but so great a Person, furnished with such a Plenitude of Power, and withall giving the most ample, and convincing Credentials of his Divine Commission, could abolish the false Religions, and Idolatrous Worship, which had then prevailed in the World, and instruct Men in the true Knowledge of God the Father, and the most acceptable way of Worshipping him. And lastly, which is in some measure coincident with the first Reason, no one besides the Son of God, who is God equal with the Father could free Men from Death, the Curse and Punishment of the Old Transgression: which He effectually did by paying down a Ransome, and yielding up his own Body to Death for all, and, by raising this Body of his from the Dead, shewing he was more powerfull than Death. And this Resurrection of Christ, being the first fruites of our Resurrection, is an assurance, that our dead dissolved Bodies shall be raised, and we thereby freed from the Punishment of the Sin of our first Parents. This is the Substance of some of the Arguments, that St *Athanasius* has made use of to prove the Necessity of the Incarnation of Christ, as, in the forecited place they are couched, and comprehended within a narrow Compass; and, as there is indeed nothing in

them, that positively and formally makes for the Natural Immortality, so I am sure there is nothing, that any Reasonable Man can think, proves or supposes the Natural Mortality of the Soul. For as the Incorruptibility, and Immortality here spoken of is primarily and chiefly to be understood of that of the *Man*, and then of the *Body*, without Reference to the *Soul*, so the Mortality and Corruption, which is here supposed, has certainly no further nor other Respect. For does he not plainly affirm, that the Corruptibility and Mortality, which was the Punishment of the Original Transgression, is taken away by a Resurrection of the *Body*? And does he not expressly say, that Christ procured this for us by offering up his own *Body* to Death, and raising this same *Body* to Immortality, as the first fruits of the Resurrection of our *Bodies*? Who is there, that has the Eyes of his Understanding not wholly closed up by Prejudice, can think, that here is the least intimation given of any Mortality of the Soul? Since indeed nothing, that is here said concerning Death as the Punishment of the Old Transgression, or our being freed from this Death by *Christ*, can ever be thought by any one who considers the Context, to have the least reference to the *Soul*. This place therefore as well as the rest must be set aside, as not giving in a sufficient Testimony, in that it does not speak to the Point you alledge it for; which is the Natural Mortality of the *Soul*, and not that of the *Body*.

The

The Close.

THUS have I in some sort performed, what I at first proposed, in endeavouring to shew, both from Scripture, and the earliest Antiquity, that the *Soul* is a Principle or Part of Man, which is in it's *own Nature* Immortal. How far I may have made good this Point, or detected and overthrown the fallacious Reasonings, and gross Misinterpretations of the Sacred Oracles, as well as of the venerable Remains of the purest Antiquity, which are to be found in the *Epistolary Discourse* of that *Unfortunate Gentleman*, whom I have throughout this Treatise opposed, I most willingly submit to the Judgment of all Skilfull and Impartial Men. I cannot, I must confess, but think, that this Opinion concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul is not onely of the most dangerous Consequence to Christianity it self, but also has a very evident tendency to undermine, and overthrow the very Foundations even of Natural Religion. In such a juncture as this, and when things of such Public, and momentous Concern are professedly invaded, and formally attacked, *quilibet homo est miles*, every one is obliged, and every one that has any concern for what ought to be dearer to us, than any thing in this World, will certainly be ready, to lend a hand to repell the Assault, and make up the Breach. And I am not without hope, that I shall be so far successfull in this attempt, as to Convince at least that *Person*, for whose sake principally I set about this tedious, and laborious Task of Examining all the severall Arguments he has made use of, and

and Citations he has alledged to prove this pernicious Doctrine. That *learned and pious Person*, who is so sensible how liable the Understandings of Men are to Error, and that the greatest Men have not been free from Mistake, will not I am sure think himself infallible: and therefore I have reason to believe will not persist in the Defense of an Opinion, which if I don't much mistake the Force and Clearness of my Proofs, so plainly appears to be as groundless and unreasonable in it self, as I am sure it is dangerous and fatal in it's Consequences. An Error, tho' in points Fundamental, yet if it be not pertinaciously adhered to, may have a great many things pleaded to alleviate, and excuse it, but when Obstinacy is added to the Mistake it immediately commences, what is properly stiled *Heresy*; and I leave it to the Consideration of this *learned Person*, how the Beginners, Publishers, and Spreaders of *Heresy*, were accounted of, and treated by the best Men in the earliest Ages of Christianity. We live indeed in an Age and Nation, wherein very great Encouragement, and Countenance is given to any New and Heterodox Opinions, tho' not indeed by the Governours and Administration either in Church or State, yet by that forwardness, chearfulness, and zeal, with which great Numbers of Men amongst us receive, embrace, and endeavour to defend and propagate these erroneous, and damnable Doctrines. But notwithstanding this deplorable condition of these wretched times, the Church of God amongst us is not destitute of very many, who are always ready vigorously to interpose in defence of his Truth, and who keep a vigilant Eye upon the Sacred *Palladium* of our Faith, which is the Churches
greatest

greatest security, that it be neither surreptitiously stole away by the secret Craft, and subtle Contrivances of Hereticks, nor violently forced away from us by the open Attempts and barefaced Assaults of Atheists and Unbelievers. The learned Author of the *Epistolary Discourse* can be no farther concerned in these Reflections, than he pleases to make them applicable to himself by an obstinate persisting in this his Erroneous and Dangerous Opinion, concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul: which, I am sure, is utterly indefensible upon any Principle of Reason, Scripture, or Antiquity. He has, I think, all the Reason in the World, by retracting and condemning this Error to acquit himself from that Charge of *Heresy*, which has already been made against him. Sure I am, that this is the most effectual, and the onely way, by which he can make Satisfaction for the Injuries it has already done, and may still do to Religion, and the Souls of Men. And since he has appealed to Scripture and Antiquity, both which, upon a fair and impartial Examination and Hearing, give in a plain and full Verdict against him, it will be impossible to excuse himself before God, his own Conscience, and the Judgments of all Good Men, if he should still proceed in endeavouring to maintain an Opinion, which can have no visible good Influence upon the Lives of Men, but has a very certain and visible ill tendency, by setting Men free from those restraints, which have hitherto kept them within some bounds of Duty, to let them loose to the worst Practises. And as little will it be for his own Advantage to proceed in this Controversy, since I am pretty sure he will by this means onely entangle himself more, and perhaps

haps fall into yet greater, and more destructive Errors.

I designed to have added to this Treatise a particular Dissertation upon Mr *Dodwell's* Notion of Baptism in *Hades*, which I have promised in one or two places of it; but finding the Bulk of it swelled beyond what I at first thought it would rise to, I must leave it till some fit Opportunity be offer'd for the Publication of it.

ERRATA.

Pag. 37. lin. 27. *πρὸ ἑσθλῆς*. pag. 38. l. 30. *ἐνομιμασίᾳ*. p. 48. l. 31. *Cleombrotum*. p. 53. lin. 8. *so earnestly contends for, and strongly proves*. p. 58. l. 34. *have a Place*. p. 63. lin. 13. *distinct*. p. 94. l. 16. *your Cause*. p. 97. l. 1. *who may hold*. p. 122. l. 35. *Psychopannuchiites*. p. 224. l. 23, and 29. *Euemerus*. p. 279. l. 11. *Thread*. p. 336. l. 24. *influence*. p. 388. l. 24. *framed and moulded*. p. 400. l. 28. *or Spirit*.

F I N I S.